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The flamboyant tycoon

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Some personal recollections

BY NANDA GODAGE

I returned to Sri Lanka in 1979 from a tour of duty in the Philippines and reassumed duties at the Foreign Ministry. One morning shortly afterwards President J.R. Jayewardene summoned me. I had never met the President and was quite curious as to how he knew of my existence. Minutes after I met him and after the customary exchange of pleasantries, that mystery was solved when the President complimented me on a ‘political report’ on the 1978 elections in the Philippines, which I had sent to Secretary/Foreign Affairs. I also sent a copy to my friend, Minister Athulathmudali, who had found it interesting and he had shared it with the President.

As for the reason for his having summoned me, that too was explained. The President very quickly came to the point. He wanted me to assume duties as Secretary-General of the precursor to the present Board of Investment, the Greater Colombo Economic Commission, as it was then known. Perhaps some reports on the functioning of the Batan export Processing Zone in the Philippines and on Investment Promotion in the Philippines, which I had sent my minister friend had also been shared with the President.

And that was how I found I myself being appointed as SG of the institution which the President often described as his pet project for which he took personal responsibility.

It was a presidential order and as such I had no option. The Katunayake ‘Free Trade Zone’ had been established through an Act of Parliament, which gave it wide-ranging powers—it was not only a Board of Investment but also the local authority for an area larger than Singapore. Even before 1 joined the institution I was aware that it was the pet hate of the Communists and their newspaper — the Aththa — the ‘Free Trade Zone’ — (I don’t know why they called it that instead of calling it the Export Processing Zone—which it was) referred to it as the Wahal Kalapaya or the slave zone, not giving credit to the fact that the ‘Zone was to be the source of employment to thousand who would otherwise have been unemployed and further, in their hatred for private enterprise, not realizing, as President JR himself said to me, “workers have their dignity and they are also voters. I created the Zone to give employment and give the people a better life not to lose votes”. On one occasion when the Aththa carried a headline report of how workers of a garment factory were put out of their lunch room to make way for sewing machines the President ordered me to close the factory and send the manager who had learned ‘bad ways’ in the Philippines out of the country. His words still echo, “The workers are our people. I will not let them to be exploited”.

Upali who was out of the country at the time endorsed the words of the President and gave instruction to the Senior Manager Industrial Relations to ensure that no worker in the Zone was exploited; this was also a matter which was wholly supported by the politician on the Board – the able and formidable Deputy Director General Mr. Paul Perera.

The newspapers at the time were also full of reports about differences between the flamboyant Chairman/Director General Upali Wijewardene and a particular colleague of his. The ‘tabloids’ also referred to the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister also ‘gunning’ for the chairman, whom they viewed as someone who could cheat them of their ambitions; in the circumstances one would understand my own reluctance to accept the appointment, but I was curtly informed that President Jayewardene had in fact made an order and that I had no option.

When I assumed duties, Upali Wijewardene was away from the country. We had met socially once or twice before, but I did not in fact really know him. When he returned from his overseas tour he sent for me-we shook hand and his first words were “you know I was never consulted about your appointment.” My response was “neither was I and had I half a chance I would not have come to the Sarpa Kalapya.” He laughed loud and long (he shook all over when he had a good belly laugh) and a friendship was made.

We worked out of the same floor – I was not only the Executive Secretary but he considered me to be his senior executive. Whenever he came to office after a break—(he came in only when he was in the country – he traveled extensively, but kept in touch on the phone) he called me in for a briefing’ On one of those occasions he asked me the following question: ‘What is the grade a student receives if he makes twenty five mistakes out of one hundred in an examination?’

The answer was of course obvious – “disto” (distinction) I replied. Upali responded with a “quite, so don’t worry, take decisions, they would come to attention only if you make mistakes of 25% and over.” He had the strength to delegate, He also had the ability to spot talent and was never afraid to give responsibility. I recall the case of a young man who looked

so boyish that I thought him to be a fourth former, whereas he was a graduate of good US University. Upali wanted to post him to an important overseas office and some of us had reservations because of the age and the fact that the young man was just out of University. But he said ‘no, lets try him out’ The recruit certainly delivered. He is presently with the UN holding a responsible position.

