Features
In defence of Provincial Councils
By Dr. Nrmala Chandrahasan
The Provincial Councils, like the windmills in Cervante’s Don Quixote, are having brickbats thrown at, and cantankerous knights tilting at them. In this piece I would like to answer some of the criticisms made against the Provincial Councils. But before I do so I note that the Prime Minister has announced that the Provincial Council elections will be held once the ground situation is ready for it. This welcome statement puts paid to all the critics, it being generally acknowledged that the Prime Minister as an experienced and consummate politician would know the political climate in the country and act accordingly.
One of the frequent criticisms is that the Provincial Councils were imposed upon the Sri Lankan polity by the Government of India. To recapitulate the sequence of events, following upon the July 1983 pogrom (riots) against the Tamil citizens of the Country and the outbreak of civil unrest in Sri Lanka, the then Prime minister of India, Shrimathi Indhira Gandhi sent an envoy as part of a diplomatic initiative to find ways of bringing the country back to normalcy. A process of negotiations was begun between the Governments of India and Sri Lanka with India playing the role of an interlocutor bringing the Tamil parties and the Government of Sri Lanka to the negotiating table, in order to solve the ongoing insurgency by Tamil militants and the ethnic problem in the island through Constitutional proposals. The outcome of these negotiations were the India –Sri Lanka: Agreement to Establish Peace and Normalcy in Sri Lanka, i. e. the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord in July 1987, and the drawing up of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution and the Provincial Councils Act no: 42 of November 1987. By virtue of these two Acts Provincial Councils were set up. The opponents of the Provincial Councils argue that it is not a homegrown institution but one imposed by a foreign power. In this connection I would refer the readers to a very informative and well-researched article by Professor Gamini Keerawella in The Island newspaper of 16th September 2020 titled “Genealogy of Concept and Genesis of 13th Amendment”, in which he traces the genesis of Provincial Councils from the Donoughmore Commission Recommendations in 1931 ,through the Regional Councils of the Bandaranaike –Chelvanayakam pact 1956 , the Dudley Senanayake –Chelvanayakam agreement, and even the promised but not forthcoming Devolution proposals made by the Sirimavo Bandaranaike Government before the 1974 bye-elections in Kankesanthurai. This proves that the matter of devolution and provincial councils has been on the political anvil in this country for a long time and is not a foreign imposition but a home grown one.
In fact the 13th Amendment came out of extensive discussions between the J. R .Jayewardene government and the TULF the Tamil party led by Mr. Amithalingam, in July- August 1986. Secretary to the discussion was Felix Dias Abeysinghe retired Commissioner of Elections. The indo-Sri Lanka treaty was signed one year later in July 1987. The 13th Amendment and the Provincial Councils Act were passed in November 1987. One might say that the leverage for the passing of the 13th Amendment was the Treaty between India and Sri Lanka which provided for devolution. In the negotiations the TULF negotiating team were no match for the astute Mr. Jayewardene who outmanoeuvred them. It was only subsequently that they came to realise that the Bills as framed were below their expectations and they distanced themselves from the whole exercise. Mr Amirthalingam in a letter to Shri Rajiv Gandhi in October 1987, set out his disappointment with the two Bills, saying that contrary to the belief that the Chapter pertaining to Provincial Councils would confer on the Provinces a measure of credible autonomy,the present Bills enabled Parliament and the Central Executive to continue to exercise its authority even in respect of those powers conferred on the Province . In my view the problem lay with the Provincial Councils Act which negates many of the powers given under the 13th Amendment. This could have been, and can still be remedied by a few amendments to the Provincial Councils Act. I will return to this later.
