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13th Amendment, fair political representation, and social-choice theory

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The signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord, which led to the establishment of Provincial Councils.

by Chandre Dharmawardana,
chandre.dharma@yahoo.ca

The TNA is the main political party of the North. S. Shritharan was recently elected its leader and M. A. Sumanthiran, who is regarded by some as being “barely Tamil”, as one Eelamist resident in Canada put it, was sidelined.  Sritharan’s vision, expressed in post-election speeches, demands the merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces; he rejects the 13A as being grossly inadequate to meet the aspirations of the Tamils. The political parties of Gajendra Ponnamblam, and of C. V. Wigneswaran takes an even harder public stand. All tactically reject 13A, even though they rush to India to support 13A when support for 13A weakens in the South. The positions taken by southern politicians regarding 13A are also merely tactical and opportunistic.

Ironically, 13A is already a part of Sri Lanka’s Constitution, with some parts of it implemented, and others in suspense, mainly due to a huge lack of trust across the Northern and Southern political formations. Even the Eastern Tamil leaders do not trust the Northern leaders.

While the minority leaders still seek the chimera of an Indian supervisory role, the majority-community politicians know that strong Indian interventions, even “parippu dropped from air” are no longer a part of the show. President Ranil Wickremasinghe was seated next to Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the latter’s inauguration, while no TNA leader was visible. Meanwhile, the provincial councils themselves have atrophied, with provincial elections not even considered worth the cost, under the current circumstances.

The Northern political leaders rightly believe that any government in Colombo will be a government of the Majority Community and that minority rights will NOT be protected under such a set-up, judging by past history. So, they aspire to have a separate government of their own as the “only effective approach”. However, this approach triggered the past history of communal politics and violence that led to terror and counter-terror. Finally, the TULF leaders, Sinhalese politicians, even the Indian Leader who fathered the 13A, and thousands of innocent civilians got wiped out.

If there is no trust, there can be NO federalism, nor an effective 13A. Even an independent Eelam, separate from a Sinhalé by a physical border is not viable, as the two neighbours will be continually at war, as is the case between India and Pakistan, or across and even within Indian states (e. g. Manipur), even though the “Indian Model”, like 13A, is claimed to resolve these conflicts. Furthermore, such “independent” states will be forced to join up with big powers and become mere pawns of global proxy wars. That is the end of their “self-determination”.

The TNA says, “We don’t trust the majority, so we want our own government; but the minorities who will be under us, i.e., Muslims of the East or any Sinhalese who live in our “exclusive homeland” must trust us. Just forget attacks on Muslims or Sinhalese minorities when the TNA was an LTTE proxy”! This “aspiration” for hegemony by Tamil leaders over other minorities will be rejected by the respective minorities, just as the Tamil leaders reject being ruled by the Majority that they do not trust.

Social-choice theory

How can we equitably allocate agents (or electoral seats) to represent a group of people within a unitary setup (with a total quota of 225 seats), or with subdivided setups (e. g., with provincial councils or federal states with quotas of seats reflecting minority groups)?

This question falls within a class of much studied mathematical problems in game theory, mathematical economics as well as in the theory of social choice. Intellectual giants like John von Neumann and other mathematicians pioneered these studies. However, the most important results relevant to our discussion here came from Blinski and Young as well as from Kenneth Arrow. The latter won the Nobel Prize for economics in 1972 for his theorems on “social-choice theory”.

Blinski and Young proved a theorem showing that any apportionment rule (or representation and devolution rule) that stays within an assigned quota (say, of seats) suffers from what is known as the population apportionment paradox. This states that unless the populations remain absolutely static, even if the minority has a decisively large rate of population growth, the majority still gains more representation (or more power) inexorably! There is NO fair apportionment scheme!

 Blinsky and Young’s result was a surprising “no-go” theorem. However, Arrow’s theorem, formulated in 1951 was even more surprising and counter-intuitive. Arrow laid down five “self-evident” axioms (or rules) about what may be called the “Will of the People” to be represented. For instance, a key rule is that the preferences and aspirations of a group should be chosen only from the group members (and not from outsiders). Another axiom is that the “will of the group” must not be that of one particular person; this is known as the no-dictator rule. The other axioms are similar harmless-looking rules about the group having specific preferences (e.g., favouring a set of religious or cultural traits against another set), or having maverick members who have changed policies in the past on a specific preference, although now in accordance with the “will of the group”.

