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Proposed Anti-Terrorism Bill: Real tiger, paper tiger or mixed bag

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By Nuwan Peiris

The writer is an Attorney, Chartered Shipbroker (UK) and UN-ITLOS Nippon Fellow 2012/2013. He holds M.Sc. Logistics (BCU-UK), LL.M (International Maritime Law) (IMO-IMLI), LL. M (International Trade Law) (Wales), LL.B (O.U.S.L).

“No generalization is wholly true – not even this one.” – Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes

The recent Anti-Terrorism Bill (ATA) has garnered more attention than one could ever imagine for a law. Emotional and sweeping generalizations are made by all and sundry on the proposed ATA. Even the recently enacted 21st Amendment did not receive so much attention from the public. Why is it that a law like the proposed ATA receives so much attention? There seems to be a legitimate fear that the proposed ATA may be no different to the existing law, namely PTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act), if not worse.

But what is the reality? Who drafted this proposed ATA? From the skilled draftsmanship associated with the proposed ATA, the draft law requires an in-depth analysis for a proper understanding unlike some of the recently introduced laws by the government.

Weaker than UK Law – Why?

In essence, the proposed ATA seems to be a strategically diluted version of the UK’s Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 – incorporating the amendments that were introduced by the UK after the London bombing. Worse still, proposed ATA is inconsequential in its effect when it comes to combating global terrorism as far as some of the fundamental provisions are concerned; in other words, a feeble draft law compared to the Patriot Act of the USA which became law after the 9/11 attacks. However, the proposed ATA may be an abusive weapon as far its enforcement orders are concerned, such as the Miscellaneous Orders contained in Part X. In short, the proposed ATA is a mixed bag. For example, most of the protestors’ dissent to the proposed law gyrates on these abusive enforcement orders.

How does a draft law like this instant one finds its way, from nowhere, to the official gazette without much public discussion? The purpose of this very brief write-up is to urge the Government in power and the opposition parties to prevent the proposed ATA being tabled in the Parliament, instead to appoint a Select Committee in the Parliament comprising of varied interests so that the matter can be reconsidered and better reforms of the ATA can be effected with consensus.

And the important point to consider by this proposed Select Committee in the Parliament is to introduce an ATA to tackle global terrorism effectively, and promulgate a law that is in line with the Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK (as amended), and better still the Patriot Act of USA – and be mindful not to introduce a version that is weaker than the UK law. Hence, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Justice Minister should be advised to set-up a Select Committee in the Parliament, so that the proposed ATA can be changed to become an acceptable legal instrument in combating global terrorism, and avoid becoming a law which is far weaker than the UK law on terrorism.

If the proposed ATA becomes law, this law may not have the same effectiveness in combating global terrorism especially given the weak substantive provisions in clauses 2 and 3, coupled with arbitrary procedural provisions that may lead to abuse in implementation. Such a proposed ATA will serve neither the purpose of combating global terrorism nor ensuring procedural fairness to the ones who are caught up as suspects. A middle of nowhere legislation, although drafted well disguised, may not serve Sri Lanka well, noting that further legislation similar to Bio-Security Act 2015 from Australia is needed to combat biological and chemical attacks. What is needed is to have extensive deliberations in a fresh Parliamentary Select Committee, where all of us can share and contribute with our experience to the formulation of a far-sighted ATA.

Why is ATA weaker than UK and USA laws?

There are two fundamental provisions in the proposed ATA – clauses 2 and 3. Clause 2 deals with jurisdiction and clause 3 deals with the offence of terrorism.This is the typical structure of an ATA law in many countries, and drafts men followed the universal structure – and we see nothing wrong in this. Here, Clause 2 becomes the international jurisdiction base for the implementation of the proposed ATA.

Clause 3 contains the offence of terrorism that becomes the basis on which other offences and provisions are built upon. Clause 3 is the mother provision, and the rest of the offences are the offspring of Clause 3 – which is typical of any ATA in the world including the UK.

