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Towards a new realism, or why American interventionism fails

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By Uditha Devapriya

In hindsight the interventionists got it wrong: they relied too much on the middle-classes, the civil societies, and the potential for permanent democracy in the countries they intervened in. After four years of entertaining doubts about interventionism, Condoleezza Rice argued, “A rising middle class also creates new centres of social power for political movements.” Today the middle-class in the Third World continues to grow and civil society continues to flourish. Yet democracy, apart from a roller-coaster ride of regime change which never seems to end and always produces electoral backlashes against it, has not. How come?

Charles Krauthammer called the US a “commercial republic.” If it is a commercial republic, it probably is the only one operating in a political system run by an oligarchy, maintained by an upper middle-class, tolerated by a lower middle-class, and suffered by a working class. In this it surpasses not only Athens, but also the European Powers.

What Clinton humanitarians and Bush realists failed to realise was that the rest of the world, barring Western Europe and South-East Asia, does not fit this description: we not only are averse to democracy maintained by a middle-class, we also don’t buy it. Joe Biden may write that “[t]he world does not organize itself” and that for 70 years the US “played a leading role in… animating the institutions that guide relations among nations.” Yet 70 years have ended in the present. Now is not 70 years back. Now is now. The world does not let one country, let alone one superpower, organise everything. The world does not wait.

In trying to intervene and imposing democracy, America hence strove to create an order in its image. “We’ll win hearts and minds”, ran the refrain when US forces pulled down Saddam Hussein’s statue in Firdos Square in April 2003. On the eve of the invasion a Congresswoman went on television and declared, “We’ll go in there, take out Saddam, destroy his army with clean surgical strikes, and everyone will think it’s great.” A year earlier, Dick Cheney made his case for regime change quoting Washington’s favourite Arab expert Fouad Ajami, who apparently believed Iraq would “erupt in joy in the same way the throngs in Kabul greeted the Americans.” But then the throngs didn’t greet the Americans in Kabul. They weren’t going to do so in Basra. What resulted from these interventions was an aberration.

US foreign policy has always been guided by national interest. Only once did it enjoy the status of a sole superpower, and that was between 1991 and 2001. Two camps surveying the world came up with two conclusions about the role of the US in the world order then: the end of history theorists and the clash of civilisations theorists.

The fall of the Soviet Union, which was less the work of Reagan Republicans and Thatcherite Conservatives than of Brezhnev’s entrenchment of the Nomenklatura and its contradictions with a supposedly egalitarian Communist state, was followed by ethno-nationalist-religious uprisings outside the West. Yet in the aftermath of Soviet collapse, the US gained supremacy. There was no one to challenge it. Not even Islamic fundamentalism.

The reaction in America was, as Charles Krauthammer put it, first of confusion, then of awe. Even so not all political pundits felt or believed that America should take over the rule of the world: the isolationists, or the paleoconservatives as they were to be called later, wanted out. But then this was not the time of the paleoconservatives: that would come a quarter century later with the Tea Party Movement, Steve Bannon, and Donald Trump.

In the meantime, civilisation-states propped up their struggle for regional hegemony with one another: Japanese and Chinese in East Asia, Buddhists and Hindus (or rather Sinhalese and Tamils: the clash of civilisations theorists always get it wrong with South Asia) in Sri Lanka. Yet in the absence of a counterweight, the US attempted to carpet the world with the kind of order it had wanted to impose for over half a century. What resulted was the suppression of nationalism on the one hand and the frothing of nationalist tensions on the other.

Accompanying all this was a shift to the neoliberal right by political parties associated with the left or the left-of-centre: the Democrats in the US, the Labourites in the UK, the Congress in India, and of course the SLFP in Sri Lanka. Underlying them was one simple, undeniable fact: for the first time since the beginning of it all, a disparity of power put one country at the helm of the world. “There is no comparison,” Paul Kennedy famously observed.

I’ve observed that American foreign policy has always been driven by national interest. It has also been driven by the need to promote national interest. Yet with Bill Clinton’s presidency there came an impasse: a dove on the Vietnam War who rejected Reagan’s neoconservatism yet embraced his promise of free markets, how was he to reconcile his anti-conservatism with the imperative to exert US strength abroad? The Clinton administration did this by looking at the world through a new lens: liberal interventionism.

