Midweek Review
Winning and Losing in Geneva
Review of Rajiva Wijesinha’s ‘Representing Sri Lanka – Geneva, Rights and Sovereignty’
By Sanja de Silva Jayatilleka
Rajiva Wijesinha’s new book “Representing Sri Lanka” (S. Godage & Brothers) spans seven significant years of Sri Lanka’s engagement with the international community, from 2007 to 2014. It is as much a travel diary as a record of his time as the Head of the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) and as Secretary to the Ministry of Human Rights under Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe.
The detailed reminiscence of engagement in both these capacities with international actors and Sri Lankan officials sheds light on hitherto little-known facts of the intense work behind the scenes that had to be carried out in order to obtain the successful outcomes for Sri Lanka, and the bureaucratic roadblocks and erroneous political decisions that resulted in avoidable failures.
While there’s much to learn from descriptions of inter-ministerial and inter-agency dealings at the highest levels during the turbulent years of the last stages of the war against the LTTE, continuing into the post-war years, the book also greatly entertains with its narrative of delightful anecdotes and hilarious pen-sketches of prominent personalities from the author’s interactions with them at close quarters.
Opening A9 from Omanthai
In a frustrated critique of the international actors operating in Sri Lanka during this time, Professor Wijesinha describes the difficulties he faced in his attempt to get the A9 Road opened for supplies to the North during the war. He found that Sri Lanka was blamed for keeping the A9 closed while the Tigers claimed people starved due to restrictions on food supplies. He approached the head of UNOPS in Sri Lanka, Rainer Freuenfeld, to find out why the road couldn’t be opened seven days and was told that the MoD wouldn’t permit it. He approached Secretary/Defence Gotabaya Rajapaksa and was informed that the ICRC would not let him open it for the seven days.
Rajiva then approached the ICRC, and its head Toon van der Hooven told him that since they had to monitor the checkpoints, they could do so only if both the government and the LTTE agreed to the opening. Since the government was seeking to open it, he asked Toon Vander Hoovan if the LTTE was against the opening. Incredibly, Toon van der Hooven told him his conversations with the LTTE were confidential. Van der Hooven affirmed the LTTE’s culpability only when it was pointed out that since the Defence Ministry had agreed, the stumbling block had to be LTTE.
Subsequently, finding that the ICRC had dropped from their minutes the request to them to raise it with the LTTE, Prof Wijesinha had to insist on its inclusion, which led to the LTTE finally agreeing to open the road for six days a week. The Norwegian Monitoring Mission then recorded in its minutes that the A9 was opened at the request of the LTTE. (pp. 26-27)
Diplomacy in Geneva
Speaking at a seminar at the OPA in Colombo, Mr. HMGS Palihakkara, former Secretary, Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN in New York during the last stages of the war, once described Sri Lanka’s diplomatic victory in 2009 in Geneva a week after its military victory at Nandikadal, not without a note of dismay, as a “gunfight”. Professor Wijesinha’s book belies this caricatured impression which mostly emerged from the Foreign Ministry.
The May 2009 Special Session at the UNHRC was dramatic and grippingly suspenseful for sure, as a bold new move by Sri Lanka in the Council saw it cease the initiative in the face of formidable odds, and the people in Sri Lanka holding their collective breath included the President and his Cabinet, but for the self-assured Sri Lankan team in Geneva which had put in the work over two years, victory was certain.
In painstaking detail, the book sets out the vast amount of multi-dimensional work that was carried out in Sri Lanka, in the Ministry of Human Rights, the Peace Secretariat, and the Attorney-General’s Department, in addition to the numerous meetings in Geneva and in other major capitals of the world, with a number of international agencies, diplomats, the Sri Lankan Diaspora and the influential media such as the BBC, during the years 2007-2009.
It is when all this came together that “The Triumph in Geneva” as he titles his Chapter 6, was made possible, together with the assiduous and dedicated work of the team at the Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka in Geneva and the delegations attending the Council’s sessions which Professor Wijesinha was often a part of as a frequent attendee. This book is essential reading for all who require a look into to how that was done and what it took.
Europe
Professor Wijesinha who travelled often to Europe for work says that when he met the then EU High Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner in Brussels, her displeasure at the ban on the LTTE gave him the impression that “She seemed to think that they would have behaved themselves and given up terrorism once she had read them a lecture.”
In London for a few days where he had a BBC World interview, he was invited to the Sri Lankan High Commissioner’s for dinner whereupon he was “astonished at the attempt to create in London the equivalent of a local baila party” which he writes was “not surprising given the ‘machang’ mentality” that was evinced “rather than professional assessments”. He writes that Britain became our worst enemy even though expressing love and affection [for the High Commissioner].