Arrow’s impossibility theorem

Kenneth Arrow proved that, in spite of the highly democratic and seemingly “fair” formulation of these axioms, no such fair representation is possible. This is known as Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. This theorem states that mandating the preferences and aspirations of the group cannot be ensured while adhering to usual “democratic” principles of fair voting procedures!

The mathematical conclusion is that a selection of people making decisions for those who elected them can never be a rational or fair process, however wise or benevolent they are! Their decisions will be necessarily autocratic! Naturally, the minorities within any group, be it under the Sinhalese majority in the main government, or under the Tamil majority in the TNA government reigning over the North and the East, will discriminate against the minority in each case.

Every available constitutional representation that satisfies Arrow’s axioms (i.e., common-sense ideas of fairness) is a perverse one. There is no “will of the people” or a democratic way of representing it. This very painful conclusion, reached by mathematicians in the 1950s, has stood all critical attacks on it. For over twenty-two decades, political scientists for whom the concept of the “will of the people” is as sacrosanct as the geocentric universe was to the medieval church attacked it! Instead of disproving Arrow, similar impossibility theorems, no-cloning theorems, etc., have been established in quantum information theory and quantum mechanics.

Devising an electoral scheme is mathematically equivalent to an apportionment scheme. Instead of allocating seats on the basis of population (i.e., “The People”), one may consider allocating “seats” on the basis of votes. This leads to models based on proportional representation (PR) instead of apportionment.

Mathematicians have shown that PR leads to even more serious negative consequences than apportionment. A variety of paradoxes of the Blinsky and Young type have been established. A very serious conclusion is that even the mildest PR system will confer a disproportionate amount of power to the third largest party in parliament! The third largest party becomes the king maker and often comes into a coalition with the second-ranking party to become the government! The validity of these results from game theory in practical politics has been established by studies of the history of governments in Germany, Israel and Denmark where high levels of proportional government have been legislated.

In my opinion, a way around these problems is to abandon electoral methods and return to the method of SORTITION advocated by Aristotle and used in several Hellenic cities during the time of Pericles.

Sortition has been adopted today in various limited ways, especially for local or provincial governments, in Ireland, France, Belgium, Canada and even Mongolia. In the simplest sortition model one arbitrarily selects by lottery a group of people who constitute the parliament. While these legislators last only five or six years, it is the administrative service that persists. The sortition parliament is not claimed to represent the “will of the people”. The lottery may be open to all the people, or only to a selection defined by their public service, education etc., as specified by a parliament chosen initially by simple sortition. That is, the first sortition parliament may enact more elaborate sortition models, but ensuring that the random element implied by sortition is never negated.

The sortition model ensures that the same set of corrupt politicians do not continue to get elected every time by controlling the list of candidates as well as the vote-gathering infrastructure which favours existing parties that have accumulated much wealth, by hook or crook. It also eliminates demagogues as the election is by lottery.

In other words, SORTITION ensures that a “system change” occurs every time. It ensures that political crooks, their henchmen and progeny do not entrench themselves and hold onto power over decades and decades, be it in the North or the South. I had given a discussion of the sortition model in a previous article in the Island (02-01-2023). It may also be accessed via the web (https://thuppahis.com/2023/01/02/crunchtime-resolving-sri-lankas-political-dilemma/ The applicability of the sortition model to the political problems in the USA has been discussed in the Harvard Review of politics (https://harvardpolitics.com/sortition-in-america/).



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Opinion

War with Iran and unravelling of the global order – II

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A US airstrike on Iran

Broader Strategic Consequences

One of the most significant strategic consequences of the war is the accelerated erosion of U.S. political and moral hegemony. This is not a sudden phenomenon precipitated solely by the present conflict; rather, the war has served to illuminate an already evolving global reality—that the era of uncontested U.S. dominance is in decline. The resurgence of Donald Trump and the reassertion of his “America First” doctrine reflect deep-seated domestic economic and political challenges within the United States. These internal pressures have, in turn, shaped a more unilateral and inward-looking foreign policy posture, further constraining Washington’s capacity to exercise global leadership.

Moreover, the conduct of the war has significantly undermined the political and moral authority of the United States. Perceived violations of international humanitarian law, coupled with the selective application of international norms, have weakened the credibility of U.S. advocacy for a “rules-based international order.” Such inconsistencies have reinforced perceptions of double standards, particularly among states in the Global South. Skepticism toward Western normative leadership is expected to deepen, contributing to the gradual fragmentation of the international system. In this broader context, the ongoing crisis can be seen as symptomatic of a more fundamental transformation: the progressive waning of a global order historically anchored in U.S. hegemony and the emergence of a more contested and pluralistic international landscape.

