Features
Promoting Reconciliation and Accountability in Sri Lanka
By Neville Ladduwahetty
From 2012, Reconciliation and Accountability have been the twin pillars of the series of Resolutions that emerged from the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. Perhaps, the thinking of those who developed the formula of linking Reconciliation with Accountability was guided by the notion that an effective accountability process that holds some members of the security forces and the associated leaders accountable and punished would somehow ease the humiliation of defeat, and make the painful processes of healing and eventual reconciliation more tolerable.
In general, this notion presumes that retributive justice would promote reconciliation. The presumption of such an outcome is not an assured given because the possibility exists for the positions of the parties hoping to reconcile to harden to a point of defeating the intended objective of reconciliation if retributive processes and their outcomes are perceived as being vindictive. Thus, the contemplated accountability exercise has the potential to be counterproductive depending on the context in which it is conducted.
SRI LANKAN EXPERIENCE
In the case of Sri Lanka, this theory could not be put to the test because the retributive process could not even get started. The reason for this being that those who devised the process overextended themselves and wanted the accountability process to be so effective that they conceived only a judicial mechanism that involved foreign judges, prosecutor etc. would achieve the intended objectives. The fact that such an arrangement would involve amending existing Laws and provisions in the Constitution, to the extent of requiring a two-third approval by Parliament and approval by the People at a referendum, escaped their attention.
This was brought to the attention of the Human Rights Council in March 2019 by the then Foreign Minister Tilak Marapana.
“The Government of Sri Lanka at the highest political levels, has both publicly and in discussions with the present and former High Commissioner for Human Rights and other interlocutors, explained the constitutional and legal challenges that preclude it from including non-citizens in its judicial processes. It has been explained that if non-citizen judges are to be appointed in such a process, it will not be possible without an amendment to the Constitution by 2/3 of members of the Parliament voting in favour and also the approval of the people at a referendum”.
This gave the present Government legitimate grounds to withdraw from the co-sponsorship of UNHRC Resolution 30/1 in terms of Article 46 of the Vienna Convention 1969, which in essence states that a State may invalidate its consent to a Treaty if it violates a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance such as a Constitution of a sovereign State.
CURRENT SITUATION
Currently, the accountability process is at a stand-still because of the failure of the approach adopted. However, what exists is a collective body of material available in Reports prepared externally by the Panel of Experts appointed by the UN Secretary General and by the Office of the Human Rights Commission in Geneva together with internal Reports of Commissions of Inquiry appointed by the Government of Sri Lanka such as the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), and the Paranagama Commission that included International Experts.
This body of material has been reviewed from two distinct perspectives. Since the mandate to the LLRC was primarily to promote national unity and reconciliation among communities, its Report gives emphasis to Human Rights as reflected in paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3 cited below. On the other hand, the other Reports reflect a perspective that is based on International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as the applicable Law since the conflict had reached the threshold of a non-International Armed Conflict. Consequently, the material reviewed from a Human Rights perspective is bound to be different to a review based on IHL. Of the several reasons for this difference the most significant is that the LLRC viewed the conflict as between a State (GoSL) and a non-state actor (LTTE), thereby holding the State to a higher level of accountability than the LTTE, while under the perspective of IHL, responsibilities are shared equally as parties to an Armed Conflict. This makes the conclusions drawn from the respective perspectives different.
Paragraph 5.2 states: “Being a party to the following seven core international human rights instruments, Sri Lanka has given obligations under these Conventions through legislative measures, including the Constitution as well as executive and administrative measures”
Paragraph 5.3 states: “Sri Lanka therefore has constitutional and international obligations for the effective national implementation of these core conventions both during times of peace and war, and in the latter situation, together with applicable International Humanitarian Law…”.
It is therefore evident from the foregoing that the LLRC emphasis is on Human Rights with “applicable International Humanitarian Law’ during times of war. Had the LLRC recognized that it was a non-International Armed Conflict from the day the Cease Fire Agreement was signed as two parties recognized nationally and internationally to the conflict, the accepted applicable Law should have been International Humanitarian Law coupled with seriously derogated Human Rights during an Armed Conflict. This interpretation is reflected in the Sri Lankan Constitution and in the relevant Conventions during an Emergency as in the case of an Armed Conflict. The failure of the LLRC to recognize that it was a non-International Armed Conflict is the significant reason for its perspective to be different to the other Reports cited above.