Although the Provincial Councils and the devolution proposals were meant for the North East which were the Tamil speaking part of the country and intended to settle the ongoing armed conflict, the Jayewardene government extended the Provincial Council system to all the provinces of the country. Hence the present Provincial Council system is based not on any specific regional or ethnic criteria but is directed to all the people of the country and seeks to empower the people in their own localities be it in Jaffna or Matara. This system allows for decisions pertaining to the Provinces to be taken closer to the local people and communities and not only by politicians and bureaucrats in Colombo, i. e. the ‘Colombites’ to use a phrase coined by Gomin Dayasri. In hindsight this was a good move as it made it an all island system. Thus, we might say that the Indian intervention brought something that was beneficial to the country and to all the communities. However, foreign intervention may not always bring good results. A lesson to be learnt from this episode is that when you do not keep your house in order and there is dissension and disaffection, the neighbours and not so near neighbours will certainly want to look in, seeking to interfere and usually it is for their own benefit. If at the behest of a few people, i. e. ultranationalists and authoritarian oriented elements, we start to upset the existing political system and cause the minority communities to feel insecure and agitated it can once again lead to a situation where third parties intervene. The best policy is to keep the ship afloat, particularly in the context of the grim economic situation without destabilising the political structure by abolishing the Provincial Councils, as is being suggested in some quarters.
Another criticism made is that the province is not the appropriate unit of devolution. As a counter to this I would refer to the Majority Report of the Experts Committee appointed by President Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2006 to advise on the constitutional changes, and of which i was myself a member. I cite from the Report as follows, “Unit of Devolution. The group held extensive discussions on the various options and the different aspects of the options. We are of the view that a unit of devolution should as far as practicable consist of geographically contiguous territory, be conducive to balanced regional development and be designed to enhance administrative efficiency. Differences in endowments are to be expected among units. In this context, the group is of the view that the appropriate Unit of Devolution would be the Province”. I might mention that there were no members of any political party in the Experts panel which included lawyers, academics and experienced members of the judicial and administrative services and the discussions were based on factual and spatial considerations.
Another criticism made is that the Provincial Councils are like white elephants and have not been effective in delivering any services to the people while the State incurs additional expenses in keeping them running. This criticism has some substance to it and the reasons for its inability to deliver have to be examined while comparing it to similar bodies in other countries. In the United Kingdom which is a Unitary state similar powers have been devolved on the different ethnic regional units, i. e. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, (which is the Province of Ulster). All these units have their own legislative assemblies, and in the case of Scotland a Parliament while at the same time they are represented in the Parliament in West Minster. In India too which has a quasi-federal Constitution the States have a Governor and Legislative Assemblies exercising powers not very different from those set out in the 13th Amendment. In all the above instances devolution has worked efficiently and the regional/ provincial units have been able to work efficiently and deliver the required services to the people. So we have to see why Provincial Councils in Lanka have not worked so well.
To begin with in order to work efficiently adequate financial funding is required. Under the provisions of the Provincial Councils Act the Governor of the Province is given a controlling power over the finances of the province. The Provincial Council cannot pass any Statue imposing or abolishing any taxes without the consent of the Governor. Governors have not been cooperative in this regard. Hence the Councils have to depend largely on Central grants. The report of the Parliamentary Sub – Committee on Centre –Periphery Relations, November 2016, points out that in addition to the limited tax raising power vested in the Provinces are the limitations placed on obtaining loans and investments, and on seeking or at least administering projects financed by foreign aid and investments. The Committee concluded that “the corrosive effect of inadequate or unprincipled financing arrangements is that they impair Provincial and local service delivery, leading to an erosion of confidence in what are constitutionally established democratic institutions”.
The Provincial Councils Act gives the Governor control of the Provincial Public service and the provincial Public Service Commission. These are powers which even the President does not exercise over the National Public service. In Provinces where the ruling party at the Centre is also the party in control of a Provincial Council, Governors have been less assertive of their prerogatives and the Chief Ministers have been better able to operate efficiently. However, the Provincial Councils of the North and the East have had less leeway. In India on the other hand the Governors of the States act like constitutional heads and do not take over executive functions.
Another area which needs re-organization is the administrative service in the Province. The Majority Report of the Experts Committee 2006, recommended that for devolution of power to be effective it should be devoid of duality and hence there should be a restructuring of the administration in the Provincial. Another matter of concern is that of the allocation of subjects. Although the 13th Amendment sets out the allocation of subjects between the Province and the Centre in two lists and a third concurrent list, there are overlapping powers and the Provincial area of competence has come to be circumscribed. In order to function efficiently there has to be clarity in the allocation of subjects and this too is a matter which has to be looked into. I have outlined the shortcomings of the Provincial Council system which have impeded their efficient functioning. Most of these stem from the Provincial Councils Act . This Act can be amended by a simple majority in Parliament. The administrative changes and restructuring of the administrative services in the Province can be done by gazette notifications by the President as provided for in the 13th Amendment itself. This will not need any major constitutional changes.
