Features
Comparing AKD to King Parakramabahu
By C. A. Chandraprema
A video clip doing the rounds on web-based media platforms shows a former secretary of the agriculture ministry stating at a JJB (Malimawa) press conference that when Anura Kumara Dissanayake was the Minister of Agriculture, Livestock, Lands and Irrigation in the Chandrika Kumaratunga government in 2004, there was a surplus of paddy in the country and that on the instructions of the minister, a part of this surplus was sold to the World Food Programme and that this was akin to exporting rice during the time of King Parakramabahu.
This was sycophancy at its worst, targeting a gullible audience made up mainly of young people with very little awareness of history and whose opinions are formed by whatever comes to them via the internet. We all know that AKD was never a member of any government before April 2004. Hence if there was a surplus of paddy in the year that he assumed ministerial office for the first time, that can only be the result of development projects implemented by preceding governments. It should be obvious to anyone that AKD could not have done anything to deserve any credit for a paddy surplus in 2004.
The Mahaweli Project is the main reason for Sri Lanka becoming more or less self-sufficient in rice. Hence the full credit for any paddy surplus in the year 2004 should go entirely to the UNP government of 1977-94. The JVP vehemently opposed the Accelerated Mahaweli Project of the J.R.Jayewardene government in the 1980s. If the then UNP government had heeded what the JVP said at that time about the Accelerated Mahaweli Project, AKD would not have had a paddy surplus to sell to the WFP in 2004. It is indeed strange to see parties that opposed the Accelerated Mahaweli Project in the 1980s claiming credit for its results today.
Throughout its history, the JVP has only opposed or sabotaged development projects. A phase of the Udawalawe Project was being implemented in the late 1980s during the JVP’s second insurrection and a report of the International Water Management Institute has described how JVP death squads extorted money from the contractors and murdered workers on the project thus causing a delay in its implementation.
Opposition to all and sundry
The JVP has a history of opposing all development projects initiated by all governments. In the 1980s, they opposed the Accelerated Mahaweli Project. When the Colombo Port City was being built, the JVP claimed that there wasn’t enough sand and metal in the country to complete a project of that magnitude, and opposed it. They opposed the construction of highways during the Rajapaksa government. The anti-development project mentality of the JVP can best be illustrated by their opposition to the Uma Oya Project which commenced construction in November 2011. The aim of the project was to construct a dam and a reservoir in the central highlands across the Uma Oya and to carry water from this reservoir through a system of tunnels into yet another reservoir and then onwards to a hydro-power project and finally into the Kirindi Oya to supply water to the Moneragala and Hambantota districts.
Around 2015-2017, water started seeping into one of the tunnels being constructed in the Uma Oya project. In drilling a tunnel, it is natural for ground water above it to seep into the tunnel and it would be necessary to seal the tunnel to prevent such seepage as the machine drills further. However, the German machine used to drill this tunnel had not been equipped with the accessories necessary to seal the tunnel. It was revealed later that this was due to some error on the part of the project consultants. Be that as it may, in 2017 on the advice of some Norwegian experts, the accessories necessary to seal the tunnel as the machine moved forward were obtained and the water seepage issue ceased to exist. The Uma Oya Project is now nearing completion and is due to be commissioned some time during this year.
When the water seepage issue gained media attention, the main political force in the country that rose up against the Uma Oya Project was the JVP. Anura Kumara Dissnayake made impassioned speeches in Parliament describing how thousands of wells, streams and springs in the Bandarawela area had dried up and how thousands of agricultural land had been abandoned due to the lack of ground water as a result of the seepage into the Uma Oya tunnel. He described how the walls of thousands of houses and other buildings in the area had cracks appearing as a result of the change in the ground conditions. He stated that construction work on the Uma Oya Project had commenced despite objections by environmentalists and other experts and that water was to be diverted through this project to the Hambantota port and airport to fulfill the desires of the Rajapaksa government.
The ground level campaign against the Uma Oya Project was led by the Badulla district JVP stalwart and ex-Parliamentarian Samantha Vidyaratne. He described this project not as a multi-purpose project but as a ‘bahu vinashakaree’ project and stated that this project has been planned by those willing to even ‘give their mothers for money’ and that all this was the doing of ‘rulers who did not think about the country’. He called for an immediate halt to the Uma Oya Project and gave examples from France, Thailand and South Korea where large scale development projects had been halted half way.
