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Midweek Review

Winning and Losing in Geneva

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Review of Rajiva Wijesinha’s ‘Representing Sri Lanka – Geneva, Rights and Sovereignty’

By Sanja de Silva Jayatilleka

Rajiva Wijesinha’s new book “Representing Sri Lanka” (S. Godage & Brothers) spans seven significant years of Sri Lanka’s engagement with the international community, from 2007 to 2014. It is as much a travel diary as a record of his time as the Head of the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) and as Secretary to the Ministry of Human Rights under Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe.

The detailed reminiscence of engagement in both these capacities with international actors and Sri Lankan officials sheds light on hitherto little-known facts of the intense work behind the scenes that had to be carried out in order to obtain the successful outcomes for Sri Lanka, and the bureaucratic roadblocks and erroneous political decisions that resulted in avoidable failures.

While there’s much to learn from descriptions of inter-ministerial and inter-agency dealings at the highest levels during the turbulent years of the last stages of the war against the LTTE, continuing into the post-war years, the book also greatly entertains with its narrative of delightful anecdotes and hilarious pen-sketches of prominent personalities from the author’s interactions with them at close quarters.

Opening A9 from Omanthai

In a frustrated critique of the international actors operating in Sri Lanka during this time, Professor Wijesinha describes the difficulties he faced in his attempt to get the A9 Road opened for supplies to the North during the war. He found that Sri Lanka was blamed for keeping the A9 closed while the Tigers claimed people starved due to restrictions on food supplies. He approached the head of UNOPS in Sri Lanka, Rainer Freuenfeld, to find out why the road couldn’t be opened seven days and was told that the MoD wouldn’t permit it. He approached Secretary/Defence Gotabaya Rajapaksa and was informed that the ICRC would not let him open it for the seven days.

Rajiva then approached the ICRC, and its head Toon van der Hooven told him that since they had to monitor the checkpoints, they could do so only if both the government and the LTTE agreed to the opening. Since the government was seeking to open it, he asked Toon Vander Hoovan if the LTTE was against the opening. Incredibly, Toon van der Hooven told him his conversations with the LTTE were confidential. Van der Hooven affirmed the LTTE’s culpability only when it was pointed out that since the Defence Ministry had agreed, the stumbling block had to be LTTE.

Subsequently, finding that the ICRC had dropped from their minutes the request to them to raise it with the LTTE, Prof Wijesinha had to insist on its inclusion, which led to the LTTE finally agreeing to open the road for six days a week. The Norwegian Monitoring Mission then recorded in its minutes that the A9 was opened at the request of the LTTE. (pp. 26-27)

Diplomacy in Geneva

Speaking at a seminar at the OPA in Colombo, Mr. HMGS Palihakkara, former Secretary, Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the UN in New York during the last stages of the war, once described Sri Lanka’s diplomatic victory in 2009 in Geneva a week after its military victory at Nandikadal, not without a note of dismay, as a “gunfight”. Professor Wijesinha’s book belies this caricatured impression which mostly emerged from the Foreign Ministry.

The May 2009 Special Session at the UNHRC was dramatic and grippingly suspenseful for sure, as a bold new move by Sri Lanka in the Council saw it cease the initiative in the face of formidable odds, and the people in Sri Lanka holding their collective breath included the President and his Cabinet, but for the self-assured Sri Lankan team in Geneva which had put in the work over two years, victory was certain.

In painstaking detail, the book sets out the vast amount of multi-dimensional work that was carried out in Sri Lanka, in the Ministry of Human Rights, the Peace Secretariat, and the Attorney-General’s Department, in addition to the numerous meetings in Geneva and in other major capitals of the world, with a number of international agencies, diplomats, the Sri Lankan Diaspora and the influential media such as the BBC, during the years 2007-2009.

It is when all this came together that “The Triumph in Geneva” as he titles his Chapter 6, was made possible, together with the assiduous and dedicated work of the team at the Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka in Geneva and the delegations attending the Council’s sessions which Professor Wijesinha was often a part of as a frequent attendee. This book is essential reading for all who require a look into to how that was done and what it took.

Europe

Professor Wijesinha who travelled often to Europe for work says that when he met the then EU High Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner in Brussels, her displeasure at the ban on the LTTE gave him the impression that “She seemed to think that they would have behaved themselves and given up terrorism once she had read them a lecture.”

In London for a few days where he had a BBC World interview, he was invited to the Sri Lankan High Commissioner’s for dinner whereupon he was “astonished at the attempt to create in London the equivalent of a local baila party” which he writes was “not surprising given the ‘machang’ mentality” that was evinced “rather than professional assessments”. He writes that Britain became our worst enemy even though expressing love and affection [for the High Commissioner].

Government Intransigence

In Geneva for UNHRC sessions, he met with WHO officials for he was “deeply conscious that we would need much psycho-social support for those who had suffered from the war”. The WHO was supportive, but back in Colombo, the effort stalled. “For three years I kept knocking my head against a wall, one reason for government intransigence being their view that admitting to psycho-social problems would strengthen the hand of those who claimed our violence had caused them. I continue to be bemused by the stupid callousness of our decision-makers, neglect fueled by the view that they were not accountable to anyone, not even our own people.”

Shady NGOs

As head of SCOPP and as Secretary, he was in constant touch with NGOs which worked in Sri Lanka or had an interest in it, and through his interactions had developed a shrewd evaluation of those who were sincere and those who were opportunists. He was therefore often called upon to respond to NGOs both at the Council and at side events and other meetings.