Despite its shortcomings and the restrictions and encroachments by the Central Government, the Provincial Council system has taken root in the Country. It provides for people to enter into and engage in political activity at the Provincial level. Persons who have gained experience of political issues at the local level can thereafter gravitate to the national level. The minorities Tamil and Muslim are able to feel that they have some say in the management of their own affairs and within their localities. This is a safety valve which is necessary in any multi- ethnic state, as we see in the United Kingdom (UK) where the ethnic Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish have devolution of powers in respect of their local areas. Without attempting to do away with the Provincial Council System it should be implemented in full while making the necessary changes through amendments and administrative action, so as to make them more efficient in the delivery of services to the people in their localities.
Provincial Councils have been part of the Sri Lankan Constitution for over 30 years. It is time the bureaucrats in Colombo and the government ministers stopped viewing them with suspicion or antipathy, and saw them as supportive institutions in the governance of the country, making for a more efficient administration and a more democratic form of governance for the whole country. The Tamil parties could, by working towards meaningful devolution and further empowered systems of Provincial Councils and Local Authorities, become engaged in a process that is in the national interest while promoting the aspirations and interests of the Tamil speaking people. It is to be hoped that the Provincial Council elections will be held early in the coming year and the continuity of the existing political system maintained.
Features
Following the Money: Tourism’s revenue crisis behind the arrival numbers – PART II
(Article 2 of the 4-part series on Sri Lanka’s tourism stagnation)
If Sri Lanka’s tourism story were a corporate income statement, the top line would satisfy any minister. Arrivals went up 15.1%, targets met, records broke. But walk down the statement and the story darkens. Revenue barely budges. Per-visitor yield collapses. The money that should accompany all those arrivals has quietly vanished, or, more accurately, never materialised.
This is not a recovery. It is a volume trap, more tourists generating less wealth, with policymakers either oblivious to the math or unwilling to confront it.
Problem Diagnosis: The Paradox of Plenty:
The numbers tell a brutal story.
Read that again: arrivals grew 15.1% year-on-year, but revenue grew only 1.6%. The average tourist in 2025 left behind $181 less than in 2024, an 11.7% decline. Compared to 2018, the drop is even sharper. In real terms, adjusting for inflation and currency depreciation, each visitor in 2025 generates approximately 27-30% less revenue than in 2018, despite Sri Lanka being “cheaper” due to the rupee’s collapse. This is not marginal variance. This is structural value destruction. (See Table 1)

The math is simple and damning: Sri Lanka is working harder for less. More tourists, lower yield, thinner margins. Why? Because we have confused accessibility with competitiveness. We have made ourselves “affordable” through currency collapse and discounting, not through value creation.
Root Causes: The Five Mechanisms of Value Destruction
The yield collapse is not random. It is the predictable outcome of specific policy failures and market dynamics.
1. Currency Depreciation as False Competitiveness
The rupee’s collapse post-2022 has made Sri Lanka appear “cheap” to foreigners. A hotel room priced at $100 in 2018 might cost $70-80 in effective purchasing power today due to depreciation. Tour operators have aggressively discounted to fill capacity during the crisis recovery.
This creates the illusion of competitiveness. Arrivals rise because we are a “bargain.” But the bargain is paid for by domestic suppliers, hotels, transport providers, restaurants, staff, whose input costs (energy, food, imported goods) have skyrocketed in rupee terms while room rates lag in dollar terms.
The transfer is explicit: value flows from Sri Lankan workers and businesses to foreign tourists. The tourism “recovery” extracts wealth from the domestic economy rather than injecting it.
