Midweek Review

Mahatma Gandhi 1869 – 1948

Published

4 years ago

2021/02/3

Oil portrait by Kamalam Krishnadasan in November 1927 when the Mahatma was in the house of her father C.Arumugam in his Colombo Villa, “Ark”. Courtesy: Sri Lanka Tamil Women’s Union

We publish an article written on the day Gandhi was assassinated with a comment on it by Tarzie Vittachchi.

“One evening – January 30, 1948 – everyone seemed to be out. The Chairman of Lake House and the Editor had gone to see the Deputy Editor playing the lead in an amateur dramatic performance of Ibsen’s “Ghosts.” I was told to see the paper to bed. An hour later, the Reuter machine clacked out the message, “Mahatma Gandhi Shot Dead.” The Editor was called. He came in shedding his jacket, and said, “Fetch the Gandhi files and any other material you can lay your hands on.”

The library ‘morgue’ had a thick file on the Mahatma, including obituaries written and stowed away by Amaratunge at every fast Gandhi had undertaken. I read them out to the Editor as he went on tapping his typewriter, seemingly heedlessly and without a pause. “Read out bits you find interesting in the books on Gandhi,” said the Editor, continuing to pound away at the machine. Within an hour he had written his 1500 words. “Now, edit it and give it a decent headline,” he ordered, walking away to supervise the layout on the stone in the case room. The 1500 words were a classic of journalism. Herbert Hulugalle had reeled it out from his mind, using the bits I had read out to give it colour, texture and depth. It was history in a hurry composed by a master of the art of connecting discrete facts with a thread of humane understanding.”

By H. A. J. Hulugalle

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was born in a small harbour-town on the west coast of India, in Kathiawar, called Porbandar, on October 2, 1869. He belonged by birth to the Vaishya, or trading caste. His grandfather and father both held the post of Dewan, or Prime Minister, under the Rajah in the Porbandar State.

Mohandas was the youngest son in a family of four children. His father died when he was 15 years old, and from that date his mother became the greatest influence in his life. Her widowhood was spent in prayer and devotion, and she became noted for the saintliness of her life. Her spiritual teacher was a Jain devotee named Bechar Swami. Among the Jains in India the central doctrine is the “sanctity of all life.” The greatest sin is to destroy life. This doctrine is called “Ahimsa,” which is often translated “Non-Violence,” but has a deeper meaning, implying compassion for all living creatures. Mohandas learnt this teaching from his mother, and it remained paramount with him all through his life.

In 1896 Mohandas Gandhi, as a young barrister, went out to the Transvaal in order to help a client in a legal suit. He signed an agreement to remain there for a year and his practical work as a barrister brought him a large income, and he was able to earn as much as 5,000 pounds a year. When he saw the political and social disabilities to which his fellow-countrymen were exposed, he determined at the end of the year to stay on in South Africa in order to help them in their struggle. Very soon after this he became their recognised leader and adviser. Meanwhile a religious conflict had been taking place within him, which had left him no peace of mind. He wavered for a time, at one period attracted by theosophy, at another by the Christian faith. At last he found complete satisfaction through reading the later works of Count Tolstoy, with whom he later corresponded as a disciple. He related these to his own Hindu scriptures, especially the Bhagavad Gita and to the end of his life he remained a devout Hindu.

Realising that his continued agitation for equality of status in South Africa was met only by the imposition of fresh restrictions upon the Indian Communities, Gandhi concluded that the only hope of amendment lay in a policy of active opposition to the authorities. It was then after about 13 years of more or less constitutional agitation, and following the enactment of a law which he considered an affront to Indian self-respect as well as Indian religion that Gandhi took his first vow of passive resistance.

The upshot of these events was the arrest and imprisonment of Gandhi at Pretoria until a compromise was reached but upon his release he resumed the agitation which led to the great strike of Indian workers in 1913 and the imprisonment of many of their leaders. On representations from Indian and Imperial Government circles the South African authorities at length adopted a more conciliatory attitude, and the Indian Relief Act and other reforms did much to remove the grievances.

These South African experiences and the concomitant issues go far towards explaining Gandhi’s later views and accounting for his deliberate attitude to Western civilization in general and British Imperialism in particular.

In 1914 he returned to India with certain definite convictions already settled in his mind and in accordance with which his whole subsequent policy has been regulated. Without relaxing his efforts to redress the “wrongs” of his countrymen, Gandhi for a number of years believed it was possible for India and Britain to enter into a righteous and honourable partnership, by means of which India would be able to build up her own particular constitution and take her full place in the fellowship of nations within the Empire.