In Bern, he had lunch with some MPs one of whom “belonged to an NGO that was part of the very shady Solidar Group…headed in Sri Lanka by a rascal called Guy Rhodes…I had no doubt that he was behind the use by the LTTE of heavy earth-moving equipment which the Norwegian component of Solidar…had kept at its headquarters in Kilinochchi”. He says that “the Norwegian Leadership of the NPA travelled to Sri Lanka to apologise” for the “abuse of vehicles” in its custody. He says Guy Rhodes and also Rainer Freuenfeld were members of UN Security Team “…a shadowy outfit that was not under the control of the UN Resident Coordinator.”

The Sri Lankan critical engagement with and responses to NGOs at the UNHRC stopped after Ambassador Jayatilleka was removed from Geneva, because his successor stopped the practice, “claiming that criticisms should be ignored.” Professor Wijesinha writes that “This was disastrous for, since she also stopped networking, the allegations made carried conviction and it was assumed that we could not answer them, not that we had chosen not to.”

‘Slow Self-Destruction’

In Chapter 7 with the above title can be seen the beginnings of the eventual closure of both SCOPP and the Ministry of Human Rights. In September 2009, resettlement of IDPs had begun and Prof Wijesinha flew to Manik Farm with Walter Kalin, Special Rapporteur of the UNHRC. The Ministry of Human Rights was coordinating the aid effort and had developed a Common Humanitarian Action Plan. He writes “But over the next few months Basil Rajapaksa pushed the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights out of the equation”. Instead, the Northern Task Force which Basil Rajapaksa chaired took over that work and informed Prof Wijesinha that he should tell his Minister that “aid was no longer his business”. (p103)

When the John Kerry-Richard Lugar Report was sent to Sri Lanka for comment, Prof Wijesinha tried vainly to get it done, even offering to draft a reply, but to no avail as “nothing happened with the Committee” (p107). After Ban ki Moon appointed the Darusman Panel, President Rajapaksa initiated the LLRC and he was told that the “mandate with regard to the Kerry report was subsumed in that of the LLRC” (p107). This he found was not the case.

Prof Wijesinha reveals that:

“Chairman C R de Silva…worked quickly and issued some Interim Recommendations well before the Darusman Panel issued its own scathing report. But, though Mohan [Peiris] was straight away appointed to chair a committee to work on these recommendations, the committee never met, and in fact he finally confessed to me, having said for weeks that he was trying to get a date from Gotabaya Rajapaksa for the committee to meet, that Gotabaya did not want that to happen”. (p108)

Geneva March 2012: What went wrong?

When President Mahinda Rajapaksa asked Prof Wijesinha to attend the March 2012 UNHRC session in Geneva, he writes “there was no efforts at all to deal with criticism at the Council itself. Previously Dayan and I had responded immediately to attacks on Sri Lanka and, since we both had facts at our disposal and could speak effectively, we soon managed to put a stop to the relentless sniping that had gone before”.

When he wanted to rebut the Amnesty International criticism, “the junior Ministry officer with me told me that they did not respond to such critiques”. He then called Tamara Kunanayakam, PR in Geneva who called Ambassador Dayan Jayatilleka in Paris to check, and on being convinced, agreed to let Prof Wijesinha speak. (p115)

However, that was too little, for he writes that “We had a sidebar that day, which was chaotic, for the government had sent a massive delegation which was totally disorganized.

The clear-cut way in which Dayan had organized presentations and responses had been replaced by confused aggression with some of those sent believing and asserting that reconciliation was quite unnecessary.” (p116)

Things were certainly not helped by the battle for supremacy between the Minister of Human Rights and the Minister of Foreign Affairs who were both in Geneva for the session. At a meeting to discuss strategy at the Hotel Intercontinental, “the hostility between them was palpable. The chief thing to be decided it seemed was who would make the closing speech on behalf of Sri Lanka when the resolution was taken up…” (p117) Considering Sri Lanka was almost certain to lose the resolution by this time, it is incomprehensible why either minister would have volunteered for the slot. Eventually when Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe “flung his badge on the table and threatened to go back to Sri Lanka, GL, with no alternative, backed down.” (p117)

There were other incidents which prefigured the 2012 defeat in Geneva. Prof Rajiva discloses that when he asked for the Action Plan with regard to the LLRC which President Mahinda Rajapaksa had wanted presented at the Council, Mohan Peiris “told me it was not yet finalized. When I suggested he let me look at what there was, he told me that it belonged to the Foreign Ministry. I went straight away to GL… ‘What plan?’ he said in bemusement and I realized nothing had been done. It was also clear that GL knew nothing about it. “(p118)

Sri Lanka lost its attempt to stop the Resolution in March 2012 sessions “at which the Americans mustered a solid majority”. (p123)

Infamous incident in New York

On the last page of his book, Rajiva refers to what must surely be one of the most incredible incidents in the history of the Foreign Ministry. Of all the anecdotes told in this book, this one is the most disreputable. In this shocking story the protagonists were Sajin Vaas Gunawardena, the monitoring MP of the Foreign Ministry, and High Commissioner to the UK Chris Nonis, who had won the nation’s applause when he performed exceptionally well in a memorable CNN interview. As most people heard it, the former slapped the latter in New York where they were both part of the Sri Lankan delegation to the UN General Assembly sessions, which was headed by President Mahinda Rajapaksa.

Professor Wijesinha writes “…[When] I went to England on a wholly private visit, I met Chris in London for the last time. He had been beaten up by Sajin Vass Gunawardena in New York and had resigned. But what traumatized him even more was that the President [Mahinda Rajapaksa] took Sajin’s side. Chris was indeed so nervous that…next day when he picked me up for dinner at the Royal Overseas League, having passed me once or twice in his car to make sure I was not being followed.”