Government Intransigence
In Geneva for UNHRC sessions, he met with WHO officials for he was “deeply conscious that we would need much psycho-social support for those who had suffered from the war”. The WHO was supportive, but back in Colombo, the effort stalled. “For three years I kept knocking my head against a wall, one reason for government intransigence being their view that admitting to psycho-social problems would strengthen the hand of those who claimed our violence had caused them. I continue to be bemused by the stupid callousness of our decision-makers, neglect fueled by the view that they were not accountable to anyone, not even our own people.”
Shady NGOs
As head of SCOPP and as Secretary, he was in constant touch with NGOs which worked in Sri Lanka or had an interest in it, and through his interactions had developed a shrewd evaluation of those who were sincere and those who were opportunists. He was therefore often called upon to respond to NGOs both at the Council and at side events and other meetings.
In Bern, he had lunch with some MPs one of whom “belonged to an NGO that was part of the very shady Solidar Group…headed in Sri Lanka by a rascal called Guy Rhodes…I had no doubt that he was behind the use by the LTTE of heavy earth-moving equipment which the Norwegian component of Solidar…had kept at its headquarters in Kilinochchi”. He says that “the Norwegian Leadership of the NPA travelled to Sri Lanka to apologise” for the “abuse of vehicles” in its custody. He says Guy Rhodes and also Rainer Freuenfeld were members of UN Security Team “…a shadowy outfit that was not under the control of the UN Resident Coordinator.”
The Sri Lankan critical engagement with and responses to NGOs at the UNHRC stopped after Ambassador Jayatilleka was removed from Geneva, because his successor stopped the practice, “claiming that criticisms should be ignored.” Professor Wijesinha writes that “This was disastrous for, since she also stopped networking, the allegations made carried conviction and it was assumed that we could not answer them, not that we had chosen not to.”
‘Slow Self-Destruction’
In Chapter 7 with the above title can be seen the beginnings of the eventual closure of both SCOPP and the Ministry of Human Rights. In September 2009, resettlement of IDPs had begun and Prof Wijesinha flew to Manik Farm with Walter Kalin, Special Rapporteur of the UNHRC. The Ministry of Human Rights was coordinating the aid effort and had developed a Common Humanitarian Action Plan. He writes “But over the next few months Basil Rajapaksa pushed the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights out of the equation”. Instead, the Northern Task Force which Basil Rajapaksa chaired took over that work and informed Prof Wijesinha that he should tell his Minister that “aid was no longer his business”. (p103)
When the John Kerry-Richard Lugar Report was sent to Sri Lanka for comment, Prof Wijesinha tried vainly to get it done, even offering to draft a reply, but to no avail as “nothing happened with the Committee” (p107). After Ban ki Moon appointed the Darusman Panel, President Rajapaksa initiated the LLRC and he was told that the “mandate with regard to the Kerry report was subsumed in that of the LLRC” (p107). This he found was not the case.
Prof Wijesinha reveals that:
“Chairman C R de Silva…worked quickly and issued some Interim Recommendations well before the Darusman Panel issued its own scathing report. But, though Mohan [Peiris] was straight away appointed to chair a committee to work on these recommendations, the committee never met, and in fact he finally confessed to me, having said for weeks that he was trying to get a date from Gotabaya Rajapaksa for the committee to meet, that Gotabaya did not want that to happen”. (p108)
Geneva March 2012: What went wrong?
When President Mahinda Rajapaksa asked Prof Wijesinha to attend the March 2012 UNHRC session in Geneva, he writes “there was no efforts at all to deal with criticism at the Council itself. Previously Dayan and I had responded immediately to attacks on Sri Lanka and, since we both had facts at our disposal and could speak effectively, we soon managed to put a stop to the relentless sniping that had gone before”.
When he wanted to rebut the Amnesty International criticism, “the junior Ministry officer with me told me that they did not respond to such critiques”. He then called Tamara Kunanayakam, PR in Geneva who called Ambassador Dayan Jayatilleka in Paris to check, and on being convinced, agreed to let Prof Wijesinha speak. (p115)
However, that was too little, for he writes that “We had a sidebar that day, which was chaotic, for the government had sent a massive delegation which was totally disorganized.