Uma Oya is a project that had been under discussion since the Bandaranaike era in the 1950s. The Dudley Senanayake government of the late 1960s, the Premadasa government in the early 1990s, the Chandrilka Kumaratunga government of 2000, and the UNP government of 2001, all carried out studies regarding this project. After all those studies and discussions, cabinet approval was obtained to commence the project on 26 January 2005. This was on the basis of cabinet paper No. 05/0036/039/002 which was presented to cabinet by Anura Kumara Dissanayake who was the Minister of Agriculture, Livestock, Lands and Irrigation at that time. AKD had stated as follows in that cabinet paper:
“For the development of the South East Dry Zone in Sri Lanka, particularly the Hambantota and Moneragala districts, there is no other alternative unless water is diverted from Uma Oya to the South East Dry Zone.”
“Strategy for economic development of both Hambantota and Moneragala districts changed during the recent past and diversion of Uma Oya to Kirindi Oya is now seen in the perspective of recently conceived Ruhunupura development. The infrastructure of Ruhunupura development consists of the development of the Hambantota harbour into one of the modern harbours in the region, international airport in the Moneragala district, and an oil refinery…For all these new developments, projected water requirement has been estimated as 100 MCM in the year 2030. In the absence of a reliable source of water in the area, water from Uma Oya is seen as the only alternative to supplement this requirement.”
“Therefore high priority should be given for this project.”
A party of protest
Even though AKD claimed in parliament that the Uma Oya Project had been inaugurated to fulfil the desires of the Rajapaksas, the cabinet paper presented to the CBK led cabinet by AKD himself, in January 2005, many months before Mahinda Rajapaksa became President in November 2005, has explained very well, the reasons for commencing the Uma Oya Project. In 2017, JVP activists had actually opposed a project that they themselves had initiated through a cabinet paper! This illustrates the mentality of the JVP. This is a party that has opposed every development project brought forward by every political party in power. Ultimately, they opposed the only development project that they themselves had initiated in their six decade long history.
Let us for a moment forget that it was AKD himself who had presented the initial cabinet paper on Uma Oya. Even if some problem emerges in the implementation of a development project initiated by someone else, the immediate reaction of a responsible political party should be to seek ways and means of solving the issue and moving forward rather than demanding that the project be abandoned. Problems do emerge in the implementation of large scale development projects. If the JVP reacted the way they did in 2017 to a minor issue which was easily resolved by procuring a few pieces of additional machinery, one can only imagine how they would have reacted in a case of a more serious issue.
The JVP is essentially a party of protest. When an opportunity to oppose something presents itself, they tend to quite literally, forget themselves. They do not possess the attitude of mind necessary to be able build or develop anything. A political party that seeks to rule the country should have the capacity to look rationally at problems that emerge in the day to day running of the country as well as in implementing major development projects. A party that sees demonstrations and agitation against all and sundry as the solution to all problems will never be able to make a positive contribution to the country.
Features
Coercive laws recipe for future misrule
by Jehan Perera
The NPP government is going after powerful figures from the past and present who have engaged in corruption, fraud and criminal activity in a way that no previous government in Sri Lanka has done. Former ministers, politicians and senior state officials are among those facing investigations and legal proceedings. The government has placed before Parliament a document listing 50 cases involving corruption, fraud and other crimes. These include not only financial offences but also cases relating to the Easter Sunday attacks, the killings of Lasantha Wickrematunge and Wasim Thajudeen, the disappearance of Prageeth Ekneligoda and attacks on journalists Keith Noyahr and Upali Tennakoon.
The significance of this effort is that it can demonstrate that nobody is above the law, regardless of political connections or social standing, which will help restore public confidence in institutions that have long been distrusted. It could also recover public resources, improve the investment climate and strengthen the foundations for a more prosperous and just Sri Lanka. When criticised for focusing on the past and not the present, the government position is that these investigations were initiated under earlier governments, particularly between 2015 and 2019, and that it is now allowing investigators to proceed to deal with the backlog without political interference.
