Features
Sri Lanka’s Central Asia gambit

By Uditha Devapriya
This is the first of a two-part article published in The Diplomat.
On Wednesday, August 21, 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sri Lanka, together with The Geopolitical Cartographer, a Colombo-based think-tank specialising in the Indian Ocean, organised a forum on Central Asia. The event took place in two sessions, one in the morning focusing on transport and logistics in Central Asia and another in the evening centring on economic ties. Both were overseen by the Ministry’s Central Asia and South-East Asia Affairs Division and attended by academics, diplomats, and Ministry officials.
The Forum, which was also attended by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, took place against the backdrop of a series of consultations that the Ministry organised with governments of Central Asian countries in 2023 and 2024. The latest of these, with Turkmenistan, happened in May this year. A month earlier, the Ministry held consultations in Astana, Uzbekistan, where both sides agreed to set up Embassies. Sri Lanka is presently accredited to the region through diplomatic missions in India, Pakistan, and Russia.
Sri Lanka’s motives in Central Asia
Colombo has been eyeing Central Asia for quite some time. Between 2011 and 2021, it sent delegations to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. While these went some way in bolstering diplomatic relations and provided a basis for further engagements, they do not seem to have been followed up. In one sense, the latest round of consultations can be described as a second phase in Sri Lanka’s relations with the region, at a time when both Sri Lanka and Central Asia are recalibrating their foreign policies.
The war in Ukraine and tensions in the Middle East and Eurasia have forced the five Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan – into a delicate balancing act. While not outright endorsing Russia’s actions in Ukraine, they have been careful not to anger Moscow. Once part of the Soviet Union – which held the world’s sixth largest Muslim population – they have since evolved their foreign policy, which scholars typically refer to as “multi-vector” – essentially, a strategy of extending outward to as many regions and countries as possible without overtly taking sides.
At first glance, this appears to be Sri Lanka’s strategy too. Since the crisis in 2022, which saw a sitting president being unseated by angry protesters over queues and shortages, the government has been trying to chart a new course in its foreign relations. Given the scale of the crisis – the worst in Sri Lanka’s post-independence history – it has been compelled to prioritise some countries and deprioritise others while balancing them with one another. India remains at the top of the list, while China – which, since 2007, lent extensively to Sri Lanka, even if one disregards the lurid sensationalism of debt trap narratives – has taken a backseat. Engagements with the United States and its allies, over areas like humanitarian aid and even infrastructure development, have grown as well.
There are obvious differences between Central Asia and Sri Lanka. Central Asia is a heavily landlocked region, while Sri Lanka is a small island-state. Yet there is some congruence in the security pressures governing the foreign policy of these countries: Central Asia from Russia, Sri Lanka from India. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the region underwent a period of economic restructuring. These generated mixed results, with some countries recording growth and others plunging into recession.
After the September 11 attacks, Central Asia revived its ties with Russia, and in turn with the US, which at the time was close to Moscow and Vladimir Putin. Since 2010, however, the region has been expanding relations with China. The latter’s dramatic ascent since 2005 has convinced the region of the benefits of closer integration with Beijing, vis-à-vis transport networks such as the Trans-Caspian Route. That has consolidated bilateral trade, which has grown from USD 25.9 billion in 2009 to almost USD 90 billion in 2023.
Central Asia has also become a strategic consideration for Western powers. In the US, the Biden administration has been trying to forge closer ties with the region. This has become important following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
After the invasion of Afghanistan, which borders Central Asia, in 2001, Washington built military bases and expand security cooperation with these countries.
However, the region experienced a fallout from the Bush administration’s interventions in the Middle East. That soured relations between Central Asia and the US. According to one analyst, the Biden administration is now using Ukraine as a ploy to restore those relations. It remains to be seen whether such tactics will work.
In all this, Central Asia has been prioritising its autonomy. Thus, while maintaining ties with Russia, it is also reaching out to China through platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which held its most recent summit in July. At the same time, while voting in favour of Palestine at the United Nations, the region, Kazakhstan in particular, has been maintaining ties with Israel. A recent study shows that Central Asia has increased interactions with other countries from 60 in 2015 to 158 in 2023. Such strategies are typical of states engaged in balancing acts, including Sri Lanka.
In the early 2000s, the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the resulting fallout pushed Central Asia into other regions. These included South Asia. Initially covering Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, Central Asia has now expanded to Dhaka. India has responded positively to these developments. In 2012, the Manmohan Singh administration held the first India-Central Asia Dialogue in Bishkek. Under Narendra Modi, such interactions have widened. Pertinently, platforms like the SCO have provided opportunities for India as well as China, to say nothing of countries like Türkiye, to consolidate ties with the region.