The clear-cut way in which Dayan had organized presentations and responses had been replaced by confused aggression with some of those sent believing and asserting that reconciliation was quite unnecessary.” (p116)
Things were certainly not helped by the battle for supremacy between the Minister of Human Rights and the Minister of Foreign Affairs who were both in Geneva for the session. At a meeting to discuss strategy at the Hotel Intercontinental, “the hostility between them was palpable. The chief thing to be decided it seemed was who would make the closing speech on behalf of Sri Lanka when the resolution was taken up…” (p117) Considering Sri Lanka was almost certain to lose the resolution by this time, it is incomprehensible why either minister would have volunteered for the slot. Eventually when Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe “flung his badge on the table and threatened to go back to Sri Lanka, GL, with no alternative, backed down.” (p117)
There were other incidents which prefigured the 2012 defeat in Geneva. Prof Rajiva discloses that when he asked for the Action Plan with regard to the LLRC which President Mahinda Rajapaksa had wanted presented at the Council, Mohan Peiris “told me it was not yet finalized. When I suggested he let me look at what there was, he told me that it belonged to the Foreign Ministry. I went straight away to GL… ‘What plan?’ he said in bemusement and I realized nothing had been done. It was also clear that GL knew nothing about it. “(p118)
Sri Lanka lost its attempt to stop the Resolution in March 2012 sessions “at which the Americans mustered a solid majority”. (p123)
Infamous incident in New York
On the last page of his book, Rajiva refers to what must surely be one of the most incredible incidents in the history of the Foreign Ministry. Of all the anecdotes told in this book, this one is the most disreputable. In this shocking story the protagonists were Sajin Vaas Gunawardena, the monitoring MP of the Foreign Ministry, and High Commissioner to the UK Chris Nonis, who had won the nation’s applause when he performed exceptionally well in a memorable CNN interview. As most people heard it, the former slapped the latter in New York where they were both part of the Sri Lankan delegation to the UN General Assembly sessions, which was headed by President Mahinda Rajapaksa.
Professor Wijesinha writes “…[When] I went to England on a wholly private visit, I met Chris in London for the last time. He had been beaten up by Sajin Vass Gunawardena in New York and had resigned. But what traumatized him even more was that the President [Mahinda Rajapaksa] took Sajin’s side. Chris was indeed so nervous that…next day when he picked me up for dinner at the Royal Overseas League, having passed me once or twice in his car to make sure I was not being followed.”
This incident was consequential in many ways. It certainly signaled a crisis in the conduct of Foreign Affairs. As for Prof Wijesinha, even though he thought Chris Nonis was “…perhaps exaggerating the present danger, what happened was appalling and I sympathized with him and his fears. That I think more than anything else ensured that I agreed to support Maithripala Sirisena against Mahinda Rajapaksa when he called an early Presidential election a month later. “(p159)
The book also provides highlights of his frequent travels around the world, representing the government of Sri Lanka and in his capacity as the head of the Sri Lankan chapter of the Liberal International including an addendum of his travels in Asia.
Most valuably, Prof Wijesinha has provided a critical evaluation of the conduct of Sri Lanka’s foreign relations starting from 2007 when he was first invited to Geneva to participate in the HNHRC sessions by then Ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka, through to the last time he represented the government of Sri Lanka in 2014. He has done so using his personal experience of close interactions with government officials both local and foreign, in the international system and numerous NGOs.
He has used his intimate experience in the corridors of power to bring fascinating accounts of instructions given by the highest political authority being ignored but forgiven, personal rivalries laid out and shamelessly played out, of meetings held and not held, reports written and withheld, to reflect on the impact of all these on the interest of the state and citizens of Sri Lanka.
As Sri Lanka struggles to regain its standing in the world, not least at the UNHRC Geneva, the lessons he recounts are worth learning.
Midweek Review
Daya Pathirana killing and transformation of the JVP
JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghe, who returned to Sri Lanka in late Nov, 2001, ending a 12-year self-imposed exile in Europe, declared that India helped him flee certain death as the government crushed his party’s second insurrection against the state in the ’80s, using even death squads. Amarasinghe, sole surviving member of the original politburo of the JVP, profusely thanked India and former Prime Minister V.P. Singh for helping him survive the crackdown. Neither the JVP nor India never explained the circumstances New Delhi facilitated Amarasinghe’s escape, particularly against the backdrop of the JVP’s frenzied anti-India campaign. The JVP has claimed to have killed Indian soldiers in the East during the 1987-1989 period. Addressing his first public meeting at Kalutara, a day after his arrival, Amarasinghe showed signs that the party had shed its anti-India policy of yesteryears. The JVPer paid tribute to the people of India, PM Singh and Indian officials who helped him escape.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Forty years after the killing of Daya Pathirana, the third head of the Independent Student Union (ISU) by the Socialist Students’ Union (SSU), affiliated with the JVP, one-time Divaina journalist Dharman Wickremaretne has dealt with the ISU’s connections with some Tamil terrorist groups. The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) hadn’t been among them, according to Wickremaretne’s Daya Pathirana Ghathanaye Nodutu Peththa (The Unseen Side of Daya Pathirana Killing), the fifth of a series of books that discussed the two abortive insurgencies launched by the JVP in 1971 and the early ’80s.
