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The SJB’s trust deficit and the JVP-NPP’s strategy

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By Uditha Devapriya

The aragalaya that lasted from February to somewhere in August showed two things: the people’s anger at the regime and the people’s rage against the system. The two are clean different. While a considerable section of the protesters wanted Gotabaya Rajapaksa out, a not inconsiderable second layer used these calls to campaign against the government: hence the interchangeable use of “regime change” and “system change.”

Given this, people should be forgiven for thinking the protests were confused, disjointed and unfocused, because they were exactly that. Laudable as their goals were, they soon deteriorated into a confused morass of rage, anger, and frustration.

The distinction between regime and State is one of the most profound in political science. Sri Lanka’s liberals and left-liberals, not to mention anarchists, tend to confuse and conflate the two. A State exists above, and beyond, a regime. A regime exists well below it, and is in fact subservient to it. If your call to displace a regime gets mixed up in calls to displace the State, then a regime, however unpopular, will find it very easy to make a comeback, on the pretext that protesters are seeking to overthrow an entire political system and with it the last vestiges of law and order. This is precisely what happened on July 13 and 14, when the FSP, followed by the JVP-NPP, asked people to walk into parliament. Their intention may or may not have been to overthrow the legislature, but people thought so.

This in turn activated the more liberal and conservative elements in the aragalaya. Almost immediately after the likes of Kumar Gunaratnam and Sunil Handunneti mobilised crowds at parliament, these groups sprang up on social media, urging people not to go and be hoodwinked by socialist parties. What these groups forgot, in their outcries, was that it had been these socialist elements – or those parading themselves as such – which had led and mobilised the protests since May. Prime among these groups, of course, was the FSP allied IUSF. The IUSF’s long march to Galle Face Green was cheered by a hitherto politically inert middle-class, in particular the youth. It is these same sections that are today castigating the IUSF and the FSP over allegations of ragging at universities.

In other words, the honeymoon is over, even if temporarily. The government has seen it fit to act against protesters and it sees the spate of arrests it has been unleashing since last month as a means of securing, if not the country, then at least Colombo. The same middle-class that hailed them as heroes are no longer bothered. This is natural, and it speaks more about the IUSF’s strategic error of relying on them than about the class preferences of these milieus. Related to this, I would say, is the IUSF’s, JVP-NPP’s, and of course FSP’s tendency to mix up State and regime, which has led these groups to commit two major blunders: to cast themselves as the only political choices in the country, and to alienate Opposition parties which can be made use of in a wider anti-government movement.

I think the November 2 protest showed these tendencies well. While the SJB, the de facto and de jure Opposition in the country, entered into an alliance of sorts with the FSP – and hence FSP allied groups – SJB MPs who entered the protests were not viewed favourably by many of the protesters themselves. Nuzly Hameem, who I believe is one of the more sincere protesters in that crowd, was blunt about Sajith Premadasa: “He simply ran away!” When an SJB official rose up to Premadasa’s defence – as he should – by arguing that Premadasa was afraid of the police attacking demonstrators, Hameem quickly countered: “Irony is such that Opposition leader run away leaving the protesters behind scared that oppression would take place where the main slogan of the protest is ‘Stop Oppression’.”

The protests caught much attention, here and abroad. The international media was much more sympathetic to their demands. The local media, by contrast, either ignored them or demonised them. One leading newspaper highlighted Premadasa’s desertion, in effect questioning his credibility. The protesters themselves, on social media, voiced their anger at Premadasa, more or less agreeing with the same media that marginalised their campaign. I think this shows the SJB’s trust deficit, a deficit compounded if not widened by Premadasa’s actions during the May 9 debacle, and his unwillingness – critiqued even by analysts like Dr Dayan Jayatilleka – to take on the premiership when it was offered to him.

