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Implication of COVID-19 Pandemic for South Asia:

By Nimmi Jayathilake

Regional Centre for Strategic Studies

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in South Asia has adversely affected all domains of social, economic and political life in the region. This global pandemic which engulfed every nook and corner of the world in the wink of an eye, entered South Asia in March 2020. By the beginning of the second quarter it had spread to all South Asian countries to a varying degree. The shock injected to South Asia by COVID-19 resulted in closed education institutes, stalled factories, idle ports, empty roads, and life standstill, at least initially. It filled hospitals and deserted public spaces, reversing the process of globalization to “slowbalization”.

Decisive and far-reaching developments are set in motion at present in South Asia and yet the true proportions of the blow and its real impact on the region are yet to be encountered in the coming future. However, it seems that South Asia would surely witness a decisive alteration post-COVID-19. In this context, the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) organized a successful two-days virtual workshop titled “The Implication of COVID-19 Pandemic for South Asia: Civil Society Perspectives” as an initiative to create a common platform for experts and young scholars from South Asia to present and discuss research that they had carried out for the past six months exploring and analyzing the various aspects that have emerged as a result of the pandemic and the future prospects for a way forward from a civil society perspective.

South Asia has always been recognized as one of the most volatile and conflict-ridden regions in the world. The South Asian nations have been experiencing both inter-state and intra-state conflicts. The inter-state conflicts mostly occur as a consequence of the tensions created by identity-politics and intra-state conflicts spark particularly in between the smaller nations and India due to unsolved border disputes. These countries have still not overcome the political and emotional baggage that they have carried since historical times and hence the suspicions and tensions have not eased off especially between India and Pakistan and thereby continue to remain in the same environment which has been marred by mutual antagonism and an uncompromising attitude. Moreover, over the last 15 years, the region has experienced an increased scale of terrorist activity in comparison to the other regions across the globe. Under this situation, where Afghanistan is seeking for peace negotiations with the Taliban, Sri Lanka was barely recovering from the unfortunate Easter Attacks and India was facing protests from all over the country due to its Citizenship Amendment Act, ‘Hindu Rashtra’ movements, people’s disenchantment with the government, youth bulge and so on what would be the implications of COVID-19 for the existing multi-layered conflict-dynamics and peace-building processes in this unstable region?

South Asia also comprises 40% of the world’s poor. The COVID-19 pandemic has widened the gap between the rich and the poor and thereby affected the vulnerable, marginalized, discriminated and subaltern groups disproportionately in a region where one third of the people struggle with poverty for their everyday existence. It tends to even further widen inequalities and deepen insecurities in the society, specifically among the disadvantaged and alienated sections. Thus, COVID-19 did not simply slow down the economic progress of the region, it has exacerbated and brought forth the already existing issues to the forefront too. The South Asian countries might well experience its worst economic performance in 40 years, with at least half the countries falling into a deep recession. It has already triggered sharp jobs and earnings losses. Tens and thousands of migrant laborers have returned home and thereby the flow of foreign remittances to the South Asian nations have decreased considerably. Overall, as a consequence, the crisis arising from the economic front would lead to an accentuation of preexisted issues with multiplied effects such as the citizens’ dissatisfaction with the functioning of the government and the expanding youth bulge. Thus, social discontent, tremendous reproduction of social class inequalities, extension of poverty and the incapacity to generate any new economic opportunities or employment would ultimately result in an equally grave social and political crisis with furious and restless citizens and a militarized government trying to contain civil protests.

Therefore, to what extent would public policies instituted by the South Asian countries prove its strength in mitigating the socio-economic impact of COVID-19, by paying adequate attention and honest concern to the marginalized and economically disadvantaged communities victimized by the already existing abstract ideological constructions of social class, caste, gender and even language? Further, the breakdown of world supply chains, shrinking of the global market, decline of air travel and constraints on international trade have severely affected the South Asian economies from broken pieces to shackles. In such a condition, what would be the long-term economic implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for South Asia?