Pathirana was killed on 15 December, 1986. His body was found at Hirana, Panadura. Pathirana’s associate, Punchiralalage Somasiri, also of the ISU, who had been abducted, along with Pathirana, was brutally attacked but, almost by a miracle, survived to tell the tale. Daya Pathirana was the second person killed after the formation of the Deshapremi Janatha Vyaparaya (DJV), the macabre wing of the JVP, in early March 1986. The DJV’s first head had been JVP politburo member Saman Piyasiri Fernando.
Its first victim was H. Jayawickrema, Principal of Middeniya Gonahena Vidyalaya, killed on 05 December, 1986. The JVP found fault with him for suspending several students for putting up JVP posters.
Wickremaretne, who had been relentlessly searching for information, regarding the violent student movements for two decades, was lucky to receive obviously unconditional support of those who were involved with the SSU and ISU as well as other outfits. Somasiri was among them.
Deepthi Lamaheva had been ISU’s first leader. Warnakulasooriya succeeded Lamahewa and was replaced by Pathirana. After Pathirana’s killing K.L. Dharmasiri took over. Interestingly, the author justified Daya Pathirana’s killing on the basis that those who believed in violence died by it.
Wickremaretne’s latest book, the fifth of the series on the JVP, discussed hitherto largely untouched subject – the links between undergraduates in the South and northern terrorists, even before the July 1983 violence in the wake of the LTTE killing 12 soldiers, and an officer, while on a routine patrol at Thinnavely, Jaffna.
The LTTE emerged as the main terrorist group, after the Jaffna killings, while other groups plotted to cause mayhem. The emergence of the LTTE compelled the then JRJ government to transfer all available police and military resources to the North, due to the constant attacks that gradually weakened government authority there. In Colombo, ISU and Tamil groups, including the PLOTE (People’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) enhanced cooperation. Wickremaretne shed light on a disturbing ISU-PLOTE connection that hadn’t ever been examined or discussed or received sufficient public attention.
In fact, EROS (Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students), too, had been involved with the ISU. According to the author, the ISU had its first meeting on 10 April, 1980. In the following year, ISU established contact with the EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front). The involvement of ISU with the PLOTE and Wickremaretne revealed how the SSU probed that link and went to the extent of secretly interrogating ISU members in a bid to ascertain the details of that connection. ISU activist Pradeep Udayakumara Thenuwara had been forcibly taken to Sri Jayewardenepura University where he was subjected to strenuous interrogation by SSU in a bid to identify those who were involved in a high profile PLOTE operation.
The author ascertained that the SSU suspected Pathirana’s direct involvement in the PLOTE attack on the Nikaweratiya Police Station, and the Nikaweratiya branch of the People’s Bank, on April 26, 1985. The SSU believed that out of a 16-member gang that carried out the twin attacks, two were ISU members, namely Pathirana, and another identified as Thalathu Oya Seneviratne, aka Captain Senevi.
The SSU received information regarding ISU’s direct involvement in the Nikaweratiya attacks from hardcore PLOTE cadre Nagalingam Manikkadasan, whose mother was a Sinhalese and closely related to JVP’s Upatissa Gamanayake. The LTTE killed Manikkadasan in a bomb attack on a PLOTE office, in Vavuniya, in September, 1999. The writer met Manikkadasan, at Bambapalitiya, in 1997, in the company of Dharmalingham Siddharthan. The PLOTE had been involved in operations in support of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s administration.
It was President Premadasa who first paved the way for Tamil groups to enter the political mainstream. In spite of some of his own advisors expressing concern over Premadasa’s handling of negotiations with the LTTE, he ordered the then Elections Commissioner Chandrananda de Silva to grant political recognition to the LTTE. The LTTE’s political wing PFLT (People’s Front of Liberation Tigers) received recognition in early December, 1989, seven months before Eelam War II erupted.
Transformation of ISU
The author discussed the formation of the ISU, its key members, links with Tamil groups, and the murderous role in the overall counter insurgency campaign during JRJ and Ranasinghe Premadasa presidencies. Some of those who had been involved with the ISU may have ended up with various other groups, even civil society groups. Somasiri, who was abducted along with Pathirana at Thunmulla and attacked with the same specialised knife, but survived, is such a person.