At the same time, these developments have disenchanted sections of the Left opposition. What the FSP thought of Premadasa’s actions last Wednesday we may never know. But we know what the JVP-NPP thought. They refused to join the protests. Justifying his party’s line, MP Wasantha Samarasinghe contended that those taking part in them were more or less siding with the government. One of the demonstrators’ many calls was the abolition of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). MP Samarasinghe point-blank observed that such calls diverted attention from other issues, and that those taking up cudgels against the PTA were following the government’s agenda. By making this case for his party’s decision not to take part, Samarasinghe thus effectively distanced it from the FSP and the SJB.

I think I understand the JVP-NPP’s argument, whataboutist as it may be. At a time of a deepening economic and social crisis, the government is using the PTA to crack down on dissent. MP Samarasinghe and the JVP-NPP may be thinking that if the campaign against the government focuses solely, or mainly, on the PTA, it will embolden the government, or the State, to portray protesters as terrorists and fellow travellers. Over the last few weeks the government has instituted legal action against several aragalistas and this has enabled it to depict the latter as extremists. Samarasinghe’s argument is that by focusing on the PTA, instead of the gross incompetence that continues to wreak havoc on the economy, these protests will make it easier for the government to suppress dissent.

This is the more complex explanation. The simpler explanation, of course, is that the JVP-NPP does not want to take part in any campaign organised by not one, but two, of its bete noires. It does not like the FSP and it has so far resisted any attempt at forging an alliance with that outfit. It does not like Sajith Premadasa, if at all for his sin of being his father’s son. Lately it has badmouthed his party, calling it no better than the SLPP – invoking, of course, the late Mangala Samaraweera’s “two sides, same coin” argument. The JVP-NPP sees itself as the superior of these two formations and for that reason it does not wish to enter into any alliance with them. Though Premadasa himself has tried to invite them, and has made many overtures to this end during the last two years, he has failed.

In politics, it is perfectly possible to be correct and wrong at the same time. The JVP-NPP is correct in its characterisation of the SJB. Not because the SJB hasn’t tried, but because it hasn’t tried hard enough. Sajith Premadasa’s speech against the recent Budget showed that the SJB wants to be seen as following a different economic paradigm. Yet the blowback against the party by centre-right, right-wing, and neoliberal outfits and think-tanks based in Colombo has pushed the party’s stalwarts, like Harsha de Silva and Eran Wickramaratne, to make statements at odds with Premadasa’s speech: one of them has come out in support of Ranil Wickremesinghe’s policies. These elements are deeply conservative and neoliberal in their outlook. The JVP-NPP cannot be faulted for calling them out on this.

The JVP-NPP is wrong, in my view, in where it wants to go with this diagnosis. Any sensible political formation pitted against an overbearing regime must value what Mao characterised as the broadest possible alliance. In no revolution have revolutionary elements all come together with a consensus on every issue and problem. Latin America is seeing a resurgence of the Pink Tide precisely because the left and centre-left have chosen not to walk it alone. This has won these parties some censure from the dogmatist Left: the editors of the World Socialist Web Site, for instance, have poured scorn on the Workers’ Party in Brazil and its mobilisation of leftist forces by calling the latter elements “pseudo-left.” The WSWS calls the JVP-NPP “pseudo-left” too: a charge the party may not agree with.

But I digress here. My point is that the JVP-NPP cannot isolate itself from the mainstream Opposition. At the same time, it cannot allow itself to be co-opted by the mainstream. The Latin American Pink Tide analogy loses ground when you consider that elements within the SJB, or what I’d like to call the Ranilist faction, are much more to the right than the centre-left and liberal elements which sided with Lula da Silva’s party in Brazil. The WSWS may be wrong in terming these formations, and their supporters, “pseudo-left”, but this is a label that can be applied to the SJB’s recent attempts at shifting to the left. The recent protests, in that sense, showed both the strengths and the weaknesses of the Left elements in the aragalaya. Unless they come up with an alliance with other parties, and unless those other parties free themselves from their neoliberal past, the only time we’ll see a vibrant protest movement here is when the country runs out of fuel, gas, and electricity.

