Features
Revisiting the UNP’s Lost Generation: Reflections on Sri Lanka’s Recent Political History through the lens of Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha
By Avishka Mario Senewiratne,
Editor of The Ceylon Journal
Last December, Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha released a new book titled Ranil Wickremesinghe and the Emasculation of the United National Party. As the title suggests, the book tackles a contentious and provocative topic and may not be an easy read for everyone. Nevertheless, it presents a highly engaging and insightful narrative that warrants close attention. While much of the information may not be entirely new, the context and storytelling offer fresh perspectives and raise critical questions about Sri Lanka’s recent history.
The book is structured into four accessible chapters, with the first, titled “The Lost Generations of the UNP,” piquing interest by exploring important aspects of the party’s history that have often been overlooked. This article should be seen as a preliminary commentary on the first chapter. The chapter itself presents a series of short biographical sketches, focusing mainly on the political journeys of key figures within the United National Party (UNP), and how their careers were shaped by events such as assassination, early retirement, party defection, or resignation. However, the chapter could have been greatly improved with a brief historical overview of the UNP as an introduction. Founded in 1947, the UNP has often been referred to as the “Grand Old Party of Sri Lanka.” While it won the 1947 and 1952 elections, the party reached its lowest point in 1956, securing just eight seats in Parliament. In the 1950s, the UNP earned the nickname “Uncle Nephew Party,” a reference to the party’s perceived nepotism. Nevertheless, the UNP made notable comebacks in 1960 and again in 1965, after being in opposition from 1956 to 1965, except for the brief period between the March and July elections of 1960. In 1970, despite securing the plurality of the popular vote in the General Election, the UNP ended up with only 17 seats, leading Dudley Senanayake, the Prime Minister at the time, to take a backseat in the Opposition. This allowed J. R. Jayewardene to take control of the opposition, with Senanayake remaining the UNP leader.
After Dudley’s sudden death in 1973, Jayewardene assumed leadership of the party. In 1977, the UNP won a historic victory, securing a five sixths super majority in Parliament, reducing the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) to just eight seats, and leaving the Leftist parties without representation. Under J. R. Jayewardene’s leadership, several skilled and effective politicians joined the Cabinet, which has been widely regarded as one of the most efficient in post-colonial Sri Lanka, particularly in managing the economy, fostering development, and strengthening foreign relations.
JR and Dudley, 1965
However, the Cabinet faced significant criticism for its handling of the ethnic conflict, which eventually led to a 26-year civil war. This issue has remained a central point of debate, overshadowing the Cabinet’s achievements. Between 1970 and 1977, the UNP lost some of its most well-known and renowned leaders such as Dudley Senanayake, M. D. Banda, U. B. Wanninayake, I. M. R. A. Iriyagolla, Paris Perera and V. A. Sugathadasa. C. P. de Silva, Philip Gunawardena, Murugesu Tiruchelvam Q. C. though not UNPers, but serving in the previous UNP regime’s Cabinet, passed away in the said period. Though elected in 1977, S. de S. Jayasinghe and Shelton Jayasinghe passed away within a year of the new government.
This left the UNP with a dominant senior member, J. R. Jayewardene, who was elected Prime Minister and then with the new Constitution, became the Executive President. There were hardly any other senior UNPers apart from Montague Jayawickrema, Edwin Hurulle and M. D. H. Jayawardene. Essentially, there was little internal opposition within the UNP to J. R. Jayewardene’s actions regarding the creation of a new constitution, the establishment of the executive presidency, the events surrounding the referendum and the many troubles of the 80s. The few who voiced dissent on these matters—M. D. H. Jayawardene and Dr. Neville Fernando—were compelled to resign from their positions well before the end of their terms.
In this context, a new generation of politicians entered the UNP cabinet, bringing with them a blend of backgrounds and political experiences. Several key members of this cabinet are discussed in detail in Wijesinha’s first chapter on the “lost generation.” The 1977/78 UNP cabinets were notably diverse, with some members having roots in the SLFP, such as Gamini Dissanayake whose father had been a prominent SLFPer. Gamini himself first attempted to contest as a SLFPer in 1970. But upon his failing to get that that party’s ticket, he contested and won under the UNP. Ronnie de Mel, who had been aligned with the SLFP until 1975, was also a significant figure in this cabinet.
R. Premadasa, the Prime Minister, came from the Labour Party. The cabinet also included seasoned UNPer Wimala Kannangara, the only woman member, and Bill Devanayagam, the only Tamil representative, along with Shahul Hameed and M. H. Mohamed, the Muslim members. All four were entrusted with influential portfolios. Then there were newcomers to politics such as Nissanka Wijeyeratne, formerly of the Ceylon Civil Service who had fallen out with Mrs. Bandaranaike, and Lalith Athulathmudali, who had a flourishing legal practice.