Upali, was by some; considered aloof and arrogant, but those of us who worked with him, found him to be quite a genial person fond of relating anecdotes. He seemed to always want an audience. I recall a particular anecdote, he had applied to Levers for a single post of management trainee. After many interviews only two applicants survived and he was one of them.

The CEO of Levers, a foreigner, had invited them to lunch at the Galle Face Hotel (according to Upali to test their table manners) The soup had been served and his competitor had tilted the soup plate towards himself to gather the last spoonfuls. Upali ended the story. ‘1 knew then that the job was mine’.

Upali never forgot his beginning as a businessman -he would often recall that he did not have the capital to make his dream of becoming a dollar millionaire at 30-years of age, come true. He would refer to the purchase of a ‘thachchi’ toffee business and remember those who had helped him. One story bears relating. There were four or five persons around the table and someone made a derogatory reference to the late Mr. TB Ilangaratne. That was the first time I saw Upali angry. He almost assaulted the man saying that Mr. Ilangaratne was eking out a bare existence. If he had made money in the manner that his political enemies made out, he would not have to depend on the charity of friends to survive. Upali; the capitalist had many socialist friends—one of whom was Sarath Navana of the LSSP, who edited the LSSP Party paper the Janadina’,

Upali was of course quite ambitious and often made his ambitions known to his ‘audience.’This I believe was the cause of his undoing. He made more enemies than friends, and his enemies were very powerful persons. The High Posts Committee of the House had not cleared the members of the Commission even by the end of 1979 (they had been appointed in 1978). When the hearing finally came around, rivalries within the Commission were not as bitter as they had once been. Old wounds had been healed and we expected the Commission to have easy clearance

That was not to be. Prime Minister Premadasa hated the very sight of Upali and. it was said by those present, tore into Upali from the word ‘go’ and had at one point referred to his ‘retinue: The SUN newspaper had reported a story of how Upali’s helicopter had been used to take supporters to Kamburupitiya. Upali, who had no respect for Premadasa had snapped back’yes of course. we look after those who work for us and this is in the best feudal tradition – something which you will not know anything about’.

The High Posts Committee headed by Premadasa found Upali unsuitable for the job of Chairman/Director General of the GCEC. It was quite ironical that this Committee which found a draftsman who had only ‘relative merit, (he was an immediate relative of Premadasa), eminently suitable to be our Ambassador in Sweden, found Sri Lanka’s forenost industrialist and venture capitalist, unsuitable to be head of the GCEC and not because they perceived any conflict of interest.

What had indeed become a huge joke did not end there. The findings of the High Posts Committee created by President Jayewardene had absolutely no effect on the president. Jayewardene had told Upali that it was he who had appointed him and therefore there was no need to step down! And he didn’t. And nothing happened. Those were the days!

JRJ, though he stood by his kinsman on that occasion let him down badly on another. The Kamburupitiya seat in Parliament had fallen vacant and Upali, who hailed from Kamburupitiya staked a claim. He considered himself as the obvious choice for the UNP ticket.

President Jayewardene had confirmed that he would be nominated. Upali summoned a special meeting of the board and farewell but he was in for an absolute shock, God only knows who could have held a. gun at JR.1’s head. but he changed his mind and gave the ticket to a nonentity from Galle whose name is now forgotten even by the people of Kamburupitiya. He was said to have been Mr. Premadasas nominee.

Despite his other obligations as Chairman of the ever expanding ‘Upali Group’ with big business interests in Malaysia, Singapore and the UK, he devoted much time to the GCEC. His style of management to which I have referred to earlier, in another context, was quite simple dorit bring problems to me. You are paid to take decisions. If you wish to consult me on solutions, bringyour solutions across and we can discuss them’

Investment promotion was an area in which he quite naturally revelled. I recall that our Senior Manager Investment Promotion then was the able and dynamic Rohan Weerasinghe, now a Director at Bartleets. Rohan did the legwork and the result had to be of the highest professional standards. Upali never compromised on standards when it came to work and never entertained excuses.

