Features
Proposed Anti-Terrorism Bill: Real tiger, paper tiger or mixed bag
By Nuwan Peiris
The writer is an Attorney, Chartered Shipbroker (UK) and UN-ITLOS Nippon Fellow 2012/2013. He holds M.Sc. Logistics (BCU-UK), LL.M (International Maritime Law) (IMO-IMLI), LL. M (International Trade Law) (Wales), LL.B (O.U.S.L).
“No generalization is wholly true – not even this one.” – Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
The recent Anti-Terrorism Bill (ATA) has garnered more attention than one could ever imagine for a law. Emotional and sweeping generalizations are made by all and sundry on the proposed ATA. Even the recently enacted 21st Amendment did not receive so much attention from the public. Why is it that a law like the proposed ATA receives so much attention? There seems to be a legitimate fear that the proposed ATA may be no different to the existing law, namely PTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act), if not worse.
But what is the reality? Who drafted this proposed ATA? From the skilled draftsmanship associated with the proposed ATA, the draft law requires an in-depth analysis for a proper understanding unlike some of the recently introduced laws by the government.
Weaker than UK Law – Why?
In essence, the proposed ATA seems to be a strategically diluted version of the UK’s Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 – incorporating the amendments that were introduced by the UK after the London bombing. Worse still, proposed ATA is inconsequential in its effect when it comes to combating global terrorism as far as some of the fundamental provisions are concerned; in other words, a feeble draft law compared to the Patriot Act of the USA which became law after the 9/11 attacks. However, the proposed ATA may be an abusive weapon as far its enforcement orders are concerned, such as the Miscellaneous Orders contained in Part X. In short, the proposed ATA is a mixed bag. For example, most of the protestors’ dissent to the proposed law gyrates on these abusive enforcement orders.
How does a draft law like this instant one finds its way, from nowhere, to the official gazette without much public discussion? The purpose of this very brief write-up is to urge the Government in power and the opposition parties to prevent the proposed ATA being tabled in the Parliament, instead to appoint a Select Committee in the Parliament comprising of varied interests so that the matter can be reconsidered and better reforms of the ATA can be effected with consensus.
And the important point to consider by this proposed Select Committee in the Parliament is to introduce an ATA to tackle global terrorism effectively, and promulgate a law that is in line with the Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK (as amended), and better still the Patriot Act of USA – and be mindful not to introduce a version that is weaker than the UK law. Hence, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Justice Minister should be advised to set-up a Select Committee in the Parliament, so that the proposed ATA can be changed to become an acceptable legal instrument in combating global terrorism, and avoid becoming a law which is far weaker than the UK law on terrorism.
If the proposed ATA becomes law, this law may not have the same effectiveness in combating global terrorism especially given the weak substantive provisions in clauses 2 and 3, coupled with arbitrary procedural provisions that may lead to abuse in implementation. Such a proposed ATA will serve neither the purpose of combating global terrorism nor ensuring procedural fairness to the ones who are caught up as suspects. A middle of nowhere legislation, although drafted well disguised, may not serve Sri Lanka well, noting that further legislation similar to Bio-Security Act 2015 from Australia is needed to combat biological and chemical attacks. What is needed is to have extensive deliberations in a fresh Parliamentary Select Committee, where all of us can share and contribute with our experience to the formulation of a far-sighted ATA.
Why is ATA weaker than UK and USA laws?
There are two fundamental provisions in the proposed ATA – clauses 2 and 3. Clause 2 deals with jurisdiction and clause 3 deals with the offence of terrorism.This is the typical structure of an ATA law in many countries, and drafts men followed the universal structure – and we see nothing wrong in this. Here, Clause 2 becomes the international jurisdiction base for the implementation of the proposed ATA.
Clause 3 contains the offence of terrorism that becomes the basis on which other offences and provisions are built upon. Clause 3 is the mother provision, and the rest of the offences are the offspring of Clause 3 – which is typical of any ATA in the world including the UK.
