Features

SMALL FARMS AND THE ‘ECONOMICALLY VIABLE HOLDING’: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

Published

4 years ago

2021/02/21

Sahan Weerasooriya

by Chandra Arulpragasam

Small Farm-Size and Productivity

The theory that the small farm would have higher yields than a larger farm was put forward for the first time by the author in 1961 in Ceylon. This was despite the fact that all economic theories and text books taught the opposite. In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of studies proved this inverse relationship between farm size and productivity to be correct beyond any doubt.¹ i.e. the smaller the farm, the higher the yield would be. Not only does the small farm make a better use of its resources, it has total factor productivity and higher yields than larger farms. The economic (theoretical) reasons for this inverse relationship between farm size and productivity are set out in other writings.

Although no systematic studies have been done on yield by farm size in Sri Lanka, available figures show that the small holdings of tea and rubber have higher yields than the larger holdings and the best managed estates in these crops. There is little doubt that studies on paddy and coconut lands would show the same – as shown in other countries.

Although small holdings make the best use of resources (especially of scarce land), it is obvious that a larger farm would bring the farmer greater total production and income. This article merely records the facts. First, small subdivided farms are the reality and growing in number in Sri Lanka and the developing world. Second, small farm yields and productivity are greater than that of larger farms and estates. Third, the small size of small farms prevents them from meeting all the income and food needs of the farm families. It is necessary, however, to clear certain misconceptions that currently confuse any informed discussion of policy on the subject: namely, the desirability and feasibility of an ‘economically viable holding’.

The Concept of an Economically Viable Holding

The above term was introduced in Sri Lanka by Dr. B.H. Farmer in his work ‘Pioneer Peasant Colonization in Ceylon’ (1957). In this he defined an economically viable holding as one which is capable of producing enough food and income for a farm family. The writer has questioned the logic as well as the economic validity of this definition in the past. Historically, it is seen that this concept was introduced from the west where there was a more favourable land:man ratio than in overcrowded Asia. There was more land per farm in Europe and America than in many developing countries, so that these countries could afford a farm size large enough to provide a decent income to a farm family.

It is now accepted that a farm is both economic and economically viable when it maximizes total factor productivity – which the small farm does best in a land-scarce, labour-surplus situation, as in Sri Lanka. Not only does the small farm make the best use of resources, but in practical terms it provides a higher yield per acre than a larger farm. The problem is not that a micro holding is uneconomic per se, but that it is not large enough to meet the full income and nutritional needs of a farm family.

The latter is a most important criterion, but it is a social criterion and not an economic one. Logically, it has nothing to do with the economics and the productivity of a farm. For what if a family doubles in size, or its members eat more? Does the economics of the farm change to become ‘uneconomic’ because they eat more? The economic viability of a farm is determined by the criterion of economic efficiency and not by a social/nutritional criterion – of whether it is capable of feeding a family. An example from the industrial sector would illustrate this point well. Let us say that in an urban industry today, only part-time employment is available to a particular worker. Would we say that the job in the factory is ‘uneconomic’ because the income that the job generates for this worker is not enough to feed his family? Would we go further to say that the whole industry providing that job is not ‘economically viable’ because the part-time wage it pays is not enough to feed his family? In fact, the firm may be economically viable and profitable only because it provides only part-time employment! Hence the whole concept of larger, ‘economically viable holdings’ in Sri Lanka’s circumstances is based on faulty logic and faulty economics.

Nor is this concept even practicable on a national scale in Sri Lanka. The Agricultural Census of 1982 showed that 25 per cent of households in the small holder sector had farms of less than half acre in extent. The Agricultural Census of 2002 showed that the situation had worsened further, leaving 45 per cent of all farms in the smallholder sector with less than one fpurth of an acre. It is true that the farmers’ try to ‘consolidate’ their operational holdings by renting in an adjoining parcel of land. On the other hand, it is known that farmers tend to scatter their holdings by renting or owning a higher piece of land or chena holding to even out their labour availability throughout the year.