Somasiri contested the 06 May Local Government elections, on the Jana Aragala Sandhanaya ticket. Jana Aragala Sandhanaya is a front organisation of the Frontline Socialist Party/ Peratugaami pakshaya, a breakaway faction of the JVP that also played a critical role in the violent protest campaign Aragalaya against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. That break-up happened in April 2012, The wartime Defence Secretary, who secured the presidency at the 2019 presidential election, with 6.9 mn votes, was forced to give up office, in July 2022, and flee the country.
Somasiri and Jana Aragala Sandhanaya were unsuccessful; the group contested 154 Local Government bodies and only managed to secure only 16 seats whereas the ruling party JVP comfortably won the vast majority of Municipal Councils, Urban Councils and Pradeshiya Sabhas.
Let us get back to the period of terror when the ISU was an integral part of the UNP’s bloody response to the JVP challenge. The signing of the Indo-Lanka accord, in late July 1987, resulted in the intensification of violence by both parties. Wickremaretne disclosed secret talks between ISU leader K.L. Dharmasiri and the then Senior SSP (Colombo South) Abdul Cader Abdul Gafoor to plan a major operation to apprehend undergraduates likely to lead protests against the Indo-Lanka accord. Among those arrested were Gevindu Cumaratunga and Anupa Pasqual. Cumaratunga, in his capacity as the leader of civil society group Yuthukama, that contributed to the campaign against Yahapalanaya, was accommodated on the SLPP National List (2020 to 2024) whereas Pasqual, also of Yuthukama, entered Parliament on the SLPP ticket, having contested Kalutara. Pasqual switched his allegiance to Ranil Wickremesinghe after Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s ouster in July 2022.
SSU/JVP killed K.L. Dharmasiri on 19 August, 1989, in Colomba Kochchikade just a few months before the Army apprehended and killed JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera. Towards the end of the counter insurgency campaign, a section of the ISU was integrated with the military (National Guard). The UNP government had no qualms in granting them a monthly payment.
Referring to torture chambers operated at the Law Faculty of the Colombo University and Yataro operations centre, Havelock Town, author Wickremaretne underscored the direct involvement of the ISU in running them.
Maj. Tuan Nizam Muthaliff, who had been in charge of the Yataro ‘facility,’ located near State Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratne’s residence, is widely believed to have shot Wijeweera in November, 1989. Muthaliff earned the wrath of the LTTE for his ‘work’ and was shot dead on May 3, 2005, at Polhengoda junction, Narahenpita. At the time of Muthaliff’s assassination, he served in the Military Intelligence.
Premadasa-SSU/JVP link
Ex-lawmaker and Jathika Chinthanaya Kandayama stalwart Gevindu Cumaratunga, in his brief address to the gathering, at Wickremaretne’s book launch, in Colombo, compared Daya Pathirana’s killing with the recent death of Nandana Gunatilleke, one-time frontline JVPer.
Questioning the suspicious circumstances surrounding Gunatilleke’s demise, Cumaratunga strongly emphasised that assassinations shouldn’t be used as a political tool or a weapon to achieve objectives. The outspoken political activist discussed the Pathirana killing and Gunatilleke’s demise, recalling the false accusations directed at the then UNPer Gamini Lokuge regarding the high profile 1986 hit.
Cumaratunga alleged that the SSU/JVP having killed Daya Pathirana made a despicable bid to pass the blame to others. Turning towards the author, Cumaratunga heaped praise on Wickremaretne for naming the SSU/JVP hit team and for the print media coverage provided to the student movements, particularly those based at the Colombo University.
Cumaratunga didn’t hold back. He tore into SSU/JVP while questioning their current strategies. At one point a section of the audience interrupted Cumaratunga as he made references to JVP-led Jathika Jana Balawegaya (JJB) and JJB strategist Prof. Nirmal Dewasiri, who had been with the SSU during those dark days. Cumaratunga recalled him attending Daya Pathirana’s funeral in Matara though he felt that they could be targeted.
Perhaps the most controversial and contentious issue raised by Cumaratunga was Ranasinghe Premadasa’s alleged links with the SSU/JVP. The ex-lawmaker reminded the SSU/JVP continuing with anti-JRJ campaign even after the UNP named Ranasinghe Premadasa as their candidature for the December 1988 presidential election. His inference was clear. By the time Premadasa secured the presidential nomination he had already reached a consensus with the SSU/JVP as he feared JRJ would double cross him and give the nomination to one of his other favourites, like Gamini Dissanayake or Lalith Athulathmudali.