Clause 2 – the clause on jurisdiction – becomes the basis for enforcement powers mentioned in the Part X of proposed ATA. Whilst the enforcement powers in the Miscellaneous Part – that comprises of Proscription Orders, Prohibition Orders, Restriction Orders etc., which is less judicially accountable – are wide and arbitrary when applied within Sri Lanka; on the contrary, its overall reach and enforcement of such Orders in the context of global terrorism is ‘fragile’ given the limitations in Clause 2.
Both Clauses 2 and 3 are the foundational structure of the proposed ATA, and the enforcement provisions contained in the rest of the ATA, including Part X forms the superstructure. Let us examine each of these aspects.
Clause 2 – Jurisdiction
There is extra-territorial application of the proposed ATA. This is a salient feature, and this is far better drafted than the ill-fated, and now demised, Counter-Terrorism Bill that was presented in 2018.
An extract of Clause 2 is as follows;
“2. (1) The provisions of this Act shall apply to any person who commits an offence under this Act, whether within or outside the territorial limits of Sri Lanka, including- …”
First limb of Clause 2(1) ends with the word ‘including’ – but given the subsequent sub-clauses it is unclear whether such sub-clauses are in fact have limiting effects on the wide scope of the first operative limb – namely, “[the] provisions of this Act shall apply to any person who commits an offence under this Act, whether within or outside the territorial limits of Sri Lanka.” It is preferable that the word, ‘including’ is replaced by the words ‘including, but not limited to -’.
Overall, it is unclear whether Sri Lanka has jurisdiction over a purely international crime of terrorism committed in violation of clause 3 of the proposed ATA. Say, if an African terrorist group (which is not proscribed as per clause 82 of the ATA) launches a pirate attack on a foreign flagged vessel in the Indian high seas, and one of the members of said terror group ends up on the shores of Sri Lanka, it is unclear whether such terrorist can be investigated and prosecuted in Sri Lanka. The entire commission of the act is in the high seas, and the said terror group is unknown to Sri Lanka, yet ends up in Sri Lanka. In this example, the ambit of the applicability of clause 2 remains questionable to exercise jurisdiction by Sri Lanka.
Or else, if assistance is sought from our State, and the government dispatches a naval convoy to help the distressed vessel, and having offered assistance in the high seas, and the crew and the vessel is brought to Sri Lanka for medical treatment, can the Sri Lankan authority initiate investigations on this matter that occurred exclusively in the High seas? The legal regime of the high seas is contained in Part VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, and the high seas are beyond the jurisdiction of any national jurisdiction of any State. Although, clause 2(c) seems to be broad enough to cover such foreign citizens by the use of words ‘any person’, clause 2(d) seems to limit the applicability of clause 2(c). Whether this is specifically brought to the attention of the government and MPs are uncertain. Also noteworthy is the uncertainty pervading the inclusive nature of clause 2(1) by the use of the words ‘including’ at the early stages, as noted by me earlier. All this, compounds the uncertainty to the jurisdictional ambit of the applicability of the proposed ATA. Therefore, there is a need to revisit the jurisdictional ambit of clause 2.
Similarly, there are many drawbacks in clause 2, and the application of the said jurisdictional clause must be considered in the light of the public international law and its bases on international jurisdiction, and how much of such international State rights that should be contained in a proposed ATA in line with similar legislation like Patriot Act of the USA or Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK. Curtailing such international rights that legitimately belong to Sri Lanka without a rational policy basis is not acceptable. Hence the proposed ATA should be reconsidered for the want of workable jurisdiction. The writer is fully aware of the criticisms on the counter terrorism laws of the UK and USA. Whether Sri Lanka wishes to retract from UK’s/USA’s positions need to be objectively decided by the policy makers with wider consultation.