Ronnie de Mel with Gamini Dissanayake and Upali Wijeywardene
The cabinet comprised a mix of old-fashioned UNPers, such as Maj. Montague Jayawickrema, Edwin Hurulle, E. L. Senanayake, Vincent Perera and Capt. C. P. J. Senewiratne, alongside more moderate figures like Anandatissa de Alwis, D. B. Wijetunga, Asoka Karunaratne, Gamini Jayasuriya, Ranjith Atapattu, and S. B. Herath. Cyril Mathew and Wijeyapala Mendis, more controversial figures, did not clearly fit into either category. Ranil Wickremasinghe, J. R. Jayewardene’s trusted nephew, remains today the sole surviving and active member of this Cabinet. Outside Parliament, Upali Wijewardena, who was speculated to enter both Parliament and the Cabinet before his disappearance in 1983, was another prominent figure. Abdul Bakeer Marker was made Speaker and later when E. L. Senanayke succeeded him, he became a Minister without a Portfolio. Though not a UNPer, S. Thondaman who was loyal to JR, found a Cabinet position as well.
Thus, JR Jayewardene’s cabinet was notably diverse, comprising individuals from varied political backgrounds, affiliations and experiences. As Wijesinha aptly notes, many of these figures were determined to pursue long political careers, with some even considered potential candidates for the presidency of Sri Lanka. What is particularly intriguing to the reader of Wijesinha’s first chapter are the significant, yet lesser-known aspects of the individuals discussed. It is questionable whether any political scientist, journalist, or historian has explored the perspectives and angles that Wijesinha addresses. Limited attention has been given to the ten individuals featured, including President Premadasa, whose biographies are often characterized by a somewhat romanticized portrayal or a hyper-critical portrait rather than a thorough, critical analysis.
Objectively speaking, all these individuals played vital roles in shaping modern Sri Lanka despite all controversy. Scholars should follow Wijesinha’s approach by critically examining and analyzing their subjects individually or collectively. Premadasa’s rise, first as Minister under Dudley Senanayake and later as Prime Minister under JR, is well-documented. Wijesinha concurs that Premadasa, with his appeal to the common man and success in programs like Gam Udawa, was the ideal candidate to succeed JR. Despite the challenges of the Civil War, the JVP insurrection, and internal party controversies, Premadasa oversaw significant economic growth. His assassination in 1993, just before his term’s end, curtailed his full potential.
JR’s Cabinet by Younus, Aththa 1980 March 19
One of the notable revelations in Wijesinha’s book, though not entirely undisclosed, is the power struggle among three prominent figures: Ronnie de Mel, Lalith Athulathmudali, and Upali Wijewardene. The former two were regarded as the most intellectually formidable members of J. R. Jayewardene’s Cabinet, and their rivalry was marked by intense animosity over policy matters and political positioning. Meanwhile, Upali Wijewardene, perceived as among the wealthiest individuals in the country at the time, was poised to enter the political arena. Ronnie de Mel achieved a significant milestone by balancing the national budget for eleven consecutive years, demonstrating a level of fiscal management unmatched by his predecessors or successors.
However, at the end of JR’s presidency, de Mel grew disillusioned with Ranasinghe Premadasa’s leadership and subsequently left the country. Although he returned to the legislature and remained politically active until 2004, he never recaptured the influence he once held under JR. Furthermore, JR’s most loyal confidante, Gamini Dissanayake, as noted by Wijesinha, initially expressed dissatisfaction with his assigned portfolio of “Irrigation, Power, and Highways.” Wijesinha’s father, Sam Wijesinha, who was then the Secretary General of the Parliament explained to the young Gamini the importance of his ministry that had been previously served by stalwarts like D. S., Dudley, Maithripala Senanayake and C. P. de Silva. Later, Gamini played a key role in implementing the Accelerated Mahaweli Development Project and in advancing Sri Lanka’s Test cricket status. Wijesinha also highlights Gamini’s presence in Jaffna in 1981 during the burning of the library, noting his subsequent shift toward a more moderate stance.
Lalith Athulathmudali, who held significant government portfolios, including Shipping and Trade and, later, National Security during the onset of the civil conflict, was regarded as one of the most respected politicians of his era. Wijesinghe notes that Lalith, an admirer of Singapore’s development, played a pivotal role in transforming the Colombo Port into one of the most efficient in Asia. Alongside Gamini Dissanayake, Lalith gained substantial popularity during the late 1970s and 1980s, fueling their aspirations for future presidential roles. By the end of 1988, however, it became evident that Premadasa was the leading contender to succeed JR. Both Lalith and Gamini supported Premadasa’s 1988 presidential campaign and hoping that one of them would be appointed Prime Minister in his administration. Instead, Premadasa appointed D. B. Wijetunga, causing significant discord within the UNP.