The writer is an international relations analyst, researcher, and columnist who can be reached at udakdev1@gmail.com



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Ongoing ‘International Disorder’ and the role of religions

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Pope Leo the 14th

It was left to that great English poet of the late eighteenth century, William Blake, to pinpoint how formal or organized religion promotes social ills by turning a blind eye on them. Blake’s disturbingly revealing poem titled ‘London’ does not flinch from exposing the horrors of the industrial age in Britain and to this day remains profoundly relevant for humankind.

From the viewpoint of Blake’s expose of the ills of his age stanza three of ‘London’ is particularly important. Focusing on the Church’s hypocrisy and inactivity on the question of helping to redeem the sad lot of persons such as chimney sweepers and soldiers, who were way down the social ladder, Blake writes:

‘How the Chimney-sweeper’s cry,
Every blackning Church appalls,
And the hapless Soldier’s sigh,
Runs in blood down Palace walls.’

Expressed summarily, the essential meaning of this stanza is as follows: the deplorable socio-economic condition of the chimney sweeper shames or ‘appalls’ the Church, on account of the latter’s complacency and lack of social commitment to relieve the burdens of the poor. The same applies to the ruling class or ‘Palace’ that could not care less about the soldier who is compelled to sell his services to the state and to die for it. The poem on the whole is an indictment of the powerful in society.

However, by extension it could be said that the ‘Church’ referred to stands for all formal religions everywhere and in all times that do nothing to alleviate the lot of the powerless in their midst. For example, are the foremost religions of the world doing anything positive and substantive to mitigate the lot of civilians suffering inexorably in the war and conflict zones of today’s world? This question cannot be answered in the affirmative unfortunately.

But the present Head of the Catholic Church Pope Leo the 14th is proving an exception to the rule. For example, he has offered to host any peace negotiations between the warring sides in the Ukraine conflict at the Vatican. Thus is the Pontiff going some distance in sensitizing the Church to the need to be a peace facilitator and a positive influence in the world. The message sent out is that religions could not any longer confine themselves to playing a mere formal or ceremonial role in the affairs of the world.

Children of the Gaza looking for food. Photo Credit: Anas Mohammed/Shutterstock.com

Unfortunately, many of the world’s religions have not decried nor done anything concrete to contain the blood-letting in the Middle Eastern and Ukrainian theatres, to take just two examples. On the other hand, they have virtually winked at the continuing bloodshed; they have stood idly by as the conflicts rage on. Often one sees in the international media, VVIP politicians of Russia, for instance, making what seems to be ‘the sign of the Cross’ in tandem with religious dignitaries.

In fact many religions have proved to be hand-in-glove with the principal perpetrators of the violence. Their clergy have stood staunchly by their lay leaders. Indeed, the blood of the soldiers and the relevant civilian publics is ‘running down Palace walls.’

With regard to the promotive role religions could play in the proliferation of conflict and war, the US continues to figure prominently. It is no secret that the Christian Right in the US is a formidable backer of the Trump administration. The latter has considerably sullied the US’ reputation as the ‘world’s mightiest democracy’ but the Christian Right is committed tooth-and-nail to the defence of the Republican Right, which Trump represents. Thus is religion collaborating with repressive Rightist rule with hardly any scruples.

In the process the political and religious Right in the US has severely compromised a central tenet of Christianity that the Church anywhere ought to be with the powerless and downtrodden of society. The Church/ religion has to be an epitome of humanity but in the US and other countries where the political Right dominates this principle is being abandoned.

However, the worst has come to pass in zones of bloodshed, such as the Middle East and the Ukraine. According to UN sources, some 14,000 babies are expected to die over the next 48 hours in the Gaza. Besides, two million people are believed to be starving in the same region. The observer cannot be blamed for saying that the Gaza could very well be on the threshold of barbarism unless the Israeli offensive is brought to an end and the US holds the key to this outcome.

However, the US is apparently getting nowhere with its supposed peace overtures. Instead it is reportedly collaborating with Israel in regulating the supply of essential necessities to the Gaza. This amounts to arrogating unto itself the role of the UN. Critics are right when they charge that such regulation could lead to a ‘weaponization’ of food and other material needs.

