Features
Happily, ever after?
By Tisaranee Gunasekara
“We hug our little destiny again.”
Seamus Heaney (Wintering Out)
2024 election season marked final act of the ‘Our Saviour II’ drama which premiered in November 2019. The NPP/JVP’s unprecedented victories would not have happened without Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s unprecedented presidential record, turning a lower-middle income country to a bankrupt one in less than three years.
Disenchantment is a radical thing.
On July 5, 2022, a 60-year-old man died in a petrol queue in Borella. And the Gota-go-gama protesters gave Gotabaya Rajapaksa three days to resign from the presidency.
On July 8, thousands of university students marched to the Galle Face Green in a massive procession, resisting barrages of tear gas and water cannon. People lined the streets cheering them on. “We are suffering a lot,” one woman cried. “These children should be protected by the gods. We are trying to correct a wrong we did… We are coming tomorrow.”
And come they did. On July 9, 2022, nearly a million Lankans poured into Colombo and drove out Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Another act unprecedented not only in modern times but in our entire 2+millennia history. Many a Lankan monarch got deposed, often violently, but there is no record of a king being evicted via a popular rebellion. There were no Cromwells in this island, let alone Robespierres.
“We are trying to correct a wrong we did,” was a constant refrain during the three Aragalaya months. Sobered by brutal reality, most of the 6.3 million Lankans who voted for Gotabaya Rajapaksa in 2019 had turned against their once-adored saviour.
The NPP/JVP was the main beneficiary of this disillusionment. According to the IHP’s first public opinion tracker, published in August 2022, 41% of Lankans would vote for Anura Kumara Dissanayake in a presidential election and 42% it said for the NPP in a parliamentary election. Neither Mr. Dissanayake nor the NPP/JVP had played a role in the Aragalaya – unlike the breakaway FSP which provided the protest movement with thousands of activists and its most recognisable spokesperson, Wasantha Mudalige.
But the FSP was too unreconstructed to be electable, even in the aftermath of an unprecedented crisis. The NPP/JVP on the other hand had a more moderate, and therefore more electable, image. Moreover, it had managed to position itself as the antipode to the Rajapaksas. The SJB too contested for that position, but embraced too many former Rajapaksa-enablers (from old-timers like Dulles Allahapperuma and GL Peiris to Viyath Maga types like Charitha Herath) to carry credibility. The NPP/JVP had prudently closed its doors to any politician closely associated with the Rajapaksas. They also promised to bring the Rajapaksas to justice, another popular promise amongst one-time Rajapaksa voters who felt betrayed and dreamt of vengeance.
So now the Rajapaksas are reduced to 3% and the voters have given the NP/JVP a governance magic wand. The Dissanayake government has enough power to deliver all its many promises – a new constitution downwards. 1977 was the last an administration had a hand so free, for good or ill. Almost half-a-century away, we still live in the country JR Jayewardene remade, both for better and for worse. The NPP/JVP has a similar opportunity to remould Sri Lanka. How they use that opportunity could determine Sri Lanka’s fate not only in the next five years but for decades to come.
Oppositional erosion
The 2024 parliamentary election was a kind of a referendum on the less than two-month tenure of Anura Kumara Dissanayake. The opposition understood this fact correctly, which was why it honed on malaises such as price hikes and shortages in rice and coconuts.
But that tactic failed. At the parliamentary election, the NPP/JVP managed to increase its vote by 1.23 million; 22%. Normally, when presidential and parliamentary elections are held in close proximity, the winner of the presidency gains parliamentary power as well, but with a reduced vote-haul. In 2010, Mahinda Rajapaksa’s UPFA swept the parliamentary election with 60% of the vote but its vote count decreased by a massive 1.15million. In 2020, the Rajapaksa SLPP won the parliamentary election with 59% of the vote, but its vote count decreased by 100,000. The NPP/JVP shattered this normal.
The IHP published two polls after the presidential election. One showed a surge in the popularity ratings of President Dissanayake and Prime Minister Amarasuriya, at 58% and 55% respectively. The other showed a massive turnaround in public satisfaction about the new direction of the country – from 16% just before the presidential election to 46% just after.
The giant leap in the NPP/JVP vote between September and November is indicative of a sense of satisfaction with its governance performance. But the even greater leap in the NPP/JVP vote share, from 43% in September to 62% in November, was caused primarily by the opposition’s galloping unpopularity. As many as 1.1million Lankans who voted in the presidential election (doubtless for Sajith Premadasa and Ranil Wickremesinghe) didn’t vote in the parliamentary election. It was this abstention which gave a two-thirds victory to the NPP/JVP. Without that, the NPP/JVP would have scored only a simple majority, with 52% of the vote.