By 1991, escalating internal tensions led Lalith, Gamini, and other UNP backbenchers, in collaboration with the SLFP, to attempt to impeach President Premadasa. This effort ultimately failed, resulting in their exit from Parliament. Lalith and Gamini then created their own party. Tragically, Lalith was assassinated shortly before Premadasa, and Gamini (who had returned to the UNP) had a similar fate in 1994, just weeks before the presidential election in which he was the UNP’s candidate. Their untimely deaths ended two promising political careers.
Two individuals from Wijesinha’s “lost generation” are Dr. Ranjit Atapattu and Gamini Jayasuriya, both described by the author as “honest politicians” with similar temperaments. Atapattu was not assigned a significant portfolio until the 1982 cabinet reshuffle, when he became Minister of Health. Many would remember and acclaim that Atapattu was one of the most productive and enterprising Health Ministers of the 20th century. Despite his discomfort with some party policies, such as the Peace Accord with India, he remained loyal to the party and was later reappointed as Minister under Premadasa. However, he left politics in 1990 to join the UN, and as Wijesinha notes, his potential remained unfulfilled, with at least another decade of service left. Gamini Jayasuriya, a seasoned politician and direct descendant of Anagarika Dharmapala, with a strong streak of nationalism could not agree with JRJ’s Indo-Lankan Accord. Ever the gentleman, he resigned both from the cabinet and parliament in 1987 and never returned to politics.
Though Wijesinha names Shahul Hameed as one of those of “the lost generation”, both under JR and Premadasa, he received much prominence and died while serving an Opposition MP in 1999. It could be argued that he would have had a prominent role in the 2001-2004 UNP regime, had he lived.
Premadasa and Cooray
B. Sirisena Cooray, a significant figure in the book, served as Mayor of Colombo for ten years during JR’s presidency but gained prominence only under Premadasa. A trusted confidante of Premadasa for nearly 40 years, Cooray became one of the most powerful ministers in his regime. Wijesinha observes that Cooray entered politics solely to support Premadasa, feeling no reason to remain active after the latter’s assassination. Wijesinha expresses his perspective on the various alleged conspiracies that Cooray was involved in during the 80s and 90s.
The author recounts a striking anecdote on page 20: “…when I went along with Chanaka (Amaratunga) to the funeral I was astonished to see what seemed an almost festive atmosphere. It was clear the senior leadership of the UNP felt no sorrow at all, and D. B. Wijetunga who was Acting President seemed more pleased at the advancement he had received than sad at the death of the man who had pushed him much higher than he deserved. And then Hema Premadasa made an extraordinary speech in which she seemed to be offering herself as her husband’s successor… as we were leaving, I noticed a man sitting by himself, tears pouring down his face. That, Chanaka, told me, was Sirisena Cooray, and I realized then that was a man of deep feeling, and his devotion to Premadasa was absolute.”
After Premadasa’s assassination, Cooray withdrew from active politics, even when he was offered the position of Prime Minister, resigning as UNP secretary, though his influence within the Colombo Municipality, as noted by Wijesinha, persisted well into the 21st century.
Dr. Gamini Wijesekera is another individual discussed by Wijesinha. As the author writes, he was less well-known then and is virtually forgotten today. Wijesekera was the General Secretary of the UNP and was a “gentleman”, who did not stoop into thuggery or corruption. A medical doctor turned politician, Wijesekera was one who played with a straight bat. He lost his first bid to parliament in a by-election in Maharagama in 1983. The winner of this election was Dinesh Gunawardena, who was heartily wished well by the defeated Wijesekera. As Wijesinha notes, Wijesekera later left the UNP disillusioned by some of its policies and formed Eksath Lanka Jathika Peramuna (ELJP) with Rukman Senanayake and A. C. Gooneratne. Wijesinha notes the interesting work of the ELJP, now a forgotten entity.
Fast forwarding to 1994, Wijesekera was back in the UNP camp and surprisingly replaced Sirisena Cooray as Secretary. In 1994, UNP lost its 17-year grip in power when the SLFP under Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga won narrowly in the General Election. However, three months later, Gamini Dissanayake was named the UNP candidate for the Presidency and ran an enthusiastic campaign, though CBK was eventually victorious. Wijesekera campaigned heavily for Dissanayake but ironically was one of the many prominent UNPers who perished in the Thotalanga bomb explosion with Gamini Dissanayake.