The regional implications of the crisis are likely to be profound, particularly given the centrality of the Persian Gulf to the global political economy. As a critical hub of energy production and maritime trade, instability in this region carries systemic consequences that extend far beyond its immediate geography. Whatever may be the outcome, whether through the decisive weakening of Iran or the inability of external powers to dismantle its leadership and strategic capabilities, the post-conflict regional order will differ markedly from its pre-war configuration. In this evolving context, traditional power hierarchies, alliance structures, and deterrence dynamics are likely to undergo significant recalibration.

A key lesson underscored by the war is the deep interconnectivity of the contemporary global economic order. In an era of highly integrated production networks and supply chains, disruptions in a single strategic node can generate cascading effects across the global system. As such, regional conflicts increasingly assume global significance. The structural realities of globalisation make it difficult to contain economic and strategic shocks within regional boundaries, as impacts rapidly transmit through trade, energy, and financial networks. In this context, peace and stability are no longer purely regional concerns but global public goods, essential to the functioning and resilience of the international system

The conflict highlights the emergence of a new paradigm of warfare shaped by the integration of artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, and unmanned systems. The extensive use of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs)—a trend previously demonstrated in the Russia–Ukraine War—has been further validated in this theatre. However, unlike the Ukraine conflict, where Western powers have provided sustained military, technological, and financial backing, the present confrontation reflects a more direct asymmetry between a dominant global hegemon and a Global South state. Iran’s deployment of drone swarms and AI-enabled targeting systems illustrates that key elements of Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) warfare are no longer confined to technologically advanced Western states. These capabilities are increasingly accessible to Global South actors, lowering barriers to entry and significantly enhancing their capacity to wage effective asymmetric warfare. In this evolving context, technological diffusion is reshaping the strategic landscape, challenging traditional military hierarchies and altering the balance between conventional superiority and innovative, cost-effective combat strategies.

The war further exposed and deepened the weakening of global governance institutions, particularly the United Nations. Many of these institutions were established in 1945, reflecting the balance of power and geopolitical realities of the immediate post-Second World War era. However, the profound transformations in the international system since then have rendered aspects of this institutional architecture increasingly outdated and less effective.

The war has underscored the urgent need for comprehensive international governance reforms to ensure that international institutions remain credible, representative, and capable of addressing contemporary security challenges. The perceived ineffectiveness of UN human rights mechanisms in responding to violations of international humanitarian law—particularly in contexts such as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and more recently in Iran—has amplified calls for institutional renewal or the development of alternative frameworks for maintaining international peace and security. Moreover, the selective enforcement of international law and the persistent paralysis in conflict resolution mechanisms risk accelerating the fragmentation of global norms. If sustained, this trajectory would signal not merely the weakening but the possible demise of the so-called liberal international order, accelerating the erosion of both the legitimacy and the effective authority of existing multilateral institutions, and deepening the crisis of global governance.

Historically, major wars have often served as harbingers of new eras in international politics, marking painful yet decisive transitions from one order to another. Periods of systemic decline are typically accompanied by instability, uncertainty, and profound disruption; yet, it is through such crises that the contours of an emerging order begin to take shape. The present conflict appears to reflect such a moment of transition, where the strains within the existing global system are becoming increasingly visible.

Notably, key European powers are exhibiting a gradual shift away from exclusive reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, seeking instead a more autonomous and assertive role in global affairs. At the same time, the war is likely to create strategic space for China to expand its influence. As the United States becomes more deeply entangled militarily and politically, China may consolidate its position as a stabilising economic actor and an alternative strategic partner. This could be reflected in intensified energy diplomacy, expanded infrastructure investments, and a more proactive role in regional conflict management, advancing Beijing’s long-term objective of reshaping global governance structures.

However, this transition does not imply a simple replacement of Pax Americana with Pax Sinica. Rather, the emerging global order is likely to be more diffuse, pluralistic, and multilateral in character. In this sense, the ongoing transformation aligns with broader narratives of an “Asian Century,” in which power is redistributed across multiple centers rather than concentrated in a single hegemon. The war, therefore, may ultimately be understood not merely as a geopolitical crisis, but as a defining inflection point in the reconfiguration of the global order.

Conclusion: A New Era on the Horizon

History shows that major wars often signal the birth of new eras—painful, disruptive, yet transformative. The present conflict is no exception. It has exposed the vulnerabilities of the existing world order, challenged U.S. dominance, and revealed the limits of established global governance.