The promotion team led by Upali travelled to the US, the UK and Australia forpresenGations. Incidentally the Chairman did not charge the government travelling expenses, though he travelled first class and stayed in suites in five star hotels. On a number of occasions questions were asked in Parliament, on the instigation of his enemies, about the amounts spent on business trips. The answers always cited expenditure incurred on account of the rest of us—and it resulted in the matter being brought to the attention oft lie President who put an end to the witch-hunt.

It was Upali who brought Motorola Semi Conductors and Harris Semi Conductors to this country. Unfortunately they packed up and left after they incidents of Black July stating that the country was not stable Upali had the GCEC treat every prospective investors as a VIP. They were looked after from the time arrival till they left.

One happening in the US on one of our trips, bears recalling. We were making our presentation (to a major US’ Corporation) when the President of the Corporation dropped in to spend a few minutes with us and apologize for his inability to he present throughout the presentation. He glanced I I Trough the CV of Upali, and perhaps noting that Upali had big business interests in South East Asia, told him that their subsidiaries in South East Asia were having problems. He asked Upali a few questions and what happened next was quite amazing.

The company president called in a number of his senior management teams to discus his company’s problems and when it was pointed out that we had a plane to catch to another destination that afternoon, the he insisted that we be his guests at an exclusive club for dinner that night and fly out to our next destination on his executive jet the following morning.

I recall another interesting incident in Australia in 1981. We had planned investment promotion meetings in Sydney and Melbourne. I had gone ahead of the others to Sydney when Upali arrived the day before the workshop, I told him of a big horse race that was scheduled for that Saturday and suggested that we stay a day longer and watch it and move on to our next destination.

‘Not just watch it’ lie said. “I may have a horse running in it”. He wanted to buy a horse and enter it for the race. I thought was a joke. But two days later when I was having breakfast he walked in to the dining room with his entourage. I inquired as to where they had all been so early He replied, “we went to buy a horse”. He had indeed bought a horse,’My Lord Avon’, was its name. When I casually inquired as to the price paid his answer made me drop my cutlery At JD 149,000! He certainly did things in style!

Upali was the only Sri Lankan known in international business circles. His reputation was high in East Asia. He had been featured in many well known magazines including Business Week but when the prestigious Fortune magazine featured him, that certainly meant that he had arrived.

But his success was also his downfall. Perhaps I should not insult the other ethnic groups in Sri Lanka by lumping them with us Sinhalese in this regard Sadly, the Sinhalese often hate to see another of their race succeed.

Upali had more than his fair share of enemies and he indeed made his own contribution to building a hate bank.

I shall conclude with a story told to me by the late Mervyn de Silva.

He had interviewed Upali for a story he intended to send to a foreign magazine. Mervyn had completed his interview and was in the process of gathering up his papers when he had casually inquired as to whether he had a sort of hero. Upalfs answer had shocked him. He had put down his papers and sat down to do new article for his own magazine, the Lanka Guardian.

Upali had said that his hero on the Sri Lanka political scene was SWRD Bandaranaike! Mervyn carried the story in the December 1991 issue of the Lanka Guardian and Upali was asked to resign days afterwards by his cousin the President, Mr.JR Jayewardene! Perhaps had he said that his hero was JR he probably would have ended up in Parliament and who knows where afterwards.

(The writer served as Executive Secretary of the Greater Colombo Economic Commission when Upali Wijewardene was Chairman/Director General. This article first appeared on Sunday Island anniversary issue of Oct 01, 2006)



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Echo fades? NPP’s waning momentum in LG polls

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The 2025 local government elections in Sri Lanka were expected to cement the National People’s Power (NPP) as the country’s emergent political force. However, the results delivered a more complex picture. Despite months of rising public frustration with traditional parties, the NPP saw a surprising loss of momentum—shedding over 2.3 million votes compared to their strong showing in the 2024 elections. This electoral drop has puzzled analysts and frustrated supporters, raising critical questions about political consistency, campaign strategy, and the evolving expectations of Sri Lanka’s voters.