2. Market Composition Shift: Trading European Yields for Asian Volumes
SLTDA data shows a deliberate (or accidental—the policy opacity makes it unclear) shift in source markets. (See Table 2)

The problem is not that we attract Indians or Russians, it is that we attract them without strategies to optimise their yield. As the next article in this series will detail, Indian tourists average approximately 5.27 nights compared to the 8-9 night overall average, with lower per-day spending. We have built recovery on volume from price-sensitive segments rather than value from high-yield segments.
This is a choice, though it appears no one consciously made it. Visa-free entry, aggressive India-focused marketing, and price positioning have tilted the market mix without any apparent analysis of revenue implications.
3. Length of Stay Decline and Activity Compression
Average length of stay has compressed. While overall averages hover around 8-9 nights in recent years, the composition matters. High-yield European and North American tourists who historically spent 10-12 nights are now spending 7-9. Indian tourists spend 5-6 nights.
Shorter stays mean less cumulative spending, fewer experiences consumed, less distribution of value across the tourism chain. A 10-night tourist patronises multiple regions, hotels, guides, restaurants. A 5-night tourist concentrates spending in 2-3 locations, typically Colombo, one beach, one cultural site.
The compression is driven partly by global travel trends (shorter, more frequent trips) but also by Sri Lanka’s failure to develop compelling multi-day itineraries, adequate inter-regional connectivity, and differentiated regional experiences. We have not given tourists reasons to stay longer.
4. Infrastructure Decay and Experience Degradation
Tourists pay for experiences, not arrivals. When experiences degrade, airport congestion, poor road conditions, inadequate facilities at cultural sites, safety concerns, spending falls even if arrivals hold.
The 2024-2025 congestion at Bandaranaike International Airport, with reports of tourists nearly missing flights due to bottlenecks, is the visible tip. Beneath are systemic deficits: poor last-mile connectivity to tourism sites, deteriorating heritage assets, unregistered businesses providing sub-standard services, outbound migration of trained staff.
An ADB report notes that tourism authorities face resource shortages and capital expenditure embargoes, preventing even basic facility improvements at major revenue generators like Sigiriya (which charges $36 per visitor and attracts 25% of all tourists). When a site generates substantial revenue but lacks adequate lighting, safety measures, and visitor facilities, the experience suffers, and so does yield.
5. Leakage: The Silent Revenue Drain
Tourism revenue figures are gross. Net foreign exchange contributions after leakages, is rarely calculated or published.
Leakages include:
· Imported food, beverages, amenities in hotels (often 30-40% of operating costs)
· Foreign ownership and profit repatriation
· International tour operators taking commissions upstream (tourists book through foreign platforms that retain substantial margins)
· Unlicensed operators and unregulated businesses evading taxes and formal banking channels
Industry sources estimate leakages can consume 40-60% of gross tourism revenue in developing economies with weak regulatory enforcement. Sri Lanka has not published comprehensive leakage studies, but all indicators, weak licensing enforcement, widespread informal sector activity, foreign ownership concentration in resorts, suggest leakages are substantial and growing.
The result: even the $3.22 billion headline figure overstates actual net contribution to the economy.
The Way Forward: From Volume to Value
Reversing the yield collapse requires
systematic policy reorientation, from arrivals-chasing to value-building.
First
, publish and track yield metrics as primary KPIs. SLTDA should report:
· Revenue per visitor (by source market, by season, by purpose)
· Average daily expenditure (disaggregated by accommodation, activities, food, retail)
· Net foreign exchange contribution after documented leakages
· Revenue per room night (adjusted for real exchange rates)
Make these as visible as arrival numbers. Hold policy-makers accountable for yield, not just volume.
Second
, segment markets explicitly by yield potential. Stop treating all arrivals as equivalent. Conduct market-specific yield analyses:
· Which markets spend most per day?
· Which stays longest?
· Which distributes spending across regions vs. concentrating in Colombo/beach corridors?
· Which book is through formal channels vs. informal operators?
Target marketing and visa policies accordingly. If Western European tourists spend $250/day for 10 nights while another segment spends $120/day for 5 nights, the revenue difference ($2,500 vs. $600) dictates where promotional resources should flow.