LLRC’s INTERPRETATION of ACCOUNTABILITY
The material presented below are extracts from Chapter 9 of the LLRC Report titled “Summary of Principal Observations and Recommendations”. Since the two primary charges against the Government and the Security Forces are the excessive use of force and the inadequacies in the delivery of humanitarian aid, the two related sub-section from the LLRC Report presented below are: (1) “Measures to safeguard civilians and avoid civilian casualties” and (2) “Supply of humanitarian relief, including food and medicine to civilians in conflict zone”.
“Measures to safeguard…and No-Fire Zones”:
Paragraph 9.4: “In evaluating the Sri Lankan experience in the context of allegations of violations of IHL, the Commission is satisfied that the military strategy that was adopted to secure the LTTE held areas was one that was carefully conceived, in which the protection of the civilian population was given the highest priority…”
9.7 Having reached the above conclusion, it is also incumbent on the Commission to consider the question, while there is no deliberate targeting of civilians by the Security Forces, whether the action of the Security Forces of returning fire into the NFZs was excessive in the context of the Principle of Proportionality…”
COMMENT: The two fundamental principles of International Humanitarian Law are: Distinction and Proportionality. Without Distinction as to who is a combatant and who is a civilian to question whether the military response was proportionate or excessive cannot be ascertained. Since the LLRC Report admits that the LTTE shed their uniforms during the final states of the conflict, the question of distinguishing a civilian from a combatant is not possible, which means the principle of Proportionality cannot be applied. Furthermore, the comment that the Security Forces were “RETURNING fire to the NFZs” makes clear that it was the LTTE in the NFZs that initiated the firing. Despite the obvious presence of LTTE combatants, the LLRC Report makes no reference to them and refers to ALL as civilians.
Therefore, to categorize ALL in the NFZs as civilians and to question whether the return of fire was excessive in the context of the Principle of Proportionality that has no applicability in the particular circumstances, is seriously flawed.
In regard to “Hospitals/Makeshift Hospitals paragraph 9.12 (b) of the LLRC report states: “None of the persons making representations was able to state with certainty that they were in a position to definitely confirm that the shells which fell on the hospitals, originated exclusively from the side of the Sri Lankan Army or from the LTTE…Another ex-LTTE cadre…stated that the Puthumatthalan hospital was in fact accidentally shelled by the LTTE for which they had subsequently apologized”.
Supply of Humanitarian Relief
Paragraph 9.15: “The Commission notes that the supply of food to the civilians held by the LTTE up to early 2009 was at reasonably adequate levels…However, these adequacy levels appear to have declined during the months of February, March, April and the first half of May 2009…”
Paragraph 9.16: “It must be acknowledged that the maximum quantities of food supplies, that were possible…due to the collective efforts of the Government of Sri Lanka, in particular the GAs and the Security Forces as well as international agencies such as the ICRC and WFP, and other volunteers who had provided selfless service on the spot in the No Fire Zone”.
The impression conveyed in the above comments is that the Government of Sri Lanka was responsible for and obligated to supply humanitarian relief to All in the No Fire Zone. Since it was not possible to separate combatants from civilians, this meant supplying humanitarian aid including medical supplies to the LTTE and engaging with them in an Armed Conflict, simultaneously. Such a flawed expectation is a result of the confused perspective adopted by the Commission as to the role of the Government. How could the Government be a party to the conflict and be a provider of humanitarian aid both at the same time?
COMMENT: Had the LLRC accepted IHL as the applicable Law, they would not have held the Government of Sri Lanka accountable for the “decline” in the supply of relief. The reason for including the Government in the list of those responsible for the supply of humanitarian relief is because their understanding of the Government’s responsibilities was misplaced. The Commission fails to acknowledge that the Government as a party to the Armed Conflict, should not be expected to supply aid of any kind to the LTTE. Instead, what the Government was expected to do was ONLY to facilitate free passage of humanitarian aid to those affected by the Armed Conflict as per ICRC Rules 55 and 56 (Vol. 87, Number 857 March 2005).