On four occasions under Clinton, liberal interventionism resorted to military action: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. How did Cold War doves turn into humanitarian hawks there? Simple, Krauthammer argued: they saw in these countries a cause for intervention “devoid of raw national interest.” In other words these were propelled by a call to promote US interests, but those interests weren’t national interests. They were more values than interests: they used the force of moral suasion, rather than the threat of war, to intervene.

The issue here was that while liberal interventionism operated on the premise of multilateral action, it didn’t need multilateralism to act. The truth was that US administrations, regardless of whoever was in power, could have gone there and bombed the living daylights out of an entire civilisation without requiring a by-your-leave from the UN or the EU. Reagan didn’t inform Margaret Thatcher of his intention to invade Grenada even at the tail-end of the Cold War, so why should Joe Biden defend the Chemical Weapons Convention on the grounds of the “moral suasion of the entire international community”?

Liberal interventionism, then as now, works best when one superpower rules them all. It does not work when two or more rising powers challenge the hegemony of the one superpower. It does not work when multilateral institutions are used by these rising powers to pre-empt the choices that the superpower has to make to impose its will upon us all. Thus it was perfectly suited to 1990s, when Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo could happen with consensus. It was ill-suited to the end of the 1990s and the 2000s, when tensions between civilisation-states no longer made “moral suasion” good enough grounds for US intervention.

What could a viable alternative be? Certainly not Kissingerian realism. Even realists had long abandoned Kissinger’s axioms about the irrelevance of morality in relations between nations. The world was too dangerous a place to try that out: unlike earlier, when nuclear powers banded themselves into either of the two main camps (Communist and capitalist, aligned and non-aligned), now they were left to their own devices. Indeed, the flip-side to US power over the world after the Cold War was the “nationalisation” of the nuclear programme: India and Pakistan now would use the bomb not in the backdrop of detente between the US and the USSR, but in the backdrop of clashes between Hindus and Muslims. Amorality was no longer a card on the table because no one dealt that card any more: while nation-states were guided by the force of authority, there was now a moral aspect to that authority.

Iraq would have wanted to bomb Israel to preserve its power, but it also would have wanted to do so because of Arab tensions with a Jewish settlement in their territory.

In other words, what worked for the world before 1939 – Wilsonian idealism – and the world before 1991 – Kissingerian realism – would not work for the world after 1991. Underlying this disjuncture between idealism and realism was another crucial one: between neoliberalism and neoconservatism. The two would meet in the Reagan presidency.

Under Reagan neoconservatism reared its head (mainly but not only) on the foreign policy front, and neoliberalism reared its head (mainly but not only) on the domestic economic front, promoting counterinsurgency in Latin America while cutting down the welfare state and also empowering the Christian Right and ballooning defence spending. It was a potpourri, and its relevance to post-Cold War US foreign policy lies in the fact that despite differences between the two, both tended to justify action with ideal: neoliberalism with its belief in free markets against government intervention, and neoconservatism with its championing of a traditional American order against internal threats and external enemies.

The neoconservatives found their home in the Bush II presidency. For a while, they grappled with what doctrine they could invoke to justify action. Then 9/11 happened. To validate US interventions in West Asia, the Bush troupe – Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Perle – all resorted to what Charles Krauthammer called “democratic realism.” It strove to balance the concerns of liberal interventionism with the imperatives of realism; in other words, “We will support democracy everywhere, but we will commit blood and treasure only in places where there is strategic necessity – meaning, places central to the larger war against the existential enemy, the enemy that poses a global mortal threat to freedom.”

To say that democratic realism squared the circle would be putting it mildly: in one stroke it assuaged the concerns of liberal interventionists, who didn’t want to impose order without a humanitarian rationale for it, while alienating the isolationists, who didn’t want the US to get involved in any order imposing project, period. What it did was to substitute values for power as the overriding principle of national interest, thereby distancing itself from the Morgenthau-Carr-Kennan-Kissinger school of international relations thought.

Francis Fukuyama criticised this new realism on the basis that it was aimed at a threat far removed from Soviet Communism.

To that Krauthammer retorted: “So what?” Islamists may not have had the means of “actualising their vision”, as Fukuyama claimed it didn’t, yet as Krauthammer observed, borrowing an analogy from Nazi Germany, Hitler did not have the means of actualising his goal of overrunning Europe when he marched into the Rhineland either. The argument was convincing, and it won over mild neoconservatives in the Bush II presidency. You see it crop up in Condoleezza Rice’s article, quoted above: she envisions an “American realism for a new world”, a fusion of power and principle. Instead of imposing our will upon them, she contends, an international order “that reflects our values” would be “the best guarantee of our enduring national interest.”