There had been intense discussions involving various factions, especially among the most powerful SSU cadre that led to putting up posters targeting Premadasa at the Colombo University. Premadasa had expressed surprise at the appearance of such posters amidst his high profile ‘Me Kawuda’ ‘Monawada Karanne’poster campaign. Having questioned the appearance of posters against him at the Colombo University, Premadasa told Parliament he would inquire into such claims and respond. Cumaratunga alleged that night UNP goons entered the Colombo University to clean up the place.
The speaker suggested that the SSU/JVP backed Premadasa’s presidential bid and the UNP leader may have failed to emerge victorious without their support. He seemed quite confident of his assertion. Did the SSU/JVP contribute to Premadasa’s victory at one of the bloodiest post-independence elections in our history.
Cumaratunga didn’t forget to comment on his erstwhile comrade Anupa Pasqual. Alleging that Pasqual betrayed Yuthukama when he switched allegiance to Wickremesinghe, Cumaratunga, however, paid a glowing tribute to him for being a courageous responder, as a student leader.
SSU accepts Eelam
One of the most interesting chapters was the one that dealt with the Viplawadi Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna/Revolutionary Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (RJVP), widely known as the Vikalpa Kandaya/Alternative Group and the ISU mount joint campaigns with Tamil groups. Both University groups received weapons training, courtesy PLOTE and EPRLF, both here, and in India, in the run-up to the so-called Indo-Lanka Peace Accord. In short, they accepted Tamils’ right to self-determination.
The author also claimed that the late Dharmeratnam Sivaram had been in touch with ISU and was directly involved in arranging weapons training for ISU. No less a person than PLOTE Chief Uma Maheswaran had told the author that PLOTE provided weapons training to ISU, free of charge ,and the JVP for a fee. Sivaram, later contributed to several English newspapers, under the pen name Taraki, beginning with The Island. By then, he propagated the LTTE line that the war couldn’t be brought to a successful conclusion through military means. Taraki was abducted near the Bambalapitiya Police Station on the night of 28 April, 2005, and his body was found the following day.
The LTTE conferred the “Maamanithar” title upon the journalist, the highest civilian honour of the movement.
In the run up to the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, India freely distributed weapons to Tamil terrorist groups here who in turn trained Sinhala youth.
Had it been part of the overall Indian destabilisation project, directed at Sri Lanka? PLOTE and EPRLF couldn’t have arranged weapons training in India as well as terrorist camps here without India’s knowledge. Unfortunately, Sri Lanka never sought to examine the origins of terrorism here and identified those who propagated and promoted separatist ideals.
Exactly a year before Daya Pathirana’s killing, arrangements had been made by ISU to dispatch a 15-member group to India. But, that move had been cancelled after law enforcement authorities apprehended some of those who received weapons training in India earlier. Wickremaretne’s narrative of the students’ movement, with the primary focus of the University of Colombo, is a must read. The author shed light on the despicable Indian destabilisation project that, if succeeded, could have caused and equally destructive war in the South. In a way, Daya Pathirana’s killing preempted possible wider conflict in the South.
Gevindu Cumaratunga, in his thought-provoking speech, commented on Daya Pathirana. At the time Cumaratunga entered Colombo University, he hadn’t been interested at all in politics. But, the way the ISU strongman promoted separatism, influenced Cumaratunga to counter those arguments. The ex-MP recollected how Daya Pathirana, a heavy smoker (almost always with a cigarette in his hand) warned of dire consequences if he persisted with his counter views.
In fact, Gevindu Cumaratunga ensured that the ’80s terror period was appropriately discussed at the book launch. Unfortunately, Wickremaretne’s book didn’t cause the anticipated response, and a dialogue involving various interested parties. It would be pertinent to mention that at the time the SSU/JVP decided to eliminate Daya Pathirana, it automatically received the tacit support of other student factions, affiliated to other political parties, including the UNP.