Another example of a defect in clause 2 is that sub-clause (d) says, that a person who had been a citizen of Sri Lanka commits the offence of terrorism within the territory of the Republic of Sri Lanka, say today, but found out later; and he subsequently shifts his habitual residence from Sri Lanka; for the provisions of the proposed ATA to be applied the concurrence of the foreign State of which he is a citizen is required. The problem continues further. Also, what if that foreign citizen later visits Sri Lanka, or he is intercepted by a Sri Lankan naval operation in the high seas and brought to the shores of Sri Lanka; does Sri Lanka have the jurisdiction to prosecute this person – although such foreign citizen now does not have any habitual residence in Sri Lanka? It is questionable whether clause 2 covers such a situation. That means, clause 2(c) seems to be broad enough to cover such foreign citizens by the use of the words ‘any person’, but clause 2(d) seems to limit the applicability of clause 2(c).
There are so many defects in clause 2. But the scope and the space of this write-up does not allow me to expand. There is provision for extra-territorial jurisdiction in the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 for terrorist financing and terrorist bombing offences in line with the UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist bombings and the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The appeal to the government is to reconsider the proposed ATA.
Clause 3 – The Offence of Terrorism
The offence of terrorism under clause 3 forms the basis for a number of criminal offenses; and triggers the application of many provisions including the encouragement of terrorism, and wide-ranging powers, like the designation and proscription of terrorist organizations; and other enforcement powers and orders.
Similarly, the Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK, includes acts of terrorism committed both in and outside of the UK, as the use or threat of one or more of the actions listed in the section, and under the Act, terrorism is currently defined as “the use or threat [of action] designed to “influence” the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purposes of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. (Vide, Section 1(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK.)
Lord Carlile’s report on “The Definition of Terrorism,” March 2007, reviewed the scope of the definition of the Anti terrorism Act of the UK and stated that the UK definition is “consistent with international comparators and treaties, and is useful and broadly fit for purpose”. In his report, Lord Carlile recommended amending the language so that only actions or the threat of action designed “to intimidate” the government, instead of the much broader word “influence”, fall within the definition.
The present the section 1(1) of the UK reads as follows;
In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where—
(a)the action falls within subsection (2),
(b)the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and
(c)the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.
The words such as “influence” can be considered much wider than the word “wrongfully” that is mentioned in clause 3(1) of our proposed ATA.
Further, the UK Act in section 4(1) contains broad definitions. For e.g. the reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated, and a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of any country, and “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom. However such effective and broad definitions do not exist in our proposed ATA.
Further, Section 38B(1) and (2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK says that it is an offence if one does not inform the police if he believes that someone he knows is in preparation of acts of terrorism. The maximum sentence in respect of Section 38B of the Act is for a term not exceeding five years’ imprisonment, although it is a defence to prove that he had a reasonable excuse for not making the disclosure.
It is also observed that the intention is expressly required as the mental element of the crime in clause 3, whereas the word ‘knowledge’ would be preferable given the complexity involved in the crime. However, section 1 of the UK Anti-terrorism Act seems to require no overburden of such intention or knowledge to the extent of proposed ATA.
The frequently cited leading case on strict liability and the presumption of ‘mens rea’ is Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132. But the recent case supreme court judgment of PWR (AP) (Appellant) v Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent) [2022] UKSC 2 held that such presumption is rebutted for the offence contained in section 13. All this shows how broadly the UK s Anti-Terrorism Act is applied, which is a clear lesson for us.
It is in this context that our proposed ATA should be reviewed as to its narrowness in combating global terrorism, and abusive in enforcing miscellaneous orders on the contrary.
The General Fears about Proposed ATA
There is an overwhelming agitation that the proposed ATA will turn out to be draconian law – just as bad as the existing PTA, if not worse. Fears have been galvanised to such an extent that many opposition parties and activists have decided to challenge the proposed ATA in the Supreme Court.