How prophetic those words were – not. 12 years later, we’re gorging on the leftovers of the Trump presidency, which in the popular consciousness of Republicans got the United States out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduced its military obligations in Europe, steered the country from globalist-internationalists and democratic realists to America First, and got the job done in the economy. Were it not for the “China virus”, his supporters declare, Trump would have easily won, a point confirmed in less than expected Democratic victories even in states where they were expected to lead by wide margins.

If, for a brief moment at least, the paleoconservatives had their day in the US, it was because democratic realism, which combined the humanitarian ideals of the Clinton presidency with the neoconservatism of the Bush presidency, ended up promoting a variant of interventionism which could not really go or think beyond recreating the world in America’s image. In that sense one can say it differed in degree and not in substance from the Wilsonian idealism and the Kissingerian realism which it eschewed. Coming in the wake of the “unipolar moment” in human history, it could not survive China’s rise and Russia’s shift to the East, or the coming up of regional powers, unless it evolved a strategy of engagement with them.

America’s belief in messianism must end, not because it isn’t a superpower, but because it’s not the only major power. Therein lies the key difference between the bipolarity of the Cold War, the unipolarity of the 1990s, the nonpolarity of the early 2000s, and the multipolarity of now: this is a world which pits the US and China on a collision course with each other, with regional players siding with either side. Interventionism by the US, no matter how pure the intentions it exhibits to the world may be, will invariably end up as a failure because every country it intervenes in will oppose it. Thus the world, contrary to what President-elect Biden says, can and will organise itself, and it will do so to oppose any one power leading the race to sort everything out. Think of it as a more interlinked order in which Rome reigns in one corner and the Persians and Chinese reign in another. In that sense this is not a Cold War. It is hotter than any Cold War. And interventionism will only make it hotter. To prevent that from happening, the US needs a new doctrine. A new realism, for a new order.

The writer can be reached at udakdev1@gmail.com



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Sat Mag

October 13 at the Women’s T20 World Cup: Injury concerns for Australia ahead of blockbuster game vs India

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Harmanpreet Kaur's 52 took India to a win against Sri Lanka [ICC]

Australia vs India

Sharjah, 6pm local time

Australia have major injury concerns heading into the crucial clash. Just four balls into the match against Pakistan, Tayla Vlaeminck was out with a right shoulder dislocation.  To make things worse, captain Alyssa Healy suffered an acute right foot injury while batting on 37 as she hobbled off the field with Australia needing 14 runs to win. Both players went for scans on Saturday.

India captain Harmanpreet Kaur who had hurt her neck in the match against Pakistan, turned up with a pain-relief patch on the right side of her neck during the Sri Lanka match. She also didn’t take the field during the chase. Fast bowler Pooja Vastrakar bowled full-tilt before the Sri Lanka game but didn’t play.

India will want a big win against Australia. If they win by more than 61 runs, they will move ahead of Australia, thereby automatically qualifying for the semi-final. In a case where India win by fewer than 60 runs, they will hope New Zealand win by a very small margin against Pakistan on Monday. For instance, if India make 150 against Australia and win by exactly 10 runs, New Zealand need to beat Pakistan by 28 runs defending 150 to go ahead of India’s NRR. If India lose to Australia by more than 17 runs while chasing a target of 151, then New Zealand’s NRR will be ahead of India, even if Pakistan beat New Zealand by just 1 run while defending 150.

Overall, India have won just eight out of  34 T20Is they’ve played against Australia. Two of those wins came in the group-stage games of previous T20 World Cups, in 2018 and 2020.

Australia squad:
Alyssa Healy (capt & wk), Darcie Brown, Ashleigh Gardner, Kim Garth, Grace Harris, Alana King, Phoebe Litchfield, Tahlia McGrath, Sophie Molineux, Beth Mooney, Ellyse Perry, Megan Schutt, Annabel Sutherland, Tayla Vlaeminck, Georgia Wareham

India squad:
Harmanpreet Kaur (capt), Smriti Mandhana (vice-capt), Yastika Bhatia (wk), Shafali Verma, Deepti Sharma, Jemimah Rodrigues, Richa Ghosh (wk), Pooja Vastrakar, Arundhati Reddy, Renuka Singh, D Hemalatha, Asha Sobhana, Radha Yadav, Shreyanka Patil, S Sajana

Tournament form guide:
Australia have three wins in three matches and are coming into this contest having comprehensively beaten Pakistan. With that win, they also all but sealed a semi-final spot thanks to their net run rate of 2.786. India have two wins in three games. In their previous match, they posted the highest total of the tournament so far – 172 for 3  and in return bundled Sri Lanka out for 90 to post their biggest win by runs at the T20 World Cup.