The gambit: Opportunities and challenges
Given the many parallels in the foreign policies of Central Asia and South Asia, in particular India, does Sri Lanka’s Central Asia gambit make sense? Without overlooking the obvious differences – in size and potential – between them, it must be noted that Central Asia and Sri Lanka have both been guided by two imperatives: a balancing act on the one hand and a more long-term “extending outward” strategy on the other. For Sri Lanka, the balancing act has played out between India, China, and the US. For Central Asia, it appears to be playing out between China and Russia, even if the latter two are too intertwined to let ties with one region, even of mutual strategic importance, overdetermine everything else.
Sri Lanka and Central Asia thus seem to be placed in a positive conjuncture, a crossroads in their histories, that has made a strategic alliance both feasible and plausible. While the 2011-2021 round of consultations took place against the backdrop of the end of the 30-year war and the need to boost foreign investment, Colombo did not feel an urge to reach out to other regions: it was able to secure largesse from Beijing to finance its huge infrastructure projects. It also issued large volumes of ISBs. Now, with both China-funded projects and ISBs coming to a standstill, it is trying to resume from where it left off.
But are strategic alliances enough to sustain bilateral ties in the longer term? At the August conclave, Director-General of the Central Asia and South-East Asia Affairs Division of the Sri Lankan Foreign Ministry Sashikala Premawardhane highlighted several sticking points in the country’s ties with Central Asia. Top among them was trade.
Uditha Devapriya is the Chief International Relations Analyst at Factum, an Asia-Pacific focused foreign policy think-tank based in Colombo, Sri Lanka. He studied at the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS), from where he graduated in 2023. His thesis, supervised by Dr Chulanee Attanayake, was on Sri Lanka Central Asia relations. It won the Prize for the Best Dissertation that year.
Features
UN’s challenge of selective accountability without international equity

Despite the prevalence of double standards in international practice, it remains in Sri Lanka’s national interest to support the principles and implementation of international law. The existence of international law, however weak, offers some level of protection that smaller countries have when faced with the predatory behaviour of more powerful states. For this reason, the Sri Lankan government must do all it can to uphold its prior commitments to the UN Human Rights Council and implement the promises it has made to the fullest extent possible.
The visit of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, later this month may possibly be overshadowed by the eruption of hostilities in the Middle East following Israel’s attack on Iran. The High Commissioner’s visit to Sri Lanka relates to the series of resolutions passed by the UN Human Rights Council over the past sixteen years since the end of the war. It will highlight the contradiction in the rules-based international order when geopolitical interests override legal commitments. These resolutions highlight the importance of protecting human rights during times of conflict and ensuring accountability for war crimes. They are part of the enduring legacy of international human rights and humanitarian law, as exemplified by the Geneva Conventions and the global post-war consensus that atrocity crimes should not go unpunished.
The High Commissioner’s visit is likely to provoke criticism that the United Nations is pursuing Sri Lanka’s adherence to international norms with greater zeal than it shows toward violations by more powerful countries. There appears to be acquiescence, indeed even tacit approval, by influential states in response to Israel’s military actions in both Iran and Gaza on the grounds of existential threats to Israel. Similar military actions were taken in 2003 by the US and the UK governments, among other international powers, to destroy weapons of mass destruction alleged to be in Iraq. One of the central arguments made by critics of the UN’s engagement in Sri Lanka is that double standards are at play. These critics contend that the United Nations disproportionately targets weaker countries, thereby reinforcing an international system that turns a blind eye to powerful countries and, in doing so, undermines the credibility and coherence of global human rights standards.
The arrival of the High Commissioner is also likely to reignite internal debate in Sri Lanka about the purpose and legitimacy of UN involvement in the country. The question is whether international standards effectively contribute to national transformation, or do they risk being reduced to symbolic gestures that satisfy external scrutiny without generating substantive change. There will be those who regard international engagement as a necessary corrective to domestic failings, and others who see it as an infringement on national sovereignty. The question of accountability for war crimes committed during the three-decade-long civil war remains a deeply divisive and sensitive issue. Sri Lanka, with its own complex and painful history, has the opportunity to lead by example by reckoning with the past unlike many other countries who justify their atrocities under the veil of national security.
International Breakdown
The modern international system emerged in the wake of two catastrophic world wars and the recognised failure of early twentieth-century diplomacy to prevent mass violence. At its core was a collective pledge to establish a rules-based international order that could maintain peace through law, institutional cooperation, and multilateral governance. The development of international human rights and humanitarian law was most pronounced in the aftermath of the mass atrocities and immense human suffering of World War II. The powerful nations of the time resolved to lead a new global order in which such horrors would never be repeated.