European powers are beginning to chart a more independent course, reducing reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, while China is poised to expand its influence as an economic stabiliser and strategic partner. Through energy diplomacy, infrastructure investments, and active engagement in regional conflicts, Beijing is quietly shaping the contours of a more multipolar world. Yet this is not the rise of Pax Sinica replacing Pax Americana. The emerging order is likely to be multilateral, fluid, and competitive—a world in which multiple powers, old and new, share the stage. The war, in all its turbulence, may therefore mark the dawn of a genuinely new global era, one where uncertainty coexists with opportunity, and where the next chapter of international politics is being written before our eyes.

by Gamini Keerawella
(First part of this article appeared yesterday (08 April)

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Opinion

University admission crisis: Academics must lead the way

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130,000 students are left out each year—academics hold the key

Each year, Sri Lanka’s G.C.E. Advanced Level examination produces a wave of hope—this year, nearly 175,000 students qualified for university entrance. Yet only 45,000 will be admitted to state universities. That leaves more than 130,000 young people stranded—qualified, ambitious, but excluded. This is not just a statistic; it is a national crisis. And while policymakers debate infrastructure and funding, the country’s academics must step forward as catalysts of change.

Beyond the Numbers: A National Responsibility

Education is the backbone of Sri Lanka’s development. Denying access to tens of thousands of qualified students risks wasting talent, fueling inequality, and undermining national progress. The gap is not simply about seats in lecture halls—it is about the future of a generation. Academics, as custodians of knowledge, cannot remain passive observers. They must reimagine the delivery of higher education to ensure opportunity is not a privilege for the few.

Expanding Pathways, Not Just Campuses

The traditional model of four-year degrees in brick-and-mortar universities cannot absorb the demand. Academics can design short-term diplomas and certificate programmes that provide immediate access to learning. These programmes, focused on employable skills, would allow thousands to continue their education while easing pressure on degree programmes. Equally important is the digital transformation of education. Online and blended learning modules can extend access to rural students, breaking the monopoly of physical campuses. With academic leadership, Sri Lanka can build a reliable system of credit transfers, enabling students to begin their studies at affiliated institutions and later transfer to state universities.

Partnerships That Protect Quality

Private universities and vocational institutes already absorb many students who miss out on state admissions. But concerns about quality and recognition persist. Academics can bridge this divide by providing quality assurance and standardised curricula, supervising joint degree programmes, and expanding the Open University system. These partnerships would ensure that students outside the state system receive affordable, credible, and internationally recognised education.

Research and Advocacy: Shaping Policy

Academics are not only teachers—they are researchers and thought leaders. By conducting labour market studies, they can align higher education expansion with employability. Evidence-based recommendations to the University Grants Commission (UGC) can guide strategic intake increases, regional university expansion, and government investment in digital infrastructure. In this way, academics can ensure reforms are not reactive, but visionary.

Industry Engagement: Learning Beyond the Classroom

Sri Lanka’s universities must become entrepreneurship hubs and innovation labs. Academics can design programmes that connect students directly with industries, offering internship-based learning and applied research opportunities. This approach reduces reliance on classroom capacity while equipping students with practical skills. It also reframes education as a partnership between universities and the economy, rather than a closed system.

Making the Most of What We Have

Even within existing constraints, academics can expand capacity. Training junior lecturers and adjunct faculty, sharing facilities across universities, and building international collaborations for joint programmes and scholarships are practical steps. These measures maximise resources while opening new avenues for students.

A Call to Action

Sri Lanka’s university admission crisis is not just about numbers—it is about fairness, opportunity, and national development. Academics must lead the way in transforming exclusion into empowerment. By expanding pathways, strengthening partnerships, advocating for policy reform, engaging with industry, and optimizing resources, they can ensure that qualified students are not left behind.

“Education for all, not just the fortunate few.”

Dr. Arosh Bandula (Ph.D. Nottingham), Senior Lecturer, Department of Agricultural Economics & Agribusiness, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Ruhuna

by Dr. Arosh Bandula

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Opinion

Post-Easter Sri Lanka: Between memory, narrative, and National security

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As Sri Lanka approaches the seventh commemoration of the Easter Sunday attacks, the national mood is once again marked by grief, reflection, and an enduring sense of incompleteness. Nearly seven years later, the tragedy continues to cast a long shadow not only over the victims and their families, but over the institutions and narratives that have since emerged.