Sajith Premadasa’s SJB lost 3.4 million votes and Ranil Wickremesinghe’s NDF lost 1.7 million votes – 78% and 75% respectively – in under two months. Both fielded candidates epitomising the worst of the past; by doing so both aligned with a political culture synonymous with corruption, privilege, and impunity. The ongoing infantile squabble for the opposition’s meagre haul of national seats cannot but worsen matters. The SJB and the UNP – and their respective leaders – obviously don’t understand how distasteful, even unsavoury, their conduct looks to ordinary people. If the two parties continue in this vein, their vote count will decrease even more drastically at the upcoming local government and provincial council elections.
In 2014, the JVP replaced Somawansa Amarasinghe with Anura Kumara Dissanayake as party leader. Had that change not happened, had Mr. Amarasinghe clung to party leadership, there would have been no NPP, and no march to power in 2024. The JVP was able to make that change because it was not – at least post-Wijeweera – a leader-centric party. Unfortunately, under Ranil Wickremesinghe the UNP has become a leader-centric party; and its offshoot SJB has that fault in its very genes. The tragic fate of the UNP, reduced from being the single largest party to a mere 4% of electoral support, is the fate that awaits the SJB, not so far ahead.
Politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum. Close to half of Lankan voters still remain on the non/anti-NPP/JVP side of the divide. If the relatively rational, moderate, and non-racist UNP and SJB dwindle into irrelevance, who or what will replace them? Especially if the NPP/JVP fails to satisfy the veritable sky of expectations deposited on its shoulders; and disenchantment, radical in consequences, sets in?
What fails to evolve sinks into extinction. That Darwinian discovery is true for political parties as well. Even with ‘Crisis Gotabaya’, the JVP would not have won if it didn’t change its leader or create the NPP. For a party like the JVP, such changes would not have come easily, yet it managed – and prevailed. Hopefully, Ranil Wickremesinghe and Sajith Premadasa would learn from the JVP. The best they can do for themselves and the country is to resign from their leadership positions, thereby removing the actual obstacles to the reunification of the UNP and the SJB. If they fail to act with maturity and responsibility, the next swing in the pendulum will bring to power a new generation of Rajapaksas, or something even worse.
Future Uncertain
The most remarkable of the NPP/JVP’s achievements in the parliamentary election was not its two-thirds majority, but the plural, Lankan nature of its mandate. In another unprecedented development, it prevailed in the Sinhala South, the Tamil North, the Muslim East and the Malayaga Tamil Upcountry simultaneously. Its vote gains in the North and the East were massive: 65% in Jaffna; 46% in Vanni; 26% in Ampara; 30% in Batticaloa; and 43% in Trinco. Economics and caste would have been factors in this voter-shift, as well as the inability of traditional Tamil politicians to deliver much on the economic or political front. The opening of the Palaly-Achchuveli main road, the promise to release all political prisoners and to return all military-occupied lands (made during the Jaffna rally) would have generated hope of a post-racial Sri Lanka in which all communities would be treated alike.
The voters don’t expect miracles. But if the government fails to deliver or delivers to the wrong people – such as not enough reduction in electricity prices for low-end consumers while substantial tax cuts for the rich or professionals, disenchantment will set in. Given the state of the opposition, the danger of the anti-government sentiment taking an anti-Tamil or anti-Muslim channel is considerable.
Already the Rajapaksas are readying for that future, as is evident from Namal Rajapaksa’s social media comment on the release of several acres of private land in Jaffna to original owners by the army after 30 years of occupation. Mr. Rajapaksa makes use of standard code-words: national security, terrorism etc. (https://x.com/rajapaksanamal/status/1859199555759227218?s=46 ) For now, the response would be limited to toxic words. Once the shine wears off the new government, the time for deeds would come.
Anti-Tamil or anti-Muslim; one or the other.
Soon after the US issued its travel advisory about an ‘impending attack on Israeli tourists’ in Arugam Bay, media reports mentioned a ‘demonstration by locals’ in support of Israeli tourists. The participants carried a host of Israeli flags. Since Israeli flags cannot be a common commodity in Arugam Bay, one wonders where they came from and whether the demonstration was organised by non-local elements, interested in creating a cat-among-pigeons type of situation in Arugam Bay.