But there is an aspect of the government’s approach that is less justifiable. While pursuing past wrongdoing by powerful individuals, it is also advancing a triumvirate of draft laws that could give the state sweeping powers over citizens, organisations and dissent in the present and future. The draft Prevention of Terrorism legislation, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill raise serious questions about the over-centralisation of power. Each of these laws strengthens the powers of the state while weakening the rights and safeguards that protect people from their misuse and thus questions the basic rights of people in democracy where ‘the power of the people is vested in the government’. This is a recipe for future misrule rather than the rule of law. As the well-known saying goes, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
Proposed Laws
The real test of system change, for which the government obtained an overwhelming mandate, requires not only a government willing to hold others accountable, but one prepared to subject itself to the same principles of legality, transparency and restraint. The three proposed laws that are particularly important in this regard are the Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill. Each of these draft laws has been presented as serving a legitimate purpose. Preventing terrorism, combating organised crime and ensuring that NGOs do not facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing are proper responsibilities of the state. Sri Lanka has international obligations in these areas, and no responsible government can disregard them. However, the existence of a legitimate objective does not justify every means adopted to achieve it.
The proposed Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill illustrates the problem. Although its definition of terrorism draws on a model developed by a former United Nations Special Rapporteur, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka has warned that the definition of terrorism extends beyond the model and could bring legitimate political protest, trade union action and civil disobedience within the scope of counter-terrorism legislation. Its concerns also include prolonged detention, inadequate judicial oversight and restrictions on access to legal counsel. These are objections that go to the heart of the relationship between the citizen and the state. The government cannot credibly promise to protect democratic freedoms while creating powers that could be used to restrict them. It is necessary for the government to reassess the draft through transparent consultation and revise provisions that could criminalise legitimate dissent.
The Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill raises similar concerns. It is presented as giving effect to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, which Sri Lanka ratified in 2006. The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has argued that the convention does not require many of the bill’s provisions. The proposed law extends to a broad range of offences, permits detention orders lasting up to a year, makes confessions to police admissible for purposes of legal evidence, and introduces extensive surveillance powers. A law intended to dismantle criminal networks should not create a parallel system of exceptional powers that could be applied far beyond organised crime. Nor should safeguards developed through years of experience with abuses under the Prevention of Terrorism Act be weakened through legislation bearing a different name. The government should review whether or not existing laws could be used effectively to control these crimes or whether each exceptional power is necessary.
Civil Society
The proposed NGO Registration and Supervision Bill presents another test of the government’s intentions. The government may reasonably seek transparency in the finances of organisations receiving public or foreign funds, including measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. It seeks to justify its overreach on the grounds of meeting the internationally mandated requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for the Asia-Pacific region. But these objectives do not justify placing civil society and NGOs under excessive administrative control when even the FATF ranks them as low to medium risks. The draft bill would require registration and renewal, impose extensive obligations on organisations and empower authorities to suspend or deregister them on broadly framed grounds. It is important to redraft provisions that confer excessive discretion over registration, renewal, suspension and deregistration of NGOs.
Among the concerns raised by United Nations human rights special rapporteurs with regard to the draft NGO law are provisions requiring organisations to align with government policies and restrictions that could affect advocacy, dissent and freedom of association. The implications extend well beyond organisations that engage directly with the government. Community groups, human rights organisations, independent researchers and organisations working on reconciliation or accountability could find their activities constrained by uncertainty over how these provisions might be interpreted. Organisations that criticise government policies are not thereby working against the country. Their freedom to do so is part of what distinguishes a democracy from a system in which the government determines which opinions and activities are acceptable.
The government has generated considerable public goodwill through its pursuit of corruption and criminality. It should not assume that this goodwill gives it an unlimited mandate to strengthen the coercive powers of the state. The NPP knows from its own history that governments can treat dissent as a threat and use the machinery of the state against their opponents. There is still time to correct the drafts through transparent public consultation, narrow definitions of offences, meaningful judicial control over detention and surveillance, and effective remedies against arbitrary decisions. A government that pursues corruption while weakening safeguards against state abuse risks undermining its own achievements. Besides bringing to light the abuse of power by previous governments, the NPP government needs to build a system in which no future government can abuse power in the belief they can get away with it.
Features
Quality assurance without quality enhancement: The irony of university QA
By Ramya Kumar
According to the Quality Assurance Council (QAC) of the University Grants Commission (UGC), quality assurance (QA) refers to “the means (i.e. the policies, attitudes, actions, procedures, etc.), by which an institution can guarantee with confidence and certainty, that the standards and quality of its educational provision are being maintained and enhanced”.
An expansive structure has been in place since 2005 to govern and implement QA processes within the state university system. The QAC is the focal point at the UGC that implements external reviews of state universities and institutes. Each university has its own Centre for Quality Assurance (CQA) tasked with performing QA in line with QAC directives. Faculties, in turn, have Internal Quality Assurance Cells (IQAC) performing their own QA; they are answerable to the CQA.