A common question they ask is whether any trade union activists or media activists that protest in public or air their voice against the government be dealt with under the proposed ATA. Such possibilities are rare given the highly structured nature of the mother clause 3 and her associated offspring provisions. The threshold tests that are needed to graduate an act to one of terrorism that gets caught in clause 3 or its associated provisions is placed at a high level, and it is very unlikely that mere protests would classify as an act of terrorism. Many, if not all the offences are directly connected to clause 3, as noted above. It is very unlikely that a final conviction from a court of law will victimize a group of mere protesters or a group of media activists engaged in criticising the government. If such be the case, the UK’s Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 would have led to far greater concerns, since, as I indicated above, the proposed ATA law in Sri Lanka is much narrower than that of the UK’s 2000 Act.
However, it needs to be observed that enforcement/miscellaneous powers that are widely couched in Part X can nevertheless be abused in the short term, and innocent people may be apprehended as suspects. Therefore a group of protesters or media activists can be harassed in the short run given the weaknesses in the enforcement procedures. Hence, it is the enforcement powers and procedures that need a revamp for the want of a greater judicial scrutiny.
One more point on Part X – miscellaneous powers in the proposed ATA. Take a look at the Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK. There is far greater judicial accountability in the UK regime, for eg., detailed de-proscription procedures in the UK law compared to the proposed ATA etc. global terror networks are complex and dangerous.
Take this example. Assume that a terror group takes an LNG carrier and her crew as hostage in the outer harbour of Colombo Port, where the sabotaging of this carrier would cause enormous destruction similar to the explosion of a nuclear bomb. The hostage situation goes on for 10 days in outer harbor. Fortunately, in the early hours of the hostage crisis Sri Lanka arrests a suspect in the Port connected to the hostage crisis. It is not advisable to bring in a human rights oversight body to question the well being of the suspect taken to custody in the first few days, since the hostage crisis is ongoing and the counter-terrorism operations are still going on. And the arrested suspect may be needed for hostage negotiation and other counter-terrorism measures. It is best advised that the proposed ATA is revisited given the serious lacuna it has with regard to the weaknesses even on the procedural provisions in addressing organized global terror networks.
The writer is aware of the statements so far issued by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA). It is noted that all these observations are primarily, if not exclusively, centred on the required procedural due process in the enforcement powers, rather than on the restrictive nature of clauses such as 2 and 3. The concerns such as lack of a proper definition of terrorism, ‘glorification’ being made an offence after the London bombing, and other substantive due process concerns etc., nevertheless exist in the UK/USA Laws, and there is no necessity for Sri Lanka to deviate from these advanced foreign legal regimes without broader expert consultation, and if a deviation from the UK/USA laws are warranted such policy must be carefully considered.
Finally – A call for a fresh Parliamentary Select Committee, a call to calm down for the public and a plea for the government to delay the proposed law:
The overabundance of criticisms from the trade unions, professional bodies, religious bodies and the NGOs need to be tempered with wiser counsel in the interest of the country. The government should also be mindful to restrain itself from introducing sweeping powers for procedural enforcement which have less judicial scrutiny. This write-up once again reiterates its clarion call to halt this legislation being pushed so hurriedly through the legislative deliberation process. We call upon all the professional/religious bodies, trade unions, NGOs and the political parties to request the powers that be to have a Parliamentary Select Committee so that an objectively drafted ATA can be finalised to one which the government and the citizens in this country want and can agree.
(The writer is an Attorney, Chartered Shipbroker (UK) and UN-ITLOS Nippon Fellow 2012/2013. He holds M.Sc. Logistics (BCU-UK), LL.M (International Maritime Law) (IMO-IMLI), LL. M (International Trade Law) (Wales), LL.B (O.U.S.L).