The danger of Arugam Bay and can be best illustrated via a de tour – the recent riots in Amsterdam. The story began with the match between Israel’s Maccabi-Tel Aviv team and the Netherland’s AFC Ajax team. Maccabi fans arrived in Amsterdam days before the match, and unlike the usual sports-tourists brought the Gaza war with them. For two days, hundreds of them roamed the city, tearing down Palestinian flags, destroying a taxi belonging to a Dutch citizen of Arab origin, and chanting such racist slogans as ‘Victory to the IDF. F….k the Arabs’. During the match, they interrupted the two-minute silence for Valencia flood victims and chanted ‘There are no schools in Gaza, (because) there are no kids’, a reference to tens of thousands of children murdered by Israeli forces.
Having lost the match, Maccabi fans went out to the streets attacking passers-by and the police. “They took the metal pipes from this construction site and started throwing them at people and police vans,” reported Bender, Amsterdam’s teen You Tube reporter. “They have kids, I think not even twelve years old, walking around with sticks on the front. And they are looking for a fight… It looks like they have these kids, barely 1.5 meters tall, who just attacked these undercover police officers with a stick” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ySHIOYyJ95A&t=21s). In retaliation, Ajax fans, made up of Amsterdam residents of Arab and Dutch origin, unleashed their own brand of violence. Though the counter-violence contained traces of anti-Semitism, it was not a pogrom as Bibi Netanyahu and Joe Biden rushed to proclaim. The Amsterdam mayor who parroted the charge later backtracked, and even admitted the role played by Maccabi fans in igniting the situation (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4H_ozYgHpoM).
From Amsterdam to Arugam Bay. Commenting on the conduct of Maccabi fans in Amsterdam, Yuval Gal, a member of the Dutch Jewish anti-Zionist collective Erev Rav said, “We know many of them are soldiers and ex-soldiers in Gaza right now. I also tried to explain this to the police. I said, ‘Look, if somebody just came back from Gaza, and just came back from killing a lot of people, you don’t expect them to act normally in your city’” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=moPFJD3L16k).
And in faraway Arugam Bay, there are at least at least two billboards commemorating IDF members killed in the war against Gaza. What if at some point an angry local objected? We know how easily verbal violence can descend into physical violence. All context would be lost; Bibi Netanyahu and Donald Trump would be screaming ‘pogrom’ and government would be forced to crack down on its own citizens.
Why are some Israeli tourists putting up structures to honour their war-dead in someone else’s country? Perhaps the answer lies in the structure at the heart of the recent terror scare. Chabad House is a religio-political structure belonging to the Chabad-Lubavitch Movement, an ultra-Orthodox Hasidic which denies Palestinian statehood and Palestinian humanity. Unlike most orthodox Jews, its members serve in the Israel army and are enthusiastic participants of the current genocidal war in Gaza. Allowing a Chabad House belonging to a right wing Israeli religious sect in Muslim majority Arugam Bay is as politically insane as allowing Bodu Bala Sena to construct a ‘Sinhalaramaya’ (Sinhala Temple) in Jaffna town.
If the Chabad-Lubavitch Movement is permitted a legal footprint in the East, the next step may well be a tactical alliance between their operatives and Sinhala hardliners dreaming of regaining a slice of power via Muslim-phobia. When the US travel advisory was issued, Udaya Gammanpila did try to run with the issue, draping himself metaphorically in the Israeli-flag, but in the current non-extremist political climate his attempt did not work. The story can have a different ending once government’s popularity starts to wane, especially if the democratic opposition’s decline continues. Since Gotabaya Rajapaksa epitomised ethno-religious racism, the anti-Gotabaya wave was non-racist. Since the new government is non-racist, the reaction to it is more likely to be racist than not.
Features
Addressing human rights needs multi-pronged approach
by Jehan Perera
The ongoing 63rd session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, which runs from September 7 to October 7, 2026, in Geneva is important to Sri Lanka. Its outcome will send a signal to other international actors, including the European Union, as to whether Sri Lanka’s reform policy is on track. The written update on Sri Lanka, prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights under High Commissioner Volker Türk and presented by Deputy High Commissioner Nada Al-Nashif, has taken a more holistic approach to the government’s performance over the past year. It acknowledged the progress Sri Lanka has made under the NPP government in relation to accountability for financial fraud and other economic crimes. At the same time, the High Commissioner’s update made clear that progress in relation to economic crime cannot be equated with progress in relation to accountability for grave human rights violations committed during the armed conflict and in other periods of political violence.