Since 2019, the NPP, led by Anura Kumara Dissanayake, had rapidly ascended in popularity, drawing support from youth, professionals, and disillusioned citizens across ethnic and social lines. Its messaging of clean governance, economic equity, and systemic reform resonated strongly in the wake of multiple national crises—from the 2019 Easter attacks to the crippling financial collapse of 2022.

In the aftermath of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s resignation and widespread protests that rocked the island in 2022, the NPP emerged as a political vessel for anti-establishment sentiment. Many expected the 2025 local government elections to be a stepping-stone to national dominance. (See table 1: Source: https://election.newsfirst.lk/#/parties)

The Vote Drop Explained

*  The loss of 2.3 million votes has several potential explanations:

Turnout Fatigue: Voter turnout was markedly lower than in the presidential elections, particularly in urban centres and among younger demographics—traditionally NPP strongholds.

* Fragmented Opposition: Other opposition parties, including the SJB and remnants of SLFP factions, may have regained localised influence, especially in rural electorates.

* Unrealised Expectations: Some voters, who rallied behind the NPP in national-level discourse, may have doubted its practical ability to manage local governance.

* Campaign Gaps: Compared to the presidential elections, the local campaign lacked grassroots mobilisation and visibility in several key districts.

* Implications for Presidential Race

While the NPP remains a key contender for the next presidential election, the 2025 local poll results suggest it cannot rely solely on public dissatisfaction to drive voter loyalty. Its ability to build consistent, multi-layered support—across local, provincial, and national levels—may determine its viability as a governing force.

The results of the 2025 local government elections are neither a death knell nor a coronation for the NPP. Rather, they serve as a sobering checkpoint in the party’s political journey. The challenge now is to reconnect with its disillusioned base, sharpen its policy delivery at the grassroots, and reassert itself, not just as a movement—but as a government-in-waiting.

Sri Lanka’s 2025 local government elections mark a significant turning point in the nation’s political trajectory. After decades of domination by traditional parties, such as the United National Party (UNP), the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), and their offshoots, a new political force—the National People’s Power (NPP)—has emerged as a credible challenger. Fuelled by public frustration over economic mismanagement, corruption, and a deepening trust deficit in governance, the NPP’s ascent signals not merely a change in voter preference but a seismic shift in political culture.

This article analyzes the key patterns emerging from the 2025 local government polls, drawing comparisons with historical voting trends from 1982 to 2024. It explores the urban-rural divide, the shifting role of ethnic minority parties, and the unprecedented surge in support for the NPP. Through this lens, we assess the long-term implications for Sri Lanka’s democratic institutions, party system, and policy direction.

Since gaining independence in 1948, Sri Lanka’s political landscape has been predominantly shaped by two major parties: the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). These parties alternated in power for decades, cultivating strong patronage networks and deep-rooted voter bases. While the UNP positioned itself as centre-right and pro-business, the SLFP leaned toward centre-left policies and a populist approach. Their dominance, however, was periodically challenged by splinter groups and coalitions, such as the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), Tamil political parties, and more recently, the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), founded by the Rajapaksa family.

The 1970s and 1980s were marked by political instability, including the JVP insurrections, ethnic tensions, and the outbreak of a protracted civil war in 1983. These events shifted the focus of governance toward national security and centralised power. The civil war’s end in 2009 created new political opportunities, especially for the Rajapaksas, whose military victory brought them immense popularity. The SLPP, a breakaway from the SLFP, capitalised on this sentiment to dominate national politics by 2019.

However, the veneer of stability began to crack following the Easter Sunday attacks in 2019, the economic collapse of 2022, and a series of mass protests that culminated in the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. These events exposed the fragility of state institutions, widespread corruption, and policy incoherence. The public’s growing disillusionment with mainstream parties created fertile ground for alternative political movements.

The National People’s Power (NPP), an alliance led by the formerly radical JVP and allied civil society actors, emerged as a legitimate alternative. With a platform centred on good governance, anti-corruption, youth empowerment, and economic justice, the NPP resonated particularly with urban voters, the educated middle class, and politically disenchanted youth. Their performance in the 2025 local government elections reflects this broader national mood and demands a serious examination of whether Sri Lanka is entering a post-partisan or realigned political era.