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic occurred at a crucial time when the western hegemons feared over the gradual global power-shift towards Asia. The Asian superpowers displayed tremendous improvement in the power-play to a point where it was estimated that they would surpass North America and Europe combined in global power based on GDP, population size, military spending and technological investment by 2030. In effect, South Asia was declared the fastest growing region in the world in 2016 and proved its economically stable position during the last five years. In relation to shifting the centre of gravity in global politics from the West to the East, South Asia’s recognition in the global order was also going through a phase of positive alteration. Nevertheless, how would the impact of the global pandemic on the evolving global balance of power alter South Asia’s position in the post-COVID world order?

The multi-dimensional threats posed by COVID-19 and the manner in which they are addressed at present will bring forth profound implications for the role and stature of the state and state-society relations in South Asia. With regards to this factor, it brings into attention the impact of emergency measures adopted to cope up with exigencies of COVID-19 on democratic political structures and processes in South Asia. The theory of surveillance has been familiar in the critical discourse of the West since the times of Bentham and Foucault. Surveillance developed with time from its physical mode of a ‘Panopticon’ to power-play with the datafication of society and transition to network surveillance. Today, some states in the South Asian region too employ ‘intrusive surveillance methods’ to keep tabs on vulnerable sectors in identified pandemic hotspots. Though it effectively saved lives by curtailing the spread of the virus, possible covert implications of such methods for civic activities in democratic governance are a matter of serious concern.

Moreover, COVID-19 has also facilitated the tendency for Democratic South Asian nations to move towards an executive friendly mode. The emergency situation created by the pandemic seems to be utilized almost as a tool of distraction to instrumentalize and solidify executive authoritarianism by citing the discourse of public health as a principal reason for greater executive control and consolidation. Hence, COVID-19 has definitely magnified certain impulses and dynamics of conflict and governance within the region rather than ameliorating the existing trends towards anti-democratization, populism, militarization and currently altered our everyday government and its governance. In this regard, what would be the directions of democratic governance in post-COVID South Asia?

South Asia still remains as one of the least integrated regions in the world and its intra-regional trade accounts for a mere 5% of its total trade, manifesting a low degree of economic bonding in the region. Despite several attempts to foster cooperation among its member states, SAARC appears to be in limbo since 2016 after India’s boycott of the Islamabad Summit. Yet it brought some hope into the faltering SAARC process when all the eight South Asian nations’ leaders gathered together on a virtual platform to address the emergency situation created by the pandemic and to contribute funds to combat the pandemic as one region. Will the COVID-19 pandemic prepare for the re-awakening of a new era of regional cooperation and compel the SAARC member-states to cooperate with each other to encounter the virus that does not take man-made divisions and boundaries into account in its itinerary. Would practical requirements in dealing with the COVID-19 threat act as a lever to minimize the trust deficit among the South Asian countries and hence create a novel chapter for regional cooperation?

Thus, it is clear that the arrival of COVID-19 halted the progress of South Asia at a historic crossroad and created a barrier over the many potential directions and options which stood before it along with various opportunities for global recognition and integration. And at the moment, we are left in an unpredictable situation with many questions unanswered, issues unsolved and a bleak tomorrow. Thus, RCSS in a joint-venture with GPPAC South Asia gathered a panel of distinguished South Asian academicians from Sri Lanka, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan namely Prof. Gamini Keerawella, Dr. Pakiasothy Saravanamuttu, Prof. Jayadeva Uyangoda, Dr. Mallika Joseph, Prof. Suba Chandran, Dr. Nishchal Pandey, Ms. Saloni Singh, Prof. Moonis Ahmar, Dr. Salma Malik and Miss Lailuma Nasiri respectively to bring to the table their thoughts and views on this historic juncture with regards to the significance of civil society intervention in a responsible manner and contribute to generate policies that are more effective, equitable and gender-sensitive and those that could be capable and influential enough to mobilize societal capacities in order to mitigate adverse social, economic and political effects of the pandemic and to shape the direction of post-Covid South Asia on a better and effective track. It was also noteworthy that young researchers from the above mentioned South Asian nations too participated and presented informative and well-analyzed Country Reports in an attempt to map the impact of COVID-19 pandemic in South Asia and to share each country’s experience on a common platform in order to examine the policy responses to counter adverse effects and to promote recovery from a civil society perspective and of course to generate a discourse in civil society as to its role in post-COVID South Asia.