These were the ten individuals who Wijesinha examines as the “Lost Generation of the UNP”. A few others, who he hasn’t shed much light can be added to this list and dealt later by himself or another scholar. These include Dr. Neville Fernando, Shelton Ranaraja, M. D. H. Jayawardena as well as Ranjan Wijeyeratne and Harsha Abeywardena, who were assassinated. With all of these individuals, virtually losing their place in the UNP, it is not surprising that its next leader would be Wijesinha’s first cousin (mother’s brother’s son), Ranil Wickremasinghe, the subject of Wijesinha’s book, whom he discusses in length in the subsequent chapters of this book, which are not subject to this review. Just as JR became powerful in the 70s, his nephew Ranil Wickremasinghe had hardly any opposition within his Party.
Wijesinha’s approach is both engaging and accessible, skillfully combining anecdotal storytelling, humor, and incisive analysis. Due to his personal connections and familial ties with prominent figures of the UNP, most aspects of his account can be regarded as particularly reliable. This blend of narrative techniques contributes to a compelling story that captivates the reader, making his work not only enjoyable but also intellectually stimulating. The opening chapter of Rajiva Wijesinha’s book merits commendation for its content and narrative style. Moreover, it invites further research and publication on several related topics. For example, many political parties have formally or informally documented their histories.
Notable works in this regard include Prof. Wiswa Warnapala’s study of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), Leslie Goonawardena’s account of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), and Wijesinha’s own writings on the Liberal Party. These accounts, authored by prominent figures within their respective parties, naturally reflect their authors’ biases. However, the history and development of the UNP remains fragmented, with no comprehensive exploration undertaken either by Party members or external scholars. While Wijesinha has addressed this topic in part, a thorough and cohesive history of the UNP remains absent.
In this context, each of the individuals from the “lost generation” of Sri Lankan politics warrants a distinct and balanced biography. Additionally, projects such as the Mahaweli Development Scheme, the Greater Colombo Economic Commission, the Mahapola Scholarship Project, and Gam Udawa deserve scholarly scrutiny and analysis in future research. Should these suggestions be realized, they could significantly contribute to the literature essential for understanding a critical aspect of Sri Lanka’s recent history.
High-tech exports serve as a critical driver of economic growth and global competitiveness for nations. In an era marked by rapid technological advancements and globalization, the ability of a country to expand its high-tech exports hinges significantly on its investment in research and development (R&D). By fostering innovation, enhancing product quality, and improving production efficiency, R&D plays a pivotal role in determining a country’s success in the high-tech export sector. This essay explores the significance of R&D in driving high-tech exports, highlighting its impact on product innovation, international competitiveness, and economic sustainability. Figure 1 compares High-Tech Exports among India, Malaysia and Sri Lanka. (See Graph 01)
The Link Between R&D and High-Tech Exports
R&D is the backbone of high-tech industries, enabling firms to develop cutting-edge products and services that cater to evolving global market demands. Technological innovations, resulting from R&D investments, enhance the quality, efficiency, and uniqueness of products, making them more attractive to international buyers. Countries with robust R&D ecosystems, such as the United States, Germany, and South Korea, have consistently led the world in high-tech exports. Their ability to create and commercialize innovative technologies underscores the direct correlation between R&D spending and export growth in the high-tech sector. Figure 2 compares High-Tech Exports and Research and Development expenses among India, Malaysia and Sri Lanka. (See Graph 2)
Figure 3 shows a comparison of High-Tech Exports and Research and Development expenses of Sri Lanka with Germany, Malaysia and the US. (See Graph 03)
Other Factors Influencing High-Tech Exports
While R&D is the primary driver of high-tech exports, several other factors also influence a country’s ability to compete in global technology markets. These include:
* Infrastructure and Logistics:
Efficient infrastructure, including transportation networks, digital connectivity, and advanced manufacturing facilities, is crucial for exporting high-tech products. However, without strong R&D, infrastructure alone cannot drive technological advancements.
* Trade Policies and Regulations:
Favourable trade policies, such as low tariffs, export incentives, and intellectual property protections, facilitate high-tech exports. Yet, without continuous innovation from R&D, trade policies alone cannot sustain competitiveness.
* Human Capital and Skilled Workforce:
A highly educated and technically skilled workforce is essential for high-tech industries. While talent is important, it must be complemented by R&D investments to create and commercialize innovations.
* Foreign Direct Investment (FDI):
FDI brings capital, expertise, and market access, enhancing a country’s ability to export high-tech products. However, nations that do not invest in R&D risk becoming mere assembly hubs rather than innovation leaders.
* Access to Capital and Financial Support:
Access to venture capital, government funding, and financial incentives supports high-tech industries. Yet, financial resources alone do not guarantee technological progress without active R&D efforts.