This incident was consequential in many ways. It certainly signaled a crisis in the conduct of Foreign Affairs. As for Prof Wijesinha, even though he thought Chris Nonis was “…perhaps exaggerating the present danger, what happened was appalling and I sympathized with him and his fears. That I think more than anything else ensured that I agreed to support Maithripala Sirisena against Mahinda Rajapaksa when he called an early Presidential election a month later. “(p159)

The book also provides highlights of his frequent travels around the world, representing the government of Sri Lanka and in his capacity as the head of the Sri Lankan chapter of the Liberal International including an addendum of his travels in Asia.

Most valuably, Prof Wijesinha has provided a critical evaluation of the conduct of Sri Lanka’s foreign relations starting from 2007 when he was first invited to Geneva to participate in the HNHRC sessions by then Ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka, through to the last time he represented the government of Sri Lanka in 2014. He has done so using his personal experience of close interactions with government officials both local and foreign, in the international system and numerous NGOs.

He has used his intimate experience in the corridors of power to bring fascinating accounts of instructions given by the highest political authority being ignored but forgiven, personal rivalries laid out and shamelessly played out, of meetings held and not held, reports written and withheld, to reflect on the impact of all these on the interest of the state and citizens of Sri Lanka.

As Sri Lanka struggles to regain its standing in the world, not least at the UNHRC Geneva, the lessons he recounts are worth learning.



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Midweek Review

Rightwing economics or centre-left Opposition?

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By Dr. DAYAN JAYATILLEKA

The situation is ripe for a progressive, social democratic, centre-left Opposition with necessarily populist appeal, but can there be one if an archaic, conservative, rightist economic theory is propounded as an alternative to the government’s oligarchic crony-capitalism?

How can the main Opposition party become a truly progressive-centrist formation which can be a magnet for voters from the vast bloc that voted for the Rajapaksas/Pohottuwa? What must it do?

The answer to that is clear and simple, and it isn’t mine. Thirty years ago, the UNP held power at the Presidential, Parliamentary and Pradesheeya Sabha levels, i.e., executive, legislative and local authority levels. That was the last time it did so. The leader responsible for that achievement made a typically unorthodox and fascinating remark while addressing his last May Day rally in 1992, at Galle Face, a year before he was assassinated by a Tiger suicide-bomber. Ranasinghe Premadasa made a surprising and pointed reference to SWRD Bandaranaike:

“…The late Prime Minister SWRD Bandaranaike…left the UNP and formed the Sri Lanka Freedom Party because he thought that his views cannot be implemented through the UNP. If one were to take into account the changes that have taken place in the UNP between then and now, I am sure that if he were still alive, he would have rejoined the UNP…When you look at it from that point of view, you will be able to guess which May Day rally he would have attended if he were alive—the rally at Galle Face or the one at Campbell Park.” (President Premadasa: His Vision and Mission, Selected Speeches, p 192)

What Premadasa says here is that SWRD Bandaranaike with the progressive, moderate nationalist, centre-left views (the SLFP’s founding document used the definition ‘social democratic’) he held at the time he ruptured with the UNP because he thought they could not be accommodated, would have felt compelled and comfortable enough to rejoin the UNP because it had been transformed so radically as to be able to accommodate and represent such personalities and perspectives.

Translated into today’s politics, it can be understood as an injunction to the post-UNP successor party (led by Premadasa’s son) to be a party so configured that it can win over the voters and personalities of the progressive centre, the moderate nationalists, by representing their ideology, sentiments and grievances. In short, an Opposition party capable of winning over the centre-left SLFP and SLPP voters; the Rajapaksa voters.

JR-Ranil or Premadasa?

The ongoing and deepening economic crisis is tailor-made for a ‘Premadasist’ intervention, for three reasons:

(a) Globally, the Covid-19 pandemic has been acknowledged as proving the need for more investment in public goods and social infrastructure, rather than rely on the ‘magic of the marketplace’ with its profit motive.

(b) President Premadasa demonstrated that even in a context of extreme crisis, is it practically possible to revive economic growth, increase industrial exports and foreign investment while simultaneously, not sequentially, transferring real income to the poorest, increasing the real wages of the people and reducing inequality.

(c) The Opposition is led by his only son. It would be as absurdly incongruous for an Opposition party, led by President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s son not to adopt the Premadasa development paradigm and policy as it would be someday for an Opposition party led by Namal Rajapaksa, not to have his father Mahinda Rajapaksa’s as symbol, his achievements as template, and Mahinda Chinthanaya as the basis of its guiding ideology.

The problem is that there is an ideological inclination on the part of some in society and Opposition politics, to ignore the Premadasa development model and philosophy, pat him on the back for ‘reforms’, and elevate instead, rightwing economic doctrines. In international terms these are the economic ideas that President George HW Bush (Bush Sr.), a moderate Republican, derided as “voodoo economics”.

The UNP never won a Presidential election, won only two parliamentary elections, 15 years apart, with never a second consecutive term in governmental office, after it dumped the Premadasa development paradigm and shifted to neoliberal economics, or shifted back to the pre-Premadasa economic model which helped cause the Southern uprising.

With its leadership and Presidential candidate who did far better in November 2019 than the party did before (Feb 2018) or since, the post-UNP Opposition is more organically suited for a frankly neo-Premadasist strategy for economic revival and social upliftment, which the current crisis demands.

JR+BR?

A slightly surreal slogan was tweeted recently, claiming that “we need JR+Shenoy reform once again”. This relates to the ideas of rightwing economist BR Shenoy who produced a pamphlet in 1966 which was adopted as a policy platform by JR Jayewardene, then a Minister in the Dudley Senanayake Cabinet of 1965-’70.

This policy perspective is wrong headed several times over, starting with the contextual fact that the JR+Shenoy platform was not conceived as alternative to the parental precursor of the current Rajapaksa government’s policies, namely the Sirimavo Bandaranaike-NM Perera policies of the coalition government of 1970-’77.

