Midweek Review

Province-based Devolution in Sri Lanka: a Critique

Published

6 years ago

2020/12/16

Sahan Weerasooriya

by G H Peiris

1. Preamble

This article is prompted by the recent announcement that the Cabinet will soon consider a proposal to conduct Provincial Council (PC) elections without delay. The article is intended to urge that the PC system should be abolished and replaced by constitutional devices to ensure: (a) genuine sharing of political power among all primordial, áscriptive and associational groups that constitute the nation of Sri Lanka; and (b) the statutory protection of Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and territorial integrity which the PC system, as long as it is permitted to last, will remain in dire peril. The article is also intended to stimulate the memory of those who appear to have forgotten the circumstances that culminated in the enactment of legislation in 1987 to establish PCs. There appears to prevail a measure of complacency among some of our present political stalwarts based on the notion that, with their two-thirds majority in Parliament, and with the 20th Amendment in place, they ought to let the status quo remain intact. This, I think, is quite silly. Apart from the fact that landslide electoral victories tend often to be brittle, those who were in the forefront of empowering the present regime are already reacting with dismay to the decision to re-establish the PCs.

2. Indo-Lanka Accord – the Indian Intervention

It is often forgotten that the government of India employed the most diabolical forms of diplomatic, military and economic coercion a powerful country could conceivably brought to bear upon a supposedly friendly nation with which it shares many cultural traits.

Omitting (for the sake of brevity) the vicissitudinous political career of Smt. Indira Gandhi during the 1970s, my elaboration of the foregoing observation begins with the commencement of her second spell of office as Prime Minister of India (January 1980 to October 1984) in the course of which she made no secret about her intense antipathy towards the JRJ-led government of Sri Lanka. This prompted certain emissaries of the ‘Tamil United Liberation Front’ (TULF) to suggest to her the desirability of launching an armed intervention in Sri Lanka of the type she had so successfully achieved at the “Liberation” of Bangladesh in 1971. That did not happen, probably because the JRJ regime had the backing of the West and the tragic end of her life in 1984. Regarding her malignant imprint on the constitutional affairs of Sri Lanka, however, it is worth citing the testimony of J. N. Dixit, Delhi’s High Commissioner in Colombo when (in his own words) he was “… involved in the most important and critical phase of Indo-Lanka relations; a period during which India’s mediatory efforts reached its peak culminating in the signing of the Indo-Lanka Agreement of 29 July 1987”. (Dixit, 1998: xvi):

“Once Mrs. Gandhi decided to be supportive of the cause of Sri Lankan Tamils on the basis of Indian interests and strategic considerations, the rest of the process which culminated in the Indo-Lanka Agreement and the induction of the IPKF was more or less inevitable”. (emphasis added)

Several reasons, partly conjectural, have been adduced for Smt. Gandhi’s hostility towards the government of Sri Lanka. For instance, She might have been resentful of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy leanings towards the ‘West’, and the reciprocal support which JRJ was attracting in abundance from some of the leading global powers for the mammoth development projects being implemented within the framework of ‘economic liberalisation’. Another explanation is that, with the worsening of relations between the Federal government and State governments of Punjab, Kashmir, Assam and West Bengal, Smt. Gandhi placed priority on consolidating her electoral support in Tamilnadu, which meant, among other things, greater concern on the demands of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. My own hunch is that it was a Shakespearian display of “Hell hath no fury as a woman scorned” towards JRJ, allegedly for an absurd insult he had hurled at her in the course of an ‘After Dinner’ speech as the Janatha government’s PM, Moraji Desai’s, guest of honour.

Be that as it may, Smt. Gandhi began to provide clandestine aid (financial, material and training in guerrilla offensives) to groups of Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents, even after it was made public knowledge through prestigious Indian journals. This is relevant background to an understanding of the disastrous anti-Tamil riot that occurred in Sri Lanka in July 1983.

The riot caused extensive damage to life and property, and a massive displacement of the Sri Lankan Tamil population in the Sinhalese-majority areas ̶ one which included a large outflow of refugees from the country. It disrupted the economy aand brought the ‘liberalisation’ boom to an abrupt end. It tarnished the image of Sri Lanka abroad, generated a global tide of sympathy towards the Tamils, and attracted international attention and concern towards Tamil grievances. It paved the way for the direct intervention of India (untrammelled by pressures from the ‘West’) in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka, culminating in the introduction in 1987 of a massive Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF). It also represented a major turning point in the history of Tamil politics in Sri Lanka, with the militant groups and their strategy of armed confrontation and terrorism gaining ascendancy over the older Tamil political parties and their proclaimed commitments to peaceful agitation and protest. The militants became a power in their own right, abandoning their earlier role as the ‘boys’ of the Tamil leadership in the political mainstreams.

Indian Intervention after the Convulsions of ‘Black July’

Smt. Indira Gandhi’s offer to “mediate” in the Sri Lankan imbroglio (pre-empting other global powers from claiming that role) could not have been turned down by the beleaguered President Jayewardene.

The process of mediation commenced with the arrival of the Indian diplomat, Parthasarathi Rao. It took the form of coercing the Sri Lanka government to change its policy of decentralisation of ‘development administration’ to devolution of political power, and to change the spatial framework for such devolution from the District to the Province, along with an amalgamation of the Northern Province and the Eastern Province. His “mission” ended with the production of document referred to in subsequent negotiations as ‘Annexure C’ which he took back to Delhi. To what this document was annexed, and whether there were other “Annexures” are not known.