Third
, develop multi-day, multi-region itineraries with compelling value propositions. Tourists extend stays when there are reasons to stay. Create integrated experiences:
· Cultural triangle + beach + hill country circuits with seamless connectivity
· Themed tours (wildlife, wellness, culinary, adventure) requiring 10+ days
· Regional spread of accommodation and experiences to distribute economic benefits
This requires infrastructure investment, precisely what has been neglected.
Fourth
, regulations to minimise leakages. Enforce licensing for tourism businesses. Channel bookings through formal operators registered with commercial banks. Tax holiday schemes should prioritise investments that maximise local value retention, staff training, local sourcing, domestic ownership.
Fifth
, stop using currency depreciation as a competitive strategy. A weak rupee makes Sri Lanka “affordable” but destroys margins and transfers wealth outward. Real competitiveness comes from differentiated experiences, quality standards, and strategic positioning, not from being the “cheapest” option.
The Hard Math: What We’re Losing
Let’s make the cost explicit. If Sri Lanka maintained 2018 per-visitor spending levels ($1,877) on 2025 arrivals (2.36 million), revenue would be approximately $4.43 billion, not $3.22 billion. The difference: $1.21 billion in lost revenue, value that should have been generated but wasn’t.
That $1.21 billion is not a theoretical gap. It represents:
· Wages not paid
· Businesses not sustained
· Taxes not collected
· Infrastructure not funded
· Development not achieved
This is the cost of volume-chasing without yield discipline. Every year we continue this model; we lock in value destruction.
The Policy Failure: Why Arrivals Theater Persists
Why do policymakers fixate on arrivals when revenue tells the real story?
Because arrivals are politically legible. A minister can tout “record tourist numbers” in a press conference. Revenue per visitor requires explanation, context, and uncomfortable questions about policy choices.
Arrivals are easy to manipulate upward, visa-free entry, aggressive discounting, currency depreciation. Yield is hard, it requires product development, market curation, infrastructure investment, regulatory enforcement.
Arrivals theater is cheaper and quicker than strategic transformation. But this is governance failure at its most fundamental. Tourism’s contribution to economic recovery is not determined by how many planes land but by how much wealth each visitor creates and retains domestically. Every dollar spent celebrating arrival records while ignoring yield collapse is a waste of dollars.
The Uncomfortable Truth
Sri Lanka’s tourism “boom” is real in volume, but it is a value bust. We are attracting more tourists and generating less wealth. The industry is working harder for lower returns. Margins are compressed, staff are paid less in real terms, infrastructure decays, and the net contribution to national recovery underperforms potential.
This is not sustainable. Eventually, operators will exit. Quality will degrade further. The “affordable” positioning will shift to “cheap and deteriorating.” The volume will follow yield down.
We have two choices: acknowledge the yield crisis and reorient policy toward value creation or continue arrivals theater until the hollowness becomes undeniable.
The money has spoken. The question is whether anyone in power is listening.
Features
Misinterpreting President Dissanayake on National Reconciliation
President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has been investing his political capital in going to the public to explain some of the most politically sensitive and controversial issues. At a time when easier political choices are available, the president is choosing the harder path of confronting ethnic suspicion and communal fears. There are three issues in particular on which the president’s words have generated strong reactions. These are first with regard to Buddhist pilgrims going to the north of the country with nationalist motivations. Second is the controversy relating to the expansion of the Tissa Raja Maha Viharaya, a recently constructed Buddhist temple in Kankesanturai which has become a flashpoint between local Tamil residents and Sinhala nationalist groups. Third is the decision not to give the war victory a central place in the Independence Day celebrations.
Even in the opposition, when his party held only three seats in parliament, Anura Kumara Dissanayake took his role as a public educator seriously. He used to deliver lengthy, well researched and easily digestible speeches in parliament. He continues this practice as president. It can be seen that his statements are primarily meant to elevate the thinking of the people and not to win votes the easy way. The easy way to win votes whether in Sri Lanka or elsewhere in the world is to rouse nationalist and racist sentiments and ride that wave. Sri Lanka’s post independence political history shows that narrow ethnic mobilisation has often produced short term electoral gains but long term national damage.