This vision of a rules-based international order as a safeguard against a return to the law of the jungle, where power alone determined justice was institutionalised through the United Nations, the Geneva Conventions, and the establishment of international courts such as the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. However, this international system has come under increasing strain in recent decades. Recent events show that it no longer functions as originally envisioned. In practice, the consistent application of international law, regardless of the status or power of a state, is frequently compromised. The selective enforcement of legal norms, particularly by powerful countries, has eroded the legitimacy of the system and calls into question the universalism at the heart of international law.
At present, at least three major international conflicts taking place in Ukraine, Gaza, and now the confrontation between Israel and Iran, illustrate a sustained breakdown in the enforcement of international legal norms. These conflicts involve powerful states that openly defy legal obligations, with the international community, especially its more influential members, often remaining conspicuously silent. Only a handful of countries, such as South Africa, have chosen to raise issues of international law violations in these conflicts. The broader silence or selective rationalisation by powerful countries has only reinforced the perception that international law is subject to political convenience, and that its authority can be subordinated to geopolitical calculation. Earlier examples would include the ruination of prosperous countries such as Iraq, Libya and Syria.
Uphold Consistency
The Sri Lankan situation illustrates the importance of preserving an international legal system with mechanisms for credible and impartial accountability. Sri Lanka, so far, has been unable to address the issues of accountability for serious war-time human rights violations through internal mechanisms. However, the broader lesson from Sri Lanka’s experience is that international norms ought not to be applied selectively. If global institutions aspire to uphold justice by holding smaller or less powerful countries accountable, they must apply the same standards to powerful states, including Israel, Russia, and the United States. Failing to do so risks creating the perception that the international legal system is an instrument of coercion and selective punishment rather than a foundation for equitable global justice.
Despite the prevalence of double standards in international practice, it remains in Sri Lanka’s national interest to support the principles and implementation of international law. The existence of international law, however weak, offers some level of protection that smaller countries have when faced with the predatory behaviour of more powerful states. For this reason, the Sri Lankan government must do all it can to uphold its prior commitments to the UN Human Rights Council and implement the promises it has made to the fullest extent possible. In multilateral forums, including the UN, Sri Lanka must reassert these commitments as strategic assets that help to defend its sovereignty and legitimacy. At the same time, Sri Lanka needs to take up the challenge of using these international platforms to highlight the problem of selective enforcement. Sri Lanka can contribute to the broader call for a more principled and consistent application of international law by demonstrating its seriousness in protecting vulnerable populations and position itself as a responsible and principled actor in the international community.
Engaging with the past in accordance with international standards is also essential for Sri Lanka’s internal reconciliation and social cohesion. The principles of transitional justice—truth, accountability, reparations, and institutional reform—are not only universally applicable but also critical to the long-term development of any post-conflict society. These principles apply across all contexts and periods. If Sri Lanka is to evolve into a united, stable, and prosperous country, it must undertake this process, regardless of what other countries do or fail to do. Only by acknowledging and addressing its own past can Sri Lanka build a future in which its multi-ethnic and multi-religious character becomes a source of strength rather than weakness.
by Jehan Perera
Features
A model for reconciliation

Conciliation between parties to a conflict involves two basic processes. The common factor to both is identifying the perpetrators associated with the conflict and holding them accountable for their actions, because of the belief that atonement for the violations committed help the aggrieved survivors to ease their pain without which reconciliation is not possible. One process involves Voluntary Admission of the TRUTH to the point of admitting guilt on the part of the perpetrators for the violations committed and Forgiveness on the part of the victims. Another process is to establish the TRUTH through mechanisms set up to investigate the scope and extent of the violations committed and identification of the perpetrators responsible, so that they could be punished to the extent of the law, thus assuaging the pain of the aggrieved. This is Retributive Justice.
The features common to both processes are that violations committed are in the PAST, which, in the case of Sri Lanka span, over a period of 16 to 30 years. Under such circumstances, ONLY Voluntary Admission would identify the perpetrators, while in the case of Retributive Justice, the credibility of the investigations to establish the TRUTH, based on which perpetrators are identified, would vary from questionable to inadmissible after the lapse of 16 to 30 years.
The first process cited above, namely Voluntary Admission followed by Forgiveness, was adopted by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. This attempt failed to meet expectations because one of the parties, who was to participate and make Reconciliation meaningful, refused to participate in the exercise. Furthermore, others see such processes as too idealistic because outcomes of the Reconciliation process require the full participation and genuine commitment of the parties to the conflict. Consequently, most countries opt for the second process, which is Reconciliation through Retributive Justice despite the fact that it is dependent on the credibility of the evidence gathered over decades and, therefore, has the potential to be flawed.