‘Annexure C’, and Sri Lanka government’s own proposals were presented to an ‘All Party Conference (APC) summoned by JRJ at which there was vehement opposition to certain sections of that Annexure. But the government extracted from the APC proceedings a draft Ordinance providing for (a) “a revitalised District Councils” system and (b) the establishment of a Second Chamber, and tabled the drafts for further dialogue with the TULF (the SLFP delegates having withdrawn from the APC). Up to about the end of the year, the TULF leadership maintained that the draft ordinance did form the basis of an acceptable settlement. But, thereafter, in a sudden volte-face, they rejected it outright.

Smt. Indira Gandhi was assassinated by Sikh militants on 31 October 1984. Her son, Rajiv was sworn in as PM later on the same day. Critics have maintained that this caused a change in Indo-Lanka relations in the sense that Rajiv tended to be less “imperial” than his late mother in his approach to conflict resolution both within and outside India.

Despite Rajiv’s affable demeanour, the policy transformation brought about by his succession was less tangible than what most observers would have us believe.

For instance:

(a) the Delhi government made available through the State government of Tamilnadu a grant of US$ 3.2 million to the LTTE leadership; (b) as Lalith Athulathmudali (Sri Lanka’s Minister of Security and Defence) had observed, a leaked RAW document indicated the continuing existence of training camps and bases for Sri Lankan Tamil separatist activists and; (c) despite repeated requests by JRJ, Delhi did not adopt coastal surveillance measures to curtail clandestine movement of people and commodities across Palk Strait.

Meanwhile the Tamil militants escalated their terrorist onslaught, the most horrendous event of which was the slaughter by LTTE operatives of 148 devotees (most of them elderly women) at the premises of the Sri Maha Bōdhi shrine in the sacred city of Anuradhapura, and another 16 civilians in the course of their retreat into the wilds of Wilpattu on May 14, 1985. There was media speculation that firearms used by the Tigers in this massacre were purchased by the LTTE with the aforesaid Indian grant.

Romesh Bhandari, Rajiv’s Foreign Secretary, initiated peace negotiations between the government and delegates of the secessionist groups at a forum staged in July/August 1985 in the capital of Bhutan, and thus labelled as the ‘Thimpu Talks’. It provided a forum to Tamil militants for worldwide propaganda for their ‘liberation’ demands that were set out as follows (lawyer N. Balendran acting as their spokesman):

“It is our considered view that any meaningful solution to the national question of the island must be based on the following four cardinal principles:

(1) Recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a distinct nationality,

(2) Recognition of an identified Tamil homeland and the guarantee of its territorial integrity,

(3) Based on the above, recognition of the inalienable right of self-determination of the Tamil nation,

(4) Recognition of the right to full citizenship and other fundamental democratic rights of all Tamils, who look upon the island as their home.”

The Sri Lanka delegation response, as presented by H. L. de Silva (recorded in Balendran’s monograph on the ‘Thimpu Talks’) was as follows:

“First, we observe that there is a wide range of meanings that can attach to the concepts and ideas embodied in the four principles, and our response to them would accordingly depend on the meaning and significance that is sought to be applied to them. Secondly, we must state quite emphatically that if the first three principles are to be taken at their face value and given their accepted legal meaning they are wholly unacceptable to the government. They must be rejected for the reason that they constitute a negation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka; they are detrimental to a united Sri Lanka and are inimical to the interests of the several communities, ethnic and religious in our country”.

The collapse of ‘Thimpu Talks’ prompted Bhandari, in barely concealed personal disgust at the arrogance and recalcitrance of Mr. Balendran and his entourage of secessionist militants, to summon a follow-up negotiations in Delhi at which he restricted Sri Lanka participation to delegates of the government and of the TULF. At the conclusion of that effort in August 1985 a document named the ‘Delhi Accord’, “initialled” by representatives of the two governments, was released to the media by India’s Foreign Office. It claimed that a measure of consensus was reached on ‘Province’ as the unit of devolution’ and on the powers to be devolved. The Delhi Accord was rejected by the LTTE. By the end of the year the TULF leadership had also rejected the ‘Delhi Accord’.

Thereafter there was a series of discussions between representatives of the two governments. A. P. Venkateswaran, appointed Foreign Secretary in January 1987, attempted unilaterally to make the ‘Delhi Accord’ more acceptable to the TULF by bringing the Accord offers close to a federal form of government.

Perhaps the greatest betrayal of the trust which the government of Sri Lanka had placed in the Rajiv regime was represented by Delhi’s reaction to the military campaign termed ‘Operation Liberation’ launched by the government on 26 May 1987 in the face of which the Tiger cadres, abandoned their Thalaivar’s bravado, and fled in disarray. An SOS appeal conveyed by the LTTE leadership to Tamilnadu resulted in a flotilla of fishing vessels sailing out in the guise of a “spontaneous” civilian response but, in fact, with the backing of the central and state governments. That maritime invasion was foiled by the Sri Lanka Nsavy. Thereupon, in a blatant violation of international law and Sri Lanka’s air space, a convoy of Mirage-2000 combat planes dropped 20 tons of food and medical supplies on Jaffna, ostensibly as a ‘mercy mission’, but in reality, a demonstration of what Delhi could do unless Sri Lanka obeys. At the commencement of ‘Operation Liberation’, Dixit informed Lalith Athulathmudali that India would not stand idly by if the Sri Lanka Army attempts to capture Jaffna (K. M. de Silva, 1994: 631).