Clause 2 – the clause on jurisdiction – becomes the basis for enforcement powers mentioned in the Part X of proposed ATA. Whilst the enforcement powers in the Miscellaneous Part – that comprises of Proscription Orders, Prohibition Orders, Restriction Orders etc., which is less judicially accountable – are wide and arbitrary when applied within Sri Lanka; on the contrary, its overall reach and enforcement of such Orders in the context of global terrorism is ‘fragile’ given the limitations in Clause 2.

Both Clauses 2 and 3 are the foundational structure of the proposed ATA, and the enforcement provisions contained in the rest of the ATA, including Part X forms the superstructure. Let us examine each of these aspects.

Clause 2 – Jurisdiction 

There is extra-territorial application of the proposed ATA. This is a salient feature, and this is far better drafted than the ill-fated, and now demised, Counter-Terrorism Bill that was presented in 2018.

An extract of Clause 2 is as follows;

“2. (1) The provisions of this Act shall apply to any person who commits an offence under this Act, whether within or outside the territorial limits of Sri Lanka, including- …”

First limb of Clause 2(1) ends with the word ‘including’ – but given the subsequent sub-clauses it is unclear whether such sub-clauses are in fact have limiting effects on the wide scope of the first operative limb – namely, “[the] provisions of this Act shall apply to any person who commits an offence under this Act, whether within or outside the territorial limits of Sri Lanka.” It is preferable that the word, ‘including’ is replaced by the words ‘including, but not limited to -’.

Overall, it is unclear whether Sri Lanka has jurisdiction over a purely international crime of terrorism committed in violation of clause 3 of the proposed ATA. Say, if an African terrorist group (which is not proscribed as per clause 82 of the ATA) launches a pirate attack on a foreign flagged vessel in the Indian high seas, and one of the members of said terror group ends up on the shores of Sri Lanka, it is unclear whether such terrorist can be investigated and prosecuted in Sri Lanka. The entire commission of the act is in the high seas, and the said terror group is unknown to Sri Lanka, yet ends up in Sri Lanka. In this example, the ambit of the applicability of clause 2 remains questionable to exercise jurisdiction by Sri Lanka.

Or else, if assistance is sought from our State, and the government dispatches a naval convoy to help the distressed vessel, and having offered assistance in the high seas, and the crew and the vessel is brought to Sri Lanka for medical treatment, can the Sri Lankan authority initiate investigations on this matter that occurred exclusively in the High seas? The legal regime of the high seas is contained in Part VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, and the high seas are beyond the jurisdiction of any national jurisdiction of any State. Although, clause 2(c) seems to be broad enough to cover such foreign citizens by the use of words ‘any person’, clause 2(d) seems to limit the applicability of clause 2(c). Whether this is specifically brought to the attention of the government and MPs are uncertain. Also noteworthy is the uncertainty pervading the inclusive nature of clause 2(1) by the use of the words ‘including’ at the early stages, as noted by me earlier. All this, compounds the uncertainty to the jurisdictional ambit of the applicability of the proposed ATA. Therefore, there is a need to revisit the jurisdictional ambit of clause 2.

Similarly, there are many drawbacks in clause 2, and the application of the said jurisdictional clause must be considered in the light of the public international law and its bases on international jurisdiction, and how much of such international State rights that should be contained in a proposed ATA in line with similar legislation like Patriot Act of the USA or Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK. Curtailing such international rights that legitimately belong to Sri Lanka without a rational policy basis is not acceptable. Hence the proposed ATA should be reconsidered for the want of workable jurisdiction. The writer is fully aware of the criticisms on the counter terrorism laws of the UK and USA. Whether Sri Lanka wishes to retract from UK’s/USA’s positions need to be objectively decided by the policy makers with wider consultation.