According to the Agrarian Research and Training Institute (now re-named the Hector Kobbekaduwa Institute), two acres is the minimum size of an ‘economically viable holding’ in Sri Lanka. Assuming that the land available to the small farm sector is more or less constant, and assuming that each small farmer with only quarter acre would be given an ‘economically viable holding’ of two acres, this could only be achieved by the dispossession of seven other holders of quarter acre each, relegating them to complete landlessness. On a national scale, this would mean the dispossession of at least 50 per cent of our small farmers, especially in the highly populated Wet Zone, in order to provide a so-called ‘economically viable holding’ to a few. First, the question arises of what would we do with this large number of displaced farmers, given the absence of alternative employment? Secondly, such ‘consolidated’ larger farms would result in lower yields per acre than each of the quarter acre holdings cultivated separately.

Hence, such a policy of providing an ‘economically viable holding’ cannot be justified on either economic or social grounds. The yardstick of ‘economic viability’ is based on an impracticable model imported from western countries blessed with more land and capital than ours, and with opposite (different) factor proportions. It is a yardstick that has no basis in logic or in economics. It has served not only to confuse our concepts, economics and terminology, but also to adversely affect our policy response to the problems of the small farm and subdivided holdings.

In fact, in Japan, Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s-1970s, the family holdings were so small that part of the farm family’s income was obtained from rural non-farm employment. As early as 1988/89, the Household Survey of the Agricultural Sector in Sri Lanka showed that micro-holders of less than quarter acre earned only 38 per cent of their income from farming – which implies that 62 per cent of the farmers’ income came from off the farm. The situation is worse today because 45 per cent of our small holdings are less than quarter acre in extent. On the other hand, the frequency and intensity of non-farm work in the rural areas has multiplied through rural towns and market centres. This needs to be recognized by policy makers. Although we would all like all our farmers to have at least two acres each, this is not feasible in our fractured agrarian structure. This does not mean that we do not care about the small farmer, who is being increasingly impoverished by the grinding mill of subdivision. The problem is that our agricultural population on our limited land is increasing and not decreasing, leading to a mounting pressure on the land – and to a greater subdivision of already small holdings. Possible policy options are considered in the discussion that follows¹.

We need to recognize the fact that the absolute number of the agricultural population on our limited farm land has increased between the year 1982 and 2009: and this is despite all the land expansion, land reforms and colonization schemes carried out in the 70 years since our independence. So why should we, after 70 years of trying, now come up with the impractical theory in Sri Lanka that a farm should be large enough to support a farm family? This was certainly not the case in Japan, Taiwan or South Korea, which started with similar land scarcity before their transition to full industrialization. So why do we not follow what the small farmers have already demonstrated in Sri Lanka, namely, of obtaining the highest returns from their micro-holdings, while obtaining more than 60 per cent of their income from rural non-farm work? Why keep barking up the wrong tree of an ‘economically viable holding’ which we cannot have anyway, when we should be doubling our efforts to provide non-farm work in the rural areas that would hasten our path to full industrialization?

(The writer was a member of the former Ceylon Civil Service who worked in the provincial administration and Colombo before joining the FAO in Rome where he lived and worked for many years.)

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Features

UN’s challenge of selective accountability without international equity

Published

3 hours ago

2025/06/17

Sahan Weerasooriya

Volker Türk

The visit of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, later this month may possibly be overshadowed by the eruption of hostilities in the Middle East following Israel’s attack on Iran. The High Commissioner’s visit to Sri Lanka relates to the series of resolutions passed by the UN Human Rights Council over the past sixteen years since the end of the war. It will highlight the contradiction in the rules-based international order when geopolitical interests override legal commitments. These resolutions highlight the importance of protecting human rights during times of conflict and ensuring accountability for war crimes. They are part of the enduring legacy of international human rights and humanitarian law, as exemplified by the Geneva Conventions and the global post-war consensus that atrocity crimes should not go unpunished.