The JRJ-Rajiv dialogue at the ‘SAARC Summit’ conducted at Bangalore in early 1987; discussions between Indian VIPs like Dinesh Singh and P. Chidambaran and Sri Lanka ministers like Lalith Athulathmudali, Gamini Dissanayake and A C S Hameed; and, more geerally, the enforcement of his will on senior bureaucrats in Colombo by J N Dixit (who, by this stage, had earned for himself the epithet ‘India’s Viceroy’) were among the Indo-Lanka interactions that brought about the signing of the agreement.

What I have sketched above is only the bare outline of how and why the aging President JRJ, nudging 80, succumbed to the ruthless Indian onslaught, disillusioned as he was, by the disintegration of his inner circle of loyalists, the aggressive extra-parliamentary campaign led by Sirimavo Bandaranaike, and the ethos of anarchy and violence created by the JVP whose oft repeated theme, disseminated through the calligraphically unique poster campaign, was ‘jay ăr maramu’ (‘let’s kill JR’). Soon after the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord, the JVP almost succeeded in doing that in a grenade attack on UNP parliamentary group meeting.

Indo-Lanka Accord’: Its Political Backdrop in Sri Lanka

Politics of insurrection gathered momentum in Jaffna at least from about a decade earlier than the signing of the said ‘Accord’ when the mainstream Tamil parties began to pursue a strategy of nurturing insurgent groups, and inculcating the notion of Sinhalese oppression (rather than inequities inherent to the mismanaged economy being experienced by all ethnic groups, and the blatant Caste-based oppression endemic to the Sri Lankan Tamil social milieu) being the root cause for their deprivations. It should also be recalled that the benefits of economic buoyancy that ushered in by the policy transformation of ‘liberalization of the economy’ from the earlier pseudo-socialist shackles, initiated by the government elected to office in 1977, were scarcely felt in the predominantly Tamil areas of the north.

It was in the context of intensifying turbulence that the leaders of Ilangai Tamil Arasi Kachchi (ITAK), All-Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) and Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) formed a coalition named the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). At its inaugural session conducted in May 1976, the TULF adopted the so-called ‘Vaddukodai Resolution’, the opening statement of which reads as follows:

“The convention resolves that the restoration and reconstitution of the Free, Sovereign, Secular state of TAMIL EELAM based on the right of self-determination inherent to every nation has become inevitable in order to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil Nation in this Country”.

The concluding paragraphs of that ‘Resolution’ (copied below) should, in retrospect, be understood as epitomising a formal decision to launch of an ‘Eelam War’.

“This convention calls upon its ‘LIBERATION FRONT’ to formulate a plan of action and launch without undue delay the struggle for winning the sovereignty and freedom of the Tamil Nation.”, followed by more specific belligerence,

“And this Convention calls upon the Tamil Nation in general and the Tamil youth in particular to come forward to throw themselves fully in the sacred fight for freedom and to flinch not until the goal of a sovereign state of TAMIL EELAM is reached”.

The campaign rhetoric of the TULF was somewhat more vicious than its belligerence at Vaddukoddai.. At a public rally conducted shortly after the formation in 1976 of the ACTC-ITAK alliance with qualified support from Arumuga Thondaman’s ‘Ceylon Workers Congress’, the person who could have been called the ‘First Lady’ of that alliance said in the course of her speech: “I will not rest until I wear slippers turned out of Sinhalese skins”. Unbelievable? If it is, look up the ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry’ into the communal disturbances of 1977 conducted by a former Supreme Court Judge (a person belonging to the Burgher community), published as Sessional Paper XII of 1980.

The data tabulated below show that the TULF appeal did not get the expected response even from the people living in the ‘North-East’. It is, of course, true that all contestants fielded by the TULF did win their seats in the Northern Province, securing comfortable majorities in the districts of Jaffna, Kilinochchi and Vavuniya; but elsewhere in the province, the margins of victory were wafer-thin. The polling outcome of the Eastern Province probably shocked the TULF leadership and certainly caused widespread surprise, especially since less than one-third of the voters of Batticaloa District (where Tamils accounted for 72%, and the ‘Sri Lankan Tamils 71% the district population) only 32% had endorsed the ‘Eelam’ appeal.

By the early 1980s, several groups had taken control over acts of terrorism and sabotage in Jaffna peninsula. The violence perpetrated by the insurgents and the retaliatory acts of the security forces reached fever-pitch on the eve of elections to the newly instituted District Development Councils. It resonated in other parts of the country in the form of two relatively brief waves of mob attacks on Tamil civilians, one in 1980 and the other in 1981. The victims included ‘Indian Tamils’.

The economic upsurge in the first 6 years of the JRJ-led government was short lived, and the political hopes proved to be illusory. The Jaffna peninsula turbulence was perceived by the government as a ‘law and order problem’ ̶ which a police contingent led by a Deputy Inspector General of Police Rudhra Rajasingham, a Tamil officer of impeccable repute, was ordered by the President to “eradicate within three months”. It failed in the face of massive protest campaigns, intensifying guerrilla attacks on government institutions and the security forces, and harsh retaliatory action by the security forces.

The ‘Eelam War’ for which the groundwork had been laid by the TULF was triggered off by the anti-Tamil riot of unprecedented brutality that took place in July 1983. Its damning repercussions were referred to earlier in this memorandum. JRJ reacted by proscribing several parties and incarcerating a few among his more articulate detractors, some, on the basis of barely credible evidence. Yet another blunder by him at this state was the holding of a national referendum in order to extend the life of the parliament (with the 4/5th majority under his command) by another 6 years. Apart from the rampant malpractices that features this poll, it did look like the fulfilment of his euphoric pledge in the aftermath of his victory to “roll back the electoral map”.