Another example of a defect in clause 2 is that sub-clause (d) says, that a person who had been a citizen of Sri Lanka commits the offence of terrorism within the territory of the Republic of Sri Lanka, say today, but found out later; and he subsequently shifts his habitual residence from Sri Lanka; for the provisions of the proposed ATA to be applied the concurrence of the foreign State of which he is a citizen is required. The problem continues further. Also, what if that foreign citizen later visits Sri Lanka, or he is intercepted by a Sri Lankan naval operation in the high seas and brought to the shores of Sri Lanka; does Sri Lanka have the jurisdiction to prosecute this person – although such foreign citizen now does not have any habitual residence in Sri Lanka? It is questionable whether clause 2 covers such a situation. That means, clause 2(c) seems to be broad enough to cover such foreign citizens by the use of the words ‘any person’, but clause 2(d) seems to limit the applicability of clause 2(c).

There are so many defects in clause 2. But the scope and the space of this write-up does not allow me to expand. There is provision for extra-territorial jurisdiction in the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 for terrorist financing and terrorist bombing offences in line with the UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist bombings and the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The appeal to the government is to reconsider the proposed ATA.

Clause 3 – The Offence of Terrorism

The offence of terrorism under clause 3 forms the basis for a number of criminal offenses; and triggers the application of many provisions including the encouragement of terrorism, and wide-ranging powers, like the designation and proscription of terrorist organizations; and other enforcement powers and orders.

Similarly, the Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK, includes acts of terrorism committed both in and outside of the UK, as the use or threat of one or more of the actions listed in the section, and under the Act, terrorism is currently defined as “the use or threat [of action] designed to “influence” the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purposes of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. (Vide, Section 1(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK.)

Lord Carlile’s report on “The Definition of Terrorism,” March 2007, reviewed the scope of the definition of the Anti terrorism Act of the UK and stated that the UK definition is “consistent with international comparators and treaties, and is useful and broadly fit for purpose”. In his report, Lord Carlile recommended amending the language so that only actions or the threat of action designed “to intimidate” the government, instead of the much broader word “influence”, fall within the definition.

The present the section 1(1) of the UK reads as follows;

In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where—

(a)the action falls within subsection (2),

(b)the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and

(c)the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.

The words such as “influence” can be considered much wider than the word “wrongfully” that is mentioned in clause 3(1) of our proposed ATA.

Further, the UK Act in section 4(1) contains broad definitions. For e.g. the reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated, and a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of any country, and “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom. However such effective and broad definitions do not exist in our proposed ATA.

Further, Section 38B(1) and (2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK says that it is an offence if one does not inform the police if he believes that someone he knows is in preparation of acts of terrorism. The maximum sentence in respect of Section 38B of the Act is for a term not exceeding five years’ imprisonment, although it is a defence to prove that he had a reasonable excuse for not making the disclosure.

It is also observed that the intention is expressly required as the mental element of the crime in clause 3, whereas the word ‘knowledge’ would be preferable given the complexity involved in the crime. However, section 1 of the UK Anti-terrorism Act seems to require no overburden of such intention or knowledge to the extent of proposed ATA.

The frequently cited leading case on strict liability and the presumption of ‘mens rea’ is Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132. But the recent case supreme court judgment of PWR (AP) (Appellant) v Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent) [2022] UKSC 2 held that such presumption is rebutted for the offence contained in section 13. All this shows how broadly the UK s Anti-Terrorism Act is applied, which is a clear lesson for us.

It is in this context that our proposed ATA should be reviewed as to its narrowness in combating global terrorism, and abusive in enforcing miscellaneous orders on the contrary.

The General Fears about Proposed ATA

There is an overwhelming agitation that the proposed ATA will turn out to be draconian law – just as bad as the existing PTA, if not worse. Fears have been galvanised to such an extent that many opposition parties and activists have decided to challenge the proposed ATA in the Supreme Court.

A common question they ask is whether any trade union activists or media activists that protest in public or air their voice against the government be dealt with under the proposed ATA. Such possibilities are rare given the highly structured nature of the mother clause 3 and her associated offspring provisions. The threshold tests that are needed to graduate an act to one of terrorism that gets caught in clause 3 or its associated provisions is placed at a high level, and it is very unlikely that mere protests would classify as an act of terrorism. Many, if not all the offences are directly connected to clause 3, as noted above. It is very unlikely that a final conviction from a court of law will victimize a group of mere protesters or a group of media activists engaged in criticising the government. If such be the case, the UK’s Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 would have led to far greater concerns, since, as I indicated above, the proposed ATA law in Sri Lanka is much narrower than that of the UK’s 2000 Act.