The JRJ-Shenoy policy doctrine was one corner of an intra-governmental UNP policy debate in the mid-1960s. Today it is being revived at the second corner of a bipolar patterning of policy discourse, i.e., in an unhealthy polarisation.

Shenoy Syndrome

As a precocious lad who spent time in the editorial offices of Lake House and hung out with my father and his journalist colleagues and buddies, I was quite aware of the Shenoy episode real-time, because BR Shenoy was tapped, and his product promoted, by Esmond Wickremesinghe, the Managing Director of Lake House (and Ranil’s father). That episode was part of a policy debate that rocked the UNP government of Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake in 1965-1970.

Far from being the antipode of the statist closed economy of the Sirimavo regime, the JR+Shenoy (actually JR+Esmond+Shenoy) platform squarely targeted the genuinely liberal-welfarist economics of the PM Dudley Senanayake and his Planning Ministry tzar, Dr Gamini Corea.

It is absurd and dangerous to exalt the JR+BR Shenoy line today, when the logic of the Dudley Senanayake-Gamani Corea response at that time has been tragically validated by our political history: “It is wiser to spend on welfare, than to cut welfare and have to spend much more on military expenditure later.”

As the John Attygalle Report (he was the IGP, but the report was co-authored by D.I.G Ana Seneviratne) on the pre-1971 JVP revealed, and the statements of the accused in the main trial of the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) confirmed, the movement was founded for armed revolution partly as a response to the ideological struggle within the UNP government. Rohana Wijeweera’s view was that the JR Jayewardene-BR Shenoy project would require the ouster of the Senanayake faction, the installation of an Indonesian style dictatorship, and the scrapping of national elections scheduled for 1970.

This was not as wildly outlandish as it seemed. The Indonesian coup and massacre had taken place in September 1965. Esmond Wickremesinghe and those who backed the JR+Shenoy programme against Senanayake liberal-welfarism, were applauding the post-coup Indonesian economic model. My father Mervyn de Silva had been in Indonesia (with his wife and son) at the invitation of President Sukarno’s Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio for the celebration by Afro-Asian journalists of the 10th anniversary of the Bandung conference virtually on the eve of the coup. Mervyn was the last foreign journalist to interview DN Aidit, leader of the PKI (the non-violent Indonesian Communist Party) who was murdered by the Army a few months later while in hiding, unarmed. My father was among the few (I’m being generous here) in the Lake House press writing against the Indonesian coup and the massacre of 1965, while “the Indonesian model” was being promoted.

Coiled for armed resistance to a dictatorship which never came at the hands of the UNP Right identified as JRJ and Esmond Wickremesinghe equipped with the BR Shenoy agenda, the JVP uncoiled uncontrollably on the watch of the elected successor government, the SLFP-led UF coalition in 1971.

It is not that today’s JVP or FSP is dabbling in any way with violent resistance or ever likely to, but a worker-peasant-student social movement radicalised by the policies and political culture of the Gotabaya presidency, has grown to almost the same capacity as in the 1960s, and if ‘JR+Shenoy’ economic policies are followed after the Rajapaksa regime is inevitably turfed-out, the social explosion will occur no less inevitably on the watch of the incoming ex-UNP administration.

Development Debate

Today’s Lankan economic neoliberals (who call themselves ‘economic liberals’) target a giant of Third World economic thinking, Raul Prebisch. The bridge to the tradition of Prebisch, and indeed the great Ceylonese contribution to the global economic debate, was not the Sirimavo Bandaranaike-NM Perera regime, but rather, those who had been the targets of JRJ and Shenoy in the policy debate within the UNP of 1965-1970: the liberal-welfarist progressives of the Planning Ministry under Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake, namely Dr. Gamani Corea and his deputy, Godfrey Gunatilleke.

In the 1970s, the Lankan node of ‘Third Worldist’ progressive development thinking was the MARGA Institute, which was targeted by the UF coalition government, especially the rightwing Minister Felix Dias Bandaranaike and the Communist Party.

The Gamani Corea-Godfrey Gunatilleke perspective that JRJ+BR Shenoy (plus Esmond Wickremesinghe) had targeted within the UNP government of 1965-1970 and eventually supplanted, found itself revived, revised and reaccommodated within the economic paradigm of Ranasinghe Premadasa.

Prime Minister Premadasa’s extempore remarks at the panel discussion on the sidelines of the UNGA 1980; his invocation of justice for the global South at the UNGA 1980 and the Nonaligned Conference in Harare 1986, are evidence of his commitment to the international tradition of development thinking which Dr. Gamani Corea was a giant of, but is reviled by today’s para-UNP economic neoliberals. (https://www.unmultimedia.org/avlibrary/asset/2114/2114561/)

It is hardly accidental that the founder-Chairperson of the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), at its initiation by Finance Minister Ronnie de Mel and through the Premadasa Presidency, was Dr. Gamani Corea rather than an ‘economic libertarian’ or ‘classic economic liberal’.

Premadasa Project

The formula that ‘we need JR+Shenoy reform once again’ also overlooks the history of the evolution of policy within the UNP in the Opposition in 1970-1973. The Dudley Senanayake line was being eclipsed, the JRJ line was becoming dominant, but a third line was coming into view, which was to be validated by real history when the ‘JR+Shenoy’ paradigm was a causative factor of the civil war in the south.