The youth unrest in the Northeast which was mobilised for electoral gain by the TULF began to be replicated in earnest elsewhere in the island in the form of the second wave of insurrection launched by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP/Peoples Liberation Front). In the economic recession that prevailed, and with the incessant Television displays of unattainable luxury restricted to the life styles of a small minority, increasing numbers of youth suffering from “frustration aggression” were attracted to the JVP fold. By 1985, they engaged in raids for the collection of money and arms, crippling the economy with frequently enforced curfews, and a range of terrorist violence such as intimidation, torture and the murder of persons identified as collaborators of the government.

The Province as a Unit of Devolution

The Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms of 1833 that introduced a network of 5 Provinces was intended to consolidate British rule over the island which remained tenuous even after the suppression of the rebellion of 1818. The spatial pattern of provinces was changes from time to time until it was finalised in 1889 against the backdrop of the mid-Victorian imperial glory and the absence of any challenge to British supremacy in ‘Ceylon’. The population of the island at that time was only 3 million; and, despite the ongoing deforestation of the Central Highlands, at least about 70% of the island territory was uncharted wilderness.

To be Continued

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Midweek Review

Unexpected focus on ‘pieces of tin’ worn by military men

Published

6 days ago

2026/07/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

Maj. Lalith Jayasinghe with Kaushalya on his wedding day. Jayasinghe, receipient of Sri Lanka's highest military honour, has been credited with unprecedented raids behind the enemy lines. He died in late November, 2008, in the Vanni east.

Second Lieutenant S.U. Aladeniya, the first recipient of the Parama Weera Vibhushanaya, died fighting the LTTE in the second week of July, 1990. The young commanding officer of the isolated Kokavil Army detachment refused an opportunity to leave his wounded colleagues. Instead, he chose to set an extraordinary example. The fate of the Kokavil detachment, as well as the unprecedented military debacle that forced the Army to vacate the Kandy–Jaffna A9 road, north of Vavuniya, in 1990, happened due to the late President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s folly. Premadasa trusted the LTTE to such an extent, he ordered several hundred police officers, in the East, to surrender to appease the LTTE. The rest is history.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Additional Solicitor General Dileepa Peiris recently questioned in court as to why retired Air Force officer Shantha Jayathilake appeared in court wearing armed forces medals.

The highly decorated war hero Flight Lieutenant Jayathilake represented himself under Section 260 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the trial of Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay, the alleged mastermind of the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage.

During his submission, Dileepa Pieris looked at the medals worn by the retired officer and said: “He comes wearing pieces of tin.”

When Jayathilake objected to the ASG’s remark, Magistrate Pasan Amarasena warned the ex-officer not to interrupt proceedings. Then Peiris said that he couldn’t see Jayathilake’s medals properly. Jayathilake is the recipient of Weewa Wickrema Vibhushanaya (WWV), the second highest gallantry medal awarded to Sri Lankan military. The PWV is the highest gallantry decoration that can be received by a living military man. Jayathilake who joined the Air Force in 1989 at the height of the JVP-led insurgency, retired in 1999, and was also the recipient of the Rana Sura Padakkama (RSP).

Senior President’s Counsel Maithree Gunaratne, who represented Sallay in court, said: “The problem is not with your eyes, but with the red-tinted glasses you are wearing. You wore blue-tinted glasses for a while, and now you wear red-tinted glasses, so the gallantry medals, earned with blood, sweat, and tears for the country, look like pieces of tin to you”

Gunaratne requested that Pieris’s comments on the ex-officer be formally recorded in court records. This happened in the Fort Magistrate’s court on 2 July, 2026. The court proceedings caused controversy with various interested parties expressing differing views on Jayathilake wearing medals to a courtroom.

Some found fault with him for wearing medals while others strongly backed him. The issue at hand received social media attention. Obviously some sought political advantage at the expense of the government and the Attorney General’s Department. Others lambasted the former State Intelligence Service (SIS) Chief Sallay (2029-2024) for causing unnecessary developments. However, the gallantry medals worn by military, both officers and men, cannot be ridiculed by anyone, regardless of his/her position in the society. Gallantry medals remind the country of immense and untold sacrifices made by the military, during the war, and any attempt to dilute them should be strongly opposed.

Those who silently backed or publicly take action against war-winning Army Chief General (retd.) Sarath Fonseka, in 2010, after his defeat at the 2010 January presidential election, shouldn’t see the incident at the Fort Magistrate court as an opportunity.

Although Sri Lanka has been deeply divided over investigations into the conduct of armed forces during the war and after, no issue caused controversy like the arrest of Sallay, a post-war head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) over the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage. Sallay served as the Director of State Intelligence Service (SIS) from 2019 to 2024 before President Anura Kumara Dissanayake replaced him. Perhaps President Gotabaya Rajapaksa shouldn’t have brought Sallay as Director, SIS, contrary to the practice of SIS always being headed by a senior police officer or he was quite right in bringing in a serving military officer with a proven intelligence track record, knowing the shameful behaviour of responsible top police officers in the run up to the Easter Sunday suicide attacks, despite there having been adequate advance intelligence warnings to prevent them.