The government may have felt sufficiently confident that its response to the High Commissioner’s update could be handled by its representative in Geneva and did not require the attendance of Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath. Sri Lanka’s representative Sumith Dassanayake called for a fundamental review of country-specific mandates within the UN Human Rights Council. Sri Lanka has been facing repeated scrutiny in the form of successive UNHRC resolutions from 2012 onwards. Ambassador Dassanayake argued that such mandates should not continue indefinitely and must be regularly assessed against measurable objectives and tangible outcomes. This may reflect confidence that its record of reform is beginning to receive recognition internationally. The reports and statements at the Human Rights Council acknowledged progress in the government’s efforts to address corruption and economic crime.
The government’s anti-corruption drive has included investigations into allegations involving individuals who held the highest political offices in the country. The arrest of former President Ranil Wickremesinghe in connection with alleged misuse of public funds, and the investigation into the controversial SriLankan Airlines Airbus transaction involving former President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s son, are examples of the reach of these investigations. The arrest of SLPP National Organiser and Member of Parliament Namal Rajapaksa in connection with allegations relating to the Airbus purchase scandal has also demonstrated that the government is willing to pursue cases involving politically powerful figures.
Wide Range
The ongoing investigations appear to encompass a wide range of parliamentarians and government members, both past and present. They suggest that accountability for corruption is not being confined to lower-level officials or to individuals who lack political influence. This is precisely the kind of accountability that the public has long demanded and that previous governments have too often failed to deliver. The government is also reaching into the upper levels of the military hierarchies of the past. The case in which 11 young men, most of them Tamil, disappeared after being abducted in Colombo between 2008 and 2009 involved allegations that some families were asked to pay ransoms. The investigation into this case has reached senior military figures. The willingness to pursue such cases is important because it challenges the assumption that those who exercised power during the war are beyond the reach of the law. Such cases would provide a practical test of whether the government’s commitment to accountability for economic crimes is part of a broader commitment to the rule of law.
Success in prosecuting corruption cannot substitute for justice for those who were unlawfully killed, disappeared, tortured or otherwise victimised. The UN report noted that there had been no recognition or accountability for crimes under international law, gross human rights violations and serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by all parties during the war. The government has yet to establish a credible and effective process to address the many cases of enforced disappearance, extrajudicial killing, torture and other serious violations. The government needs to take the international commitments it has inherited on human rights issues seriously. It needs to adopt a multi-pronged approach and go beyond focusing primarily on financial and corruption-related accountability.
Need Action
As a member of the international community, Sri Lanka has a responsibility to abide by the commitments it has made. It cannot selectively uphold international obligations postponing those that are politically difficult. Also, as a small country, Sri Lanka has a self-interest in ensuring the survival of international law, which is all that it has to protect it from the depredations of the bigger international actors. The erosion of international law by powerful states makes it all the more important that smaller states uphold the principles on which the international system is based. Sri Lanka cannot credibly appeal to international law when it is threatened from outside while disregarding its own obligations within. Sri Lanka also needs to win the confidence of its own population that it is committed to justice and equality for all. Public opinion polls and community-level research have disclosed that ethnic and religious minorities are appreciative of the sense of greater security they enjoy under the present government from ethnic or religious extremists.
But a sense of security is not the same as the fulfilment of rights. As far as the Tamil people are concerned, the government has yet to deliver on several of its specific promises. These include the long-standing problems of missing persons, the release of political prisoners who have been members of Tamil militant organisations, and the return of land taken over for military purposes during the war. The issue of Buddhist statues and archaeological sites found on their properties which are then taken from their control continue to trouble them especially as they see no signs of resolution of those disputes. The issue of pastureland in the east of the country in Mylathamadu is particularly concerning to them as they see orders by successive presidents, both President Ranil Wickremesinghe and President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, being disregarded on the ground. The Mylathamadu pastureland dispute is where traditional Tamil dairy farmers have engaged in multi-year protests against the ongoing encroachment of their ancestral grazing lands by Sinhalese crop cultivators relocated under government development schemes.