Soon after Anura Kumara Dissanayake received the leadership of the JVP from Somawansa Amarasinghe, in December 2014, he, in an interview with Saroj Pathirana of BBC Sandeshaya, regretted their actions during the second insurgency. Responding to Pathirana’s query, Dissanayake not only regretted but asked for forgiveness for nearly 6,000 killings perpetrated by the party during that period. Author Wickremaretne cleverly used FSP leader Kumar Gunaratnam’s interview with Upul Shantha Sannasgala, aired on Rupavahini on 21 November, 2019, to remind the reader that he, too, had been with the JVP at the time the decision was taken to eliminate Daya Pathirana. Gunaratnam moved out of the JVP, in April 2012, after years of turmoil. It would be pertinent to mention that Wimal Weerawansa-Nandana Gunatilleke led a group that sided with President Mahinda Rajapaksa during his first term, too, and had been with the party by that time. Although the party split over the years, those who served the interests of the JVP, during the 1980-1990 period, cannot absolve themselves of the violence perpetrated by the party. This should apply to the JVPers now in the Jathika Jana Balawegaya (JJB), a political party formed in July 2019 to create a platform for Dissanayake to contest the 2019 presidential election. Dissanayake secured a distant third place (418,553 votes [3.16%])
However, the JVP terrorism cannot be examined without taking into JRJ’s overall political strategy meant to suppress political opposition. The utterly disgusting strategy led to the rigged December 1982 referendum that gave JRJ the opportunity to postpone the parliamentary elections, scheduled for August 1983. JRJ feared his party would lose the super majority in Parliament, hence the irresponsible violence marred referendum, the only referendum ever held here to put off the election. On 30 July, 1983, JRJ proscribed the JVP, along with the Nawa Sama Samaja Party and the Communist Party, on the false pretext of carrying out attacks on the Tamil community, following the killing of 13 soldiers in Jaffna.
Under Dissanayake’s leadership, the JVP underwent total a overhaul but it was Somawansa Amarasinghe who paved the way. Under Somawansa’s leadership, the party took the most controversial decision to throw its weight behind warwinning Army Chief General (retd) Sarath Fonseka at the 2010 presidential election. That decision, the writer feels, can be compared only with the decision to launch its second terror campaign in response to JRJ’s political strategy. How could we forget Somawansa Amarasinghe joining hands with the UNP and one-time LTTE ally, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), to field Fonseka? Although they failed in that US-backed vile scheme, in 2010, success was achieved at the 2015 presidential election when Maithripala Sirisena was elected.
Perhaps, the JVP took advantage of the developing situation (post-Indo-Lanka Peace Accord), particularly the induction of the Indian Army here, in July 1987, to intensify their campaign. In the aftermath of that, the JVP attacked the UNP parliamentary group with hand grenades in Parliament. The August 1987 attack killed Matara District MP Keerthi Abeywickrema and staffer Nobert Senadheera while 16 received injuries. Both President JRJ and Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa had been present at the time the two hand grenades were thrown at the group.
Had the JVP plot to assassinate JRJ and Premadasa succeeded in August 1987, what would have happened? Gevindu Cumaratunga, during his speech also raised a very interesting question. The nationalist asked where ISU Daya Pathirana would have been if he survived the murderous JVP.
Midweek Review
Reaping a late harvest Musings of an Old Man
I am an old man, having reached “four score and five” years, to describe my age in archaic terms. From a biological perspective, I have “grown old.” However, I believe that for those with sufficient inner resources, old age provides fertile ground to cultivate a new outlook and reap a late harvest before the sun sets on life.
Negative Characterisation of Old Age
My early medical education and training familiarised me with the concept of biological ageing: that every living organism inevitably undergoes progressive degeneration of its tissues over time. Old age is often associated with disease, disability, cognitive decline, and dependence. There is an inkling of futility, alienation, and despair as one approaches death. Losses accumulate. As Shakespeare wrote in Hamlet, “When sorrows come, they come not single spies, but in battalions.” Doctors may experience difficulty in treating older people and sometimes adopt an attitude of therapeutic nihilism toward a life perceived to be in decline.
Categorical assignment of symptoms is essential in medical practice when arriving at a diagnosis. However, placing an individual into the box of a “geriatric” is another matter, often resulting in unintended age segregation and stigmatisation rather than liberation of the elderly. Such labelling may amount to ageism. It is interesting to note that etymologically, the English word geriatric and the Sanskrit word jara both stem from the Indo-European root geront, meaning old age and decay, leading to death (jara-marana).
Even Sigmund Freud (1875–1961), the doyen of psychoanalysis, who influenced my understanding of personality structure and development during my psychiatric training, focused primarily on early development and youth, giving comparatively little attention to the psychology of old age. He believed that instinctual drives lost their impetus with ageing and famously remarked that “ageing is the castration of youth,” implying infertility not only in the biological sense. It is perhaps not surprising that Freud began his career as a neurologist and studied cerebral palsy.
Potential for Growth in Old Age
The model of human development proposed by the psychologist Erik Erikson (1902–1994), which he termed the “eight stages of man,” is far more appealing to me. His theory spans the entire life cycle, with each stage presenting a developmental task involving the negotiation of opposing forces; success or failure influences the trajectory of later life. The task of old age is to reconcile the polarity between “ego integrity” and “ego despair,” determining the emotional life of the elderly.