The intervention made by the retired Air Force officer triggered an unexpected reaction from the Attorney General’s top representative and the subsequent continuing controversy influenced The Island to discuss the awarding of gallantry medals, namely Parama Weera Vibhushanaya (PWV), the highest, followed by Weera Wickrema Vibhushanaya (WWV), Rana Wickrema Padakkama (RWP) and Rana Sura Padakkama (RSP). The fourth medal, Weeradhara Vibhushanaya, is awarded for bravery, regardless of the risks to one’s own life, but for voluntary interventions outside the battlefield.

Bravery of an exceptional kind

During the war, Sri Lanka awarded 32 PVWs posthumously. The Army, Navy and Air Force shared 29, 2 and 1, respectively. The PVW is awarded to all ranks of armed forces, both regular and volunteer, for individual acts of bravery in the face of enemy, disregarding the risks to one’s own life. Of the 32 recipients of the PVW, the extraordinary case of Maj. J.A.L. Jayasinghe (Lalith Jayasinghe), posthumously promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, captured unprecedented public attention.

On many occasions, PWVs were awarded posthumously for sacrifices made in defensive action, while the armed forces were responding to enemy action. However, Lalith had initiated action deep within the enemy-held territory and his efforts reflected the overall military strategy.

The 29 recipients consisted of 27 Army: Second Lieutenant S.U Aladeniya, Lance Corporal (LC) Y.G.G. Kularatne (Hasalaka Gamini), Second Lt. K.W.T. Nishshanka, Staff Sgt. H.P.B. Gunasekera, LC W.I.M. Seneviratne, Lt. Col. A.F Lafir, Capt. G.S. Jayanath, Maj. J.A.L. Jayasinghe, Maj. K.A. Gamage, Capt. U.G.A.S. Samaranayake, H.G.M.K.I. Megawarna, Sgt H.G.S. Bandara, Corporal P.N. Suranga, Corporal P.M.N. Pushpakumara, Corporal D.N\M.S. Chandrasiri Bandara, LC K. Chandana, Private R.M.D.M. Ratnayake, LC A.M.M.P. Abeysinghe, recruit A.M.B.H.G. Abeyratne Banda, private T.G.R. Dayananda, Lt. P.N. Punsiri, Second Lt W.D. Jayathilake, Sgt. K.G.N.L.R. Perera, Corporal K.P.D.T. Gunasekera, LC H.A. Nilantha Kumara, LC S.V.A.M. Pushpamal. Navy: Lt. J.L.D.S. Wijetunga, Petty Officer K.G. Shantha and Air Force: Squadron Leader T.D.S. Silvapulle.

Although Jayasinghe paid the supreme sacrifice, while serving the Special Forces, he had been a proud member of the Gemunu Watch (GW). GW veteran Maj. Gen. K.B. Egodawele in his Hewayekuge Mathaka Satahan (Memories of a soldier), first launched in 2012, declared that Jayasinghe had been among four GW personnel, namely Captain U.G.A.S. Samaranayake, Captain H.P.M.K. Meghawardena and Corporal D.M.A.M. Pushpakumara to receive the PWV, posthumously.

All of them received the highest gallantry award for actions on the Vanni east region during Eelam War IV (2006 August to 2009 May).

Jayasinghe’s wife Kaushalya accepted the PVW on 19 May, 2012, at the annual Victory Day parade. Maj. Gen. Kamal Gunaratne read the awardee’s official citation. Kaushalya had been five months pregnant at the time Jayasinghe mounted a raid deep inside the LTTE-held territory in the Vanni east region. Gunaratne, the wartime General Officer Commanding (GoC) of the 53 Division declared that Jayasinghe had been in command of an LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol)/Deep Penetration Unit tasked to eliminate LTTE leaders. That unit had moved about 40 kms into the enemy held territory in Oddusuddan and was positioned alongside the Mankulam-Oddusuddan road to kill LTTE leaders, on 26 November, 2008.

Suddenly, Jayasinghe had fallen sick but joined other members of the LLRP to fight the enemy after fierce fighting erupted between the two sides. In spite of having an opportunity to retreat, Jayasinghe, hero of many previous battles, suffered grievous injuries during the battle and succumbed to his injuries.

Jayasinghe had been an extraordinary soldier and was the recipient of the second highest gallantry medal, WWV, on three or four occasions. In one such occasion, Jayasinghe had received two WWVs at one ceremony and recalled retired Maj. Gen. Dhammi Hewage, who received the RSP at the same event. Hewage spoke admirably about what he called high risk and extraordinary LRRP operations undertaken by Jayasinghe over a period of time. Let me give you an opportunity to know more about Hewage whose no holds barred examination of the Army during the war received public attention ( https://island.lk/a-special-forces-officers-narrative/)

Those who risked their lives to earn battlefield recognition played a significant role in transforming the armed forces, particularly the Army. Gallantry medals had been earned by armed forces officers and men in various circumstances but the deadly LRRP strikes, deep within the LTTE held territory, made quite a difference in the overall direction of the war. Those who operated in enemy territory in a way functioned as suicide cadres/units as the probability of them being intercepted by the LTTE was very high. But, regardless of severe risks, they ventured out of government-held areas to infiltrate deep inside enemy held territory to carry out operations. The LRRP team, led by Jayasinghe, is a case in point.