The Keynote address of the inaugural session was delivered by Admiral Prof. Jayanath Colomabage, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His participation to this regional workshop was indeed an honour for RCSS. Admiral Prof. Colombage made a significant and informative speech on the current proceedings of Sri Lanka in countering the various challenges posed by the second wave of COVID-19 and the measures taken by the government in order to adapt to the “new normal” without disrupting the progression of the country. He also referred to the current repatriation process which keeps ongoing despite the outbreak of the rapidly spreading second wave and where over 40,000 stranded Sri Lankans were brought back to the motherland.

The first technical session brought forth into discussion the trends towards the retreat of democracy and the kind of impact it would have especially on two of the oldest Democratic nations in South Asia- India and Sri Lanka. And if this would ultimately result in a democratic backlash from the civilian side? Several aspects with regards to regional governance and multilateralism in the COVID-19 world were also brought into attention. And there was further discussion on the implications of COVID-19 for the existing conflict patterns and the process of regional cooperation in South Asia.

The second technical session included the presentation and discussion of the country reports of Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. The third technical session focused on the country reports of India, Pakistan and Nepal. The six research reports from six different South Asian countries brought into discussion several common issues that have been concerning the region as a result of the pandemic situation such as rising inequalities, increase in smuggling, health-care challenges and responses, increased domestic violence, the digital gap that has affected students from rural areas at large in continuing their education online and the extent to which the vulnerable communities suffer from food and health insecurity as these groups won’t be able to hold any longer till the economy recovers at a slow pace. And country wise, the country report on Pakistan pointed out how the citizens acted irresponsible pertaining to different myths on COVID-19 and the dilemma of the government in choosing to protect life and livelihoods. In the case of India, COVID-19 has vastly impacted the manufacturing sector, disrupted the supply chain and led to job losses. The inability to make proper and timely announcements especially with regards to the lockdown of the country pushed the migrant laborers into a very uncomfortable situation. Nevertheless, several small states such as Kerala have continued to perform well despite the damage caused by the pandemic. Moving onto Afghanistan, its citizens who reside in the provinces which are being controlled by the Taliban remain unable in reaching out to the services provided by the government. And on top of that, the suicide bombings too have not decreased and the people keep losing their lives both from the pandemic and from terrorist attacks.

History depicts the end of a catastrophe as the beginning of social, economic and political change and revival from one age to another. When one way does not work, mankind has always proved to be creative and thrived their businesses and institutions in a novel way. They have been remarkably quick to discover innovations to recover and reemerge once again. Catastrophes created a pause in the usual universal procedures and provided space for mankind to rethink and make necessary changes to the manner in which they live, to the modes through which goods and services are produced and distributed and to the institutions through which collective decisions are made and implemented. Thus, in this phase of the modern era, will COVID-19 pandemic serve as a propellant for social, economic and political change?



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Rebuilding the country requires consultation

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A positive feature of the government that is emerging is its responsiveness to public opinion. The manner in which it has been responding to the furore over the Grade 6 English Reader, in which a weblink to a gay dating site was inserted, has been constructive. Government leaders have taken pains to explain the mishap and reassure everyone concerned that it was not meant to be there and would be removed. They have been meeting religious prelates, educationists and community leaders. In a context where public trust in institutions has been badly eroded over many years, such responsiveness matters. It signals that the government sees itself as accountable to society, including to parents, teachers, and those concerned about the values transmitted through the school system.

This incident also appears to have strengthened unity within the government. The attempt by some opposition politicians and gender misogynists to pin responsibility for this lapse on Prime Minister Dr Harini Amarasuriya, who is also the Minister of Education, has prompted other senior members of the government to come to her defence. This is contrary to speculation that the powerful JVP component of the government is unhappy with the prime minister. More importantly, it demonstrates an understanding within the government that individual ministers should not be scapegoated for systemic shortcomings. Effective governance depends on collective responsibility and solidarity within the leadership, especially during moments of public controversy.

The continuing important role of the prime minister in the government is evident in her meetings with international dignitaries and also in addressing the general public. Last week she chaired the inaugural meeting of the Presidential Task Force to Rebuild Sri Lanka in the aftermath of Cyclone Ditwah. The composition of the task force once again reflects the responsiveness of the government to public opinion. Unlike previous mechanisms set up by governments, which were either all male or without ethnic minority representation, this one includes both, and also includes civil society representation. Decision-making bodies in which there is diversity are more likely to command public legitimacy.