The big question is whether this all-encompassing top-down QA system, that in many ways undermines the internal dynamics of university governance, actually supports universities to enhance the quality of education. This article highlights some concerns.
Top-down check-box activities
The QAC conducts external reviews of universities and degree programmes. A review team appointed by the UGC (who may or may not have experience in the institution/programme in question) examines the self-evaluation report submitted by the said institution/programme. The team then conducts a site visit to verify the claims made in the university’s self-evaluation report, clarify issues identified during the desk review, and examine how QA procedures operate in practice. The team holds meetings with the university administration, members of the Council and Senate, Deans, Heads of Departments, academic and non-academic staff, students, and others. Following the visit, a draft report is submitted to the relevant institution/programme for comment before final publication. The reviewed institution/programme then prepares and publishes an action plan addressing the recommendations, with subsequent monitoring of progress.
There are some worthy QA initiatives under implementation, such as improving facilities for students with disabilities and strengthening mechanisms to address sexual- and gender-based violence. However, for the most part, QA activities have little to do with improving the quality of education. They are mostly preoccupied with monitoring faculty and department websites, digital transformation, student feedback, subject evaluation, course evaluation, peer evaluation, and, more recently, staff appraisal. These activities, which consume an inordinate amount of time—so precious at understaffed universities—have become check-box activities completed to generate evidence for the next review. Below is an excerpt of a conversation between two academics (1 and 2) that conveys how QA plays out at universities (reproduced with permission).
1: … .it’s like social media you know, like posting things on Facebook or twitter or Instagram. When people do a lot of social media, everything they do, they do thinking, “okay I’m going to post it in this way… this I have to put on my Instagram.” QA is a little like that… everything is considered in light of, “ah we can use this for the review, as evidence… for example very recently we were encouraged to have all the things that we do in our department in the faculty newsletter so then they can put in the review. Every little thing has to be noted down….
2: And with pictures and all…
1: At the very least it has to be written so that you have written evidence .. you can’t be doing something for the sake of doing something or because it is good for the department … and sometimes people tell me “oh yea that’s a good idea we can fit that under this x, y section of the review..”
2: Yea, and nobody really thinks about the actual outcome… whether it’s actually helping anyone..
1: I also find that a lot of the words that we used in different ways have now been co-opted to the QA discourse ..including quality.. I can’t actually say what I want as an “outcome”, for example, that the outcome of this workshop is that my students “think about” … then I am told “ah but no that’s not one of the Bloom’s taxonomy words, “think about”.…
2: And the worst part is these medical and agriculture people, these types of people go around spreading it like some kind of gospel!
1: Yea, this cookie cutter way of doing things, they think is the height of innovativeness or creativity, when actually it is so mundane … for me the most awful thing about it is like some fungus of mundanity has taken over through QA reviews.
2: yea, when you say QA, my mind closes off immediately and I stop listening…
Auditing everything but power
QA leaves out crucial aspects of university governance. For instance, there is no review or assessment of the “quality” of university administrations under Criterion 1 or the integrity of procedures governing the promotion of academic staff under Criterion 6 of the institutional reviews.
The majority in the Council—the university’s executive and governing body, which is responsible for selecting the Vice-Chancellor (VC)—are appointed in ad hoc fashion. Apart from the Ex-Officio members in the Council (VC, Deans, etc.), and the two members elected by the Senate, the remainder are appointed by the UGC with no formal consultation or vetting procedure. The VC appointment process described in UGC Circular No. 03/2023 exemplifies how an ostensibly technical process can become entangled in political sycophancy. The Registrar invites applications for the position of VC through advertisement. Applicants must submit a curriculum vitae, a statement of vision for the university and supporting documents. The University Council appoints a three-member Search Committee of senior academics to encourage “eminent persons” to apply, while the UGC appoints a former VC from another university to “observe” the selection process.
A Special Meeting of the University Council is convened. Candidates are interviewed and must make a presentation to the Council Members, followed by questions. Each Council member “gives marks” for seven prescribed criteria: strategic focus (20%), effective leadership (20%), holistic thinking/conceptual skills (10%), academic and research excellence (15%), personal integrity (10%), professional communication (10%) and managerial competence (15%). Marks are averaged, and the Council recommends three candidates to the UGC in rank order. The UGC-appointed observer separately submits a confidential report on the selection process.