However, it needs to be observed that enforcement/miscellaneous powers that are widely couched in Part X can nevertheless be abused in the short term, and innocent people may be apprehended as suspects. Therefore a group of protesters or media activists can be harassed in the short run given the weaknesses in the enforcement procedures. Hence, it is the enforcement powers and procedures that need a revamp for the want of a greater judicial scrutiny.

One more point on Part X – miscellaneous powers in the proposed ATA. Take a look at the Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK. There is far greater judicial accountability in the UK regime, for eg., detailed de-proscription procedures in the UK law compared to the proposed ATA etc. global terror networks are complex and dangerous.

Take this example. Assume that a terror group takes an LNG carrier and her crew as hostage in the outer harbour of Colombo Port, where the sabotaging of this carrier would cause enormous destruction similar to the explosion of a nuclear bomb. The hostage situation goes on for 10 days in outer harbor. Fortunately, in the early hours of the hostage crisis Sri Lanka arrests a suspect in the Port connected to the hostage crisis. It is not advisable to bring in a human rights oversight body to question the well being of the suspect taken to custody in the first few days, since the hostage crisis is ongoing and the counter-terrorism operations are still going on. And the arrested suspect may be needed for hostage negotiation and other counter-terrorism measures. It is best advised that the proposed ATA is revisited given the serious lacuna it has with regard to the weaknesses even on the procedural provisions in addressing organized global terror networks.

The writer is aware of the statements so far issued by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA). It is noted that all these observations are primarily, if not exclusively, centred on the required procedural due process in the enforcement powers, rather than on the restrictive nature of clauses such as 2 and 3. The concerns such as lack of a proper definition of terrorism, ‘glorification’ being made an offence after the London bombing, and other substantive due process concerns etc., nevertheless exist in the UK/USA Laws, and there is no necessity for Sri Lanka to deviate from these advanced foreign legal regimes without broader expert consultation, and if a deviation from the UK/USA laws are warranted such policy must be carefully considered.

Finally – A call for a fresh Parliamentary Select Committee, a call to calm down for the public and a plea for the government to delay the proposed law:

The overabundance of criticisms from the trade unions, professional bodies, religious bodies and the NGOs need to be tempered with wiser counsel in the interest of the country. The government should also be mindful to restrain itself from introducing sweeping powers for procedural enforcement which have less judicial scrutiny. This write-up once again reiterates its clarion call to halt this legislation being pushed so hurriedly through the legislative deliberation process. We call upon all the professional/religious bodies, trade unions, NGOs and the political parties to request the powers that be to have a Parliamentary Select Committee so that an objectively drafted ATA can be finalised to one which the government and the citizens in this country want and can agree.

(The writer is an Attorney, Chartered Shipbroker (UK) and UN-ITLOS Nippon Fellow 2012/2013. He holds M.Sc. Logistics (BCU-UK), LL.M (International Maritime Law) (IMO-IMLI), LL. M (International Trade Law) (Wales), LL.B (O.U.S.L).



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Features

USAID and NGOS under siege

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A file photo of the USAID signage being removed in Washington

by Jehan Perera

The virtually overnight  suspension of the U.S. government’s multibillion dollar foreign aid programme channeled through USAID has been headline news in the U.S. and in other parts of the world where this aid has been very important.  In the U.S. itself the suspension of USAID programmes has been accompanied by large scale loss of jobs in the aid sector without due notice.  In areas of the world where U.S. aid was playing an important role, such as in mitigating conditions of famine or war, the impact is life threatening to large numbers of hapless people.  In Sri Lanka, however, the suspension of U.S. aid has made the headlines for an entirely different reason.