Why R&D is the Most Powerful Factor
Despite the influence of these factors, R&D remains the most powerful driver of high-tech exports because it is the source of continuous innovation and competitive advantage. Infrastructure, policies, human capital, and financial support can facilitate high-tech exports, but without groundbreaking research and new technological developments, a country risks stagnation in global markets. Nations that lead in high-tech exports—such as the US, Japan, and China—have consistently prioritized R&D, enabling them to pioneer new technologies and set industry standards.
Enhancing International Competitiveness
A strong R&D culture equips businesses with the ability to maintain a competitive edge in global markets. By developing proprietary technologies and advanced manufacturing processes, firms can reduce production costs, improve product functionality, and increase overall efficiency. This, in turn, enhances their competitive standing in international markets, allowing them to secure long-term trade relationships. Additionally, R&D-driven innovation fosters brand reputation and consumer trust, leading to increased demand for high-tech exports.
Economic Sustainability and Knowledge-Based Growth
Investing in R&D facilitates long-term economic sustainability by transitioning economies from resource-based models to knowledge-driven ones. High-tech exports contribute significantly to GDP growth, employment generation, and foreign exchange earnings. Countries that prioritize R&D in their high-tech sectors experience increased productivity, reduced dependency on traditional industries, and higher value-added output. Moreover, R&D fosters entrepreneurship and the development of start-ups, further strengthening the high-tech export ecosystem.
The Role of Government Policies and Industry Collaboration
Governments play a crucial role in fostering R&D through policy frameworks, financial incentives, and strategic collaborations. Public-private partnerships, tax incentives, and funding for research institutions are essential mechanisms that stimulate innovation. Additionally, collaboration between universities and industries facilitates technology transfer and the commercialization of research outcomes, leading to the development of exportable high-tech products.
The most appropriate and suitable types of R&D for driving high-tech exports include:
1. Applied Research
Applied research is crucial for fostering high-tech exports as it focuses on developing new technologies with immediate commercial applications. Unlike basic research, which is theoretical in nature, applied research is directed toward practical outcomes that enhance global competitiveness. For example, advancements in nanotechnology and artificial intelligence (AI) have significantly contributed to the global expansion of semiconductor and automation industries. Furthermore, applied research helps in bridging the gap between scientific discovery and market implementation, ensuring that new technologies can be effectively utilized in high-tech exports.
2. Product Development R&D
Product development R&D plays a key role in creating innovative products with unique features, enabling firms to differentiate themselves in international markets. It involves activities, such as prototype testing, performance enhancement, and feature innovation, which contribute to the competitive advantage of high-tech firms. For instance, the global smartphone industry continuously invests in R&D to develop new functionalities, improve user experience, and introduce cutting-edge designs, thereby sustaining consumer demand in highly competitive markets. The strategic focus on product innovation allows firms to maintain premium pricing and brand loyalty in high-tech sectors.
3. Process Innovation R&D
Process innovation R&D enhances production efficiency and cost-effectiveness, making high-tech exports more competitive in price-sensitive markets. This type of R&D focuses on improving manufacturing techniques, reducing waste, and integrating automation to optimize resource utilization. For example, the use of additive manufacturing (3D printing) in aerospace and biomedical industries has resulted in cost reductions and faster production cycles, leading to improved market penetration of high-tech exports. Companies that invest in process innovation are able to achieve economies of scale and maintain long-term cost advantages in global markets.
4. Collaborative R&D
Collaborative R&D, involving partnerships between academia, industry, and government, accelerates the commercialization of new technologies. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) facilitate knowledge exchange, reduce R&D costs, and increase the likelihood of successful innovation. A notable example is the European Union’s Horizon 2020 programme, which funds cross-border collaborative research to enhance industrial competitiveness and technological leadership. Additionally, collaboration between multinational corporations and research institutions has led to breakthrough innovations in biotechnology, renewable energy, and telecommunications. By leveraging diverse expertise and shared resources, collaborative R&D enhances the scalability and global reach of high-tech exports.
5. Market-Driven R&D
Market-driven R&D aligns research efforts with global consumer trends and regulatory requirements to maximize export potential. Unlike traditional R&D approaches that focus solely on technological advancements, market-driven R&D emphasizes consumer needs, sustainability, and compliance with international standards. For example, the increasing demand for environmentally friendly products has prompted R&D investments in electric vehicles (EVs) and sustainable packaging solutions, ensuring market acceptance and regulatory approval in various regions. Companies that integrate market intelligence into their R&D strategies are better positioned to develop products that meet international demand, enhance brand reputation, and drive high-tech export growth.