The High Commissioner’s visit is likely to provoke criticism that the United Nations is pursuing Sri Lanka’s adherence to international norms with greater zeal than it shows toward violations by more powerful countries. There appears to be acquiescence, indeed even tacit approval, by influential states in response to Israel’s military actions in both Iran and Gaza on the grounds of existential threats to Israel. Similar military actions were taken in 2003 by the US and the UK governments, among other international powers, to destroy weapons of mass destruction alleged to be in Iraq. One of the central arguments made by critics of the UN’s engagement in Sri Lanka is that double standards are at play. These critics contend that the United Nations disproportionately targets weaker countries, thereby reinforcing an international system that turns a blind eye to powerful countries and, in doing so, undermines the credibility and coherence of global human rights standards.

The arrival of the High Commissioner is also likely to reignite internal debate in Sri Lanka about the purpose and legitimacy of UN involvement in the country. The question is whether international standards effectively contribute to national transformation, or do they risk being reduced to symbolic gestures that satisfy external scrutiny without generating substantive change. There will be those who regard international engagement as a necessary corrective to domestic failings, and others who see it as an infringement on national sovereignty. The question of accountability for war crimes committed during the three-decade-long civil war remains a deeply divisive and sensitive issue. Sri Lanka, with its own complex and painful history, has the opportunity to lead by example by reckoning with the past unlike many other countries who justify their atrocities under the veil of national security.

International Breakdown

The modern international system emerged in the wake of two catastrophic world wars and the recognised failure of early twentieth-century diplomacy to prevent mass violence. At its core was a collective pledge to establish a rules-based international order that could maintain peace through law, institutional cooperation, and multilateral governance. The development of international human rights and humanitarian law was most pronounced in the aftermath of the mass atrocities and immense human suffering of World War II. The powerful nations of the time resolved to lead a new global order in which such horrors would never be repeated.

This vision of a rules-based international order as a safeguard against a return to the law of the jungle, where power alone determined justice was institutionalised through the United Nations, the Geneva Conventions, and the establishment of international courts such as the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. However, this international system has come under increasing strain in recent decades. Recent events show that it no longer functions as originally envisioned. In practice, the consistent application of international law, regardless of the status or power of a state, is frequently compromised. The selective enforcement of legal norms, particularly by powerful countries, has eroded the legitimacy of the system and calls into question the universalism at the heart of international law.

At present, at least three major international conflicts taking place in Ukraine, Gaza, and now the confrontation between Israel and Iran, illustrate a sustained breakdown in the enforcement of international legal norms. These conflicts involve powerful states that openly defy legal obligations, with the international community, especially its more influential members, often remaining conspicuously silent. Only a handful of countries, such as South Africa, have chosen to raise issues of international law violations in these conflicts. The broader silence or selective rationalisation by powerful countries has only reinforced the perception that international law is subject to political convenience, and that its authority can be subordinated to geopolitical calculation. Earlier examples would include the ruination of prosperous countries such as Iraq, Libya and Syria.

Uphold Consistency

The Sri Lankan situation illustrates the importance of preserving an international legal system with mechanisms for credible and impartial accountability. Sri Lanka, so far, has been unable to address the issues of accountability for serious war-time human rights violations through internal mechanisms. However, the broader lesson from Sri Lanka’s experience is that international norms ought not to be applied selectively. If global institutions aspire to uphold justice by holding smaller or less powerful countries accountable, they must apply the same standards to powerful states, including Israel, Russia, and the United States. Failing to do so risks creating the perception that the international legal system is an instrument of coercion and selective punishment rather than a foundation for equitable global justice.