This procedure is expected to guarantee quality, but does it? Applications are submitted to the Council Members, who have been appointed on questionable bases, and who are expected to review the applications and give scores, based on objective assessments. But, in reality, most Council Members are manipulated by VC candidates, who often have personal ties with them. The UGC-appointed observer usually has no genuine interest in the outcome. And there is no way for anyone to actually question the Council’s decision once it is made. Although the highest-ranked candidate may ultimately be appointed, the selection remains a political decision made by the President, who retains the discretion to appoint any one of the three.
External reviews also do not look into the promotions of academic staff, except to scrutinise whether there are policies and procedures in place to govern promotion. Academic staff may apply for promotion to Professor once they satisfy the prescribed eligibility requirements, which typically include the period of service, academic qualifications, research and publication achievements, teaching experience, and contributions to the university and wider community. Applications are evaluated against specified criteria, with research output and academic contributions assessed through documentary evidence and expert evaluation. Under the UGC’s scheme for Professors, two experts from outside the applicant’s institution assess specified aspects of research and knowledge dissemination. Again, beneath this technical process, which is externally evaluated, lies a problematic points-based scheme that can be manipulated and abused with impunity.
Rethinking university QA
Like the VC election process and the schemes of promotion for academic staff, QA reviews are open to manipulation. Before a review, there is a chaotic rush to complete evidence gathering and reporting. Academics leave all other work aside, including at times their teaching, to focus on completing documentation and preparing reports. The standardised criteria in the review manuals and scoring sheets often do not reflect differences in disciplines and institutional contexts. But this does not really matter because any serious problems experienced by institutions or programmes are hastily brushed under the carpet to conceal any evidence that could taint the review. The goal is to obtain an A or at least a B grade at whatever cost.
QA may result in positive change if it moves beyond top-down check-box activities towards internally designed and owned processes encompassing all aspects of university governance, led by departments and faculties, and supported by adequate resources. The current QA system needs to be dismantled and replaced by procedures that are accountable, not to the UGC, but to our students and the communities we serve.
(Ramya Kumar is attached to the Department of Community and Family Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Jaffna)
. Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
Features
Down Memory Lane — the Grand 20th Edition!
Yes, Down Memory Lane, the beloved Sing-Along concert series that first struck a chord, way back in 1997, returns for its landmark 20th edition this Saturday, 17th October, at the beautiful Bolgoda Grand Resort, Moratuwa town centre.
Having celebrated its glorious 25th anniversary with the show in 2023, this milestone 20th concert promises to be even more special.
The organisers, the ever-popular Moratuwa Arts Forum, are pulling out all the stops to present yet another unforgettable evening, brimming with camaraderie, fellowship, and pure nostalgia.
Get ready for two-and-a-half hours of non-stop singing as veteran vocalists, from the Moratuwa Arts Forum, will take the stage to lead and inspire the happy audience to sing, sing and sing to their hearts’ content.
The repertoire? Absolutely magical, according to the organisers.

Veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike: Will handle the evening’s proceedings / Priya Peiris: Event Conceptor
Around 40 golden oldies — from timeless English vintage evergreens and hits from the 50s to the 90s, to toe-tapping calypsos, soulful American plantation melodies, rousing cowboy and Dixieland favourites, aa well as cherished Sinhala standards. All to be sung with much gusto!
This year’s dedicated organising committee comprises Brian Coorey (Chairman), Priya Peiris (Event Conceptor), Hiran Fernando, Suranga Fernando, Viranjan Perera, Hemka Fernando and Neelesh Silva. Guidance and support comes from Moratuwa Arts Forum President Sarana Guneratne and Secretary Chandani Silva.
Adding his signature charm to the evening, as Master of Ceremonies, will be the veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike.
Don’t miss this landmark celebration of music and memories!
For further details, contact Hiran Fernando on 0772636446 or WhatsApp 0783636446.
-
Features5 days agoThe Sri Lankan who made Scottish history
-
Sports5 days agoNissanka absence opens door for Sri Lanka’s young guns
-
News4 days agoNDB fraud Rs 60mn more than reported
-
News6 days agoGnansara Thera to be assigned to prison printing section: Officials
-
News4 days agoRemoving monk’s robes matter for Sangha to decide: Mahanayake Theras
-
Features5 days agoFuture of Sri Lanka’s state university system: Should it be shut down and reopened?
-
News6 days agoOIC of FCID summoned before Maligakanda Magistrate
-
News5 days agoShiranthi R remanded until 13 Oct.