Task Force

The Presidential Task Force to Rebuild Sri Lanka overlooks eight committees to manage different aspects of the recovery, each headed by a sector minister. These committees will focus on Needs Assessment, Restoration of Public Infrastructure, Housing, Local Economies and Livelihoods, Social Infrastructure, Finance and Funding, Data and Information Systems, and Public Communication. This structure appears comprehensive and well designed. However, experience from post-disaster reconstruction in countries such as Indonesia and Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami suggests that institutional design alone does not guarantee success. What matters equally is how far these committees engage with those on the ground and remain open to feedback that may complicate, slow down, or even challenge initial plans.

An option that the task force might wish to consider is to develop a linkage with civil society groups with expertise in the areas that the task force is expected to work. The CSO Collective for Emergency Relief has set up several committees that could be linked to the committees supervised by the task force. Such linkages would not weaken the government’s authority but strengthen it by grounding policy in lived realities. Recent findings emphasise the idea of “co-production”, where state and society jointly shape solutions in which sustainable outcomes often emerge when communities are treated not as passive beneficiaries but as partners in problem-solving.

Cyclone Ditwah destroyed more than physical infrastructure. It also destroyed communities. Some were swallowed by landslides and floods, while many others will need to be moved from their homes as they live in areas vulnerable to future disasters. The trauma of displacement is not merely material but social and psychological. Moving communities to new locations requires careful planning. It is not simply a matter of providing people with houses. They need to be relocated to locations and in a manner that permits communities to live together and to have livelihoods. This will require consultation with those who are displaced. Post-disaster evaluations have acknowledged that relocation schemes imposed without community consent often fail, leading to abandonment of new settlements or the emergence of new forms of marginalisation. Even today, abandoned tsunami housing is to be seen in various places that were affected by the 2004 tsunami.

Malaiyaha Tamils

The large-scale reconstruction that needs to take place in parts of the country most severely affected by Cyclone Ditwah also brings an opportunity to deal with the special problems of the Malaiyaha Tamil population. These are people of recent Indian origin who were unjustly treated at the time of Independence and denied rights of citizenship such as land ownership and the vote. This has been a festering problem and a blot on the conscience of the country. The need to resettle people living in those parts of the hill country which are vulnerable to landslides is an opportunity to do justice by the Malaiyaha Tamil community. Technocratic solutions such as high-rise apartments or English-style townhouses that have or are being contemplated may be cost-effective, but may also be culturally inappropriate and socially disruptive. The task is not simply to build houses but to rebuild communities.

The resettlement of people who have lost their homes and communities requires consultation with them. In the same manner, the education reform programme, of which the textbook controversy is only a small part, too needs to be discussed with concerned stakeholders including school teachers and university faculty. Opening up for discussion does not mean giving up one’s own position or values. Rather, it means recognising that better solutions emerge when different perspectives are heard and negotiated. Consultation takes time and can be frustrating, particularly in contexts of crisis where pressure for quick results is intense. However, solutions developed with stakeholder participation are more resilient and less costly in the long run.

Rebuilding after Cyclone Ditwah, addressing historical injustices faced by the Malaiyaha Tamil community, advancing education reform, changing the electoral system to hold provincial elections without further delay and other challenges facing the government, including national reconciliation, all require dialogue across differences and patience with disagreement. Opening up for discussion is not to give up on one’s own position or values, but to listen, to learn, and to arrive at solutions that have wider acceptance. Consultation needs to be treated as an investment in sustainability and legitimacy and not as an obstacle to rapid decisionmaking. Addressing the problems together, especially engagement with affected parties and those who work with them, offers the best chance of rebuilding not only physical infrastructure but also trust between the government and people in the year ahead.