Over the past four decades, Sri Lanka’s political stage has experienced seismic shifts — from the firm grip of traditional powerhouses, like the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), to a recent wave of public support for reformist newcomers like the National People’s Power (NPP).

From Dominance to Decline: UNP and SLFP’s Waning Appeal

In the early 1980s, the UNP was riding high, securing over half the vote in national elections. But as the years progressed, public dissatisfaction began to creep in. By 1994, after over a decade of UNP-led rule, marked by civil unrest and economic concerns, voters decisively turned to the SLFP, handing it a landslide victory with over 62% of the vote. This marked the beginning of a back-and-forth tug-of-war between the two traditional giants.

From 2005 to 2015, elections were closely fought. The SLFP, supported by a strong rural base and popular policies, held a slight edge. However, in 2015, a wave of frustration over governance saw the UNP bounce back. The contest remained tight until the SLFP once again gained ground in 2019.

2024: A System in Flux

By 2024, the grip of both the UNP and SLFP had visibly weakened. In one round of results, the SLFP led with 42.3% while the UNP lagged behind at 32.75%. In another, the gap widened even further, with the SLFP reaching nearly 56% of the vote. These figures, however, painted only part of the picture. Beneath the surface, a deeper shift was brewing — the emergence of a third force.

Urban-Rural Divide Becomes Clearer

The NPP made sweeping gains in urban areas like Colombo, Gampaha, Kalutara, and Kandy. Educated young voters, professionals, and middle-class families — hit hard by job losses and rising living costs — turned to the NPP’s promise of clean governance and reform.

In contrast, rural regions, particularly in the South and North Central areas, still leaned toward the SLPP and SJB (Samagi Jana Balawegaya), albeit with thinner margins than in previous years. Old loyalties and patronage networks seemed to persist, though weakening steadily.

Ethnic Politics and Emerging National Themes

Tamil political parties, particularly the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), held their ground in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, winning most local seats in places like Jaffna and Batticaloa. However, voter turnout was low, signalling deep political disillusionment.

Interestingly, the NPP also made modest inroads in these regions, suggesting its message is resonating across ethnic lines, particularly among younger and more urbanised voters.

Economic Anger Fuels Political Upheaval

The steep decline of the SLPP has been linked directly to the economic crisis, where food, fuel, and medicine shortages led to the 2022–2023 protests known as Aragalaya. The ruling party’s failure to stabilise the economy appears to have cost them dearly, aligning with global trends where poor governance results in electoral punishment.

While the SJB made some gains, especially in southern regions, it couldn’t fully capitalise on voter frustration. Analysts suggest this may be due to its perceived links to the old UNP, vague policy directions, and lack of a bold vision.

End of Bipolar Politics?

The rise of the NPP signals the beginning of a new political era. For decades, Sri Lankan politics was defined by a two-party rivalry — UNP vs. SLFP, and later SLPP vs. SJB. Now, the landscape is tripolar, and possibly moving toward a multiparty democracy where ideas and reform matter more than family legacies and party loyalty.

Young, first-time voters and professionals are looking for issue-based politics: anti-corruption, economic stability, and public accountability. The NPP seems to be answering that call — for now.

A New Chapter Begins

In short, Sri Lanka is witnessing a political transformation. The old guard is losing ground. A new generation of voters is demanding answers, not slogans. And if the 2025 local elections are anything to go by, the future may well belong to those who listen, adapt, and lead with integrity.

(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT , Malabe. He is also the author of the “Doing Social Research and Publishing Results”, a Springer publication (Singapore), and “Samaja Gaveshakaya (in Sinhala). The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the institution he works for. He can be contacted at saliya.a@slit.lk and www.researcher.com)

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A plural society requires plural governance

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The local government elections that took place last week saw a consolidation of the democratic system in the country.  The government followed the rules of elections to a greater extent than its recent predecessors some of whom continue to be active on the political stage.  Particularly noteworthy was the absence of the large-scale abuse of state resources, both media and financial, which had become normalised under successive governments in the past four decades.  Reports by independent election monitoring organisations made mention of this improvement in the country’s democratic culture.