U.S. government authorities have been asserting that the reason for the suspension of the foreign aid programme is due to various reasons, including inefficiency and misuse that goes against the present government’s policy and is not in the U.S. national interest.  This has enabled politicians in Sri Lanka who played leading roles in previous governments, but are now under investigation for misdeeds associated with their periods of governance, to divert attention from themselves.  These former leaders of government are alleging that they were forced out of office prematurely due to the machination of NGOs that had been funded by USAID and not because of the misgovernance and corruption they were accused of.

 In the early months of 2022, hundreds of thousands of people poured out onto the streets of Sri Lanka in  all parts of the country demanding the exit of the then government.  The Aragalaya protests became an unstoppable movement due the unprecedented economic hardships that the general population was being subjected to at that time.  The protestors believed that those in the government had stolen the country’s wealth.  The onset of economic bankruptcy meant that the government did not have foreign exchange (dollars) to pay for essential imports, including fuel, food and medicine.  People died of exhaustion after waiting hours and even days in queues for petrol and in hospitals due to lack of medicine.

PROBING NGOS 

There have been demands by some of the former government leaders who are currently under investigation that USAID funding to Sri Lanka should be probed.  The new NPP government has responded to this demand by delegating the task to the government’s National NGO Secretariat.  This is the state institution that is tasked with collecting information from the NGOs registered with it about their quantum and sources of funding and what they do with it for the betterment of the people.  Public Security Minister Ananda Wijepala has said he would deal with allegations over USAID funding in Sri Lanka, and for that he had sought a report from the NGO Secretariat which is operating under his Ministry.

 Most donor agencies operating in Sri Lanka, including USAID, have rigorous processes which they follow in disbursing funds to NGOs.   Usually, the donor agency will issue a call for proposals which specify their areas of interest.  NGOs have to compete to obtain these funds, stating what they will do with it in considerable detail, and the impact it will have.  Once the grant is awarded, the NGOs are required to submit regular reports of work they have done.  The donor agencies generally insist that reputed audit firms, preferably with international reputations, perform regular annual or even six-monthly audits of funds provided.  They may even send independent external monitors to evaluate the impact of the projects they have supported.

 The value of work done by NGOs is that they often take on unpopular and difficult tasks that do not have mass appeal but are essential for a more just and inclusive society.  Mahatma Gandhi who started the Sarvodaya (meaning, the wellbeing of all) Movement in India was inspired by the English philosopher John Ruskin who wrote in 1860 that a good society was one that would care for the very last member in it.   The ideal that many NGOs strive for, whether in child care, sanitation, economic  development or peacebuilding is that everyone is included and no one is excluded from society’s protection, in which the government necessarily plays a lead role.

 SELF-INTEREST

 Ironically, those who now demand that USAID funds and those organisations that obtained such funds be investigated were themselves in government when USAID was providing such funds.  The National NGO Secretariat was in existence doing its work  of monitoring the activities of NGOs then.  Donor agencies, such as USAID, have stringent policies that prevent funds they provide being used for partisan political purposes.  This accounts for the fact that when NGOs invite politicians to attend their events, they make it a point to invite those from both the government and opposition, so that their work is not seen as being narrowly politically partisan.

 The present situation is a very difficult one for NGOs in Sri Lanka and worldwide.  USAID was the biggest donor agency by far, and the sudden suspension of its funds has meant that many NGOs have had to retrench staff, stop much of their work and some have even closed down.  It appears that the international world order is becoming more openly based on self-interest, where national interests take precedence over global interests, and the interests of the wealthy segments of society take precedence over the interests of the people in general.  This is not a healthy situation for human beings or for civilisation as the founders of the world religions knew with their consistent message that the interests of others, of the neighbour, of all living beings be prioritised.

 In 1968, when the liberal ideas of universal rights were more dominant in the international system, Garrett Hardin, an evolutionary biologist, wrote a paper called “The Tragedy of the Commons”.  Hardin used an example of sheep grazing land when describing the adverse effects of overpopulation. He referred to a situation where individuals, acting in their own self-interest, overexploit a shared resource, like a pasture or fishery, leading to its depletion and eventual destruction, even though it is detrimental to everyone in the long run; essentially, the freedom to use a common resource without regulation can lead to its ruin for all users.   The world appears to be heading in that direction.  In these circumstances, the work of  those, who seek the wellbeing of all, needs to be strengthened and not undermined.