This ‘third paradigm’ was Ranasinghe Premadasa’s, an early articulation of which was his 4th April 1973 address to the Colombo West Rotary Club. He was so committed to that speech (delivered several years before Susil Sirivardhana joined him) that he republished it in the ‘SAARC Summit special supplement’ of the Daily News during his Presidency, accompanied by an introduction in bold type which read: “The seeds of today’s concepts were sown years ago…President Ranasinghe Premadasa, then First Member of Parliament for Colombo Central was invited by the Colombo West Rotary Club to deliver an address on the topic ‘A Plan for Sri Lanka’ at a luncheon meeting of the Club. The speech was delivered when President Ranasinghe Premadasa was only an Opposition member of Parliament and portrays the vision of a young politician of what he thought was the best for Sri Lanka”.

That he chose to reproduce it in the SAARC special supplement (1991) indicates that this perspective is one he wanted the outside world to know about, and which he hoped to radiate in the region.

In April 1973, he wrestled with the same problem that the economy faces today– the crisis of foreign exchange and dependency—and gave an answer that is distinctively redolent of the Rooseveltian New Deal (his 1988 Presidential election manifesto was to be entitled ‘a New Vision, a New Deal’):

“…If the problems of foreign exchange, development and unemployment are to be satisfactorily tackled, a massive development venture has to be launched to provide the necessary infra-structure such as a network of roads, a network of electricity, a network of irrigation and a network of domestic water supply. With the launching of such a scheme large number of people could be gainfully employed. Together with development of the infrastructure the country’s agricultural and industrial ventures will automatically improve. As a result, foreign exchange could be conserved. People will get more money into their hands thus enabling them to purchase their requirements. The question of subsidies will eventually be eliminated. We can solve our problems. Scarcity of foreign exchange is no obstacle. To earn foreign exchange, we must increase production; to increase production we must develop our national resources, and if we are to develop our national resources, we must harness the human potential that we have in abundance. It is futile to go on bended knees to foreign countries begging for assistance…” (Republished as ‘People’s Participation in Government’, CDN Nov. 21, 1991.)

After the UNP victory of 1977 and the installation of ‘JR+Shenoy reforms’ the evidence of its downside piled up in the 1980s from the reports of various UN agencies which had replaced ‘classical liberal economics’ with indices of inequality, the physical quality of life index (PQLI) and later the Human Development report (HDR), under the intellectual impact of a global struggle for ‘Another Development’ (as it was conceptualized) in which Gamini Corea and Godfrey Gunatilleke were the foremost Sri Lankan figures.

Prime Minister Premadasa appointed the Warnasena Rasaputram Commission. Janasaviya was Premadasa’s response to the revelations of the Rasaputram Report. The hubris of the Open economy and the ‘JR +Shenoy reform’ model had evaporated with the bloody near-extermination of the UNP in the latter half of the 1980s by Sinhala youth from the South (just as Premadasa had predicted).

Open Economy, ‘Economic Democracy’

“If anything, I am for economic democracy” Premadasa told civil service legend Neville Jayaweera in a substantive interview given to the latter published as ‘Charter for Democracy’ (1990). For him, ‘economic democracy’ meant “turning the nation into one where ‘have-nots’ become ‘haves’”.

This was Premadasa’s perspective on the open economy:

“In a world of economic interdependence, those who are self-dependent grow in strength. We live in a world society. We cannot close ourselves off from the world. Yet, we must be free to live and develop as we wish to. We will provide all the conditions for economic growth in an open economy. But an open economy does not mean an economy dictated to by others. An open economy does not mean an economy run for the benefit of others. An open economy must first benefit Sri Lankans before it benefits outsiders.” (‘Address at the Inauguration of the Koggala Export Processing Zone’-June 14th 1991, in ‘President Premadasa: His Vision & Mission-Selected Speeches’, pp 89-92.)

The Premadasa economic philosophy, though partly based on the Open Economy, is not that of ‘JR+BR Shenoy reforms’ of 1977 still less of 1966. It is a different, far more progressive policy paradigm or economic episteme. It is Sri Lankan Social Democracy.

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Midweek Review

9/11 Imperatives

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By Lynn Ockersz

Twenty years and counting,

The 9/11 horrors rage on,

With the first splurge of civilian blood,

Which was unleashed in New York,

Soon transcending time and space,

And spilling into and becoming a flood,

In fiercely contested Iraq and Afghanistan,

Where it triggered aftershocks all around,

But blessed are those who see,

In this worldwide Slaughter of Lambs,

A shameful hour for mankind,

And hear in the tragedy a rallying call,

To lose no time to come together as one,

And bring healing to angry hearts and minds,

That by designing demagogues of divisive strife,

Are tamely led along self-annihilative paths.

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Midweek Review

Easter Sunday imbroglio!

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Archbishop of Colombo Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith reiterates demand for justice at a recent media briefing. The Church has sought the intervention of the Vatican as well as the UNHRC to pressure Sri Lanka over the Easter Sunday probe

Can Parliament, as an institution, absolve itself of the responsibility for tainted political parties? The House did nothing when the TNA recognised the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people. Both Parliament and the Election Department/Election Commission conveniently remained silent. Both institutions turned a blind eye when the TNA, on behalf of the LTTE, in blatant violation of the right to vote, ordered the Northern electorate to boycott the 2005 presidential election to ensure the defeat of Ranil Wickremesinghe as they thought it would be easier to prosecute the war successfully with Rajapaksa in power as he was unpopular with the West. May be the West, too, had a hand in that strategy for they, too, merely kept silent over TNA’s undemocratic demand to the Tamil electorate to boycott the vote. The TNA declared that the presidential poll was irrelevant therefore no point in the Tamil electorate exercising their franchise. But, the move was meant to ensure that normally pro-UNP majority of Tamils did not vote, thereby sealing candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe’s defeat and helping Mahinda Rajapaksa win. When the writer raised this issue with Kumaran Pathmanathan aka ‘KP’ in Aug. 2009, the one-time Chief LTTE procurer of weapons, too, declared that Rajapaksa’s victory would have created an environment conducive for an all-out war. Within three weeks after the 2005 presidential election, the LTTE resumed claymore mine attacks in the Jaffna peninsula. In January, 2006, the LTTE rammed suicide boats into a Fast Attack Craft off Trincomalee harbour. In late April 2006, the LTTE almost succeeded in assassinating Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka. The Eelam war IV commenced in the second week of August 2006, just weeks after the Army neutralised the LTTE threat at Mavil-aru.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