In a world where democracy is under siege even in long-established democracies, Sri Lanka’s improvement in electoral integrity is cause for optimism. It also offers a reminder that democracy is always a work in progress, ever vulnerable to erosion and needs to be constantly fought for. The strengthening of faith in democracy as a result of these elections is encouraging.  The satisfaction expressed by the political parties that contested the elections is a sign that democracy in Sri Lanka is strong.  Most of them saw some improvement in their positions from which they took reassurance about their respective futures.

The local government elections also confirmed that the NPP and its core comprising the JVP are no longer at the fringes of the polity.  The NPP has established itself as a mainstream party with an all-island presence, and remarkably so to a greater extent than any other political party.  This was seen at the general elections, where the NPP won a majority of seats in 21 of the country’s 22 electoral districts. This was a feat no other political party has ever done. This is also a success that is challenging to replicate. At the present local government elections, the NPP was successful in retaining its all-island presence although not to the same degree.

Consolidating Support

Much attention has been given to the relative decline in the ruling party’s vote share from the 61 percent it secured in December’s general election to 43 percent in the local elections. This slippage has been interpreted by some as a sign of waning popularity. However, such a reading overlooks the broader trajectory of political change. Just three years ago, the NPP and its allied parties polled less than five percent nationally. That they now command over 40 percent of the vote represents a profound transformation in voter preferences and political culture. What is even more significant is the stability of this support base, which now surpasses that of any rival. The votes obtained by the NPP at these elections were double those of its nearest rival.

The electoral outcomes in the north and east, which were largely won by parties representing the Tamil and Muslim communities, is a warning signal that ethnic conflict lurks beneath the surface. The success of the minority parties signals the different needs and aspirations of the ethnic and religious minority electorates, and the need for the government to engage more fully with them.  Apart from the problems of poverty, lack of development, inadequate access to economic resources and antipathy to excessive corruption that people of the north and east share in common with those in other parts of the country, they also have special problems that other sections of the population do not have. These would include problems of military takeover of their lands, missing persons and persons incarcerated for long periods either without trial or convictions under the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (which permits confessions made to security forces to be made admissible for purposes of conviction) and the long time quest for self-rule in the areas of their predominance

The government’s failure to address these longstanding issues with urgency appears to have caused disaffection in electorate in the north and east. While structural change is necessarily complex and slow, delays can be misinterpreted as disinterest or disregard, especially by minorities already accustomed to marginalisation. The lack of visible progress on issues central to minority communities fosters a sense of exclusion and deepens political divides. Even so, it is worth noting that the NPP’s vote in the north and east was not insignificant. It came despite the NPP not tailoring its message to ethnic grievances. The NPP has presented a vision of national reform grounded in shared values of justice, accountability, development, and equality.

Translating electoral gains into meaningful governance will require more than slogans. The failure to swiftly address matters deemed to be important by the people of those areas appears to have cost the NPP votes amongst the ethnic and religious minorities, but even here it is necessary to keep matters in perspective.  The NPP came first in terms of seats won in two of the seven electoral districts of the north and east.  They came second in five others. The fact that the NPP continued to win significant support indicates that its approach of equity in development and equal rights for all has resonance. This was despite the Tamil and Muslim parties making appeals to the electorate on nationalist or ethnic grounds.

Slow Change

Whether in the north and east or outside it, the government is perceived to be slow in delivering on its promises.  In the context of the promise of system change, it can be appreciated that such a change will be resisted tooth and nail by those with vested interests in the continuation of the old system.  System change will invariably be resisted at multiple levels.  The problem is that the slow pace of change may be seen by ethnic and religious minorities as being due to the disregard of their interests.  However, the system change is coming slow not only in the north and east, but also in the entire country.