But what is needed of the US is a firm proactive role to end the bloodshed by pressuring Israel to expore the path of a negotiated end to the war. Power aggrandizement, among other factors, is preventing the US from doing this.

The world is getting nowhere to a peaceful settlement in the Ukraine as well. President Trump is on record that progress is being made towards a casefire following some recent conversations that he had with President Putin, but the Kremlin, we are told, is not committing itself firmly to such an undertaking. With regard to timeframes, for instance, a Kremlin spokesman was quoted saying: ‘There are no deadlines and there cannot be any.’

Accordingly, a closure to the current ‘International Disorder’ is nowhere in sight. The UN system for all intents and purposes is paralysed and helpless. As long as the UN Security Council remains divided within itself it would wield no decisive influence over present international develpments. ‘Things have fallen apart’ as never before.

However, the world’s major religions are yet to do their best for world peace and for civilzed co-existence among countries. In fact they are yet to be fully tested. They would need to come together grandly to call for world peace and go more than the extra mile to realize it. The success of such an enterprise depends on the ability of religions to go beyond the formal observance of religion and inculculcate in hearts and minds everywhere a ‘Reverence for Life’.

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UK-India Free Trade Agreement and Sri Lanka

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Diligent observer or clueless bystander

* What will be the implications on Sri Lanka, of this FTA between the UK, our second-largest export market and India, our third-largest export market?

* The UK’s imports from Sri Lanka have declined significantly during the last ten years (from US$1,108 million in 2013 to US$800 million by 2024), mainly due to the drop in apparel exports.

* The FTA will be a game-changer for the Indian apparel exporters as it would provide a nearly ten percent tariff advantage to them. As a result, apparel exports from India to the UK are projected to double by 2030. As the size of the UK’s apparel market is not going to expand proportionately, this growth need to come from the market shares of other main exporters like Sri Lanka.

* Will this, along with new additional Ad Valorem duty in the United States, sound the death knell for Sri Lanka’s apparel exports?

Biggest and most economically significant FTA

On 6th May 2025, India and the United Kingdom agreed on a Free Trade Agreement (the FTA) after nearly three years of negotiations. The FTA is expected to take effect in January 2026. Announcing the agreement, the British government labelled it as the “biggest and most economically significant” trade agreement the UK has signed since leaving the European Union in 2020. If so, this is an extremely important development because the UK has already signed 39 trade agreements with about 73 countries, including very significant trade deals with Australia and Japan and one with the EU. The UK Prime Minister, Keir Starmer hailed this agreement as a major achievement and a “landmark deal with far-reaching economic implications.”

Unfortunately, the “far-reaching economic implications” from a landmark deal like this would not be limited to the parties to the agreement. It would certainly result in equally far-reaching implications for their trading partners. The United Kingdom and India are Sri Lanka’s second and third-largest trading partners for exports. So, what would be the implications of this FTA for Sri Lanka?

Implications on “Bystanders”

Regrettably, so far, I have not seen any public discussion on this agreement within the country. Normally, such a discussion should have been initiated by the relevant government agencies and our High Commissions in New Delhi and London, because they have access to more information on this subject, including access to the negotiators. These government agencies should have prompted a public discussion on the FTA with trade chambers, think tanks, exporters and the media, long before the agreement was concluded. Now, as the agreement is finalised, the options available to Sri Lanka to counter the possible adverse implications are more limited. However, even at this late stage, it is necessary to begin a public discussion on the issue, particularly because, a cursory look at the available data shows that the FTA would have a serious adverse impact on Sri Lanka’s exports of goods and services to the UK in general and on apparel exports in particular.

Sri Lanka’s Declining Competitiveness in the UK

To begin with, it is necessary to point out, the UK’s total imports from Sri Lanka had declined substantially during the last ten years; from US$ 1,108 million in 2013 to US$800 million in 2024. Yet, as illustrated in the table below, UK’s imports from India, Vietnam, Pakistan and Bangladesh had improved significantly during the same period. (See Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3)

The drop in imports from Sri Lanka, as illustrated in Tables 2 and 3, has mainly resulted from the decline of apparel imports from US$ 916 million in 2013 to US$ 510 million by 2024. Unfortunately, our apparel exports are continuing to be stagnant or decline and the market share is getting eroded fast due to strong competition from Bangladesh, Cambodia, Pakistan, Pakistan and Viet Nam. The export performance of China and India has also been somewhat lacklustre.