Players to watch:
Two of their best batters finding their form bodes well for India heading into the big game. Harmanpreet and Mandhana’s collaborative effort against Pakistan boosted India’s NRR with the semi-final race heating up. Mandhana, after a cautious start to her innings, changed gears and took on Sri Lanka’s spinners to make 50 off 38 balls. Harmanpreet, continuing from where she’d left against Pakistan, played a classic, hitting eight fours and a six on her way to a 27-ball 52. It was just what India needed to reinvigorate their T20 World Cup campaign.

[Cricinfo]

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Sat Mag

Living building challenge

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By Eng. Thushara Dissanayake

The primitive man lived in caves to get shelter from the weather. With the progression of human civilization, people wanted more sophisticated buildings to fulfill many other needs and were able to accomplish them with the help of advanced technologies. Security, privacy, storage, and living with comfort are the common requirements people expect today from residential buildings. In addition, different types of buildings are designed and constructed as public, commercial, industrial, and even cultural or religious with many advanced features and facilities to suit different requirements.

We are facing many environmental challenges today. The most severe of those is global warming which results in many negative impacts, like floods, droughts, strong winds, heatwaves, and sea level rise due to the melting of glaciers. We are experiencing many of those in addition to some local issues like environmental pollution. According to estimates buildings account for nearly 40% of all greenhouse gas emissions. In light of these issues, we have two options; we change or wait till the change comes to us. Waiting till the change come to us means that we do not care about our environment and as a result we would have to face disastrous consequences. Then how can we change in terms of building construction?

Before the green concept and green building practices come into play majority of buildings in Sri Lanka were designed and constructed just focusing on their intended functional requirements. Hence, it was much likely that the whole process of design, construction, and operation could have gone against nature unless done following specific regulations that would minimize negative environmental effects.

We can no longer proceed with the way we design our buildings which consumes a huge amount of material and non-renewable energy. We are very concerned about the food we eat and the things we consume. But we are not worrying about what is a building made of. If buildings are to become a part of our environment we have to design, build and operate them based on the same principles that govern the natural world. Eventually, it is not about the existence of the buildings, it is about us. In other words, our buildings should be a part of our natural environment.

The living building challenge is a remarkable design philosophy developed by American architect Jason F. McLennan the founder of the International Living Future Institute (ILFI). The International Living Future Institute is an environmental NGO committed to catalyzing the transformation toward communities that are socially just, culturally rich, and ecologically restorative. Accordingly, a living building must meet seven strict requirements, rather certifications, which are called the seven “petals” of the living building. They are Place, Water, Energy, Equity, Materials, Beauty, and Health & Happiness. Presently there are about 390 projects around the world that are being implemented according to Living Building certification guidelines. Let us see what these seven petals are.

Place

This is mainly about using the location wisely. Ample space is allocated to grow food. The location is easily accessible for pedestrians and those who use bicycles. The building maintains a healthy relationship with nature. The objective is to move away from commercial developments to eco-friendly developments where people can interact with nature.

Water

It is recommended to use potable water wisely, and manage stormwater and drainage. Hence, all the water needs are captured from precipitation or within the same system, where grey and black waters are purified on-site and reused.

Energy

Living buildings are energy efficient and produce renewable energy. They operate in a pollution-free manner without carbon emissions. They rely only on solar energy or any other renewable energy and hence there will be no energy bills.

Equity

What if a building can adhere to social values like equity and inclusiveness benefiting a wider community? Yes indeed, living buildings serve that end as well. The property blocks neither fresh air nor sunlight to other adjacent properties. In addition, the building does not block any natural water path and emits nothing harmful to its neighbors. On the human scale, the equity petal recognizes that developments should foster an equitable community regardless of an individual’s background, age, class, race, gender, or sexual orientation.

Materials

Materials are used without harming their sustainability. They are non-toxic and waste is minimized during the construction process. The hazardous materials traditionally used in building components like asbestos, PVC, cadmium, lead, mercury, and many others are avoided. In general, the living buildings will not consist of materials that could negatively impact human or ecological health.