Six months into the term of office of the new government, the main positive achievements continue to remain economic and political stability and the reduction of waste and corruption. The absence of these in the past contributed to a significant degree to the lack of development of the country. The fact that the government is making a serious bid to ensure them is the best prognosis for a better future for the country. There is still a distance to go. The promised improvements that would directly benefit those who are at the bottom of the economic pyramid, and the quarter of the population who live below the poverty line, have yet to materialise. Prices of essential goods have not come down and some have seen sharp increases such as rice and coconuts. There are no mega projects in the pipeline that would give people the hope that rapid development is around the corner.
There were times in the past when governments succeeded in giving the people big hopes for the future as soon as they came to power. Perhaps the biggest hope came with the government’s move towards the liberalisation of the economy that took place after the election of 1977. President J R Jayewardene and his team succeeded in raising generous international assistance, most of it coming in the form of grants, that helped to accelerate the envisaged 30 year Mahaweli Development project to just six years. In 1992 President Ranasinghe Premadasa thought on a macro scale when his government established 200 garment factories throughout the country to develop the rural economy and to help alleviate poverty. These large scale projects brought immediate hope to the lives of people.
More recently the Hambantota Port project, Mattala Airport and the Colombo Port City project promised mega development that excited the popular imagination at the time they commenced, though neither of them has lived up to their envisaged potential. These projects were driven by political interests and commission agents rather than economic viability leading to debt burden and underutilisation. The NPP government would need to be cautious about bringing in similar mega projects that could offer the people the hope of rapid economic growth. During his visits to India and China, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake signed a large number of agreements with the governments of those countries but the results remain unclear. The USD 1 billion Adani project to generate wind power with Indian collaboration appears to be stalled. The USD 3.7 billion Chinese proposal to build an oil refinery also appears to be stalled.
RENEWED GROWTH
The absence of high profile investments or projects to generate income and thereby take the country to a higher level of development is a lacuna in the development plans of the government. It has opened the door to invidious comparisons to be drawn between the new government’s ability to effect change and develop the economy in relation to those in the opposition political parties who have traditionally been in the seats of power. However, recently published statistics of the economic growth during the past year indicates that the economy is doing better than anticipated under the NPP government. Sri Lanka’s economy grew by 5 percent in the year 2024, reversing two years of contraction with the growth rate for the year of 2023 being estimated at negative 2.3 percent. What was particularly creditable was the growth rate for the fourth quarter of 2024 (after the new government took over) being 5.4 percent. The growth figures for the present quarter are also likely to see a continuation of the present trend.
Sri Lanka’s failure in the past has been to sustain its economic growth rates. Even though the country started with high growth rates under different governments, it soon ran into problems of waste and corruption that eroded those gains. During the initial period of President J R Jayawardene’s government in the late 1970s, the economy registered near 8 percent growth with the support of its mega projects, but this could not be sustained. Violent conflict, waste and corruption came to the centre stage which led to the economy getting undermined. With more and more money being spent on the security forces to battle those who had become insurgents against the state, and with waste and corruption skyrocketing there was not much left over for economic development.
The government’s commitment to cut down on waste and corruption so that resources can be saved and added to enable economic growth can be seen in the strict discipline it has been following where expenditures on its members are concerned. The government has restricted the cabinet to 25 ministers, when in the past the figure was often double. The government has also made provision to reduce the perks of office, including medical insurance to parliamentarians. The value of this latter measure is that the parliamentarians will now have an incentive to upgrade the health system that serves the general public, instead of running it down as previous governments did. With their reduced levels of insurance coverage they will need to utilise the public health facilities rather than go to the private ones.
COMMITTED GOVERNMENT
The most positive feature of the present time is that the government is making a serious effort to root out corruption. This is to be seen in the invigoration of previously dormant institutions of accountability, such as the Bribery and Corruption Commission, and the willingness of the Attorney General’s Department to pursue those who were previously regarded as being beyond the reach of the law due to their connections to those in the seats of power. The fact that the Inspector General of Police, who heads the police force, is behind bars on a judicial order is an indication that the rule of law is beginning to be taken seriously. By cost cutting, eliminating corruption and abiding by the rule of law the government is removing the obstacles to development. In the past, the mega development projects failed to deliver their full benefits because they got lost in corrupt and wasteful practices including violent conflict.