Some analysts may try to argue that the decline of Sri Lanka’s exports to UK has resulted from the reduction of UK’s overall imports of apparel products after Brexit (2020). It is true that the UK’s overall imports of apparel have also declined significantly since Brexit. But Sri Lanka’s apparel exports to UK had already reached a very low mark even by 2020 and have failed to recover since.

Impact of Tariff

Currently, all these countries, other than India and China, have duty-free market access to UK market. Bangladesh, Cambodia, Sri Lanka and Pakistan enjoy zero-duty access to the UK under its Developing Countries Trading Scheme (DCTS). Vietnam has an FTA (the UK-Vietnam FTA) under which tariffs will be phased out, but for many Vietnamese apparel exports already enjoy reduced or zero tariffs to the UK. India is currently subjected to a DCTS tariff which is at 9.5 percent. China faces higher MFN tariff of 12 percent.

Though Sri Lanka has duty-free entry under DCTS, Sri Lanka’s preference utilisation has remained significantly low for apparel. I don’t have an official number, but I believe this is less than 50 percent. Most probably, more than half of our exports are charged a 12 percent MFN tariff.

UK India FTA – A Game-Changer for Indian Apparel Industry

Due to the competitive disadvantageous position in this important market, India has very cleverly negotiated this FTA, focussing on the elimination of tariffs on approximately 99 percent of Indian exports to the UK. More importantly, these tariff concessions cover key labour-intensive sectors like apparel, which had struggled under high tariffs. The FTA will eliminate this duty disadvantage instantly and level the playing field for India against her competitors who already have duty-free access to the UK. In the highly price-sensitive apparel market, many companies often operate on very thin margins. For them, this 9.5 percent tariff advantage will be a great advantage to consolidate and expand the market share in the UK.

It is also noteworthy that Indian apparel exporters, even with a major tariff disadvantage, have managed to perform reasonably well in the UK market. Now with the FTA, they can build on this momentum, significantly improve their cost competitiveness and expand its UK market share. An Indian investment information and credit rating agency, ICRA, has predicted that due to the tariff concessions under the FTA, India’s apparel and home textiles exports to the United Kingdom would double by 2030. A reputed apparel industry trade journal has predicted that Indian apparel exports may achieve this landmark by 2027.

Impact on Other Exporters

As the size of the UK’s apparel market is not going to expand proportionately to accommodate this growth, it needs to come from the market shares of other main exporters. According to available information, for a long period, India has focused on relatively higher-priced garments in the UK apparel market, while Bangladesh and Cambodia have operated in the low and ultra-low-cost segments of the market. China and Vietnam, on the other hand, have focused on the middle and premium market segments and have priced their products closer to Indian prices. Sri Lanka, due to the higher cost of production and the focus on ethical and sustainable manufacturing, has always operated around the higher end of the market. So, the enhanced competition from India will have a more immediate impact on Chinese, Vietnamese and Sri Lankan exports than on Bangladeshi or Cambodian exports. And the impact on Sri Lanka may be harsher because we have lost our competitive advantage in the market due low utilization of preferential access.

Will this sound the death knell for Sri Lanka’s apparel exports?

I don’t want to sound pessimistic, but in these uncertain times it is necessary to “prepare for the worst and hope for the best.”

The prevailing conditions in the UK market, 12% duty as against 0% duty for Viet Nam, Bangladesh and Cambodia, don’t bode well for the bulk of our apparel exports. Duty-free access to India would further aggravate the situation. This will reduce our apparel exports significantly, very significantly, unless action is taken early, to improve the conditions on market access through DCTS or other arrangements. This requires early proactive intervention by the government with the UK authorities. If not, this, along with new additional Ad Valorem duty in the United States, may sound the death knell for Sri Lanka’s apparel exports.