Beauty

Our physical environments are not that friendly to us and sometimes seem to be inhumane. In contrast, a living building is biophilic (inspired by nature) with aesthetical designs that beautify the surrounding neighborhood. The beauty of nature is used to motivate people to protect and care for our environment by connecting people and nature.

Health & Happiness

The building has a good indoor and outdoor connection. It promotes the occupants’ physical and psychological health while causing no harm to the health issues of its neighbors. It consists of inviting stairways and is equipped with operable windows that provide ample natural daylight and ventilation. Indoor air quality is maintained at a satisfactory level and kitchen, bathrooms, and janitorial areas are provided with exhaust systems. Further, mechanisms placed in entrances prevent any materials carried inside from shoes.

The Bullitt Center building

Bullitt Center located in the middle of Seattle in the USA, is renowned as the world’s greenest commercial building and the first office building to earn Living Building certification. It is a six-story building with an area of 50,000 square feet. The area existed as a forest before the city was built. Hence, the Bullitt Center building has been designed to mimic the functions of a forest.

The energy needs of the building are purely powered by the solar system on the rooftop. Even though Seattle is relatively a cloudy city the Bullitt Center has been able to produce more energy than it needed becoming one of the “net positive” solar energy buildings in the world. The important point is that if a building is energy efficient only the area of the roof is sufficient to generate solar power to meet its energy requirement.

It is equipped with an automated window system that is able to control the inside temperature according to external weather conditions. In addition, a geothermal heat exchange system is available as the source of heating and cooling for the building. Heat pumps convey heat stored in the ground to warm the building in the winter. Similarly, heat from the building is conveyed into the ground during the summer.

The potable water needs of the building are achieved by treating rainwater. The grey water produced from the building is treated and re-used to feed rooftop gardens on the third floor. The black water doesn’t need a sewer connection as it is treated to a desirable level and sent to a nearby wetland while human biosolid is diverted to a composting system. Further, nearly two third of the rainwater collected from the roof is fed into the groundwater and the process resembles the hydrologic function of a forest.

It is encouraging to see that most of our large-scale buildings are designed and constructed incorporating green building concepts, which are mainly based on environmental sustainability. The living building challenge can be considered an extension of the green building concept. Amanda Sturgeon, the former CEO of the ILFI, has this to say in this regard. “Before we start a project trying to cram in every sustainable solution, why not take a step outside and just ask the question; what would nature do”?

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Something of a revolution: The LSSP’s “Great Betrayal” in retrospect

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By Uditha Devapriya

On June 7, 1964, the Central Committee of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party convened a special conference at which three resolutions were presented. The first, moved by N. M. Perera, called for a coalition with the SLFP, inclusive of any ministerial portfolios. The second, led by the likes of Colvin R. de Silva, Leslie Goonewardena, and Bernard Soysa, advocated a line of critical support for the SLFP, but without entering into a coalition. The third, supported by the likes of Edmund Samarakkody and Bala Tampoe, rejected any form of compromise with the SLFP and argued that the LSSP should remain an independent party.

The conference was held a year after three parties – the LSSP, the Communist Party, and Philip Gunawardena’s Mahajana Eksath Peramuna – had founded a United Left Front. The ULF’s formation came in the wake of a spate of strikes against the Sirimavo Bandaranaike government. The previous year, the Ceylon Transport Board had waged a 17-day strike, and the harbour unions a 60-day strike. In 1963 a group of working-class organisations, calling itself the Joint Committee of Trade Unions, began mobilising itself. It soon came up with a common programme, and presented a list of 21 radical demands.

In response to these demands, Bandaranaike eventually supported a coalition arrangement with the left. In this she was opposed, not merely by the right-wing of her party, led by C. P. de Silva, but also those in left parties opposed to such an agreement, including Bala Tampoe and Edmund Samarakkody. Until then these parties had never seen the SLFP as a force to reckon with: Leslie Goonewardena, for instance, had characterised it as “a Centre Party with a programme of moderate reforms”, while Colvin R. de Silva had described it as “capitalist”, no different to the UNP and by default as bourgeois as the latter.

The LSSP’s decision to partner with the government had a great deal to do with its changing opinions about the SLFP. This, in turn, was influenced by developments abroad. In 1944, the Fourth International, which the LSSP had affiliated itself with in 1940 following its split with the Stalinist faction, appointed Michel Pablo as its International Secretary. After the end of the war, Pablo oversaw a shift in the Fourth International’s attitude to the Soviet states in Eastern Europe. More controversially, he began advocating a strategy of cooperation with mass organisations, regardless of their working-class or radical credentials.