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Dealing with sexual-and gender-based violence in universities

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Out of the Shadows:

By Nicola Perera

Despite policy interventions at the University Grants Commission (UGC), university, and faculty levels, sexual- and gender-based violence (SGBV) is so entrenched in the system that victim-survivors seeking justice are more likely to experience concerted pushback than the empathetic solidarity of their peers. Colleagues and friends will often close ranks, rallying to protect the accused under misguided notions of safeguarding the reputation of, not merely the assumed perpetrator, but the institution. While gender and sexual inequalities, inflected by class, ethnicity, religion, region, and other characteristics, shape the identities of the perpetrator and victim and the situation of abuse, the hyper-hierarchised nature of the university space itself enables and conceals such violence. It’s also important to note that women are not the exclusive victims of violence; boys and men are caught in violent dynamics, too.

Similar to intimate partner violence in the private confines of home and family, violence attributed to the sex and gender of abusers and victims in our universities goes heavily underreported. The numerous power imbalances structuring the university – between staff and students; academic staff versus non-academic staff; senior academic professionals as opposed to junior academics; or, senior students in contrast to younger students – also prevent survivors from seeking redress for fear of professional and personal repercussions. Research by the UGC in 2015 in collaboration with the Federation of University Teachers’ Associations (FUTA) and CARE International Sri Lanka, and more recently with UNICEF in 2021, revealed discomfiting truths about the university as places of work and education. In naming oneself as a survivor-victim, even within whatever degree of confidentiality that current grievance mechanisms offer, the individual may also represent (to some members of the university community, if not to the establishment itself) a threat to the system.

Conversely, an accused is liable to not just disciplinary action by their university-employer, but to criminal prosecution by the state. Via the Penal Code, the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (2005), etc., the law recognises SGBV as an offence that can take place across many contexts in the private and public spheres. (The criminalisation of SGBV is in line with state commitments to ensuring the existence, safety, and dignity of women and girls under a host of international agreements, such as the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Vienna Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, the Sustainable Development Goals, International Labour Organisation conventions regarding non-discrimination in employment, etc.). Specific to the university, the so-called anti-ragging act (the Prohibition of Ragging and Other Forms of Violence in Education Institutes Act of 1998, in addition to UGC circular no. 919 of 2010, etc.) deems SGBV as a punishable offence. The rag is one site where SGBV often finds fluent articulation, but it is hardly the only one: this is not a problem with just our students.

As the apex body governing higher education in the country, the UGC has not remained insensible to the fact that SGBV harms the lives, rights, and work of students, staff, (and other parties) in university spaces. The Centre for Gender Equity/Equality sits at the UGC level, along with gender cells/committees in individual universities. Universities and faculties have elaborated their own policies and bylaws to address sexual- or gender-based harassment and sexual violence. Although variously articulated, these policies touch on issues of consent; discrimination against a person, or creation of a hostile environment, on the basis of their gender or sexuality; the spectrum of actions that may constitute harassment/violence (including through the use of technology); coerced or voluntary sexual favours as a quid-pro-quo for academic or professional benefits; procedures for making and investigating SGBV complaints; protection of witnesses to an investigation; the irrelevance of the complainant’s sexual history to the complaint at hand. And here begins the inevitable tale of distance between policy, practice, and effect.

Different faculties of the same university may or may not include SGBV awareness/ training in the annual orientation for new students. The faculty’s SGBV policy may or may not appear in all three languages and Braille in student handbooks. Staff Development Centres training new recruits in outcome-based education and intended learning outcomes may or may not look at (or even realise) the politics of education, nor include an SGBV component in its Human Resources modules. Universities may or may not dedicate increasingly stretched resources to training workshops on SGBV for staff, or cover everyone from academics, to administrative staff, to the marshals, to maintenance staff, to hostel wardens.