There is a need, however, for new and innovative development projects that require knowledge and expertise that is not necessarily within the government. So far it appears that the government is restricting its selection of key decision makers to those it knows, has worked with and trusts due to long association. Two of the committees that the government has recently appointed, the Clean Lanka task force and the Tourism advisory committee are composed of nearly all men from the majority community. If Sri Lanka is to leverage its full potential, the government must embrace a more inclusive approach that incorporates women and diverse perspectives from across the country’s multiethnic and multireligious population, including representation from the north and east. For development that includes all, and is accepted by all, it needs to tap into the larger resources that lie outside itself.
By ensuring that women and ethnic minorities have representation in decision making bodies of the government, the government can harness a broader range of skills, experiences, and perspectives, ultimately leading to more effective and sustainable development policies. Sustainable development is not merely about economic growth; it is about inclusivity and partnership. A government that prioritises diversity in its leadership will be better equipped to address the challenges that can arise unexpectedly. By widening its advisory base and integrating a broader array of voices, the government can create policies that are not only effective but also equitable. Through inclusive governance, responsible economic management, and innovative development strategies the government will surely lead the country towards a future that benefits all its people.
by Jehan Perera
Former Minister Ali Sabry’s recent op-ed, “Why Sri Lanka must continue to pursue a non-aligned, yet multi-aligned foreign policy,” published in the Daily FT on 3 March, offers a timely reflection on Sri Lanka’s foreign policy trajectory in an increasingly multipolar world. Sabry’s articulation of a “non-aligned yet multi-aligned” approach is commendable for its attempt to reconcile Sri Lanka’s historical commitment to non-alignment with the realities of contemporary geopolitics. However, his framework raises critical questions about the principles of non-alignment, the nuances of multi-alignment, and Sri Lanka’s role in a world shaped by great power competition. This response seeks to engage with Sabry’s arguments, critique certain assumptions, and propose a more robust vision for Sri Lanka’s foreign policy.
Sabry outlines five key pillars of a non-aligned yet multi-aligned foreign policy:
- No military alignments, no foreign bases: Sri Lanka should avoid entangling itself in military alliances or hosting foreign military bases.
- Economic engagement with all, dependency on none
: Sri Lanka should diversify its economic partnerships to avoid over-reliance on any single country.
* Diplomatic balancing
: Sri Lanka should engage with multiple powers, leveraging relationships with China, India, the US, Europe, Japan, and ASEAN for specific benefits.
- Leveraging multilateralism
: Sri Lanka should participate actively in regional and global organisations, such as UN, NAM, SAARC, and BIMSTEC.
- Resisting coercion and protecting sovereignty
: Sri Lanka must resist external pressures and assert its sovereign right to pursue an independent foreign policy.
While pillars 1, 2, and 5 align with the traditional principles of non-alignment, pillars 3 and 4 warrant closer scrutiny. Sabry’s emphasis on “diplomatic balancing” and “leveraging multilateralism” raises questions about the consistency of his approach with the spirit of non-alignment and whether it adequately addresses the challenges of a multipolar world.
Dangers of over-compartmentalisation
Sabry’s suggestion that Sri Lanka should engage with China for infrastructure, India for regional security and trade, the US and Europe for technology and education, and Japan and ASEAN for economic opportunities reflects a pragmatic approach to foreign policy. However, this compartmentalisation of partnerships risks reducing Sri Lanka’s foreign policy to a transactional exercise, undermining the principles of non-alignment.
Sabry’s framework, curiously, excludes China from areas like technology, education, and regional security, despite China’s growing capabilities in these domains. For instance, China is a global leader in renewable energy, artificial intelligence, and 5G technology, making it a natural partner for Sri Lanka’s technological advancement. Similarly, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) offers significant opportunities for economic development and regional connectivity. By limiting China’s role to infrastructure, Sabry’s approach risks underutilising a key strategic partner.