Clandestine operations received public attention in the run-up to the 2001 December parliamentary election when UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe all of a sudden alleged that the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) was planning to assassinate him. Within weeks after the UNP victory at the parliamentary election, the UNP unleashed the police on the DMI. The police raided the DMI safe house at Millennium City, Athurugiriya. In spite of Army Chief, the late Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle, personally assuring the UNP that there was absolutely no basis for such claims, Wickremesinghe was not prepared to change his political strategy. He gave Minister John Amaratunga in charge of police the go ahead for planned action.

The January 2, 2002, raid led to the arrest of Captain Mohamed Nilam, Staff Sgt. P. Ananda Udulagama, Staff Sergeant I. Edirisinghe Jayamanne, Corporal H.M. Nissanka Herath, Lance Corporal H. Mohamed Hilmy and an LTTE operative identified as Niyaz/Subashkaran. Others involved in that particular operation had been living in the East and were called into join operations, depending on the requirement. On the instructions of Lt. Gen. Balagalle, those tasked with carrying out attacks on selected targets received the opportunity to train under Special Forces instructors from Maduru Oya. They underwent training at the Panaluwa Test Firing Range, where firing special weapons was a key element in the training schedule.

In a bid to ensure secrecy, those operatives mostly operated on their own, and had their own arsenal, which included a range of weapons, including claymore mines. In fact, those involved in such operations functioned on a need-to-know basis. Even senior DMI officials, as well as the Army top brass, except a few, hadn’t been aware of what was going on. Even the then powerful Deputy Defence Minister, the late Anuruddha Ratwatte, hadn’t been told of the Millennium City safe-house, though he knew of the ongoing hits behind enemy lines.

Shortly after the exposure of the DMI operation, Balagalle met Premier Wickremesinghe to explain the secret operations undertaken against the LTTE. The Army chief had been accompanied by officials, including Hendarawithana, while one-time Attorney General Tilak Marapana, National List MP holding the Defence portfolio, and Minister Milinda Moragoda, too, were present.

“Except for Minister Moragoda, the others obviously didn’t realise what we were doing. They acted as if we were conspiring to do away with the political leadership so as to undermine the Norwegian initiative,” a source familiar with the dynamics of the project said. “We quickly realised we were up against a government, which simply wanted to negotiate a deal with the LTTE at any cost. The LTTE and the Norwegians exploited the situation to the hilt.”

Success in the East

Hitting the enemy in the area under its control had been Balagalle’s idea. The DMI hadn’t been successful in its first and the second attempts to take two specific targets. The targeted area had been Batticaloa south and the first and the second operations were mounted on 18 July 2001 and 12 September 2001. But both actions went awry and the targeted men identified as Jim Kelly (commander of Jeyanthan regiment) and Jeevan escaped death.

But, they succeeded on 17 September 2001. Operatives carried out a successful attack on ‘Major’ Mano Master, who was at that time in charge of the communications network in the Ampara-Batticaloa area.

But immediately after the UNP’s victory, the government terminated all such operations. The treacherous government betrayed those who risked their lives for the country. Ex-LTTEers and others who worked for the Army were exposed and the LTTE hunted them down. Scores of men were killed. Some were tortured and killed.

Apart from Mano Master, the secret raids claimed the lives of Batticaloa District Intelligence Head Lt. Col Nizam and Capt. Thevathasan.

Among those killed in the north were LTTE Air Wing Head Col. Shankar (Vaithilingam Sornalingam) and Sea Tiger Deputy Commander Lt. Col Kangai Amaran.

S.P. Thamilselvan, his Deputy Major S. Thangan, Vavuniya Special Commander Col. Jeyam and Deputy Military Chief Col. Balraj were believed to have been targeted in the North but escaped. In the East, among those who escaped targeted killings, were Col. Karuna, Karikalan, Jim Kelly and Intelligence Chief Lt. Col. Ramanan.

In spite of the LTTEers, particularly its leaders on a heightened state of alert, the Army ambushed Karikalan’s vehicle on 18 October, 2001. The destruction of the vehicle fuelled speculation of Karikalan’s demise, with a section of the media reporting him killed in a special operation. Shortly before the attack on Karikalan’s vehicle, the Army intercepted a radio conversation between Karikalan and his wife, a medical doctor by profession, serving in the Northern Province. “She simply begged him to leave Batticaloa and take refuge in the North to avoid the Army’s deep penetration operations,” a source familiar with LRRP operations told the writer many years ago.

The Army struck again on 26 November, 2001. ‘Major’ Swarnaseelan and ‘Captain’ Devadas were eliminated in the Pulipanjikkal area. It was the last operation before the December 5 General Election.

The UNP terminated the operation. But, the Army revived the strategy after the eruption of hostilities in 2005.

It would be pertinent to mention that hit and run attacks, deep within the LTTE held territory, troubled them to such an extent, they took up the issue with Norway. Fearing a relentless campaign, the LTTE got Norway to include LRRP operations in their negotiations, leading to a one-sided Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) signed in February 2002 by the Wickremesinghe regime. That CFA revealed the existence of a secret Army project to target the LTTE in their own area. The CFA called for termination of LRRP operations.

Three PVWs

Lieutenant J.L.D.S. Wijetunga was the first Navy recipient of the Parama Weera Vibhushanaya (PWV), Sri Lanka’s highest gallantry award given posthumously. Wijetunga, Commanding Officer of the Israeli built Dvora Fast Attack Craft (FAC), maneuvered his vessel to intercept an explosives-laden Sea Tiger suicide boat approaching a troop transport ship off Point Pedro on 30 March, 1996. Wijetunga, in spite of knowing his action was suicidal, went ahead with the risky maneuver that saved the lives of a large contingent of off duty servicemen on their way to Trincomalee from Kankesanthurai (KKS).