(The writer, a former public servant, can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)

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English the official language:What India and Sri Lanka can teach US

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President Trump

The United States isn’t the first country to wrestle with the idea of enforcing a single national language. In fact, two Asian democracies—India and Sri Lanka—offer cautionary tales about how language policies, when driven by nationalist ideals, can deepen social divides instead of healing them.

In a sweeping move that has sparked fierce debate across the country, President Donald Trump signed an executive order officially declaring English as the national language of the United States. The announcement came on March 1, 2025, along with the removal of the Spanish-language version of the White House website, signaling a renewed push toward what many are calling “linguistic nationalism.”

While supporters hail the decision as a unifying force, critics warn it could divide the nation further by alienating millions of Americans who speak languages other than English.

Why This Order Matters

The new executive order marks a sharp departure from previous language-access policies, notably reversing a Clinton-era rule that required federally funded programmes to offer assistance in multiple languages. Now, while government agencies are allowed to continue offering services in other languages, there’s no longer a mandate to do so. Instead, they’re “encouraged” to promote English proficiency as a gateway to opportunity.

According to the White House, the change is about “strengthening national unity,” claiming that a common language empowers Americans—new and old—to engage more fully in society.

“English is the language of our founding documents, of our shared culture, and of our national success,” President Trump stated in a press release.

The Reality on the Ground

However, the U.S. isn’t exactly a monolingual country. Far from it. According to the latest Census data, over 350 languages are spoken in American homes. Spanish, Chinese, Tagalog, Vietnamese, and Arabic are just a few of the most common.

For many immigrants and ethnic communities, language is more than a tool for communication—it’s a part of their identity. Critics argue that making English the sole official language could marginalise these groups, reduce access to public services like healthcare and education, and ultimately create a more divided society.

“This policy sends a message that some Americans are more ‘American’ than others,” says Dr. Elena Cárdenas, a linguistics and civil rights researcher. “It doesn’t promote unity—it punishes diversity.”

What Other Countries Have Done

The U.S. is one of the few developed nations that has never had an official language—until now. Countries like France and China have long enforced language laws to preserve a national identity. But those policies have come with their own challenges, including the suppression of regional dialects and minority languages.

Meanwhile, nations like Canada and Switzerland have embraced multilingualism. Canada’s bilingual system (English and French) is often credited with strengthening its global trade relationships and social inclusiveness. Switzerland, with four national languages, shows that diversity in language doesn’t have to be a weakness—it can be a strength.

What’s at Stake: Brain functions and human rights

Supporters of the executive order argue that using a single language will make government operations more efficient and encourage immigrants to assimilate. They also point to the fact that more than 30 U.S. states already recognise English as their official language.

But many economists and education experts see it differently. Studies show that being multilingual boosts brain function, increases job opportunities, and improves a country’s ability to compete in global markets. In fact, the European Union operates with 24 official languages and considers linguistic diversity a key part of its economic and diplomatic strategy.

There’s also the legal angle. Critics say removing language-access requirements could violate international human rights agreements, including United Nations guidelines that promote linguistic and cultural inclusion.

A Political Flashpoint

This isn’t the first time language has become a political hot-button. Similar debates have played out in places like Sri Lanka and India, where promoting one language over others led to long-standing social unrest and even violence.

While the U.S. situation is different, the tension is real. Civil rights groups are already exploring legal challenges. Many Spanish-speaking Americans and other minority communities fear losing access to vital information—from disaster alerts to voting instructions—if those services are no longer offered in their native languages.

“This policy doesn’t build bridges—it builds walls,” said Congressman Luis Gutierrez. “It’s less about language and more about whose voices get heard.”

Sri Lanka: A Language That Sparked a Civil War

In 1956, Sri Lanka passed the Sinhala Only Act, which made Sinhala the sole official language of the country. This law was pushed by nationalist Sinhalese politicians to assert cultural dominance in a newly independent nation. But in doing so, it marginalised Tamil-speaking minorities—many of whom had lived in the country for generations.