Moreover, Sabry’s emphasis on India for regional security overlooks the broader geopolitical context. While India is undoubtedly a critical partner for Sri Lanka, regional security cannot be addressed in isolation from China’s role in South Asia. The Chinese autonomous region of Xizang (Tibet) is indeed part of South Asia, and China’s presence in the region is a reality that Sri Lanka must navigate. A truly non-aligned foreign policy would seek to balance relationships with both India and China, rather than assigning fixed roles to each.
Sabry’s compartmentalisation of partnerships risks creating silos in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, limiting its flexibility and strategic depth. For instance, by relying solely on the US and Europe for technology and education, Sri Lanka may miss out on opportunities for South-South cooperation with members of BRICS.
Similarly, by excluding China from regional security discussions, Sri Lanka may inadvertently align itself with India’s strategic interests, undermining its commitment to non-alignment.
Limited multilateralism?
Sabry’s call for Sri Lanka to remain active in organisations like the UN, NAM, SAARC, and BIMSTEC is laudable. However, his omission of the BRI, BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is striking. These platforms represent emerging alternatives to the Western-dominated global order and offer Sri Lanka opportunities to diversify its partnerships and enhance its strategic autonomy.
The BRI is one of the most ambitious infrastructure and economic development projects in history, involving over 140 countries. For Sri Lanka, the BRI offers opportunities for infrastructure development, trade connectivity, and economic growth. By participating in the BRI, Sri Lanka can induce Chinese investment to address its infrastructure deficit and integrate into global supply chains. Excluding the BRI from Sri Lanka’s foreign policy framework would be a missed opportunity.
BRICS and the SCO represent platforms for South-South cooperation and multipolarity. BRICS, in particular, has emerged as a counterweight to such Western-dominated institutions as the IMF and World Bank, advocating for a more equitable global economic order. The SCO, on the other hand, focuses on regional security and counterterrorism, offering Sri Lanka a platform to address its security concerns in collaboration with major powers like China, Russia, and India. By engaging with these organisations, Sri Lanka can strengthen its commitment to multipolarity and enhance its strategic autonomy.
Non-alignment is not neutrality
Sabry’s assertion that Sri Lanka must avoid taking sides in major power conflicts reflects a misunderstanding of non-alignment. Non-alignment is not about neutrality; it is about taking a principled stand on issues of global importance. During the Cold War, non-aligned countries, like Sri Lanka, opposed colonialism, apartheid, and imperialism, even as they avoided alignment with either the US or the Soviet Union.
Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, under leaders like S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and Sirimavo Bandaranaike, was characterised by a commitment to anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, opposing racial segregation and discrimination in both its Apartheid and Zionist forms. Sri Lanka, the first Asian country to recognise revolutionary Cuba, recognised the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, supported liberation struggles in Africa, and opposed the US military base in Diego Garcia. These actions were not neutral; they were rooted in a principled commitment to justice and equality.
Today, Sri Lanka faces new challenges, including great power competition, economic coercion, and climate change. A truly non-aligned foreign policy would require Sri Lanka to take a stand on issues like the genocide in Gaza, the colonisation of the West Bank, the continued denial of the right to return of ethnically-cleansed Palestinians and Chagossians, the militarisation of the Indo-Pacific, the use of economic sanctions as a tool of coercion, and the need for climate justice. By avoiding these issues, Sri Lanka risks becoming the imperialist powers’ cringing, whingeing client state.
The path forward
Sabry’s use of the term “multi-alignment” reflects a growing trend in Indian foreign policy, particularly under the BJP Government. However, multi-alignment is not the same as multipolarity. Multi-alignment implies a transactional approach to foreign policy, where a country seeks to extract maximum benefits from multiple partners without a coherent strategic vision. Multipolarity, on the other hand, envisions a world order where power is distributed among multiple centres, reducing the dominance of any single power.