The government’s failure to hold Provincial Council elections is particularly troubling. The provincial council system is the only one that can provide the Tamil people and other ethnic minorities the opportunity to wield political power and exercise a measure of self-determination in the areas in which they are the numerical majority. The continued postponement of Provincial Council elections therefore has consequences that go beyond an ordinary electoral delay. It deprives communities of an important constitutional avenue for democratic participation and power-sharing. The ethnic and religious minorities appreciate what the government is doing in the larger national interest, but they must not be made to feel that their special concerns are being ignored. The government cannot resolve Sri Lanka’s entire legacy of rights violations overnight. But it does need to demonstrate that it is willing to move forward on multiple fronts, not only on a few.
Features
The emptying university: why are academics leaving?
by Hasini Lecamwasam
Brain drain in Sri Lanka is at an all-time high. The latest Human Flight and Brain Drain Index for 2024 shows that we are 16th of 175 countries on this count, and first in South Asia. That this is a crisis goes without saying. Brain drain affects all sectors, and is a huge strain on the resources of a developing country. Particularly in Sri Lanka, where considerable public investment is made in the moulding of professionals through the system of free education, this amounts to transferring the resources of poorer countries to richer ones with top migration destinations. It is, therefore, important to consider the push and pull factors behind skilled outmigration, specifically from the public university system of Sri Lanka, a key focus of the Kuppi column.
From frustration to exit
Several bitter realities in our crumbling public university system act as push factors in the migration decisions of academics. Many essays on this column have, over several years, attempted to highlight numerous aspects of this erosion. Perhaps, primary among them is the lack of adequate funding, which has debilitating ramifications for the system: very little investment is made in the up-keep of infrastructure (and even less in its expansion), resulting in serious constraints in accommodating growing batches of students and the wellbeing of the staff (particularly in regional universities); research funding is negligible, severely curtailing academics’ ability to effectively discharge their primary duty of teaching which should ideally be informed by their research (and the research of others, access to which is also, unfortunately, mediated by funding); a funding crunch also means a slash in (or greater constraints on) recruitments, increasing the workloads of academics, currently in service, and eating into the quality of their teaching and research.
What recruitments are done frustrate those with any faith in merit. As many of our interventions in this column have shown, recruitment processes are characterised by archaic selection criteria that place very little weight on a candidate’s postgraduate growth and the advantages of interdisciplinary training. Added to this is the general preference for ‘culturally compliant’ candidates who would not rock the boat too much. The combined effect is that those with the capacity and spirit to try out innovations in education are discouraged from joining or staying on in the public university system. Some, or many, of them may instead seek appointments abroad.
A thread that binds all of these problems together is pervasive hierarchy which, again, many interventions on this column have sought to highlight. It is the interest in preserving hierarchy that leads to the preference for alumni in recruitment processes. Hierarchy within universities can be particularly frustrating for younger faculty and women, who typically have to bear the brunt of the workload of their senior, often male, colleagues. In a context of funding, and, therefore, recruitment, restrictions, this translates into a disproportionate burden being placed on junior (usually female) faculty, seriously hindering their prospects of growing into successful academics due to the time constraints within which they have to operate. Junior academics, therefore, are more likely to look to educational institutions abroad for what they hope would be a different work culture that respects them more.
Ideological ruses
On top of these structural frustrations are also the workings of neoliberal ideology. For one, the nature of relations between the global metropole and peripheral countries like Sri Lanka largely dictates what is desirable and what is not. The apparent lifestyles of Western countries – from food to clothing, housing, appliances, and so on – have continued to lure people from the periphery with the promise of a ‘better’ life, alongside better career advancement opportunities. This, of course, masks much of the struggle that goes on behind the scenes to survive in Western societies. For instance, in most cases highly attractive public infrastructure such as roads, public transport, clean air, quality control of food, and so on belie the astronomical privatised costs of healthcare and education. Health insurance is usually mandatory and steep in most high-income settings, while even subsidised education (for which eligibility criteria are strict) creates a serious dent in household earnings. Of course, the happy images of glossy trams and gleeful international travellers don’t convey this.
A second ideological ruse is the myth of greater opportunities and recognition abroad. While there is no denying that local skilled sectors – be it higher education, health, civil service, or private white-collar positions – are replete with issues that inhibit merit-based professional advancement, the notion that things are fundamentally different in Western countries stems from an uninformed optimism. As is now increasingly known and discussed, Western labour markets are notoriously racialised, and equivalent skills are rarely treated as such. Instead, it is usually demanded that skilled migrants clear certain formal examinations in their host countries. In fields like medicine, this is followed by an interview that may also be racially prejudiced. Once these initial steps are cleared, remuneration reverts to square one irrespective of experience accumulated abroad, not to mention the many subtle aggressions, rejections, and trials one has to go through in the negotiation of everyday life. In the many cases where professional qualifications are used as leverage for a move abroad, sights are set on a better future for one’s children, which again is informed by the misplaced faith in greater opportunities and a lack of awareness of the factors outlined above. Needless to say, in the global swing to the Right, things have become even more challenging. In such a context, considering the few rare cases where skilled migrants live extremely comfortable lives as the norm becomes a dangerous misconception.