During the world conflict of 1914-18 he was actuated by this belief. He encouraged and assisted the recruitment of Indian troops – thousands of whom served the Allied Cause on various fronts – and he willingly sacrificed his personal interests on behalf of the sick and wounded. He believed, as many others did, that through the tears and blood of those four terrible years a new spirit would be kindled to regenerate the British nation and Empire; and in that new spirit the just claims of India would surely receive generous recognition. Thus, as late as 1918, Gandhi defined “Swaraj” as partnership within the Empire making no secret of his confidence that the nationalist cause would be rapidly furthered by his country’s generous war services.

After the conclusion of hostilities Gandhi’s hopes were completely shattered by Britain’s repeated refusals to recognize what he regarded as her obligations. His disillusionment with the British rule in India was aggravated by what he and his countrymen regarded as irrefutable evidence that the attitude and spirit of the British “Raj” had changed but little. By the very force of circumstances Gandhi felt compelled to abandon all ideas of partnership and to adopt an attitude of hostility to British rule.

The report of the “Sedition Committee” in 1919, and the “Rowlatt Acts,” made clear the Indian Government’s intention to restrict the scope of active political agitation. Also the serious disturbances in the Punjab – culminating in the tragic affairs at Amritsar in April of the same year, when British troops under General Dyer fired upon a helpless and terrified mob, of whom more than 350 were killed and some 1,200 wounded – roused ill-feeling upon both sides.

Gandhi thereupon initiated the great “non-co-operation movement” throughout India, and instituted the vow of “Satyagraha” or passive resistance which pledged his followers to boycott the new constitution drafted by the Government, including the Provincial as well as the Central Legislature; and all the Government Services, even the schools, and – not least in importance – all goods of European origin. They swore to disobey the laws aimed at suppression of the widespread nationalist propaganda carried on by means of Congress resolutions at the same time “following the truth and refraining from violence.”

This stupendous crusade – to which Gandhi devoted himself with relentless energy – was intended to cripple and paralyse the whole British-Indian administration; and India’s salvation was to be arrived at by means of a complete severance from an alien civilization denounced by him as inherently immoral and evil. The campaign involved the renunciation of everything given or offered to India by the Western world, a return to the spinning wheel and the simple life of the East in its primitive peace and purity.

Gandhi had at this time the largest personal following of any leader in the whole world; he won the unequivocal admiration of men of every community in India, even political opponents gladly recognizing his fine personal character.

Gandhi sternly and repeatedly forbade the use of force or any weapon other than that of passive resistance, and his own passions were held in complete subjection even in situations of unusual provocation; but again and again his followers broke out into acts of violence.

In 1922 Gandhi the recognized leader of Indian nationalism, was arrested for sedition and sentenced to six years imprisonment. In February 1924, however, he was released on the ground of ill-health and he stood before the world a pathetically frail little man; yet one whose least word could sway millions even though it should be whispered from a hospital veranda. The great crusade had, of course, wrought irreparable harm upon British trade with India, but from all practical points of view it had to be written down as a failure.

All the world knows how Nationalist India – under Gandhi’s leadership – continued to agitate unceasingly for self-government, and how all the constitutional advances proposed by the Imperial Government were rejected as inadequate. The “Indian National Congress” and its “Working Committee” most of the time declined to co-operate with the British authorities, preferring to follow a policy of open defiance. It was on December 31, 1929, that Congress declared for nothing less than complete independence, and new ideas to this end were set in motion.

In March, 1930, Gandhi set out to begin a fresh “civil disobedience” movement by openly infringing the Salt Laws and advocating the non-payment of certain taxes in addition to the trade boycott. The manufacture and sale of salt being a Government monopoly, this movement was inspired by the twofold idea of flouting British authority and embarrassing the Government by the withholding of revenue. In spite of repeated warnings, and the arrest of his chief lieutenants, he and the Congress carried on undaunted. When at length riots and disorders broke out, and a critical situation arose in the turbulent North-West Provinces, Gandhi was again arrested and interned at Yeravda Goal, Poona in May, 1931.

In January, 1932, a truce between Gandhi and the Viceroy was arrived at in view of the proposed Round Table Conference in London, which it was hoped would produce what the rejected “Simon Report” of the summer of 1930 had failed to provide, namely an acceptable basis of discussion for a new Indian constitution. After some hesitation, Gandhi-along with representatives of every section of Indian opinion – attended the Conference on behalf of Congress; in face of the Nationalist claim for complete “Swaraj” his presence was a welcome step towards conciliation.

On his return from the London Conference, Gandhi received a tumultuous welcome from his followers; but he immediately came into conflict with the authorities. The struggle carried on after the Government of India Act gave India provincial autonomy and a majority of the Provinces came under Congress rule is recent history. Mahatma Gandhi was not directly concerned with the political and administrative work and for a number of years he was not even a member of Congress. When war broke out in 1939, India’s attitude towards the conflict gradually crystallised. Pandit Nehru has described how Congress specifically demanded that India should not be committed to any war without the consent of the people or their representatives and that no Indian troops should be sent for service abroad without such consent.