Conclusion
R&D stands as a cornerstone in driving high-tech exports, shaping a nation’s ability to compete in the global economy. While factors such as infrastructure, trade policies, human capital, FDI, and financial support play a role in high-tech exports, they are secondary to the fundamental necessity of continuous innovation. By fostering technological advancements, enhancing competitiveness, and promoting economic sustainability, R&D investments serve as the ultimate catalyst for high-tech export growth. Countries aiming to strengthen their high-tech export sectors must prioritize R&D policies and create an ecosystem that supports innovation, ensuring long-term prosperity in an increasingly technology-driven world.
Investing in different types of R&D is essential for fostering high-tech exports. Applied research drives technological advancements, product development R&D ensures market differentiation, and process innovation R&D enhances cost efficiency. Additionally, collaborative R&D accelerates innovation through strategic partnerships, while market-driven R&D ensures alignment with global consumer trends and regulatory standards. A comprehensive approach that incorporates all these R&D types will enable firms to sustain their competitive advantage and expand their presence in the global high-tech market.
(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT University, Malabe. He is also the author of the “Doing Social Research and Publishing Results”, a Springer publication (Singapore), and “Samaja Gaveshakaya (in Sinhala). The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the institution he works for. He can be contacted at saliya.a@slit.lk and www.researcher.com)
By Sunil Abhayawardhana
Though Sri Lanka has a new government, its first budget for 2025 remains within the conditions and targets of the ongoing IMF programme (which will continue until the end of 2027).
A major shortfall in the budget is the lack of a ‘developmental thrust,’ which is essential for the country to grow out of the current crisis. Rather than discussing the minutiae of the budget, it is worth looking at how Sri Lanka got into this situation by making the same mistakes over and over again.
Though these mistakes can be pointed out, mainstream economists prefer to stick to the outdated textbook economics taught at university even when proven wrong. Therefore, the best way to bring up Sri Lanka’s mistakes is through a comparative approach with the High Performing Asian Economies (HPAEs).
Missed Opportunities
At independence in 1948, Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) was expected to develop rapidly due to advantages such as its strategic location, which was expected to be a multiplier by itself. This ‘strategic location’ has not fully been made use of to this day.
The oil tank farm in Trincomalee was a big storage facility in 1948. If the government had negotiated to buy the facility from the British (which was finally done in 1965 for 250,000 sterling pounds) and set up a refinery, Trincomalee could have become the oil hub of Asia, long before Singapore. This could have saved the country from the perennial forex crisis that it had to deal with due to the diminishing returns from the plantation economy.
The plantation economy had reached its peak over two decades before Independence and was not able to sustain a growing population. Yet, the immediate post-Independence governments did nothing about this. Though funds were available, there was a deficit in the thinking and a lack of vision for the future. The lack of immediate effort to diversify and industrialise the economy was the first act of economic suicide.
At around the same time, HPAEs such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (China) embarked on their development programmes, which have brought results far exceeding their own expectations. What was it that the HPAEs got so right, and what did Sri Lanka get so wrong?
A comparison between Sri Lanka and the HPAEs brings up many differences. The four major points of interest that stand out were as follows:
1) No plan
2) Bad theory
3) Bad advice
4) Not understanding development
No Plan
A sovereign country should know where it wants to go and how it hopes to reach its objectives. This is normally expressed in a development plan that provides the public with a clear roadmap. A plan becomes more necessary when countries start out from a very low level of development. An initial burst of energy is required before markets can take over.
A fair amount of strategic thinking goes into the formulation of such a plan. It should take into account the natural and human resources available and the strategic sectors that need development. The plan should aim to keep the cost of development as low as possible.
In a country with different communities, the plan should also unite people to work towards a common objective. A development plan looks not only at growth but also at the pattern of growth. When growth becomes more widespread, it opens up more opportunities for the public.
All HPAEs began their journeys with development plans covering many decades. Some countries, like China and Vietnam, still adhere to five-year plans. Sri Lanka is the one country that tried to develop without a plan. The World Bank mission of 1952 recommended a planning process for Sri Lanka, though it was hardly implemented. The first Ten-Year Plan of 1959 (which took three years to formulate) was never implemented. The Five-Year Plan of 1972 was derailed by the 1973 oil shock.
While Sri Lanka struggled to plan, the HPAEs were already implementing their plans and seeing results. Sri Lanka drifted to depending on ad-hoc methods without long-term objectives. Even after 77 years of Independence, the country is still unable to identify the sectors for industrial development.