Rule 55: “The parties to the conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse, distinction, subject to their right of control”
Rule 56: “The parties to the conflict must ensure the freedom of movement of authorized humanitarian relief personnel essential to the exercise of their functions. Only in the case of imperative necessity may their movements be temporarily restricted”.
PROPOSED STRATEGY
There are two basic approaches that Sri Lanka could take in presenting its case before the forthcoming sessions in Geneva. One approach is to plead its case by presenting all the available evidence from sources such as that of Lord Naseby, UN Reports, opinions of experts in the Paranagama Commission Report and any other sources challenging the alleged claims in the UNHRC Resolution 30/1. The other is to challenge the alleged violations on the basis of International Humanitarian Law, backed up with support material referred to above. Of these two approaches there is a greater likelihood of the latter approach being more acceptable because it has a more credible basis than the former.
CONCLUSION
When Sri Lanka placed on record at the March 2019 UNHRC sessions that it was withdrawing from the co-sponsorship of UNHRC Resolution 30/1, it undertook, among other undertakings, to appoint a Commission of Inquiry “to review the reports of previous Sri Lankan COIs which investigated alleged violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, to assess the status of implementation of their recommendations and to propose deliverable measures to implement them in keeping with the new Government’s policy”.
The plea to anyone engaged in fulfilling the commitment stated above is to declare at the very outset that its review of reports of previous COIs is based on the fact that the conflict in Sri Lanka that ended in May 2009 was a non-International Armed Conflict, as recognized by international law. Consequently, the review process should bear in mind that the applicable Law is International Humanitarian Law together with derogated Human Rights Laws as reflected in International Covenants and in Sri Lanka’s Constitution during an Emergency. Therefore, the alleged violations presented in these Reports should be assessed in the context of these Laws, backed up with support material such from UN Reports, evidence presented by Lord Naseby, opinions of experts in the Paranagama Commission Report, and by the ICRC, etc.. Since the Additional Protocol II of 1977 is accepted as part of Customary Law and the fact that it embodies all recognized provisions of non-International Armed Conflict, the provisions of the Protocol should guide the review process of alleged violations committed collectively or individually.
The review process should also identify which recommendations in the Commission of Inquiry Reports relating to Reconciliation are deliverable in keeping with Government policy. In this regard one measure that would make a significant difference to Reconciliation is to demand tangible outcomes from the Office of Missing Persons, bearing in mind that their work could be constrained by the non-cooperation of Member States if they fail to disclose the identities of persons missing from Sri Lanka and who are now living in their countries under altered identities.
The forthcoming sessions in Geneva would be a defining moment for Sri Lanka in its relations with the UNHRC. Therefore, the Government should conclude its review process well in time, in order to enable it to canvas support among the members of the UN Human Rights Council on the basis of the legitimacy of the approach taken and bring closure to Accountability. At the same time the UN Human Rights Council should permit Sri Lanka the time and space to address Reconciliation through processes that each country has to fashion because its uniqueness is special to every country, and no country or International Agency has a universal formula to bring about Reconciliation among communities in a country.
Neville Ladduwahetty
November 15, 2020.
Features
Rebuilding the country requires consultation
A positive feature of the government that is emerging is its responsiveness to public opinion. The manner in which it has been responding to the furore over the Grade 6 English Reader, in which a weblink to a gay dating site was inserted, has been constructive. Government leaders have taken pains to explain the mishap and reassure everyone concerned that it was not meant to be there and would be removed. They have been meeting religious prelates, educationists and community leaders. In a context where public trust in institutions has been badly eroded over many years, such responsiveness matters. It signals that the government sees itself as accountable to society, including to parents, teachers, and those concerned about the values transmitted through the school system.
This incident also appears to have strengthened unity within the government. The attempt by some opposition politicians and gender misogynists to pin responsibility for this lapse on Prime Minister Dr Harini Amarasuriya, who is also the Minister of Education, has prompted other senior members of the government to come to her defence. This is contrary to speculation that the powerful JVP component of the government is unhappy with the prime minister. More importantly, it demonstrates an understanding within the government that individual ministers should not be scapegoated for systemic shortcomings. Effective governance depends on collective responsibility and solidarity within the leadership, especially during moments of public controversy.