Pablo argued that from an objective perspective, tensions between the US and the Soviet Union would lead to a “global civil war”, in which the Soviet Union would serve as a midwife for world socialist revolution. In such a situation the Fourth International would have to take sides. Here he advocated a strategy of entryism vis-à-vis Stalinist parties: since the conflict was between Stalinist and capitalist regimes, he reasoned, it made sense to see the former as allies. Such a strategy would, in his opinion, lead to “integration” into a mass movement, enabling the latter to rise to the level of a revolutionary movement.

Though controversial, Pablo’s line is best seen in the context of his times. The resurgence of capitalism after the war, and the boom in commodity prices, had a profound impact on the course of socialist politics in the Third World. The stunted nature of the bourgeoisie in these societies had forced left parties to look for alternatives. For a while, Trotsky had been their guide: in colonial and semi-colonial societies, he had noted, only the working class could be expected to see through a revolution. This entailed the establishment of workers’ states, but only those arising from a proletarian revolution: a proposition which, logically, excluded any compromise with non-radical “alternatives” to the bourgeoisie.

To be sure, the Pabloites did not waver in their support for workers’ states. However, they questioned whether such states could arise only from a proletarian revolution. For obvious reasons, their reasoning had great relevance for Trotskyite parties in the Third World. The LSSP’s response to them showed this well: while rejecting any alliance with Stalinist parties, the LSSP sympathised with the Pabloites’ advocacy of entryism, which involved a strategic orientation towards “reformist politics.” For the world’s oldest Trotskyite party, then going through a series of convulsions, ruptures, and splits, the prospect of entering the reformist path without abandoning its radical roots proved to be welcoming.

Writing in the left-wing journal Community in 1962, Hector Abhayavardhana noted some of the key concerns that the party had tried to resolve upon its formation. Abhayavardhana traced the LSSP’s origins to three developments: international communism, the freedom struggle in India, and local imperatives. The latter had dictated the LSSP’s manifesto in 1936, which included such demands as free school books and the use of Sinhala and Tamil in the law courts. Abhayavardhana suggested, correctly, that once these imperatives changed, so would the party’s focus, though within a revolutionary framework. These changes would be contingent on two important factors: the establishment of universal franchise in 1931, and the transfer of power to the local bourgeoisie in 1948.

Paradoxical as it may seem, the LSSP had entered the arena of radical politics through the ballot box. While leading the struggle outside parliament, it waged a struggle inside it also. This dual strategy collapsed when the colonial government proscribed the party and the D. S. Senanayake government disenfranchised plantation Tamils. Suffering two defeats in a row, the LSSP was forced to think of alternatives. That meant rethinking categories such as class, and grounding them in the concrete realities of the country.

This was more or less informed by the irrelevance of classical and orthodox Marxian analysis to the situation in Sri Lanka, specifically to its rural society: with a “vast amorphous mass of village inhabitants”, Abhayavardhana observed, there was no real basis in the country for a struggle “between rich owners and the rural poor.” To complicate matters further, reforms like the franchise and free education, which had aimed at the emancipation of the poor, had in fact driven them away from “revolutionary inclinations.” The result was the flowering of a powerful rural middle-class, which the LSSP, to its discomfort, found it could not mobilise as much as it had the urban workers and plantation Tamils.

Where else could the left turn to? The obvious answer was the rural peasantry. But the rural peasantry was in itself incapable of revolution, as Hector Abhayavardhana has noted only too clearly. While opposing the UNP’s Westernised veneer, it did not necessarily oppose the UNP’s overtures to Sinhalese nationalism. As historians like K. M. de Silva have observed, the leaders of the UNP did not see their Westernised ethos as an impediment to obtaining support from the rural masses. That, in part at least, was what motivated the Senanayake government to deprive Indian estate workers of their most fundamental rights, despite the existence of pro-minority legal safeguards in the Soulbury Constitution.

To say this is not to overlook the unique character of the Sri Lankan rural peasantry and petty bourgeoisie. Orthodox Marxists, not unjustifiably, characterise the latter as socially and politically conservative, tilting more often than not to the right. In Sri Lanka, this has frequently been the case: they voted for the UNP in 1948 and 1952, and voted en masse against the SLFP in 1977. Yet during these years they also tilted to the left, if not the centre-left: it was the petty bourgeoisie, after all, which rallied around the SLFP, and supported its more important reforms, such as the nationalisation of transport services.