About the middle of 1939 it became known that Indian troops had been despatched overseas. Immediately there was an outcry at this having been done without any reference to the representative of the people. Steps were also being taken through the British Parliament to amend the Government of India Act of 1935 under which the Provincial Governments were functioning with a view to concentrating all power in the Central Government.

While this tug-of-war was going on in India’s mind and a feeling of desperation was growing, Gandhi wrote a number of articles which suddenly gave a new direction to people’s thoughts and gave shape to their vague ideas. Inaction at that critical stage and submission to all that was happening had become intolerable to him. The only way to meet that situation he said was for Indian freedom to be recognised and for a free India to meet aggression and invasion in co-operation with Allied nations. If this recognition was not forthcoming, then some action must be taken to challenge the existing system and wake up the people from the lethargy that was paralysing them and making them easy prey for every kind of aggression. In a conflict between nationalism and internationalism Gandhi’s new writing created a stir all over India.

In August 1942 the All-India Congress Committee passed the famous Quit India resolution which resulted in the incarceration of all the Congress leaders including Mr. Gandhi. When he was in jail, his wife who had shared with him all the hardships of his political struggle died.

Mr. Gandhi’s part in the negotiations with the Cripps Mission in 1942 has been misrepresented. Behind the scenes he always worked for a settlement with England on honourable terms. He succeeded in most of his aims except the achievement of complete Hindu-Muslim unity which was his life’s aim. He has now made the supreme sacrifice for that cause.

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Midweek Review

Batalanda and complexities of paramilitary operations

Published

1 day ago

2025/03/26

Sahan Weerasooriya

Former President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s recent combative ‘Head-to-Head’ interview with British-American Mehdi Hasan on Al Jazeera has opened a can of worms. As to why Hasan raised the Batalanda Presidential Commission report, during a 49-minute interview conducted at the London’s Conway Hall, with a clearly pro LTTE audience, remains a mystery. This must be yet another notorious way to show how even-handed they are as in the case of its coverage of Russia, China, Palestine or Ukraine for their gullible viewers.

Recorded in February and aired in March 2025, the interview is definitely the most controversial the UNP leader, who is also an Attorney-at-Law, ever faced during his political career; always used to getting kid glove treatment, especially after taking over the party in 1994.

The continuing public discourse on Batalanda should provoke a wider discussion on Sri Lanka’s response to separatist Tamil terrorism, since the cold blooded murder of Jaffna SLFP Mayor Alfred Duriappah, which signalled the beginning of the LTTE terror campaign that ended in May 2009 with the crushing military defeat of the Tigers on the banks of the Nathikadal lagoon, as well as two southern insurgencies in 1971 and 1987-1990.

As Nandana Gunatilleke (one time JVP General Secretary and ex-MP), Dr. Wasantha Bandara (ex-JVPer and close associate of the slain JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera), Indrananda de Silva (ex-JVPer, incumbent Central Committee member of Frontline Socialist Party [FSP] and ex-military photographer) and Uvindu Wijeweera (Rohana Wijeweera’s son and leader of Dewana Parapura) agreed during the recent Hiru ‘Balaya’ discussion, conducted by Madushan de Silva, the Batalanda operation was in line with the overall counter-terrorist/insurgency strategy of the then government.

The issues at hand cannot be discussed at all without taking into consideration the JVP terrorism that, at one-time, almost overwhelmed the UNP’s unbroken rule, since 1977, carried out while openly brushing aside most of the universally accepted genuine parliamentary norms. The country’s second Republican constitution, promulgated by the UNP regime with a 5/6 majority in Parliament, in 1978, had been amended no less than 13 times by the time they were finally ousted in 1995. This was mainly to facilitate their continuous rule. Unfortunately, all stakeholders have sought to take advantage of Batalanda, thereby preventing a proper dialogue. Quite surprisingly, none of the guests, nor the interviewer, bothered, at least, to make a reference to the JVP bid on President J.R. Jayewardene’s life in Parliament on the morning of July 18, 1987. At the time, JVPer Ajith Kumara, working in the House as a minor employee, hurled two hand grenades towards JRJ, with the then Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa seated next to JRJ. While one government MP lost his life, several others suffered injuries, including then National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali, whose spleen had to be removed.

At one point, Gunatilleke declared that they assassinated UNP MP for Tangalle Jinadasa Weerasinghe on July 3, 1987, in response to the government killing well over 100 people, in Colombo, protesting against the signing of the Indo-Lanka accord on July 29, 1987. The parliamentarian was killed near the Barawakumbuka-Welangahawela bridge on the Colombo-Rathnapura-Embilipitiya Road. The UNPer was killed on his way home after having declined Premier Premadasa’s offer to make an SLAF chopper available for him to reach home safely.