Workshops may in any case only draw a core of participants, mostly young, mostly women. Instead, groups of male academics (aided sometimes by women colleagues) will actively organise against any gender policy which they construe as a personal affront to their professional stature. Instead, the outspoken women academic is painted as a troublemaker. Existing policy fails to address such discourse, and other normalised microaggressions and subtle harassment which create a difficult environment for gender and sexual minorities. In fact, the implementation of gender policy at all may rest on the critical presence of an individual (inevitably a woman) in a position of power. Gender equality in the university at any point appears to rest on the convictions and labour of a handful of (mostly women) staff or officials.

The effect is the tediously heteropatriarchal spaces that staff and students inhabit, spaces which whether we acknowledge them as such or not, are imbued with the potential, the threat of violence for those on the margins. The effect, as Ramya Kumar writing earlier in this column states, is the inability of our LGBTQI students and staff to be their authentic selves, except to a few confidantes. Since the absence/rarity of SGBV complaints is no evidence that the phenomenon does not exist, perhaps a truer indication of how gender-sensitised our institutions and personnel are, comes back again to the reception of such complaints. Thus, a woman accuser is frequently portrayed as the archetypal scorned woman: abuse is rewritten not just as consent, but a premeditated transaction of sexual relations in exchange for better grades, a secured promotion, and so on. A situation of abuse becomes inscribed as one of seduction, where the accuser basically changes their tune and cries harassment or rape when the expected gains fail to materialise. Especially with the global backlash to MeToo, society is preoccupied with the ‘false accusation,’ even though there is plenty of evidence that few incidents of SGBV are reported, and fewer still are successfully prosecuted. These misogynist tropes of women and women’s sexuality matter in relation to SGBV in university, because Faculty Boards, investigative committees, Senates, and Councils will be as equally susceptible to them as any citizen or juror in a court of law. They matter in placing the burden of documenting abuse/harassment as it takes place on the victim-survivor, to accumulate evidence that will pass muster before a ‘neutral,’ ‘objective’ observer.

At the end of the day, when appointments to gender committees may be handpicked to not rock the boat, or any university Council may dismiss a proven case of SGBV on a technicality, the strongest policies, the most robust mechanisms and procedures are rendered ineffective, unless those who hold power in everyday dealings with students and persons in subordinate positions at the university also change.

(Nicola Perera teaches English as a second language at the University of Colombo.)

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

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Features

4th Feb. celebrations…with Mirage in the scene

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Mirage: Singing the National Anthem…in the Seychelles (L) / A proud moment for Mirage (R)

There were celebrations everywhere, connected with our 77th Independence Day, and in the Seychelles, too, it was a special happening.

Perhaps, it was also the very first occasion where the group Mirage found themselves in the spotlight, at an Independence Day event, and singing the National Anthem, as well.

It all happened on Tuesday, 4th February, in Silhouette Island, in the Seychelles.

Sri Lankans, plus the locals, joined in the celebrations, which included the hoisting of the National Flag, by the General Manager of the Hilton Seychelles Labriz Resort & Spa, Marc Schumacher, the singing of the National Anthem, and the usual Sri Lankan delicacies, connected with such special occasions.

The National Anthem, led by Mirage, was sung with enthusiasm, and pride, by the crowd present, waving the National Flag.

Hoisting of the National Flag (L) / General Manager of the Hilton Seychelles Labriz Resort & Spa (R)

Mirage also did the Valentine’s Day scene, on 14th February, at the Labriz Lounge.

The group has turned out to be a favourite with the folks in the Seychelles. and the management at the Lo Brizan restaurant and pub, where the group performs six nights a week, is keen for the band to return, in December, for another stint at Lo Brizan.

This is the group’s second visit to the Seychelles and they are now due home on the 19th of this month.

They have already got a big assignment on the cards, in Colombo, where they would be seen in action at ‘Legends of Ceylon,’ scheduled for 19th March, doing the needful for some of the legends in the local music scene – Joey Lewis, Dalrene, Manilal, Gefforey Fernando, Mignonne and Sohan.

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