One must, of course, be wary of pasting the radical tag on these measures and the classes that ostensibly stood for them. But if the Trotskyite critique of the bourgeoisie – that they were incapable of reform, even less revolution – holds valid, which it does, then the left in the former colonies of the Third World had no alternative but to look elsewhere and to be, as Abhayavardhana noted, “practical men” with regard to electoral politics. The limits within which they had to work in Sri Lanka meant that, in the face of changing dynamics, especially among the country’s middle-classes, they had to change their tactics too.

Meanwhile, in 1953, the Trotskyite critique of Pabloism culminated with the publication of an Open Letter by James Cannon, of the US Socialist Workers’ Party. Cannon criticised the Pabloite line, arguing that it advocated a policy of “complete submission.” The publication of the letter led to the withdrawal of the International Committee of the Fourth International from the International Secretariat. The latter, led by Pablo, continued to influence socialist parties in the Third World, advocating temporary alliances with petty bourgeois and centrist formations in the guise of opposing capitalist governments.

For the LSSP, this was a much-needed opening. Even as late as 1954, three years after S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike formed the SLFP, the LSSP continued to characterise the latter as the alternative bourgeois party in Ceylon. Yet this did not deter it from striking up no contest pacts with Bandaranaike at the 1956 election, a strategy that went back to November 1951, when the party requested the SLFP to hold a discussion about the possibility of eliminating contests in the following year’s elections. Though it extended critical support to the MEP government in 1956, the LSSP opposed the latter once it enacted emergency measures in 1957, mobilising trade union action for a period of three years.

At the 1960 election the LSSP contested separately, with the slogan “N. M. for P.M.” Though Sinhala nationalism no longer held sway as it had in 1956, the LSSP found itself reduced to a paltry 10 seats. It was against this backdrop that it began rethinking its strategy vis-à-vis the ruling party. At the throne speech in April 1960, Perera openly declared that his party would not stabilise the SLFP. But a month later, in May, he called a special conference, where he moved a resolution for a coalition with the party. As T. Perera has noted in his biography of Edmund Samarakkody, the response to the resolution unearthed two tendencies within the oppositionist camp: the “hardliners” who opposed any compromise with the SLFP, including Samarakkody, and the “waverers”, including Leslie Goonewardena.

These tendencies expressed themselves more clearly at the 1964 conference. While the first resolution by Perera called for a complete coalition, inclusive of Ministries, and the second rejected a coalition while extending critical support, the third rejected both tactics. The outcome of the conference showed which way these tendencies had blown since they first manifested four years earlier: Perera’s resolution obtained more than 500 votes, the second 75 votes, the third 25. What the anti-coalitionists saw as the “Great Betrayal” of the LSSP began here: in a volte-face from its earlier position, the LSSP now held the SLFP as a party of a radical petty bourgeoisie, capable of reform.

History has not been kind to the LSSP’s decision. From 1970 to 1977, a period of less than a decade, these strategies enabled it, as well as the Communist Party, to obtain a number of Ministries, as partners of a petty bourgeois establishment. This arrangement collapsed the moment the SLFP turned to the right and expelled the left from its ranks in 1975, in a move which culminated with the SLFP’s own dissolution two years later.

As the likes of Samarakkody and Meryl Fernando have noted, the SLFP needed the LSSP and Communist Party, rather than the other way around. In the face of mass protests and strikes in 1962, the SLFP had been on the verge of complete collapse. The anti-coalitionists in the LSSP, having established themselves as the LSSP-R, contended later on that the LSSP could have made use of this opportunity to topple the government.

Whether or not the LSSP could have done this, one can’t really tell. However, regardless of what the LSSP chose to do, it must be pointed out that these decades saw the formation of several regimes in the Third World which posed as alternatives to Stalinism and capitalism. Moreover, the LSSP’s decision enabled it to see through certain important reforms. These included Workers’ Councils. Critics of these measures can point out, as they have, that they could have been implemented by any other regime. But they weren’t. And therein lies the rub: for all its failings, and for a brief period at least, the LSSP-CP-SLFP coalition which won elections in 1970 saw through something of a revolution in the country.

The writer is an international relations analyst, researcher, and columnist based in Sri Lanka who can be reached at udakdev1@gmail.com

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