Sri Lanka should advocate for a multipolar world order that reflects the diversity of the global South. This would involve strengthening platforms like BRICS, the SCO, and the NAM, while also engaging with Western institutions like the UN and the WTO. By promoting multipolarity, Sri Lanka can contribute to a more equitable and just global order, in line with the principles of non-alignment.
Ali Sabry’s call for a non-aligned, yet multi-aligned foreign policy falls short of articulating a coherent vision for Sri Lanka’s role in a multipolar world. To truly uphold the principles of non-alignment, Sri Lanka must:
* Reject compartmentalisation
: Engage with all partners across all domains, including technology, education, and regional security.
* Embrace emerging platforms
: Participate in the BRI, BRICS, and SCO to diversify partnerships and enhance strategic autonomy.
* Take principled stands
: Advocate for justice, equality, and multipolarity in global affairs.
* Promote South-South cooperation
: Strengthen ties with other Global South countries to address shared challenges, like climate change and economic inequality.
By adopting this approach, Sri Lanka can reclaim its historical legacy as a leader of the non-aligned movement and chart a course toward a sovereign, secure, and successful future.
(Vinod Moonesinghe read mechanical engineering at the University of Westminster, and worked in Sri Lanka in the tea machinery and motor spares industries, as well as the railways. He later turned to journalism and writing history. He served as chair of the Board of Governors of the Ceylon German Technical Training Institute. He is a convenor of the Asia Progress Forum, which can be contacted at asiaprogressforum@gmail.com.)
by Vinod Moonesinghe
Cancellation of shows has turned out to be a regular happening where former Backstreet Boys Nick Carter is concerned. In the past, it has happened several times.
If Nick Carter is not 100 percent fit, he should not undertake these strenuous world tours, ultimately disappointing his fans.
It’s not a healthy scene to be cancelling shows on a regular basis.
In May 2024, a few days before his scheduled visit to the Philippines, Carter cancelled his two shows due to “unforeseen circumstances.”
The promoter concerned announced the development and apologised to fans who bought tickets to Carter’s shows in Cebu, on May 23, and in Manila, on May 24.
The dates were supposed to be part of the Asian leg of his ‘Who I Am’ 2024 tour.
Carter previously cancelled a series of solo concerts in Asia, including Jakarta, Mumbai, Singapore, and Taipei. And this is what the organisers had to say:
“Due to unexpected matters related to Nick Carter’s schedule, we regret to announce that Nick’s show in Asia, including Jakarta on May 26 (2024), has been cancelled.
His ‘Who I Am’ Japan tour 2024 was also cancelled, with the following announcement:
Explaining, on video, about the
cancelled ‘Who I Am’ shows
“We regret to announce that the NICK CARTER Japan Tour, planned for June 4th at Toyosu PIT (Tokyo) and June 6th at Namba Hatch (Osaka), will no longer be proceeding due to ‘unforeseen circumstances.’ We apologise for any disappointment.
Believe me, I had a strange feeling that his Colombo show would not materialise and I did mention, in a subtle way, in my article about Nick Carter’s Colombo concert, in ‘StarTrack’ of 14th January, 2025 … my only worry (at that point in time) is the HMPV virus which is reported to be spreading in China and has cropped up in Malaysia, and India, as well.
Although no HMPV virus has cropped up, Carter has cancelled his scheduled performance in Sri Lanka, and in a number of other countries, as well, to return home, quoting, once again, “unforeseen circumstances.”
“Unforeseen circumstances” seems to be his tagline!
There is talk that low ticket sales is the reason for some of his concerts to be cancelled.
Yes, elaborate arrangements were put in place for Nick Carter’s trip to Sri Lanka – Meet & Greet, Q&A, selfies, etc., but all at a price!
Wonder if there will be the same excitement and enthusiasm if Nick Carter decides to come up with new dates for what has been cancelled?
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