The Navy earned its second PWV on 1 November, 2008, off Point Pedro, during the Eelam war IV. A Petty Officer of elite Special Boat Squadron K.G. Shantha rammed an explosives-laden Sea Tiger suicide craft with his Arrow boat (Z-142 ). Shantha and his three SBS colleagues were blasted to smithereens, though their action saved an Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) carrying a dozen SBS personnel.

Wing Commander T.D.S. Silvapulle received the nation’s highest gallantry award PWV for attacking Sea Tiger boats firing at Army defences south-east of Elephant Pass on 19 December, 1999. Silvapulle, flying a Mi 24 helicopter gunship in adverse weather conditions, regardless of the threat posed by surface-to-air missiles, engaged the enemy craft. Silvapulle compelled the enemy to flee but was hit during the confrontation. His individual act of gallantry was recognized in 2012, four years after the eradication of the LTTE. The then President Mahinda Rajapaksa conferred the PWV at a ceremony held on 19 May, 2012. Maj. Lalith Jayasinghe received his PWV at the same ceremony.

The betrayal of the armed forces in October, 2015, at the Geneva-based Human Rights Council, by the treacherous Sirisena-Wickremesinghe regime, underscored the mentality of those who wielded political power. The calling of gallantry medals ‘pieces of tin’ reminded the country of the pathetic and disgraceful state of affairs.

Midweek Review

Poor, little upper-middle income country

Published

6 days ago

2026/07/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

“Sri Lanka has been ranked among the least happy countries in the latest World Happiness Report 2026…standing alongside Ethiopia”- The Sunday Island March 2026

Sri Lanka was officially declared an Upper-Middle Income country by the World Bank in July 2026, regaining the classification it had in 2019.

On the 30th of June, the IMF delegation meeting the President at the Presidential Secretariat praised the government: “…IMF praised the government’s economic programme and noted that Sri Lanka has made greater progress than many other countries implementing IMF-supported programmes. The delegation commended the government for maintaining macroeconomic stability despite a series of external shocks and for remaining firmly committed to its reform agenda…” (Presidential Media Division, 30 June 2026)

Meanwhile, a UN-backed World Happiness Report 2026 compiled by the Wellbeing Research Centre at the University of Oxford, ranked Sri Lanka 134th out of 147 nations. A daily newspaper which ran the story on the 19th of March 2026, added that the report showed that “Sri Lanka has slipped one place from its 133rd ranking in 2025, now standing alongside Ethiopia. The country also trails behind its South Asian neighbours, with India ranked 116th, Pakistan and Bangladesh positioned significantly higher.”

Good News, Bad News

The Upper-Middle Income classification was declared by the World Bank during the Yahapalana government in July 2019. 6 months later, the Yahapalana government was swept out at elections.

Only 2 years later, in April 2022, the country was declared bankrupt, and by July that year the newly elected President was toppled by a people’s uprising for the first time in the country’s history.

To fill the vacuum, an unlikely combination of an unelected MP from the Opposition who was made President by the Parliament and an unpopular government that had barely survived the uprising, governed the country together. It was massively defeated by the people only 2 years later in 2024, despite ‘stabilising’ the economy.

An Upper-Middle Income status may give the impression of a prosperous people, but prosperous people are not an unhappy people. The World Bank report 2026 (World Bank, Sri Lanka Development Update) notes the anomaly: “the recovery is unfinished and has not translated into widespread improvements in welfare.”

The report adds:

* Real output remains below 2018 levels.

* Although poverty is projected to decline in 2025, it remains double the 2019 levels.

* Vulnerability remains high with an additional 10 percent of the population living just above the poverty line.

* Malnutrition continues to be elevated.

* The labour market recovery is slow with real wages and labor force participation well below 2019 levels.

The World Bank’s Poverty and Equity Brief (October 2025) sheds further light:

* Poverty is projected at 22.3-22.4 percent in 2025 and around 20 percent until 2027 without stronger inclusive growth.

* Real earnings remain below pre-crisis levels.

So, are Top of the Class in the IMF index and almost Bottom of the Class in the Happiness Index related?

As a friend who is a highly-placed economist explained to me, if people are poorer, undernourished, indebted, and insecure after stabilisation, then reserves, inflation, and primary balances alone cannot be relied on to judge the next IMF programme. Sri Lanka needs a national programme whose success metric is household recovery, jobs, nutrition, and productive capacity.

From the praise heaped on the President and this government’s strong leadership by the IMF for their performance thus far, sticking closely to the IMF conditionalities, we can only infer that things for the unhappy citizens will hardly get better as they negotiate the 18th IMF programme.

The AKD administration doesn’t haggle on behalf of the people. They see the rewards of that approach in fiscal consolidation and macroeconomic stability. This however, is not the only kind of stability they have to bear in mind, given recent history.

By the People, But Not for the People?

The new or renewed (from July 2019) ‘Upper-Middle Income’ classification has served to remind people where the government has failed, been weak, as much as where it has been strong and succeeded. The economy in the abstract is better off, but the majority of the people who gave the government a two thirds majority, are much worse off in material reality.

To return to my top economist friend, she explained that Sri Lanka should not reject fiscal discipline, but it must own the design of fiscal adjustment. The country needs a fairer tax mix, better tax administration, public investment discipline, and protection of health, education, nutrition, and climate-resilient infrastructure. Otherwise, fiscal discipline becomes socially brittle and growth-reducing.