A reference to the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage at the commencement of the 48th sessions of the Geneva–based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) was expected. Human Rights Commissioner Michelle Bachelet, in her oral update delivered on Sept.13 on the Situation in Sri Lanka dealt with the Easter Sunday massacre as revealed by Rev. Father Cyril Gamini Fernando, spokesperson for the National Catholic Committee for Justice (NCCJ).

The former Chilean President (2006-2010 and 2014-2018) Bachelet made two separate references to the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage. Let me reproduce them verbatim to ensure that The Island is not accused of trying to misinterpret facts.

Bachelet declared: “Despite various inquiries, the victims of the Easter Sunday bombings in 2019 and religious leaders continue to call urgently for truth and justice, and a full account of the circumstances that permitted those attacks.”

Referring to the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), Bachelet said: “The Government has reaffirmed its intention to revisit the Act and established a Cabinet sub-committee for this purpose. However, I am deeply concerned about the continued use of the Act to arrest and detain people. Lawyer Hejaaz Hizbullah has now been detained for 16 months under the Act without credible evidence presented before a court. Likewise, Ahnaf Jazeem, a teacher and poet, has been detained without charge since May 2020. I urge an immediate moratorium on the use of the Act, and that a clear timeline be set for its comprehensive review or repeal.”

Bachelet conveniently refrained from stating why the one-time Attorney General’s Department Counsel Hizbullah (2005-2010) is in government custody. Bachelet was careful not to include Hizbullah’s arrest in the paragraph that dealt with concerns raised by the Catholic Church as regards the investigation into the heinous crime. In fact, the UK-led self-appointed Sri Lanka Core Group at the UNHRC on more than one occasion raised Hizbullah’s detention without making reference to the Easter Sunday carnage.

Now that the Catholic Church has declared that it had no option but to seek the intervention of the Vatican and UNHRC to pressure the government over the Easter Sunday investigation, Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith should explain his stand on the detention of lawyer Hizbullah in connection with the Easter carnage.

The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) arrested Hizbullah on April 14, 2020. The lawyer was charged on March 3, 2021.

Why did Bachelet make reference to Hizbullah’s arrest without directly naming him as an Easter Sunday suspect? Did UNHRC conduct its own inquiries before taking up Hizbullah’s issue at the 48th session?

Although Sri Lanka Core Group had referred to Hizbullah in its statements (44th, 45th, and 47th sessions) previously, Bachelet, in her statements to the council, had never mentioned the lawyer by name before the 48th session. May be Bachelet is simply prostituting her independence like so many UN big shots on matters of Western interests. No wonder, one of the first things that the Iraqi rebellion against the US-led invasion of that country did was to blow up the UN compound in Baghdad!

Sri Lanka Core Group comprises Germany, Canada, North Macedonia, Malawi, Montenegro, and the United Kingdom.

Obviously, both Bachelet and the Core Group have taken the Sri Lanka civil society (read Western backed NGOs’) stand on the lawyer. A number of civil society organisations made public statements on behalf of Hizbullah though the government insists on the lawyer’s involvement with extremists. Defence Secretary General Kamal Gunaratne in the run-up to the Geneva sessions declared that the government had irrefutable evidence as regards Hizbullah’s role in the suicide attacks blamed on the now proscribed National Thowheed Jamaat (NTJ) and other organisations with similar ideology.

Those who stood for him have described the lawyer as a minority rights advocate and legal counsel for Muslim victims of human rights violations. Amnesty International is among the groups that expressed concerns over Hizbullah’s arrest. The lawyer, held under the PTA, has handled litigation before the Labour Tribunals and Magistrate’s Courts to the Supreme Court.

Let us, however, not forget a very important fact about AI. It corroborated a fantastic piece of ‘evidence’ after the Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in which a weeping teenager told the US Congress how she witnessed the invading Iraqi army pulling premature babies from their incubators in a Kuwaiti hospital. Later it came to light that she was merely acting from a prepared script and she was none other than the daughter of Kuwait’s then ambassador to Washington. And she was nowhere near the action. Her performance would have easily beaten Bush/Blair’s Weapons of Mass Destruction script.

Truth certainly is a first casualty when states go into war, but what about so-called neutral umpires like AI when they too make truth a casualty?

The European Parliament’s June 10, 2021 Resolution on Sri Lanka referred to Hizbullah. The lawyer seemed to be blessed with sufficient support both here and abroad to move even the UN system. The UNHRC taking up the Easter Sunday issue should be a matter for serious concern. The UNHRC meets thrice a year. With the Vatican, too, taking an active interest in the controversial investigation, UNHRC and Sri Lanka’s self-appointed Core Group are likely to keep it on the Geneva agenda.

SLPP in quandary over MS

 The Church accuses the SLPP government of turning a blind eye to the recommendations made by the Presidential Commission of Inquiry the (PCoI). In spite of repeatedly assuring the Church of transparent investigation and judicial process, free of political interference, the Church is furious over what it calls the the government’s failure to act on the PCoI report. The bone of contention is alleged attempts to save former President Maithripala Sirisena and the then head of State Intelligence Service (SIS) Senior DIG Nilantha Jayawardena.