 

by Jehan Perera

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PSTA: Terrorism without terror continues

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When the government appointed a committee, led by Rienzie Arsekularatne, Senior President’s Counsel, to draft a new law to replace the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), as promised by the ruling NPP, the writer, in an article published in this journal in July 2025, expressed optimism that, given Arsekularatne’s experience in criminal justice, he would be able to address issues from the perspectives of the State, criminal justice, human rights, suspects, accused, activists, and victims. The draft Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PSTA), produced by the Committee, has been sharply criticised by individuals and organisations who expected a better outcome that aligns with modern criminal justice and human rights principles.

This article is limited to a discussion of the definition of terrorism. As the writer explained previously, the dangers of an overly broad definition go beyond conviction and increased punishment. Special laws on terrorism allow deviations from standard laws in areas such as preventive detention, arrest, administrative detention, restrictions on judicial decisions regarding bail, lengthy pre-trial detention, the use of confessions, superadded punishments, such as confiscation of property and cancellation of professional licences, banning organisations, and restrictions on publications, among others. The misuse of such laws is not uncommon. Drastic legislation, such as the PTA and emergency regulations, although intended to be used to curb intense violence and deal with emergencies, has been exploited to suppress political opposition.

 

International Standards

The writer’s basic premise is that, for an act to come within the definition of terrorism, it must either involve “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” or be committed to achieve an objective of an individual or organisation that uses “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” to realise its aims. The UN General Assembly has accepted that the threshold for a possible general offence of terrorism is the provocation of “a state of terror” (Resolution 60/43). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has taken a similar view, using the phrase “to create a climate of terror.”

In his 2023 report on the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the Secretary-General warned that vague and overly broad definitions of terrorism in domestic law, often lacking adequate safeguards, violate the principle of legality under international human rights law. He noted that such laws lead to heavy-handed, ineffective, and counterproductive counter-terrorism practices and are frequently misused to target civil society actors and human rights defenders by labelling them as terrorists to obstruct their work.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has stressed in its Handbook on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism that definitions of terrorist acts must use precise and unambiguous language, narrowly define punishable conduct and clearly distinguish it from non-punishable behaviour or offences subject to other penalties. The handbook was developed over several months by a team of international experts, including the writer, and was finalised at a workshop in Vienna.

 

Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2023

A five-member Bench of the Supreme Court that examined the Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2023, agreed with the petitioners that the definition of terrorism in the Bill was too broad and infringed Article 12(1) of the Constitution, and recommended that an exemption (“carve out”) similar to that used in New Zealand under which “the fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy, or dissent, or engages in any strike, lockout, or other industrial action, is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for inferring that the person” committed the wrongful acts that would otherwise constitute terrorism.

While recognising the Court’s finding that the definition was too broad, the writer argued, in his previous article, that the political, administrative, and law enforcement cultures of the country concerned are crucial factors to consider. Countries such as New Zealand are well ahead of developing nations, where the risk of misuse is higher, and, therefore, definitions should be narrower, with broader and more precise exemptions. How such a “carve out” would play out in practice is uncertain.

In the Supreme Court, it was submitted that for an act to constitute an offence, under a special law on terrorism, there must be terror unleashed in the commission of the act, or it must be carried out in pursuance of the object of an organisation that uses terror to achieve its objectives. In general, only acts that aim at creating “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” should come under the definition of terrorism. There can be terrorism-related acts without violence, for example, when a member of an extremist organisation remotely sabotages an electronic, automated or computerised system in pursuance of the organisation’s goal. But when the same act is committed by, say, a whizz-kid without such a connection, that would be illegal and should be punished, but not under a special law on terrorism. In its determination of the Bill, the Court did not address this submission.

 

PSTA Proposal

Proposed section 3(1) of the PSTA reads:

Any person who, intentionally or knowingly, commits any act which causes a consequence specified in subsection (2), for the purpose of-

(a) provoking a state of terror;

(b) intimidating the public or any section of the public;

(c) compelling the Government of Sri Lanka, or any other Government, or an international organisation, to do or to abstain from doing any act; or

(d) propagating war, or violating territorial integrity or infringing the sovereignty of Sri Lanka or any other sovereign country, commits the offence of terrorism.