Despite the prevalence of double standards in international practice, it remains in Sri Lanka’s national interest to support the principles and implementation of international law. The existence of international law, however weak, offers some level of protection that smaller countries have when faced with the predatory behaviour of more powerful states. For this reason, the Sri Lankan government must do all it can to uphold its prior commitments to the UN Human Rights Council and implement the promises it has made to the fullest extent possible. In multilateral forums, including the UN, Sri Lanka must reassert these commitments as strategic assets that help to defend its sovereignty and legitimacy. At the same time, Sri Lanka needs to take up the challenge of using these international platforms to highlight the problem of selective enforcement. Sri Lanka can contribute to the broader call for a more principled and consistent application of international law by demonstrating its seriousness in protecting vulnerable populations and position itself as a responsible and principled actor in the international community.

Engaging with the past in accordance with international standards is also essential for Sri Lanka’s internal reconciliation and social cohesion. The principles of transitional justice—truth, accountability, reparations, and institutional reform—are not only universally applicable but also critical to the long-term development of any post-conflict society. These principles apply across all contexts and periods. If Sri Lanka is to evolve into a united, stable, and prosperous country, it must undertake this process, regardless of what other countries do or fail to do. Only by acknowledging and addressing its own past can Sri Lanka build a future in which its multi-ethnic and multi-religious character becomes a source of strength rather than weakness.

by Jehan Perera

Features

A model for reconciliation

Published

3 hours ago

2025/06/17

Sahan Weerasooriya

Volker Türk

Conciliation between parties to a conflict involves two basic processes. The common factor to both is identifying the perpetrators associated with the conflict and holding them accountable for their actions, because of the belief that atonement for the violations committed help the aggrieved survivors to ease their pain without which reconciliation is not possible. One process involves Voluntary Admission of the TRUTH to the point of admitting guilt on the part of the perpetrators for the violations committed and Forgiveness on the part of the victims. Another process is to establish the TRUTH through mechanisms set up to investigate the scope and extent of the violations committed and identification of the perpetrators responsible, so that they could be punished to the extent of the law, thus assuaging the pain of the aggrieved. This is Retributive Justice.

The features common to both processes are that violations committed are in the PAST, which, in the case of Sri Lanka span, over a period of 16 to 30 years. Under such circumstances, ONLY Voluntary Admission would identify the perpetrators, while in the case of Retributive Justice, the credibility of the investigations to establish the TRUTH, based on which perpetrators are identified, would vary from questionable to inadmissible after the lapse of 16 to 30 years.

The first process cited above, namely Voluntary Admission followed by Forgiveness, was adopted by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. This attempt failed to meet expectations because one of the parties, who was to participate and make Reconciliation meaningful, refused to participate in the exercise. Furthermore, others see such processes as too idealistic because outcomes of the Reconciliation process require the full participation and genuine commitment of the parties to the conflict. Consequently, most countries opt for the second process, which is Reconciliation through Retributive Justice despite the fact that it is dependent on the credibility of the evidence gathered over decades and, therefore, has the potential to be flawed.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

TO RECONCILIATION

If admission of Guilt and Forgiveness is realistically not an option, or the limitations of mechanisms to establish credible evidence is also not a dependable option, the only alternative most countries adopt is for time to heal the grievances between parties to the conflict in a manner that best suits their respective social and civilisational values Since such an alternative leaves grievances that initiated the conflict to resolve itself on its own accord, the inevitable outcome is for societies to stay divided and frustrated thus making them fertile grounds for conflicts to recur.

The primary reason for the failure of the options hitherto pursued is that it limits the process of Reconciliation ONLY to violations associated with the Conflict. It does not factor in the grievances that initiated the conflict. This aspect is completely overlooked in the processes that involve admission of guilt followed by forgiveness or in Retributive Justice. Consequently, accountability based on Retributive Justice, advocated by the UNHRC and recommended by some in Sri Lanka, remains far from what is needed for meaningful Reconciliation.

It is, therefore, imperative that Sri Lanka presents a viable alternative that is NOT rooted in PAST actions but in the PRESENT because it is in the PRESENT that the livelihoods of those affected by the conflict have to be restored and their sense of hopelessness healed. Furthermore, Reconciliation, based on the PRESENT is recognized as the principal pillar in meditation as being the most rewarding to contribute to overall human wellbeing.