Commemoration, however, must go beyond ritual. It must be anchored in clarity, accountability, and restraint. What is increasingly evident in the post-Easter landscape is not merely a search for truth, but a contest over how that truth is framed, interpreted, and presented to the public.

In recent times, public discourse has been shaped by book launches, panel discussions, and media interventions that claim to offer new insights into the attacks. While such contributions are not inherently problematic, the manner in which certain narratives are advanced raises legitimate concerns. The selective disclosure of information particularly when it touches on intelligence operations demands careful scrutiny.

Sri Lanka’s legal and institutional framework is clear on the sensitivity of such matters. The Official Secrets Act (No. 32 of 1955) places strict obligations on the handling of information related to national security. Similarly, the Police Ordinance and internal administrative regulations governing intelligence units emphasize confidentiality, chain of command, and the responsible use of information. These are not mere formalities; they exist to safeguard both operational integrity and national interest.

When individual particularly those with prior access to intelligence structures enter the public domain with claims that are not subject to verification, it raises critical questions. Are these disclosures contributing to justice and accountability, or are they inadvertently compromising institutional credibility and future operational capacity?

The challenge lies in distinguishing between constructive transparency and selective exposure.

The Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Easter Sunday Attacks provided one of the most comprehensive official examinations of the attacks. Its findings highlighted a complex web of failures: lapses in intelligence sharing, breakdowns in inter-agency coordination, and serious deficiencies in political oversight. Importantly, it underscored that the attacks were not the result of a single point of failure, but a systemic collapse across multiple levels of governance.

Yet, despite the existence of such detailed institutional findings, public discourse often gravitates toward simplified narratives. There is a tendency to identify singular “masterminds” or to attribute responsibility in ways that align with prevailing political or ideological positions. While such narratives may be compelling, they risk obscuring the deeper structural issues that enabled the attacks to occur.

Equally significant is the broader socio-political context in which these narratives are unfolding. Sri Lanka today remains a society marked by fragile intercommunal relations. The aftermath of the Easter attacks saw heightened suspicion, polarisation, and, in some instances, collective blame directed at entire communities. Although there have been efforts toward reconciliation, these fault lines have not entirely disappeared.

In this environment, the language and tone of public discourse carry immense weight. The framing of terrorism whether as a localized phenomenon or as part of a broader ideological construct must be handled with precision and responsibility. Overgeneralization or the uncritical use of labels can have far-reaching consequences, including the marginalization of communities and the erosion of social cohesion.

At the same time, it is essential to acknowledge that the global discourse on terrorism is itself contested. Competing narratives, geopolitical interests, and selective historiography often shape how events are interpreted. For Sri Lanka, the challenge is to avoid becoming a passive recipient of external frameworks that may not fully reflect its own realities.

A professional and unbiased approach requires a commitment to evidence-based analysis. This includes:

· Engaging with primary sources, including official reports and judicial findings
·

· Cross-referencing claims with verifiable data
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· Recognizing the limits of publicly available information, particularly in intelligence matters

It also requires intellectual discipline the willingness to question assumptions, to resist convenient conclusions, and to remain open to complexity.

The role of former officials and subject-matter experts in this discourse is particularly important. Their experience can provide valuable insights, but it also carries a responsibility. Public interventions must be guided by professional ethics, respect for institutional boundaries, and an awareness of the potential impact on national security.

There is a fine balance to be maintained. On one hand, democratic societies require transparency and accountability. On the other, the premature or uncontextualized release of sensitive information can undermine the very systems that are meant to protect the public.

As Sri Lanka reflects on the events of April 2019, it must resist the temptation to reduce a national tragedy into competing narratives or political instruments. The pursuit of truth must be methodical, inclusive, and grounded in law.

Easter is not only a moment of remembrance. It is a test of institutional maturity and societal resilience.

The real question is not whether new narratives will emerge they inevitably will. The question is whether Sri Lanka has the capacity to engage with them critically, responsibly, and in a manner that strengthens, rather than weakens, the foundations of its national security and social harmony.

In the end, justice is not served by noise or conjecture. It is served by patience, rigor, and an unwavering commitment to truth.

Mahil Dole is a former senior law enforcement officer and national security analyst, with over four decades of experience in policing and intelligence, including serving as Head of Counter-Intelligence at the State Intelligence Service of Sri Lanka and a graduate of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawai, USA.

by Mahil Dole
Former Senior Law Enforcement Officer National Security Analyst; Former Head of Counter-Intelligence, State Intelligence Service)

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