The continuing important role of the prime minister in the government is evident in her meetings with international dignitaries and also in addressing the general public. Last week she chaired the inaugural meeting of the Presidential Task Force to Rebuild Sri Lanka in the aftermath of Cyclone Ditwah. The composition of the task force once again reflects the responsiveness of the government to public opinion. Unlike previous mechanisms set up by governments, which were either all male or without ethnic minority representation, this one includes both, and also includes civil society representation. Decision-making bodies in which there is diversity are more likely to command public legitimacy.
Task Force
The Presidential Task Force to Rebuild Sri Lanka overlooks eight committees to manage different aspects of the recovery, each headed by a sector minister. These committees will focus on Needs Assessment, Restoration of Public Infrastructure, Housing, Local Economies and Livelihoods, Social Infrastructure, Finance and Funding, Data and Information Systems, and Public Communication. This structure appears comprehensive and well designed. However, experience from post-disaster reconstruction in countries such as Indonesia and Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami suggests that institutional design alone does not guarantee success. What matters equally is how far these committees engage with those on the ground and remain open to feedback that may complicate, slow down, or even challenge initial plans.
An option that the task force might wish to consider is to develop a linkage with civil society groups with expertise in the areas that the task force is expected to work. The CSO Collective for Emergency Relief has set up several committees that could be linked to the committees supervised by the task force. Such linkages would not weaken the government’s authority but strengthen it by grounding policy in lived realities. Recent findings emphasise the idea of “co-production”, where state and society jointly shape solutions in which sustainable outcomes often emerge when communities are treated not as passive beneficiaries but as partners in problem-solving.
Cyclone Ditwah destroyed more than physical infrastructure. It also destroyed communities. Some were swallowed by landslides and floods, while many others will need to be moved from their homes as they live in areas vulnerable to future disasters. The trauma of displacement is not merely material but social and psychological. Moving communities to new locations requires careful planning. It is not simply a matter of providing people with houses. They need to be relocated to locations and in a manner that permits communities to live together and to have livelihoods. This will require consultation with those who are displaced. Post-disaster evaluations have acknowledged that relocation schemes imposed without community consent often fail, leading to abandonment of new settlements or the emergence of new forms of marginalisation. Even today, abandoned tsunami housing is to be seen in various places that were affected by the 2004 tsunami.
Malaiyaha Tamils
The large-scale reconstruction that needs to take place in parts of the country most severely affected by Cyclone Ditwah also brings an opportunity to deal with the special problems of the Malaiyaha Tamil population. These are people of recent Indian origin who were unjustly treated at the time of Independence and denied rights of citizenship such as land ownership and the vote. This has been a festering problem and a blot on the conscience of the country. The need to resettle people living in those parts of the hill country which are vulnerable to landslides is an opportunity to do justice by the Malaiyaha Tamil community. Technocratic solutions such as high-rise apartments or English-style townhouses that have or are being contemplated may be cost-effective, but may also be culturally inappropriate and socially disruptive. The task is not simply to build houses but to rebuild communities.
The resettlement of people who have lost their homes and communities requires consultation with them. In the same manner, the education reform programme, of which the textbook controversy is only a small part, too needs to be discussed with concerned stakeholders including school teachers and university faculty. Opening up for discussion does not mean giving up one’s own position or values. Rather, it means recognising that better solutions emerge when different perspectives are heard and negotiated. Consultation takes time and can be frustrating, particularly in contexts of crisis where pressure for quick results is intense. However, solutions developed with stakeholder participation are more resilient and less costly in the long run.
Rebuilding after Cyclone Ditwah, addressing historical injustices faced by the Malaiyaha Tamil community, advancing education reform, changing the electoral system to hold provincial elections without further delay and other challenges facing the government, including national reconciliation, all require dialogue across differences and patience with disagreement. Opening up for discussion is not to give up on one’s own position or values, but to listen, to learn, and to arrive at solutions that have wider acceptance. Consultation needs to be treated as an investment in sustainability and legitimacy and not as an obstacle to rapid decisionmaking. Addressing the problems together, especially engagement with affected parties and those who work with them, offers the best chance of rebuilding not only physical infrastructure but also trust between the government and people in the year ahead.
by Jehan Perera
Features
PSTA: Terrorism without terror continues
When the government appointed a committee, led by Rienzie Arsekularatne, Senior President’s Counsel, to draft a new law to replace the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), as promised by the ruling NPP, the writer, in an article published in this journal in July 2025, expressed optimism that, given Arsekularatne’s experience in criminal justice, he would be able to address issues from the perspectives of the State, criminal justice, human rights, suspects, accused, activists, and victims. The draft Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PSTA), produced by the Committee, has been sharply criticised by individuals and organisations who expected a better outcome that aligns with modern criminal justice and human rights principles.