Bad Theory
At independence, the country did not have much know-how in economics. The few who had been educated in economics at the UK universities were taught neoclassical economics with a Keynesian tinge. The Quantity Theory of Money (QTM) was the guiding orthodoxy of the time. What the QTM says is that if the quantity of money is increased, there would be a corresponding increase in prices and therefore inflation.
However, the HPAEs realised that if new money was directed towards investment in productive industry, the result would be an expansion of the economy rather than inflation. The bulk of their funds for development came from monetary financing from the Central Bank. They would have taken inspiration from examples such as Canada in the 1940s and Japan in the 1930s, both of which used monetary financing for specific purposes.
Another point to note is the fact that all the HPAEs had multiple development banks, which helped in the development drive. In contrast, Sri Lanka got rid of its two development banks on advice from the West, thereby reducing the availability of long-term credit for the development process.
Due to Sri Lanka’s adherence to the QTM, we have had to rely on other methods of finance, which has created a dependency on foreign aid and a huge foreign currency debt. Though there is so much evidence that monetary financing used wisely can bring great results, many in Sri Lanka still adhere to the QTM. While most universities still teach the old concepts, it is sad that students at the master’s level and beyond do not think for themselves.
Bad Advice
When a country lacks knowledge and experience, it becomes necessary to seek advice from others. The World Bank and the IMF did perform this function in the early days. However, since the neoliberal onslaught, the purpose of these institutions has taken a more politicised turn.
The advice given by the IMF and other international advice has to be analysed, as it often turns out to be more damaging. For example, austerity has been proven to be counterproductive and causes more damage to the economy and social life. The present advice the government is receiving from the IMF, the CBSL, and the Ministry of Finance is no different.
When South Korean President Park Chung-Hee was offered Western economic advisors, he knew exactly what their advice would be. So, he declined the offer and obtained economic advisors from Japan instead.
Sri Lanka, on the other hand, accepted whatever came from the West. Our leaders accepted the ‘Washington Consensus,’ which we follow to this day, even though the author of the document, John Williamson, has himself declared it a dead document.
Economists advise governments towards suicidal actions without observing what has been done around the world before. There are political aspects to this bad advice. As there is an overproduction of global money, such bad advice is actually beneficial to the Western financial sector and its political interests.
Not Understanding Development
Sri Lanka has still not understood what development means. This can be seen from the fact that despite having a potential 30,000 MW of wind power generation, the government wants to give this opportunity to foreign companies and buy back the power with foreign exchange. Even the export potential is given to foreign companies, while local companies lose that opportunity.
If such a situation had been in any of the HPAEs, they would have first developed a local windmill manufacturing industry to meet their needs. That is what development is – developing productive capabilities and creating a productive ecosystem. There are many opportunities that Sri Lanka has missed because the concept of development has not been understood.
Had local inventors been encouraged and supported, a true industrial base would have been flourishing today. One example is Ray Wijewardene’s hand tractor, to which one Sri Lankan asked, “Why do we need hand tractors when there are so many buffaloes around?”. Imagine what the HPAEs would have done with a brilliant, innovative mind like Ray Wijewardene’s.
Even the few sectors of industry built up to world-class levels have been destroyed by bad government policy. One such industry was the heavy construction industry, which is vital for infrastructure development. A local company had built up its capacity to do international projects funded by the World Bank and had performed many projects in the country, but the change of policy after 1977 destroyed the company and opened the doors to foreign companies at inflated prices, for which the country struggles to pay off its loans.
The local highway construction projects are an example, where Sri Lanka’s highways are considered the most expensive in the world, which opened opportunities for corruption. The very first industry developed in the HPAEs was the heavy construction industry in order to keep the cost of development low. Sri Lanka did the opposite.
Conclusion
It is quite clear that Sri Lanka’s present position is of its own making, following quite the opposite of what the HPAEs did. However, though many learn from mistakes, Sri Lanka does not seem to have learnt any lessons. Our advisors keep telling us to repeat our mistakes, and we keep listening to them.
It was expected that the NPP government would make a radical change in thinking, but it has not expressed any meaningful change of thinking with regard to major issues. Without such a change, Sri Lanka will continue on its suicidal path.
(Sunil Abhayawardhana was CEO of Sri Lanka’s largest heavy construction company. He has a master’s degree from the University of Wales and is working on a PhD in economics. He is a member of the Asia Progress Forum, which is a collective of like-minded intellectuals, professionals, and activists dedicated to building dialogue that promotes Sri Lanka’s sovereignty, development, and leadership in the Global South. APF can be contacted at asiaprogressforum@gmail.com).
by Jehan Perera
The Batalanda Commission report which goes into details of what happened during the JVP insurrection of 1987-89 has become the centre of public attention. The controversy has long been a point of contention and a reminder of the country’s troubled past and entrenched divisions that still exist. The events that occurred at Batalanda during the violent suppression of the JVP-led insurgency, remain a raw wound, as seen in the sudden resurfacing of the issue. The scars of violence and war still run deep. At a time when the country is grappling with pressing challenges ranging from economic recovery to social stability, there is a need to keep in focus the broader goal of unity for long-term peace and prosperity. But the ghosts of the past need also to be put to rest without continuing to haunt the present and future.