The consequences were far-reaching and tragic. Tamil communities were excluded from government jobs, education, and public services. Over time, this linguistic injustice fueled ethnic tensions that escalated into a brutal civil war lasting nearly 30 years. Many experts and historians point to the Sinhala Only Act as a key trigger for the conflict. In short, language policy turned into a weapon of division rather than a tool of unity.

India: A Nation United in Diversity—But Not Without Tensions

India, too, has had its struggles with language politics. After independence in 1947, leaders attempted to make Hindi the sole official language. But this move met strong resistance, especially from southern states where people speak Dravidian languages like Tamil, Telugu, and Kannada.

To prevent further unrest, the Indian government compromised by keeping English as an additional associate official language, alongside Hindi. Today, India recognises 22 official languages and supports many regional tongues. While tensions over language still flare up occasionally, the country has largely managed to celebrate its linguistic diversity rather than suppress it.

These international examples show us what can happen when language policies ignore the lived realities of multilingual societies. Instead of creating a shared sense of belonging, such policies can end up deepening divides—whether ethnic, regional, or cultural.

To understand the risks, look no further than Sri Lanka—a country whose well-intentioned language policy in 1956 led not to unity, but to decades of violence.

Sri Lanka: When Language Laws Divide Instead of Unite

In the aftermath of independence, Sri Lanka’s government passed the Sinhala Only Act, making Sinhala the exclusive official language of administration, law, and education. While meant to assert sovereignty and majority identity, it alienated Tamil-speaking minorities who had been integral to the nation’s social fabric.

The Tamil population faced systemic exclusion: they lost access to public sector jobs, university admissions, and government services. Peaceful protests were met with repression, and what began as a linguistic grievance eventually transformed into an armed ethnic conflict. By the early 1980s, Sri Lanka was in the grip of a full-blown civil war, one of the longest and bloodiest in Asia. Historians widely agree: the Sinhala Only policy didn’t just fail to unite Sri Lanka—it fractured it. The country is still healing from the scars today.

India: Diversity Managed Through Inclusion, Not Imposition

In contrast, neighbouring India avoided such a fate by adopting a more pluralistic approach. Though Hindi was promoted as a national language, protests—particularly from Tamil Nadu—led the central government to compromise. Today, India recognizes 22 official languages, with both Hindi and English used at the national level, and regional languages thriving within states.

While not without tensions, India’s inclusive linguistic framework has helped preserve national unity in a country of over 1.4 billion people and extraordinary linguistic diversity.

Conclusion

The ongoing debate in the United States over making English the sole official language may appear as a patriotic initiative aimed at fostering unity. However, history offers a cautionary tale. In 1956, Sri Lanka introduced the “Sinhala Only Act,” effectively excluding the Tamil-speaking minority from state affairs, education, and employment. Rather than uniting the nation, this policy sowed deep resentment, ultimately contributing to a devastating civil war that lasted nearly three decades and claimed over 100,000 lives. The lesson is clear: language is not merely a means of communication—it is a symbol of identity, dignity, and inclusion.

Today, India recognises 22 official languages and uses English as a neutral bridge, managing to maintain unity within diversity despite significant challenges. The Indian experience demonstrates that pluralism, though messy, can be a powerful safeguard against social fragmentation.

As the U.S. contemplates linguistic policy, it must recognise the complex emotional and political weight language carries. In a nation where communities speak hundreds of languages and dialects, enforcing a single linguistic identity risk marginalising entire populations and undermining social cohesion. Rather than repeating historical mistakes, the U.S. has the opportunity to lead by example—building unity not through exclusion, but through recognition and respect for its linguistic and cultural mosaic.

The lesson for the U.S.? Imposing a one-language-fits-all policy may seem like a path to national unity, but it risks alienating communities and undermining the very cohesion it aims to promote. As history shows, true unity often lies in embracing diversity—not erasing it.

(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT , Malabe. He is also the author of the “Doing Social Research and Publishing Results”, a Springer publication (Singapore), and “Samaja Gaveshakaya (in Sinhala). The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the institution he works for. He can be contacted at saliya.a@slit.lk and www.researcher.com)

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