THE ALTERNATIVE

The approaches pursued by Sri Lanka were to appoint Presidential Commissions of Inquiry, Presidential Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, Task Forces to investigate and gather evidence with Foreign participation and the ongoing Evidence Gathering Mechanisms of the UNHRC, to name a few. In the midst of these attempts, Sri Lanka also set up the “Office for Reparations” (OR) under Act, No. 34 of 2018 and the Office on Missing Persons (OMP).

The stated Objective of OR was the recognition given by the Act to “a comprehensive reparations scheme anchored in the rights of all Sri Lankans to an effective remedy will contribute to the promotion of reconciliation for the wellbeing and security of all Lankans, including future generations”. Whether these Offices were set up with the conscious intention of focusing on the PRESENT while continuing to engage with Retributive Justice mechanisms that focus on the PAST, is not known.

The title of the 2018 Act states:

“AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE FOR

REPARATIONS; TO IDENTIFY AGGRIEVED PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR

REPARATIONS, AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE PROVISION OF INDIVIDUAL

AND COLLECTIVE REPARATIONS TO SUCH PERSONS…”;

Its Vision is: “To create Reconciliation among Nationalities and ensure Human Rights through Economic and Social Prosperity”.

Its Objectives are:

1. To formulate and recommend to the Cabinet of Ministers, policies on reparations to grant individual and collective reparations to aggrieved persons.

2. To facilitate and implement such policies on reparations as approved by the Cabinet of Ministers, by the office for Reparations, including specialised policies on public education, memorialisation and on children, youths, women and victims of sexual violence and persons with disabilities.

3. To establish links to ensure the compatibility of the office for reparations with other mechanisms aimed at reconciliation.

4. To monitor and evaluate the progress of delivery of reparations to eligible aggrieved persons

GRANTS TO FAMILIES OF MISSING PERSONS

“The (OR) makes monetary grants to victims of conflict as a form of reparations. The focus of the OR is to assist aggrieved persons (victims) in ways that will provide meaningful assistance that is sustainable. Hence, the grant is not intended to serve as compensation but is given as a form of monetary relief. Families of missing persons are included in Livelihood development programmes, with particular focus on women who are heads of households”.

“Families of missing persons are among those to whom monetary grants are made by the OR on receipt of confirmation from the Office on Missing Persons (OMP) that the person is in fact missing. In terms of section 11(a) of the OR Act No. 34 of 2018, the OR is empowered to “receive recommendations with regard to reparations to be made to aggrieved persons, from the Office on Missing Persons.”

“Since the year 2022, the OR has received recommendations from the OMP to make payments to claimants in respect of a family member who they confirm are missing, after the conduct of an inquiry by the OMP into complaints made to the OMP by the family member (a claimant). The sum granted is Rs. 200,000/= per missing person, and is the same as the sum granted to applicants who make direct requests to the OR for monetary relief on the basis of the death of a family member”.

The three-step procedure followed by the OR on receiving the recommendation from the OMP is as follows-

STEP 1- OBTAINING INFORMATION FROM FAMILY:

“The letter received from the OMP confirms that the person named therein is reported missing, based on documents produced to the OMP, and recommends that a payment be made to the complainant named therein.

The information in the letter is sometimes inadequate to affirm the identity of the missing person and ascertain whether any previous grants have already been made to the family of that person on a direct application made to the OR. Hence the OR proceeds to obtain necessary information from the OMP and/or the complainant regarding – (1) the identity of the claimant and the missing person (Name, address, NIC number if available), to check from the OR information system whether a payment has been made previously and (2) the Bank Account to which the grant money should be remitted.

Where appropriate, the OR requests an affidavit from the claimant to state that no member of the family has previously received any payment on account of the death of that family member. A template of the Affidavit is provided by the OR”.

STEP 2 –

Processing the claim on receiving information.

STEP 3 –

Remittance of grant money to claimant.