The two ideological pull factors mentioned above are complemented by a push factor, which has to do with a highly classed understanding of what a white-collar professional is due in their society. Many of these aspirations are clearly articulated in academic trade union action demanding separate quotas for school entry, increased fuel allowances, winning back the presently stalled vehicle permit scheme, salary hikes, and so on. While working people have every right to agitate for better material conditions, insofar as it remains unconnected to a broader movement for improving the conditions of the lot of the working class, it remains self-serving and very much within the class logic of capitalist society. Since these demands are articulated as a means of maintaining distinction, it is clear that they are not envisaged as part of a class movement. The frustration of not having these needs for distinction satisfied may push some to seek greener pastures abroad, at least financially, (perhaps as a means of social mobility based on it), only to be disappointed on most occasions.
What is to be done?
Addressing the systemic push factors listed above requires, first and foremost, greater allocations for free public higher education. This would immediately translate into more recruitments and less work per academic, and better research and teaching in the long haul. An increase in funding would also ideally lead to greater infrastructural investments, especially including improving the living conditions of those who work in regional universities amid untold hardships. Next, fairer, more creative, and, therefore, more effective recruitment policies are badly needed to attract talented individuals to university positions. Rather than carving out a ‘special category’ for academics to achieve this purpose, which is informed by a classed logic, this needs to be done through fundamental reforms in recruitment processes. Third, a persistent attack on the entrenched hierarchy within universities through internal reform is much called for. Reforming recruitment practices will go a long way towards addressing this. Measures should also be taken to introduce more stringent policies against SGBV (not to mention ragging, even though it is not directly connected to brain drain). Such measures would create a safer, fairer, and more attractive workplace, which would give more reasons for people to stay.
On top of greater allocations, we also need a transformation of our aspirations themselves if this situation is to change. That necessitates a kind of education capable of questioning the ‘paradise’ conception of Western societies, and lays bare their colonial material and ideological dimensions, in both their historical and contemporary manifestations. These colonial understandings of the ‘good life’, moreover, have devastating ecological implications for the planet, not to mention social justice. An education with the ability to transform this mindset would hopefully prove to be more than a mere path to social mobility, rather being a tool of social emancipation that renders mobility moot.
(Hasini Lecamwasam is with the Department of Political Science, University of Peradeniya)
Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
Features
Friends favourite Suzi Croner returns for Oktoberfest 2026
Charming audiences in Switzerland as Suzi Flückiger, Sri Lanka’s own Suzi Croner is coming home… for a very special occasion.
The bubbly former frontline vocalist of 90s band Friends will take the stage at a popular venue in Colombo for Oktoberfest 2026.
Known in Europe for her country and classic hits, Suzi has remained a much-loved name back home. This will be a rare chance for local fans to see her live and celebrate the voice behind so many Friends memories.
Oktoberfest 2026 in Colombo promises an evening of live music, traditional Bavarian food and beer, colourful dirndls and lederhosen, folk dancing, and plenty of community cheer.

Suzi Croner (Flückiger)
Against this lively backdrop, Suzi will take the stage for a special solo set, featuring her own pre-recorded music. She performed at the event last year too, as a solo artiste, but a German band providing the music.
This year, however she says, it’s a different scene.
“The novel attraction will be the dancers from Germany — all girls, clad in German outfits,” Suzi said. She added that the event will also highlight the activities generally connected with Oktoberfest, which should generate a lot of fun and excitement for those who join her in Colombo next month.
Suzi has become a much-in-demand artiste in Europe, and has even performed Down Under, in Melbourne.
In Switzerland, where she has been based for the past 42 years, she continues to charm audiences with country and classic hits, performing at private events and community nights across Europe.
“My weekends are generally loaded with my work as a singer,” she said. “And I also play tennis three times a week, because I need to keep fit to entertain my audience in an active way.”
Her repertoire is made up mainly of Swiss, German and English songs.
And true to form, Suzi loves springing surprises.
“So watch out when you join me at Oktoberfest 2026, in Colombo!” she said.
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