At the general election in December last year, the NPP won an unprecedented number of parliamentary seats in both the country as well as in the north and east.  But it has still to make use of its 2/3 majority to make the changes that its super majority permits it to do.  With control of 267 out of 339 local councils, but without outright majorities in most, it must now engage in coalition-building and consensus-seeking if it wishes to govern at the local level. This will be a challenge for a party whose identity has long been built on principled opposition to elite patronage, corruption and abuse of power rather than to governance. General Secretary of the JVP, Tilvin Silva, has signaled a reluctance to form alliances with discredited parties but has expressed openness to working with independent candidates who share the party’s values. This position can and should be extended, especially in the north and east, to include political formations that represent minority communities and have remained outside the tainted mainstream.

In a plural and multi-ethnic society like Sri Lanka, democratic legitimacy and effective governance requires coalition-building. By engaging with locally legitimate minority parties, especially in the north and east, the NPP can engage in principled governance without compromising its core values. This needs to be extended to the local government authorities in the rest of the country as well. As the 19th century English political philosopher John Stuart Mill observed, “The worth of a state in the long run is the worth of the individuals composing it,” and in plural societies, that worth can only be realised through inclusive decision-making.

by Jehan Perera

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Commercialising research in Sri Lanka – not really the healthiest thing for research

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Image credit University of Sydney

In the early 2000s, a colleague, returning to Sri Lanka after a decade in a research-heavy first world university, complained to me that ‘there is no research culture in Sri Lanka’. But what exactly does having a ‘research culture’ mean? Is a lot of funding enough? What else has stopped us from working towards a productive and meaningful research culture? A concerted effort has been made to improve the research culture of state universities, though there are debates about how healthy such practices are (there is not much consideration of the same in private ‘universities’ in Sri Lanka but that is a discussion for another time). So, in the 25 years since my colleague bemoaned our situation, what has been happening?

What is a ‘research culture’?

A good research culture would be one where we – academics and students – have the resources to engage productively in research. This would mean infrastructure, training, wholesome mentoring, and that abstract thing called headspace. In a previous Kuppi column, I explained at length some of the issues we face as researchers in Sri Lankan universities, including outdated administrative regulations, poor financial resources, and such aspects. My perspective is from the social sciences, and might be different to other disciplines. Still, I feel that there are at least a few major problems that we all face.

Number one: Money is important.

Take the example American universities. Harvard University, according to Harvard Magazine, “received $686.5 million in federally sponsored research grants” for the fiscal year of 2024 but suddenly find themselves in a bind because of such funds being held back. Research funds in these universities typically goes towards building and maintenance of research labs and institutions, costs of equipment, material and other resources and stipends for graduate and other research assistants, conferences, etc. Without such an infusion of money towards research, the USA would not have been able to attracts (and keeps) the talent and brains of other countries. Without a large amount of money dedicated for research, Sri Lankan state universities, too, will not have the research culture it yearns for. Given the country’s austere economic situation, in the last several years, research funds have come mainly from self-generated funds and treasury funds. Yet, even when research funds are available (they are usually inadequate), we still have some additional problems.

Number two: Unending spools of red tape

In Sri Lankan universities red tape is endless. An MoU with a foreign research institution takes at least a year. Financial regulations surrounding the award and spending of research grants is frustrating.

Here’s a personal anecdote. In 2018, I applied for a small research grant from my university. Several months later, I was told I had been awarded it. It comes to me in installments of not more than Rs 100,000. To receive this installment, I must submit a voucher and wait a few weeks until it passes through various offices and gains various approvals. For mysterious financial reasons, asking for reimbursements is discouraged. Obviously then, if I were working on a time-sensitive study or if I needed a larger amount of money for equipment or research material, I would not be able to use this grant. MY research assistants, transcribers, etc., must be willing to wait for their payments until I receive this advance. In 2022, when I received a second advance, the red tape was even tighter. I was asked to spend the funds and settle accounts – within three weeks. ‘Should I ask my research assistants to do the work and wait a few weeks or months for payment? Or should I ask them not to do work until I get the advance and then finish it within three weeks so I can settle this advance?’ I asked in frustration.