CONCLUSION

With the conclusion of the Armed Conflict in Sri Lanka in May 2009, the approach to Reconciliation recommended Internationally, by the UNHRC, and by some Sri Lankans, was to address accountability for violations committed during and after the conflict through mechanisms of Retributive Justice that involve investigations, evidence gathering followed by prosecution. Over the years, Sri Lanka has laboured under these pressures without any meaningful outcomes as far as Reconciliation is concerned. This has been the experience with other countries as well.

The primary reason for this being the inability to gather credible evidence associated with violations committed over the PAST 16 to 30 years for Reconciliation to be meaningful. Furthermore, since the process is time consuming, the impression created is that no Government is serious about Reconciliation. This has left the survivors of all communities frustrated and disappointed in respect of their emotional and physical aspects of living in the PRESENT.

In the meantime, Sri Lanka set up the Office for Reparations (OR) and Office on Missing Persons (OMP) in 2018. Over the last seven years, these Offices have been working in the shadows, focusing on the physical needs and priorities of the survivors with a focus on the PRESENT and not on the PAST. This enables visible and tangible benefits to the survivors which is far more meaningful to their daily physical living with feedbacks to their emotional wellbeing, as well, than attempting to uncover the TRUTH of what took place decades ago. However, the need to expand the mandate of the OR to cover the development of Policies that address the causes that initiated the conflict is imperative.

Hence, the present Government should make the expanded Objectives of the OR the theme of their model for Reconciliation because the relevance of the PRESENT has its roots in meditation that promotes living in the PRESENT as being the most rewarding for human wellbeing. This model should first be discussed with a representative group of communities in Sri Lanka followed by first presenting it to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk, during his visit to Sri Lanka, and then to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva as a Resolution for acceptance.

by Neville Ladduwahetty

Features

Unique mashup cover…

Published

3 hours ago

2025/06/17

Sahan Weerasooriya

Mayuka Aparnatha may not be seen and heard in all parts of the country, performing live on stage, but he is certainly a star on social media, and has done modelling, as well – both ramp and photographic.

His preference, at the moment, he says, is to work on cover songs, adding that he does his covers with a touch of his own.

His latest song is titled ‘Asai Mannam’ and it has just been released. It is his fourth cover and also marks his first-ever mashup.

According to Mayuka, ‘Asai Mannam’ is a unique Sinhalese interpretation of the South Indian hit ‘Asa Kooda’ by Sai Abhyankkar and Sai Smriti.

“I consider this cover special because it’s a mashup with the song ‘Ma Diha’ by Dilu Beats. To my knowledge, this is the first-ever Sinhala cover of ‘Asa Kooda.’”

Mayuka’s musical journey began when he was very young.

Mayuka in action in the ‘Asai Mannam’ video

“Coming from a musical family, where my grandparents were involved in stage and drama, I naturally gravitated toward singing. I took part in inter-school competitions, as a child, and was fortunate to win a few. It has always been my dream to become a singer.”

Mayuka says he received formal training at KK Music, adding that he began making his music by starting with cover songs on YouTube.

Prior to ‘Asai Mannam,’ he has released three other covers, which are also available on his YouTube channel – MAYUKA.

Of course, one would say that the turning point in his musical career was when he participated in The Voice Sri Lanka, aired on Sirasa TV, and competed under Coach Raini’s team. He progressed until the battle rounds.

“Being a part of that show was a dream come true and something I can proudly tick off my bucket list.”

Mayuka went on to say that creating this official cover and music video of ‘Asai Mannam’ has been a rewarding experience.

“Music has always helped me through emotional and mental challenges, and I sincerely hope my songs can do the same for others, whether by healing, comforting, or simply bringing joy.”

Says Mayuka: “I’m deeply grateful to everyone who has supported me so far. I hope those who resonate with my style will continue to listen, and I look forward to sharing more music with you in the future.

“I’m also incredibly grateful to be featured in The Island newspaper. Thank you so much for the support.”