The consequences listed in sub-section (2) include: death; hurt; hostage-taking; abduction or kidnapping; serious damage to any place of public use, any public property, any public or private transportation system or any infrastructure facility or environment; robbery, extortion or theft of public or private property; serious risk to the health and safety of the public or a section of the public; serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with, any electronic or automated or computerised system or network or cyber environment of domains assigned to, or websites registered with such domains assigned to Sri Lanka; destruction of, or serious damage to, religious or cultural property; serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with any electronic, analogue, digital or other wire-linked or wireless transmission system, including signal transmission and any other frequency-based transmission system; without lawful authority, importing, exporting, manufacturing, collecting, obtaining, supplying, trafficking, possessing or using firearms, offensive weapons, ammunition, explosives, articles or things used in the manufacture of explosives or combustible or corrosive substances and biological, chemical, electric, electronic or nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices, nuclear material, radioactive substances, or radiation-emitting devices.

Under section 3(5), “any person who commits an act which constitutes an offence under the nine international treaties on terrorism, ratified by Sri Lanka, also commits the offence of terrorism.” No one would contest that.

The New Zealand “carve-out” is found in sub-section (4): “The fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy or dissent or engages in any strike, lockout or other industrial action, is not by itself a sufficient basis for inferring that such person (a) commits or attempts, abets, conspires, or prepares to commit the act with the intention or knowledge specified in subsection (1); or (b) is intending to cause or knowingly causes an outcome specified in subsection (2).”

While the Arsekularatne Committee has proposed, including the New Zealand “carve out”, it has ignored a crucial qualification in section 5(2) of that country’s Terrorism Suppression Act, that for an act to be considered a terrorist act, it must be carried out for one or more purposes that are or include advancing “an ideological, political, or religious cause”, with the intention of either intimidating a population or coercing or forcing a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act.

When the Committee was appointed, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka opined that any new offence with respect to “terrorism” should contain a specific and narrow definition of terrorism, such as the following: “Any person who by the use of force or violence unlawfully targets the civilian population or a segment of the civilian population with the intent to spread fear among such population or segment thereof in furtherance of a political, ideological, or religious cause commits the offence of terrorism”.

The writer submits that, rather than bringing in the requirement of “a political, ideological, or religious cause”, it would be prudent to qualify proposed section 3(1) by the requirement that only acts that aim at creating “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” or are carried out to achieve a goal of an individual or organisation that employs “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” to attain its objectives should come under the definition of terrorism. Such a threshold is recognised internationally; no “carve out” is then needed, and the concerns of the Human Rights Commission would also be addressed.

 

by Dr. Jayampathy Wickramaratne
President’s Counsel

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ROCK meets REGGAE 2026

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JAYASRI: From Vienna, Austria

We generally have in our midst the famous JAYASRI twins, Rohitha and Rohan, who are based in Austria but make it a point to entertain their fans in Sri Lanka on a regular basis.

Well, rock and reggae fans get ready for a major happening on 28th February (Oops, a special day where I’m concerned!) as the much-awaited ROCK meets REGGAE event booms into action at the Nelum Pokuna outdoor theatre.

It was seven years ago, in 2019, that the last ROCK meets REGGAE concert was held in Colombo, and then the Covid scene cropped up.

Chitral Somapala with BLACK MAJESTY

This year’s event will feature our rock star Chitral Somapala with the Australian Rock+Metal band BLACK MAJESTY, and the reggae twins Rohitha and Rohan Jayalath with the original JAYASRI – the full band, with seven members from Vienna, Austria.

According to Rohitha, the JAYASRI outfit is enthusiastically looking forward to entertaining music lovers here with their brand of music.

Their playlist for 28th February will consist of the songs they do at festivals in Europe, as well as originals, and also English and Sinhala hits, and selected covers.

Says Rohitha: “We have put up a great team, here in Sri Lanka, to give this event an international setting and maintain high standards, and this will be a great experience for our Sri Lankan music lovers … not only for Rock and Reggae fans. Yes, there will be some opening acts, and many surprises, as well.”

Rohitha, Chitral and Rohan: Big scene at ROCK meets REGGAE

Rohitha and Rohan also conveyed their love and festive blessings to everyone in Sri Lanka, stating “This Christmas was different as our country faced a catastrophic situation and, indeed, it’s a great time to help and share the real love of Jesus Christ by helping the poor, the needy and the homeless people. Let’s RISE UP as a great nation in 2026.”

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