Sections of the opposition and segments of the general public have been critical of the president for taking these positions. They have claimed that the president is taking these positions in order to obtain more Tamil votes or to appease minority communities. The same may be said in reverse of those others who take contrary positions that they seek the Sinhala votes. These political actors who thrive on nationalist mobilisation have attempted to portray the president’s statements as an abandonment of the majority community. The president’s actions need to be understood within the larger framework of national reconciliation and long term national stability.
Reconciler’s Duty
When the president referred to Buddhist pilgrims from the south going to the north, he was not speaking about pilgrims visiting long established Buddhist heritage sites such as Nagadeepa or Kandarodai. His remarks were directed at a specific and highly contentious development, the recently built Buddhist temple in Kankesanturai and those built elsewhere in the recent past in the north and east. The temple in Kankesanturai did not emerge from the religious needs of a local Buddhist community as there is none in that area. It has been constructed on land that was formerly owned and used by Tamil civilians and which came under military occupation as a high security zone. What has made the issue of the temple particularly controversial is that it was established with the support of the security forces.
The controversy has deepened because the temple authorities have sought to expand the site from approximately one acre to nearly fourteen acres on the basis that there was a historic Buddhist temple in that area up to the colonial period. However, the Tamil residents of the area fear that expansion would further displace surrounding residents and consolidate a permanent Buddhist religious presence in the present period in an area where the local population is overwhelmingly Hindu. For many Tamils in Kankesanturai, the issue is not Buddhism as a religion but the use of religion as a vehicle for territorial assertion and demographic changes in a region that bore the brunt of the war. Likewise, there are other parts of the north and east where other temples or places of worship have been established by the military personnel in their camps during their war-time occupation and questions arise regarding the future when these camps are finally closed.
There are those who have actively organised large scale pilgrimages from the south to make the Tissa temple another important religious site. These pilgrimages are framed publicly as acts of devotion but are widely perceived locally as demonstrations of dominance. Each such visit heightens tension, provokes protest by Tamil residents, and risks confrontation. For communities that experienced mass displacement, military occupation and land loss, the symbolism of a state backed religious structure on contested land with the backing of the security forces is impossible to separate from memories of war and destruction. A president committed to reconciliation cannot remain silent in the face of such provocations, however uncomfortable it may be to challenge sections of the majority community.
High-minded leadership
The controversy regarding the president’s Independence Day speech has also generated strong debate. In that speech the president did not refer to the military victory over the LTTE and also did not use the term “war heroes” to describe soldiers. For many Sinhala nationalist groups, the absence of these references was seen as an attempt to diminish the sacrifices of the armed forces. The reality is that Independence Day means very different things to different communities. In the north and east the same day is marked by protest events and mourning and as a “Black Day”, symbolising the consolidation of a state they continue to experience as excluding them and not empathizing with the full extent of their losses.
By way of contrast, the president’s objective was to ensure that Independence Day could be observed as a day that belonged to all communities in the country. It is not correct to assume that the president takes these positions in order to appease minorities or secure electoral advantage. The president is only one year into his term and does not need to take politically risky positions for short term electoral gains. Indeed, the positions he has taken involve confronting powerful nationalist political forces that can mobilise significant opposition. He risks losing majority support for his statements. This itself indicates that the motivation is not electoral calculation.
President Dissanayake has recognized that Sri Lanka’s long term political stability and economic recovery depend on building trust among communities that once peacefully coexisted and then lived through decades of war. Political leadership is ultimately tested by the willingness to say what is necessary rather than what is politically expedient. The president’s recent interventions demonstrate rare national leadership and constitute an attempt to shift public discourse away from ethnic triumphalism and toward a more inclusive conception of nationhood. Reconciliation cannot take root if national ceremonies reinforce the perception of victory for one community and defeat for another especially in an internal conflict.
BY Jehan Perera
Features
Recovery of LTTE weapons
I have read a newspaper report that the Special Task Force of Sri Lanka Police, with help of Military Intelligence, recovered three buried yet well-preserved 84mm Carl Gustaf recoilless rocket launchers used by the LTTE, in the Kudumbimalai area, Batticaloa.
These deadly weapons were used by the LTTE SEA TIGER WING to attack the Sri Lanka Navy ships and craft in 1990s. The first incident was in February 1997, off Iranativu island, in the Gulf of Mannar.