Before taking up the PCoI’s specific recommendations pertaining to the former President and the Senior DIG, now turned state witness and in charge of the Central Province, it would be pertinent to name members of the PCoI appointed by Sirisena on Sept 22, 2019. Senior DIG Jayawardena received appointment as Senior DIG, East, in early January 2020 in the wake of the last presidential election.

Supreme Court judge Janak de Silva (Chairman), Court of Appeal judge Nishshanka Bandula Karunaratne, retired Supreme Court judges Nihal Sunil Rajapaksha and A. L. Bandula Kumara Atapattu and former Secretary to the Ministry of Justice W. M. M. R. Adhikari. H. M. P. Buwaneka Herath functioned as the Secretary to the Commission.

 The PCoI handed over its final report to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa on Feb 1, 2020. The first and second interim reports were handed over to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa on December 20, 2019 and on March 02, 2020 respectively.

In spite of President Rajapaksa no sooner after assuming office inquiring from Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith whether he wanted to suggest a new member or two to the PCoI, the Archbishop declined the opportunity for obvious reasons.

Rev Father Cyril Gamini Fernando has declared that there couldn’t be any justifiable reason for the refusal on the part of the government to implement the PCoI recommendations.

Rev. Fernando described the appointment of a six-member Committee, headed by Minister Chamal Rajapaksa to study the PCoI recommendations as well as the report of the Sectoral Oversight Committee on National Security submitted to Parliament, as political intervention meant to derail the process.

The six-member committee comprised ministers Chamal Rajapaksa, Johnston Fernando, Udaya Gammanpila, Ramesh Pathirana, Prasanna Ranatunga and Rohitha Abeygunawardena.

Rev Father Fernando declared they were quite horrified by Attorney-at-Law Harigupta Rohanadeera’s revelation that Senior DIG Jayawardena, named by the PCoI, would be a state witness. Rohanadeera made the declaration in his capacity as the Director General, Legal Affairs, President’s Office.

Rohanadeera was on Hiru ‘Salakuna,’ a live weekly programme telecast on Mondays. Obviously, those in authority hadn’t given due consideration to their own report, the Church spokesperson said, vowing to pursue a campaign for justice.

The Island sought a clarification from those closely following the case. The writer was told that Senior DIG Jayawardena would be a prosecuting witness in respect of indictments filed in cases to be heard beginning next month. But, in respect of cases pertaining to negligence, the Senior DIG wouldn’t be there as a prosecution witness.

SLPP troubled by key recommendations

The PCoI declared that there is criminal liability on the part of former President Sirisena for failing in his duties and responsibilities. The PCoI alleged Sirisena’s failure exceeds mere civil negligence. On the basis of evidence gathered, the PCoI recommended that the Attorney General consider criminal proceedings against the former President under any suitable provision in the Penal Code (PCoI Final Report, Vol. 1, p 265).

This recommendation, the first in a series of references, posed quite a political challenge as the former President Sirisena is now a member of the ruling SLPP parliamentary group. As the leader of the SLFP, the main constituent of the SLPP, judicial or otherwise measures against Sirisena who returned to Parliament from his home base of Polonnaruwa at the last parliamentary election can place the SLPP-SLFP relationship in jeopardy. The SLFP parliamentary group headed by Sirisena consists of 14 members, including the leader. Of the 14, 12 successfully contested on the SLPP ticket, one entered on the SLPP National List (Dr. Suren Ragavan) and one entered on the SLFP ticket.

The issue is whether the SLPP-SLFP partnership can survive if the Attorney General moves court against the former President. The Church is unlikely to take that factor into consideration as it steps up pressure on the SLPP administration. The government will find itself in an extremely difficult situation. Similarly, the UNHRC, too, faces a dicey situation. On one hand, Geneva wants Sri Lanka to go the whole hog against perpetrators of the Easter Sunday attacks. And on the other hand, it is seriously concerned about lawyer Hizbullah held over the Easter Sunday carnage. The UNHRC, too, is also in a dilemma.

Deputy Solicitor General Dileepa Peiris is on record as having compared the role of Hizbullah to that of the late Anton Balasingham, British national of Sri Lankan origin, who functioned as the LTTE’s ideologue until his very end.

The government parliamentary group comprises 145 members. The SLPP leadership is aware that their relationship with the SLFP is on thin ice against the backdrop of pressure to move against the former President. The SLPP does not want to lose the SLFP’s support at this moment.

The PCoI also recommended criminal proceedings under any suitable provision in the Penal Code (PCoI Final Report, Vol 1, pages 287-288) in respect of Senior DIG Jayawardena.

The government seems largely reluctant to implement the recommendations or delve into certain observations made by the five-member expert P CoI. Interestingly, the Church, in a missive dated July 12, 2021, addressed to President Rajapaksa, has questioned the rationale in the PCoI conveniently failing to make any specific recommendation in respect of the then Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe in its final findings, thereby literally alluding to possible bias on the part of PCoI vis-à-vis the UNP Leader.

To be fair by the PCoI it clearly pointed out Wickremesinghe’s lax approach towards Islam extremism, which deprived the then administration of an opportunity to take tangible counter measures. The PCoI asserted the UNP leader’s failure facilitated the Easter Sunday carnage (PCoI Final Report, Vol 1, pages 276-277). The Church declared: “Our view is that there should be additional investigations on this matter. We need not stress that there on that fact, Wickremesinghe, in spite of his holding special powers under the 19th Amendment, followed a soft approach. It is, in our view, a serious act of irresponsibility and neglect of duty.”