Grisly accounts of what transpired at Batalanda now fill the social media even in the Tamil media, though Tamils were not specifically targeted at that time. There was then a ceasefire between the government and LTTE. The Indo-Lanka Accord had just been signed and the LTTE were fighting the Indian peacekeeping army. The videos that are now circulating on social media would show the Tamil people that they were not the only ones at the receiving end of counter-terrorist measures. The Sinhalese were in danger then, as it was a rebellion of Sinhalese against the state. Sinhalese youth had to be especially careful.
It appears that former president Ranil Wickremesinghe was caught unprepared by the questions from a team from Al Jazeera television. The answers he gave, in which he downplayed the significance of the Batalanda Commission report have been viewed differently, depending on the perspective of the observer. He has also made a statement in which he has rejected the report. The report, which demands introspection, referred to events that had taken place 37 years earlier. But the ghosts of the past have returned. After the issue has come to the fore, there are many relatives and acquaintances of the victims from different backgrounds who are demanding justice and offering to come forward to give evidence of what they had witnessed. They need closure after so many years.
MORE POLARISATION
The public reaction to the airing of the Al Jazeera television programme is a reminder that atrocities that have taken place cannot be easily buried. The government has tabled the Batalanda Commission report in parliament and hold a two-day debate on it. The two days were to be consecutive but now the government has decided to space them out over two months. There is reason to be concerned about what transpires in the debate. The atrocities that took place during the JVP insurrection involved multiple parties. Batalanda was not the only interrogation site or the only torture chamber. There were many others. Former president Ranil Wickremesinghe was not the only prominent protagonist in the events that transpired at that time.
The atrocities of the late 1980s were not confined to one location, nor were they the responsibility of a single individual or group. The JVP engaged in many atrocities and human rights violations. In addition to members of the former government and military who engaged in counter-terrorism operations there were also other groups that engaged both in self-defence and mayhem. These included members of left political parties who were targeted by the JVP and who formed their own para-military groups. Some of the leaders went on to become ministers in succeeding governments and even represented Sri Lanka at international human rights forums. Even members of the present government will not be able to escape the fallout of the debate over the Batalanda Commission report.
If the debate becomes a battleground for assigning blame rather than seeking solutions, it could have far-reaching consequences for Sri Lanka’s social and political stability. Economic recovery, governance reform, and development require stability and cooperation. The present storm caused by the Batalanda Commission report, and the prospects for increased polarisation and hatred do not bode well for the country. Rather than engaging in potentially divisive debates that could lead to further entrenchment of opposing narratives, Sri Lanka would be better served by a structured and impartial approach to truth-seeking and reconciliation.
NATIONAL HEALING
Earlier this month at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, the government rejected the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights assertion that the external evidence gathering unit would continue to collect evidence on human rights violations in Sri Lanka. This evidence gathering unit has a mandate to collect information on a wide range of human rights violations including intimidation and killings of journalists but with a focus on the human rights violations and war crimes during the course of the LTTE war and especially at its end. The government’s position has been that it is determined to deal with human rights challenges including reconciliation through domestic processes.
Addressing the High-Level Segment of the 58th Regular Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva in February this year, Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath said: “The contours of a truth and reconciliation framework, will be further discussed with the broadest possible cross section of stakeholders, before operationalisation to ensure a process that has the trust of all Sri Lankans. Our aim is to make the domestic mechanisms credible and sound within the constitutional framework. This will include strengthening the work towards a truth and reconciliation commission empowered to investigate acts of violence caused by racism and religious extremism that give rise to tensions within Sri Lankan society.”
The concept of a truth and reconciliation commission was first broached in 2015 by then prime minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s government. In 2019 after winning the presidential elections, former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa too saw merit in the idea, but neither of these two leaders had the commitment to ensure that the process was completed. Promoting reconciliation in Sri Lanka among divergent political actors with violent political pasts requires a multi-faceted approach that blends political, social, and psychological strategies.
Given the country’s complex history of armed conflict, ethnic tensions, and political polarisation, the process must be carefully designed to build trust, address grievances, and create a shared vision for the future. A truth and reconciliation process as outlined in Geneva by the government, which has teeth in it for both punishment and amnesty, can give the country the time and space in which to uncover the painful truths and the path to national healing.
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