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
TO RECONCILIATION
If admission of Guilt and Forgiveness is realistically not an option, or the limitations of mechanisms to establish credible evidence is also not a dependable option, the only alternative most countries adopt is for time to heal the grievances between parties to the conflict in a manner that best suits their respective social and civilisational values Since such an alternative leaves grievances that initiated the conflict to resolve itself on its own accord, the inevitable outcome is for societies to stay divided and frustrated thus making them fertile grounds for conflicts to recur.
The primary reason for the failure of the options hitherto pursued is that it limits the process of Reconciliation ONLY to violations associated with the Conflict. It does not factor in the grievances that initiated the conflict. This aspect is completely overlooked in the processes that involve admission of guilt followed by forgiveness or in Retributive Justice. Consequently, accountability based on Retributive Justice, advocated by the UNHRC and recommended by some in Sri Lanka, remains far from what is needed for meaningful Reconciliation.
It is, therefore, imperative that Sri Lanka presents a viable alternative that is NOT rooted in PAST actions but in the PRESENT because it is in the PRESENT that the livelihoods of those affected by the conflict have to be restored and their sense of hopelessness healed. Furthermore, Reconciliation, based on the PRESENT is recognized as the principal pillar in meditation as being the most rewarding to contribute to overall human wellbeing.
THE ALTERNATIVE
The approaches pursued by Sri Lanka were to appoint Presidential Commissions of Inquiry, Presidential Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, Task Forces to investigate and gather evidence with Foreign participation and the ongoing Evidence Gathering Mechanisms of the UNHRC, to name a few. In the midst of these attempts, Sri Lanka also set up the “Office for Reparations” (OR) under Act, No. 34 of 2018 and the Office on Missing Persons (OMP).
The stated Objective of OR was the recognition given by the Act to “a comprehensive reparations scheme anchored in the rights of all Sri Lankans to an effective remedy will contribute to the promotion of reconciliation for the wellbeing and security of all Lankans, including future generations”. Whether these Offices were set up with the conscious intention of focusing on the PRESENT while continuing to engage with Retributive Justice mechanisms that focus on the PAST, is not known.
The title of the 2018 Act states:
“AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE FOR
REPARATIONS; TO IDENTIFY AGGRIEVED PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR
REPARATIONS, AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE PROVISION OF INDIVIDUAL
AND COLLECTIVE REPARATIONS TO SUCH PERSONS…”;
Its Vision is: “To create Reconciliation among Nationalities and ensure Human Rights through Economic and Social Prosperity”.
Its Objectives are:
1. To formulate and recommend to the Cabinet of Ministers, policies on reparations to grant individual and collective reparations to aggrieved persons.
2. To facilitate and implement such policies on reparations as approved by the Cabinet of Ministers, by the office for Reparations, including specialised policies on public education, memorialisation and on children, youths, women and victims of sexual violence and persons with disabilities.
3. To establish links to ensure the compatibility of the office for reparations with other mechanisms aimed at reconciliation.
4. To monitor and evaluate the progress of delivery of reparations to eligible aggrieved persons
GRANTS TO FAMILIES OF MISSING PERSONS
“The (OR) makes monetary grants to victims of conflict as a form of reparations. The focus of the OR is to assist aggrieved persons (victims) in ways that will provide meaningful assistance that is sustainable. Hence, the grant is not intended to serve as compensation but is given as a form of monetary relief. Families of missing persons are included in Livelihood development programmes, with particular focus on women who are heads of households”.
“Families of missing persons are among those to whom monetary grants are made by the OR on receipt of confirmation from the Office on Missing Persons (OMP) that the person is in fact missing. In terms of section 11(a) of the OR Act No. 34 of 2018, the OR is empowered to “receive recommendations with regard to reparations to be made to aggrieved persons, from the Office on Missing Persons.”
“Since the year 2022, the OR has received recommendations from the OMP to make payments to claimants in respect of a family member who they confirm are missing, after the conduct of an inquiry by the OMP into complaints made to the OMP by the family member (a claimant). The sum granted is Rs. 200,000/= per missing person, and is the same as the sum granted to applicants who make direct requests to the OR for monetary relief on the basis of the death of a family member”.
The three-step procedure followed by the OR on receiving the recommendation from the OMP is as follows-
STEP 1- OBTAINING INFORMATION FROM FAMILY:
“The letter received from the OMP confirms that the person named therein is reported missing, based on documents produced to the OMP, and recommends that a payment be made to the complainant named therein.