Ego integrity, according to Erikson, is the sense of self developed through working through the crises (challenges) of earlier stages and accruing psychological assets through lived experience. Ego despair, in contrast, results from the cumulative impact of multiple physical and emotional losses, especially during the final stage of life. A major task of old age is to maintain dignity amidst such emotionally debilitating forces. Negotiating between these polarities offers the potential for continued growth in old age, leading to what might be called a “meaningful finish.”
I do not dispute the concept of biological ageing. However, I do not regard old age as a terminal phase in which growth ceases and one is simply destined to wither and die. Though shadowed by physical frailty, diminishing sensory capacities and an apparent waning of vitality, there persists a proactive human spirit that endures well into late life. There is a need in old age to rekindle that spirit. Ageing itself can provide creative opportunities and avenues for productivity. The aim is to bring life to a meaningful close.
To generate such change despite the obstacles of ageing — disability and stigmatisation — the elderly require a sense of agency, a gleam of hope, and a sustaining aspiration. This may sound illusory; yet if such illusions are benign and life-affirming, why not allow them?
Sharon Kaufman, in her book The Ageless Self: Sources of Meaning in Late Life, argues that “old age” is a social construct resisted by many elders. Rather than identifying with decline, they perceive identity as a lifelong process despite physical and social change. They find meaning in remaining authentically themselves, assimilating and reformulating diverse life experiences through family relationships, professional achievements, and personal values.
Creative Living in Old Age
We can think of many artists, writers, and thinkers who produced their most iconic, mature, or ground-breaking work in later years, demonstrating that creativity can deepen and flourish with age. I do not suggest that we should all aspire to become a Monet, Picasso, or Chomsky. Rather, I use the term “creativity” in a broader sense — to illuminate its relevance to ordinary, everyday living.
Endowed with wisdom accumulated through life’s experiences, the elderly have the opportunity for developmental self-transformation — to connect with new identities, perspectives, and aspirations, and to engage in a continuing quest for purpose and meaning. Such a quest serves an essential function in sustaining mental health and well-being.
Old age offers opportunities for psychological adaptation and renewal. Many elders use the additional time afforded by retirement to broaden their knowledge, pursue new goals, and cultivate creativity — an old age characterised by wholeness, purpose, and coherence that keeps the human spirit alive and growing even as one’s days draw to a close.
Creative living in old age requires remaining physically, cognitively, emotionally, and socially engaged, and experiencing life as meaningful. It is important to sustain an optimistic perception of health, while distancing oneself from excessive preoccupation with pain and trauma. Positive perceptions of oneself and of the future help sustain well-being. Engage in lifelong learning, maintain curiosity, challenge assumptions — for learning itself is a meaning-making process. Nurture meaningful relationships to avoid disengagement, and enter into respectful dialogue, not only with those who agree with you. Cultivate a spiritual orientation and come to terms with mortality.
The developmental task of old age is to continue growing even as one approaches death — to reap a late harvest. As Rabindranath Tagore expressed evocatively in Gitanjali [‘Song Offerings’], which won him the Nobel Prize:: “On the day when death will knock at thy door, what wilt thou offer to him?
Oh, I will set before my guest the full vessel of my life — I will never let him go with empty hands.”
by Dr Siri Galhenage
Psychiatrist (Retired)
[sirigalhenage@gmail.com]
Midweek Review
Left’s Voice of Ethnic Peace
Multi-gifted Prof. Tissa Vitarana in passing,
Leaves a glowing gem of a memory comforting,
Of him putting his best foot forward in public,
Alongside fellow peace-makers in the nineties,
In the name of a just peace in bloodied Sri Lanka,
Caring not for personal gain, barbs or brickbats,
And for such humanity he’ll be remembered….
Verily a standard bearer of value-based politics.
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JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghe, who returned to Sri Lanka in late Nov, 2001, ending a 12-year self-imposed exile in Europe, declared that India helped him flee certain death as the government crushed his party’s second insurrection against the state in the ’80s, using even death squads. Amarasinghe, sole surviving member of the original politburo of the JVP, profusely thanked India and former Prime Minister V.P. Singh for helping him survive the crackdown. Neither the JVP nor India never explained the circumstances New Delhi facilitated Amarasinghe’s escape, particularly against the backdrop of the JVP’s frenzied anti-India campaign. The JVP has claimed to have killed Indian soldiers in the East during the 1987-1989 period. Addressing his first public meeting at Kalutara, a day after his arrival, Amarasinghe showed signs that the party had shed its anti-India policy of yesteryears. The JVPer paid tribute to the people of India, PM Singh and Indian officials who helped him escape.