This article is limited to a discussion of the definition of terrorism. As the writer explained previously, the dangers of an overly broad definition go beyond conviction and increased punishment. Special laws on terrorism allow deviations from standard laws in areas such as preventive detention, arrest, administrative detention, restrictions on judicial decisions regarding bail, lengthy pre-trial detention, the use of confessions, superadded punishments, such as confiscation of property and cancellation of professional licences, banning organisations, and restrictions on publications, among others. The misuse of such laws is not uncommon. Drastic legislation, such as the PTA and emergency regulations, although intended to be used to curb intense violence and deal with emergencies, has been exploited to suppress political opposition.
International Standards
The writer’s basic premise is that, for an act to come within the definition of terrorism, it must either involve “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” or be committed to achieve an objective of an individual or organisation that uses “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” to realise its aims. The UN General Assembly has accepted that the threshold for a possible general offence of terrorism is the provocation of “a state of terror” (Resolution 60/43). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has taken a similar view, using the phrase “to create a climate of terror.”
In his 2023 report on the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the Secretary-General warned that vague and overly broad definitions of terrorism in domestic law, often lacking adequate safeguards, violate the principle of legality under international human rights law. He noted that such laws lead to heavy-handed, ineffective, and counterproductive counter-terrorism practices and are frequently misused to target civil society actors and human rights defenders by labelling them as terrorists to obstruct their work.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has stressed in its Handbook on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism that definitions of terrorist acts must use precise and unambiguous language, narrowly define punishable conduct and clearly distinguish it from non-punishable behaviour or offences subject to other penalties. The handbook was developed over several months by a team of international experts, including the writer, and was finalised at a workshop in Vienna.
Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2023
A five-member Bench of the Supreme Court that examined the Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2023, agreed with the petitioners that the definition of terrorism in the Bill was too broad and infringed Article 12(1) of the Constitution, and recommended that an exemption (“carve out”) similar to that used in New Zealand under which “the fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy, or dissent, or engages in any strike, lockout, or other industrial action, is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for inferring that the person” committed the wrongful acts that would otherwise constitute terrorism.
While recognising the Court’s finding that the definition was too broad, the writer argued, in his previous article, that the political, administrative, and law enforcement cultures of the country concerned are crucial factors to consider. Countries such as New Zealand are well ahead of developing nations, where the risk of misuse is higher, and, therefore, definitions should be narrower, with broader and more precise exemptions. How such a “carve out” would play out in practice is uncertain.
In the Supreme Court, it was submitted that for an act to constitute an offence, under a special law on terrorism, there must be terror unleashed in the commission of the act, or it must be carried out in pursuance of the object of an organisation that uses terror to achieve its objectives. In general, only acts that aim at creating “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” should come under the definition of terrorism. There can be terrorism-related acts without violence, for example, when a member of an extremist organisation remotely sabotages an electronic, automated or computerised system in pursuance of the organisation’s goal. But when the same act is committed by, say, a whizz-kid without such a connection, that would be illegal and should be punished, but not under a special law on terrorism. In its determination of the Bill, the Court did not address this submission.
PSTA Proposal
Proposed section 3(1) of the PSTA reads:
Any person who, intentionally or knowingly, commits any act which causes a consequence specified in subsection (2), for the purpose of-
(a) provoking a state of terror;
(b) intimidating the public or any section of the public;
(c) compelling the Government of Sri Lanka, or any other Government, or an international organisation, to do or to abstain from doing any act; or
(d) propagating war, or violating territorial integrity or infringing the sovereignty of Sri Lanka or any other sovereign country, commits the offence of terrorism.