Links between suicide bombers and political parties

A wider investigation is required to find out the actual links between the Easter Sunday attackers and political parties. The SJB has repeatedly demanded justice for the Easter Sunday victims. But, Vanni District MP Rishad Bathiudeen, leader of the All Ceylon Makkal Congress (ACMC), now in judicial custody, remains with the main Opposition party. The SJB demands implementation of the PCoI recommendations but has chosen to remain silent on Bathiudeen. The PCoI has recommended criminal proceedings against Bathiudeen under any suitable provision of the Penal Code whereas reference was also made to his brother, Riyaj Bathiudeen now also back in custody.

It would be pertinent to mention that Riyaj who had been taken into custody was clandestinely released by the CID under controversial circumstances. The release coincided with some members of the ACMC voting for the 20th Amendment passed by the Parliament in Oct 2020.

A majority in the SLPP demanded an inquiry from President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Premier Mahinda Rajapaksa into Riyaj’s release. The then Attorney General, too, sought an explanation from the CID. The government never revealed why Riyaj was released. However, he was taken back into custody later following a growing outcry over his abrupt release.

The ACMC leader has served in the cabinet of Mahinda Rajapaksa (2020-2015) and President Maithripala Sirisena (2015-2019). The incumbent government cannot ignore accusations that during Rishad Bathiudden’s time as the Trade and Commerce Minister of MR and MS cabinet, the politician supported the Colossus copper factory at Wellampitiya managed by the family of two of the Easter Sunday suicide bombers, Imsath Ahmed Ibrahim and Ilham Ahmed Ibrahim and their father, Mohamed Ibrahim, the founder of Colombo-based Ishana Exports, which describes itself on its website as the ‘largest exporter of spices from Sri Lanka since 2006.’

The JVP never really explained the circumstances Mohamed Ibrahim ended up on their National List at the 2015 parliamentary election. Ibrahim is in custody.

Colossus management had direct access to the highest Offices in the land. During the Yahapalana administration, the Colossus sought supply of copper from the Presidential Secretariat. Interestingly, defeated UPFA lawmaker Shantha Bandara had been the recipient of the Colossus letter at the Presidential Secretariat. Shantha Bandara is now a member of the ruling SLPP. Bandara represents the Kurunegala District.

2019 presidential election

Defence Secretary Gen. Kamal Gunaratne and Rohanadeera recently countered accusations that the 2019 Easter attacks were meant to benefit SLPP candidate Gotabaya Rajapaksa. ‘Salakuna’ anchor Chamuditha Samarawickrema raised the issue with Rohanadeera, who pointed out that the results of the 2018 Feb Local Government polls indicated the ground situation at that time. Gen. Gunaratne declared at a recent meeting that there was absolutely no basis for such accusations and it was a despicable attempt to tarnish President Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

Academic Dr. Rajan Hoole’s ‘Sri Lanka’s Easter Tragedy: When the Deep State gets out of its Depth,’ discussed the circumstances leading to the Easter carnage. Hoole shed light on the complex web of secrets/situations/relationships that led to the Easter carnage. Dr. Hoole, who authored ‘The Arrogance of Power: Myths, decadence and murder,’ in January 2001, blamed the State elements for the attack. Dr. Hoole is unambiguous in his accusation that those who backed SLPP candidate Gotabaya Rajapaksa created an environment to deprive the Muslims of an opportunity to vote at the Nov 2019 presidential election. The author asserted that attempt failed while making reference to the plantation Tamils being disenfranchised in 1949, consequent to the 1948 Citizenship Act.

In Chapter 4, Dr. Hoole briefly discussed the possibility of the failure on the part of the now proscribed NTJ to secure representation in Parliament at the August 2015 general election. Had the NTJ succeeded in securing a foothold in Parliament, the Easter Sunday carnage might not have happened, Dr. Hoole asserted, declaring that the NTJ adopted an aggressive strategy, in the wake of the electoral failure. Dr. Hoole based his quite controversial assessment on an electoral agreement, involving the NTJ, M.L.A.M. Hizbullah of the UPFA (United People’s Freedom Alliance) and Abdul Rahuman and Shibly Farook (both members of SLMC-Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, a constituent of the UNP-led coalition).

Dr. Hoole likened the attempt made by Kattankudy-born Zahran Hashim to have some of his nominees, in Parliament, to that of Prabhakaran’s successful arrangement with R. Sampanthan of the TNA. In terms of the agreement finalised in 2001, the TNA acknowledged the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamils, two years after the high-profile assassination of TULF lawmaker, Neelan Thiruchelvam, in 1999.

President Sirisena had no qualms in accommodating defeated M.L.A.M. Hizbullah in Parliament on the UPFA National List. Hizbullah was among over half a dozen defeated UPFA candidates, accommodated on its National List. National List MP Hizbullah functioned as the Batticaloa political lord until he resigned in January 2019 to pave the way for President Sirisena loyalist, Shantha Bandara, to enter Parliament (The man who helped Colossus procure scrap copper from the state at a nominal price usually reserved for craftsmen and cottage industrialists). Hizbullah was named the Eastern Province Governor. At the time of the Easter attacks, Hizbullah served as the Eastern Province Governor and Chairman of the controversial Batticaloa Campus (Pvt) Limited.

In a report presented to the Parliament Sectoral Sub-Committee on Higher Education and Human Resources, the scandalous politician identified himself as Dr. M.L.A.M. Hizbullah. In spite of failing to get elected from the Batticaloa District with NTJ backing, did Hizbullah serve the interests of Zahran Hashim?

Whatever the political parties may say, both major political alliances, the SLPP and the SJB are tainted. There is no point in denying the fact that the way the TNA continues to politically suffer due to its disgraceful alliance with the LTTE sometime ago, other political parties and alliances experience difficulties as a result of their relationship with Zahran’s group.

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