The direction she recommended is hardly where the government is heading. The World Bank warns that the on-going reliance on regressive indirect taxes could worsen the poverty outlook, while the primary expenditure ceiling of 13 percent of GDP can constrain public investment and service delivery.

A leading financial daily (6 July) reported that at the CA Sri Lanka’s 5th Annual Economic and Tax Symposium, both the Government’s tax policies and the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) “came under sustained criticism from leading private sector tax professionals”. Gajma & Co. Senior Partner N.R. Gajendran argued that “…higher revenues had come largely from imposing a heavier burden on existing taxpayers rather than widening the tax base.”

He said that “When taxes become excessive and unbearable, and it is not coming from the widening of the base, it is coming from the same taxpayer, it erodes expenditure capabilities, it erodes saving capabilities, and it erodes investment capabilities,” warning that “sustained over-taxation ultimately weakens consumption, investment, and long-term economic growth.”

Sri Lanka has already lost a large number of skilled professionals who migrated in droves in the last two years. Factum reports (April 2026) that the annual departures for foreign employment have hovered above the 310,000 mark. This includes Healthcare Professionals (Doctors, nurses), Academics and Researchers (including 80-90% of State University graduates), Technologists and Engineers.

Will the Lawyers be next? The Island editorial of 6 July 2026 strongly supports the stand that the BASL has taken, (endorsed by the Colombo Law Society, Colombo High Court Lawyers Association, LAWASIA and the Commonwealth Lawyers Association) opposing the government’s effort to move a constitutional amendment to extend the retirement age of judges of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, denouncing political interference in the judiciary and urging the government to avoid a Zimbabwean crisis.

None of this makes for a happy citizen, stability notwithstanding.

By the People, for the Creditors

So, what of all those promises made with such passion to do better than all previous governments since Independence in 1948?

The World Food Programme has this to report:

* Households unable to meet essential food needs increased from 14 percent in 2024 to 20 percent in 2026.

* If price trends continue, another 1.3 million people could be unable to afford essential food needs, including nearly 300,000 urban poor.

* Child nutrition remains worrying: stunting 10.1 percent, wasting 8.6 percent, and underweight 16.1 percent. (WFP, Food Security Under Pressure)

Economists warn that a programme that ‘stabilises’ the economy while households sell assets, cut food, reduce education and health spending, and slide into coping strategies, i.e., de-stabilises the household economy and lives, will not be socially, politically or developmentally sustainable.

Those who care for the people recommend that Sri Lanka’s own programme must place adaptive social protection, nutrition, and livelihoods at the very centre.

The promised re-negotiation of the 17th IMF package to make the necessary economic recovery less taxing (pun intended) for the people, less painful, and more sustainable overall, never happened. The government acted as if it was elected by the People for the Creditors.

We have been warned that Sri Lanka’s shift toward commercial borrowing and ISBs changed the debt-risk profile, with ISBs carrying high interest rates and short maturities. The government’s promised negotiations didn’t resemble anything like what was expected by the people, and went the way of the ISB holders who celebrated the victory in Canary Wharf toasting our President in absentia.

IMF Country Report No 26/111 indicates that even after restructuring, debt sustainability risks remain high. Public debt is projected at around 100.1 percent of GDP in 2026, with central government gross financing needs at 19.8 percent of GDP.

Economists remind us that Sri Lanka’s recent graduation to the Upper Middle-Income classification means that we will have to pay more in debt repayments as per the macro-linked bond of the debt restructuring settlement with the creditors.

IMF 18, going on 19?

Who’d have thought it? In the last 77 years, the most pro-people, pro-poor administration has certainly not been the AKD government. There were much better ones, even during the 30 year war, when policies were more enlightened and served the people; were undertaken with confidence and determination, and some still continue to provide the foreign exchange to pay for subsequent errors of judgment. And with the courage of their convictions and confidence in their capacity to deliver, those leaders didn’t feel the need to postpone any elections.

Stabilisation was an immediate necessity. But my economist friend spoke for us all when she told me “Sri Lanka cannot stabilise its way to prosperity. It should not risk turning emergency discipline into a permanent development model”.

With the current state of play, is that what we are looking at? There is little evidence that this administration has the capacity to design an independent programme, not subject to the whims and fancies of IFIs, but as my friend put it, “our own programme: fiscally responsible, socially protective, production-oriented, climate-resilient, and politically owned. The IMF can support that programme, but it cannot be the programme.”

An unhappy people is surely as much of an indicator of the real health of the economy, as the Gross National Income per capita calculated in US dollars by the World Bank. A Sunday newspaper quoted a young economist, Rehana Thowfeek, co-founder/director at Arutha Research, who says: “There is no point in celebrating becoming an upper-middle-income country while 1 in 4 of our people is in poverty, two out of every 5 Sri Lankans cannot afford a healthy diet and 1 out of 3 of our children under 5 years is malnourished.”

This is not a situation that should be allowed to prevail by an allegedly pro-people government, or indeed any government that has been granted the privilege to govern, through the people’s vote. The planning, the policy choices are all in the hands of the government. Will they choose a better path?

People are not unhappy because they are too mean to acknowledge what a wonderful job this government is doing, and give praise to this administration like the IMF at the Presidential Secretariat. It is because they are in pain, they are suffering, they are hungry, they cannot pay the bills, and they are looking at a future where none of these things are going away, but is set to get much worse, as the government slouches towards its next IMF programme and the next debt repayment.