The consequences listed in sub-section (2) include: death; hurt; hostage-taking; abduction or kidnapping; serious damage to any place of public use, any public property, any public or private transportation system or any infrastructure facility or environment; robbery, extortion or theft of public or private property; serious risk to the health and safety of the public or a section of the public; serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with, any electronic or automated or computerised system or network or cyber environment of domains assigned to, or websites registered with such domains assigned to Sri Lanka; destruction of, or serious damage to, religious or cultural property; serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with any electronic, analogue, digital or other wire-linked or wireless transmission system, including signal transmission and any other frequency-based transmission system; without lawful authority, importing, exporting, manufacturing, collecting, obtaining, supplying, trafficking, possessing or using firearms, offensive weapons, ammunition, explosives, articles or things used in the manufacture of explosives or combustible or corrosive substances and biological, chemical, electric, electronic or nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices, nuclear material, radioactive substances, or radiation-emitting devices.
Under section 3(5), “any person who commits an act which constitutes an offence under the nine international treaties on terrorism, ratified by Sri Lanka, also commits the offence of terrorism.” No one would contest that.
The New Zealand “carve-out” is found in sub-section (4): “The fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy or dissent or engages in any strike, lockout or other industrial action, is not by itself a sufficient basis for inferring that such person (a) commits or attempts, abets, conspires, or prepares to commit the act with the intention or knowledge specified in subsection (1); or (b) is intending to cause or knowingly causes an outcome specified in subsection (2).”
While the Arsekularatne Committee has proposed, including the New Zealand “carve out”, it has ignored a crucial qualification in section 5(2) of that country’s Terrorism Suppression Act, that for an act to be considered a terrorist act, it must be carried out for one or more purposes that are or include advancing “an ideological, political, or religious cause”, with the intention of either intimidating a population or coercing or forcing a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act.
When the Committee was appointed, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka opined that any new offence with respect to “terrorism” should contain a specific and narrow definition of terrorism, such as the following: “Any person who by the use of force or violence unlawfully targets the civilian population or a segment of the civilian population with the intent to spread fear among such population or segment thereof in furtherance of a political, ideological, or religious cause commits the offence of terrorism”.
The writer submits that, rather than bringing in the requirement of “a political, ideological, or religious cause”, it would be prudent to qualify proposed section 3(1) by the requirement that only acts that aim at creating “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” or are carried out to achieve a goal of an individual or organisation that employs “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” to attain its objectives should come under the definition of terrorism. Such a threshold is recognised internationally; no “carve out” is then needed, and the concerns of the Human Rights Commission would also be addressed.
by Dr. Jayampathy Wickramaratne
President’s Counsel
Features
ROCK meets REGGAE 2026
We generally have in our midst the famous JAYASRI twins, Rohitha and Rohan, who are based in Austria but make it a point to entertain their fans in Sri Lanka on a regular basis.
Well, rock and reggae fans get ready for a major happening on 28th February (Oops, a special day where I’m concerned!) as the much-awaited ROCK meets REGGAE event booms into action at the Nelum Pokuna outdoor theatre.
It was seven years ago, in 2019, that the last ROCK meets REGGAE concert was held in Colombo, and then the Covid scene cropped up.

Chitral Somapala with BLACK MAJESTY
This year’s event will feature our rock star Chitral Somapala with the Australian Rock+Metal band BLACK MAJESTY, and the reggae twins Rohitha and Rohan Jayalath with the original JAYASRI – the full band, with seven members from Vienna, Austria.
According to Rohitha, the JAYASRI outfit is enthusiastically looking forward to entertaining music lovers here with their brand of music.
Their playlist for 28th February will consist of the songs they do at festivals in Europe, as well as originals, and also English and Sinhala hits, and selected covers.
Says Rohitha: “We have put up a great team, here in Sri Lanka, to give this event an international setting and maintain high standards, and this will be a great experience for our Sri Lankan music lovers … not only for Rock and Reggae fans. Yes, there will be some opening acts, and many surprises, as well.”

Rohitha, Chitral and Rohan: Big scene at ROCK meets REGGAE
Rohitha and Rohan also conveyed their love and festive blessings to everyone in Sri Lanka, stating “This Christmas was different as our country faced a catastrophic situation and, indeed, it’s a great time to help and share the real love of Jesus Christ by helping the poor, the needy and the homeless people. Let’s RISE UP as a great nation in 2026.”
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