Admiral Cecil Tissera took over as Commander of the Navy on 27 January, 1997, from Admiral Mohan Samarasekara.
The fight against the LTTE was intensified from 1996 and the SLN was using her Vanguard of the Navy, Fast Attack Craft Squadron, to destroy the LTTE’s littoral fighting capabilities. Frequent confrontations against the LTTE Sea Tiger boats were reported off Mullaitivu, Point Pedro and Velvetiturai areas, where SLN units became victorious in most of these sea battles, except in a few incidents where the SLN lost Fast Attack Craft.

Carl Gustaf recoilless rocket launchers
The intelligence reports confirmed that the LTTE Sea Tigers was using new recoilless rocket launchers against aluminium-hull FACs, and they were deadly at close quarter sea battles, but the exact type of this weapon was not disclosed.
The following incident, which occurred in February 1997, helped confirm the weapon was Carl Gustaf 84 mm Recoilless gun!
DATE: 09TH FEBRUARY, 1997, morning 0600 hrs.
LOCATION: OFF IRANATHIVE.
FACs: P 460 ISRAEL BUILT, COMMANDED BY CDR MANOJ JAYESOORIYA
P 452 CDL BUILT, COMMANDED BY LCDR PM WICKRAMASINGHE (ON TEMPORARY COMMAND. PROPER OIC LCDR N HEENATIGALA)
OPERATED FROM KKS.
CONFRONTED WITH LTTE ATTACK CRAFT POWERED WITH FOUR 250 HP OUT BOARD MOTORS.
TARGET WAS DESTROYED AND ONE LTTE MEMBER WAS CAPTURED.
LEADING MARINE ENGINEERING MECHANIC OF THE FAC CAME UP TO THE BRIDGE CARRYING A PROJECTILE WHICH WAS FIRED BY THE LTTE BOAT, DURING CONFRONTATION, WHICH PENETRATED THROUGH THE FAC’s HULL, AND ENTERED THE OICs CABIN (BETWEEN THE TWO BUNKS) AND HIT THE AUXILIARY ENGINE ROOM DOOR AND HAD FALLEN DOWN WITHOUT EXPLODING. THE ENGINE ROOM DOOR WAS HEAVILY DAMAGED LOOSING THE WATER TIGHT INTEGRITY OF THE FAC.
THE PROJECTILE WAS LATER HANDED OVER TO THE NAVAL WEAPONS EXPERTS WHEN THE FACs RETURNED TO KKS. INVESTIGATIONS REVEALED THE WEAPON USED BY THE ENEMY WAS 84 mm CARL GUSTAF SHOULDER-FIRED RECOILLESS GUN AND THIS PROJECTILE WAS AN ILLUMINATER BOMB OF ONE MILLION CANDLE POWER. BUT THE ATTACKERS HAS FAILED TO REMOVE THE SAFETY PIN, THEREFORE THE BOMB WAS NOT ACTIVATED.

Sea Tigers
Carl Gustaf 84 mm recoilless gun was named after Carl Gustaf Stads Gevärsfaktori, which, initially, produced it. Sweden later developed the 84mm shoulder-fired recoilless gun by the Royal Swedish Army Materiel Administration during the second half of 1940s as a crew served man- portable infantry support gun for close range multi-role anti-armour, anti-personnel, battle field illumination, smoke screening and marking fire.
It is confirmed in Wikipedia that Carl Gustaf Recoilless shoulder-fired guns were used by the only non-state actor in the world – the LTTE – during the final Eelam War.
It is extremely important to check the batch numbers of the recently recovered three launchers to find out where they were produced and other details like how they ended up in Batticaloa, Sri Lanka?
By Admiral Ravindra C. Wijegunaratne
WV, RWP and Bar, RSP, VSV, USP, NI (M) (Pakistan), ndc, psn, Bsc (Hons) (War Studies) (Karachi) MPhil (Madras)
Former Navy Commander and Former Chief of Defence Staff
Former Chairman, Trincomalee Petroleum Terminals Ltd
Former Managing Director Ceylon Petroleum Corporation
Former High Commissioner to Pakistan
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