The information in the letter is sometimes inadequate to affirm the identity of the missing person and ascertain whether any previous grants have already been made to the family of that person on a direct application made to the OR. Hence the OR proceeds to obtain necessary information from the OMP and/or the complainant regarding – (1) the identity of the claimant and the missing person (Name, address, NIC number if available), to check from the OR information system whether a payment has been made previously and (2) the Bank Account to which the grant money should be remitted.
Where appropriate, the OR requests an affidavit from the claimant to state that no member of the family has previously received any payment on account of the death of that family member. A template of the Affidavit is provided by the OR”.
STEP 2 –
Processing the claim on receiving information.
STEP 3 –
Remittance of grant money to claimant.
CONCLUSION
With the conclusion of the Armed Conflict in Sri Lanka in May 2009, the approach to Reconciliation recommended Internationally, by the UNHRC, and by some Sri Lankans, was to address accountability for violations committed during and after the conflict through mechanisms of Retributive Justice that involve investigations, evidence gathering followed by prosecution. Over the years, Sri Lanka has laboured under these pressures without any meaningful outcomes as far as Reconciliation is concerned. This has been the experience with other countries as well.
The primary reason for this being the inability to gather credible evidence associated with violations committed over the PAST 16 to 30 years for Reconciliation to be meaningful. Furthermore, since the process is time consuming, the impression created is that no Government is serious about Reconciliation. This has left the survivors of all communities frustrated and disappointed in respect of their emotional and physical aspects of living in the PRESENT.
In the meantime, Sri Lanka set up the Office for Reparations (OR) and Office on Missing Persons (OMP) in 2018. Over the last seven years, these Offices have been working in the shadows, focusing on the physical needs and priorities of the survivors with a focus on the PRESENT and not on the PAST. This enables visible and tangible benefits to the survivors which is far more meaningful to their daily physical living with feedbacks to their emotional wellbeing, as well, than attempting to uncover the TRUTH of what took place decades ago. However, the need to expand the mandate of the OR to cover the development of Policies that address the causes that initiated the conflict is imperative.
Hence, the present Government should make the expanded Objectives of the OR the theme of their model for Reconciliation because the relevance of the PRESENT has its roots in meditation that promotes living in the PRESENT as being the most rewarding for human wellbeing. This model should first be discussed with a representative group of communities in Sri Lanka followed by first presenting it to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk, during his visit to Sri Lanka, and then to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva as a Resolution for acceptance.
by Neville Ladduwahetty
Features
Unique mashup cover…

Mayuka Aparnatha may not be seen and heard in all parts of the country, performing live on stage, but he is certainly a star on social media, and has done modelling, as well – both ramp and photographic.
His preference, at the moment, he says, is to work on cover songs, adding that he does his covers with a touch of his own.
His latest song is titled ‘Asai Mannam’ and it has just been released. It is his fourth cover and also marks his first-ever mashup.
According to Mayuka, ‘Asai Mannam’ is a unique Sinhalese interpretation of the South Indian hit ‘Asa Kooda’ by Sai Abhyankkar and Sai Smriti.
“I consider this cover special because it’s a mashup with the song ‘Ma Diha’ by Dilu Beats. To my knowledge, this is the first-ever Sinhala cover of ‘Asa Kooda.’”
Mayuka’s musical journey began when he was very young.

Mayuka in action in the ‘Asai Mannam’ video
“Coming from a musical family, where my grandparents were involved in stage and drama, I naturally gravitated toward singing. I took part in inter-school competitions, as a child, and was fortunate to win a few. It has always been my dream to become a singer.”
Mayuka says he received formal training at KK Music, adding that he began making his music by starting with cover songs on YouTube.
Prior to ‘Asai Mannam,’ he has released three other covers, which are also available on his YouTube channel – MAYUKA.
Of course, one would say that the turning point in his musical career was when he participated in The Voice Sri Lanka, aired on Sirasa TV, and competed under Coach Raini’s team. He progressed until the battle rounds.
“Being a part of that show was a dream come true and something I can proudly tick off my bucket list.”
Mayuka went on to say that creating this official cover and music video of ‘Asai Mannam’ has been a rewarding experience.
“Music has always helped me through emotional and mental challenges, and I sincerely hope my songs can do the same for others, whether by healing, comforting, or simply bringing joy.”
Says Mayuka: “I’m deeply grateful to everyone who has supported me so far. I hope those who resonate with my style will continue to listen, and I look forward to sharing more music with you in the future.
“I’m also incredibly grateful to be featured in The Island newspaper. Thank you so much for the support.”
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