Colleagues, who regularly use university grants, frustratedly go along with it; others may opt to work with organisations outside the university. At a university meeting, a few years ago, set up specifically to discuss how young researchers could be encouraged to do research, a group of senior researchers ended the meeting with a list of administrative and financial problems that need to be resolved if we want to foster ‘a research culture’. These are still unresolved. Here is where academic unions can intervene, though they seem to be more focused on salaries, permits and school quotas. If research is part of an academic’s role and responsibility, a research-friendly academic environment is not a privilege, but a labour issue and also impinges on academic freedom to generate new knowledge.

Number three: Instrumentalist research – a global epidemic

The quality of research is a growing concern, in Sri Lanka and globally. The competitiveness of the global research environment has produced seriously problematic phenomena, such as siphoning funding to ‘trendy’ topics, the predatory publications, predatory conferences, journal paper mills, publications with fake data, etc. Plagiarism, ghost writing and the unethical use of AI products are additional contemporary problems. In Sri Lanka, too, we can observe researchers publishing very fast – doing short studies, trying to publish quickly by sending articles to predatory journals, sending the same article to multiple journals at the same time, etc. Universities want more conferences rather than better conferences. Many universities in Sri Lanka have mandated that their doctoral candidates must publish journal articles before their thesis submission. As a consequence, novice researchers frequently fall prey to predatory journals. Universities have also encouraged faculties or departments to establish journals, which frequently have sub-par peer review.

Alongside this are short-sighted institutional changes. University Business Liankage cells, for instance, were established as part of the last World Bank loan cycle to universities. They are expected to help ‘commercialise’ research and focuses on research that can produce patents, and things that can be sold. Such narrow vision means that the broad swathe of research that is undertaken in universities are unseen and ignored, especially in the humanities and social sciences. A much larger vision could have undertaken the promotion of research rather than commercialisation of it, which can then extend to other types of research.

This brings us to the issue of what types of research is seen as ‘relevant’ or ‘useful’. This is a question that has significant repercussions. In one sense, research is an elitist endeavour. We assume that the public should trust us that public funds assigned for research will be spent on worth-while projects. Yet, not all research has an outcome that shows its worth or timeliness in the short term. Some research may not be understood other than by specialists. Therefore, funds, or time spent on some research projects, are not valued, and might seem a waste, or a privilege, until and unless a need for that knowledge suddenly arises.

A short example suffices. Since the 1970s, research on the structures of Sinhala and Sri Lankan Tamil languages (sound patterns, sentence structures of the spoken versions, etc.) have been nearly at a standstill. The interest in these topics are less, and expertise in these areas were not prioritised in the last 30 years. After all, it is not an area that can produce lucrative patents or obvious contributions to the nation’s development. But with digital technology and AI upon us, the need for systematic knowledge of these languages is sorely evident – digital technologies must be able to work in local languages to become useful to whole populations. Without a knowledge of the structures and sounds of local languages – especially the spoken varieties – people who cannot use English cannot use those devices and platforms. While providing impetus to research such structures, this need also validates utilitarian research.

This then is the problem with espousing instrumental ideologies of research. World Bank policies encourage a tying up between research and the country’s development goals. However, in a country like ours, where state policies are tied to election manifestos, the result is a set of research outputs that are tied to election cycles. If in 2019, the priority was national security, in 2025, it can be ‘Clean Sri Lanka’. Prioritising research linked to short-sighted visions of national development gains us little in the longer-term. At the same time, applying for competitive research grants internationally, which may have research agendas that are not nationally relevant, is problematic. These are issues of research ethics as well.

Concluding thoughts

In moving towards a ‘good research culture’, Sri Lankan state universities have fallen into the trap of adopting some of the problematic trends that have swept through the first world. Yet, since we are behind the times anyway, it is possible for us to see the damaging consequences of those issues, and to adopt the more fruitful processes. A slower, considerate approach to research priorities would be useful for Sri Lanka at this point. It is also a time for collective action to build a better research environment, looking at new relationships and collaborations, and mentoring in caring ways.

(Dr. Kaushalya Perera teaches at the Department of English, University of Colombo)

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

By Kaushalya Perera

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