Against the backdrop of MP Weerasinghe’s assassination and the grenade attack on the UNP parliamentary group that claimed the life of Keethi Abeywickrema (MP for Deniyaya), the government had no option but to respond likewise. The operation, established at the Batalanda Housing scheme of the State Fertiliser Corporation, constituted part of the counter-insurgency strategy pursued by the UNP.

Those who called Batalanda complex Batalanda torture camp/ wadakagaraya conveniently forgot during the second JVP inspired insurgency, the military had to utilize many public buildings, including schools, as makeshift accommodation for troops. Of course the UNP established Batalanda under different circumstances with the then Industries Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe providing political authority. Batalanda had been an exclusive police operation though the Army had access to it whenever a requirement arose.

Those who had been suddenly withdrawn from the Northern and Eastern Provinces, to meet the rapidly evolving security threat in the South, required accommodation. FSP CC member Indrananada de Silva had received unhindered access to Batalanda in his capacity as a military photographer and the rest is history.

As to why Indrananda de Silva switched his allegiance to the FSP should be examined, taking into consideration his previous role as a trusted military photographer, formerly a Lance Corporal of the Military Police. An influential section of the JVP, led by Kumar Gunaratnam, formed the FSP in April 2012 though it didn’t receive the much anticipated public support. Both Indrananda de Silva and Nandana Gunatilleke, who aligned himself with the UNP, found fault with the JVP-led National People’s Power (NPP) over its handling of the Batalanada issue.

Paramilitary operations

Paramilitary operations had been an integral part of the overall counter-insurgency campaign, directed at the JVP responsible for approximately 6,600 killings. Among those death squads were PRRA primarily drawn from the SLMP (Sri Lanka Mahajana Party) and SRRA (the socialist Revolutionary Red Army). PRRA had close links with the Independent Student Union (ISU) whose leader Daya Pathirana was slain by the JVP. The vast majority of people do not remember that Daya Pathirana, who led the ISU during the turbulent 1985-1986 period, was killed mid-Dec. 1989. The second insurgency hadn’t started at that time though the JVP propagated the lie that they took up arms against the UNP government following the signing of the Indo-Lanka peace accord on July 29, 1987.

In addition to PRRA and SRRA, the government made use of paramilitary groups, namely Kalu balallu, Ukkusso, Rajaliyo, Kaha balallu, Kola koti, Rathu Makaru, Mapila, Gonussa, Nee, Keshara Sinhayo, Le-mappillu and Kalu koti.

The UNP also involved some elements of Indian trained Tamil groups (not of the LTTE) in paramilitary operations. Such operations, that had been backed by respective Cabinet Ministers, were supervised by local law enforcement authorities. Paramilitary operations had been in line with psychological warfare that was meant to cause fear among the JVP, as well as the general population. Military operations that had been combined with paramilitary actions received the blessings of the political leadership at the highest level. In the case of Batalanda (1988-1990) President J.R. Jayewardene and Ranasinghe Premadasa knew of its existence.

Even after the eradication of the top JVP leadership, by Nov. 1989, police, military and paramilitary operations continued unabated. Former JVPers appearing on ‘Balaya’ agreed that counter-insurgency operations were actually brought to an end only after D.B. Wijetunga succeeded President Ranasinghe Premadasa after the latter’s assassination on May Day 1993.

After the LTTE resumed war in June 1990, just a couple of months after the withdrawal of the Indian Army (July 1987-March1990), the UNP authorized paramilitary operations in the northern and eastern areas. Members of TELO, PLOTE, EPRLF as well as EPDP were made part of the overall government security strategy. They operated in large groups. Some paramilitary units were deployed in the Jaffna islands as well. And these groups were represented in Parliament. They enjoyed privileged status not only in the northern and eastern regions but Colombo as well. The government allowed them to carry weapons in the city and its suburbs.

These groups operated armed units in Colombo. The writer had the opportunity to visit EPDP and PLOTE safe houses in Colombo and its suburbs soon after they reached an understanding with President Ranasinghe Premadasa. Overnight at the behest of President Premadasa, the Election Department granted these Tamil groups political recognition. In other words, armed groups were made political parties. The Premadasa government accepted their right to carry weapons while being represented in Parliament.

It would be pertinent to mention that thousands of Tamil paramilitary personnel served the government during that period. There had been many confrontations between them and the LTTE over the years and the latter sought to eliminate key paramilitary personnel. Let me remind you of the circumstances, the EPRLF’s number 02 Thambirajah Subathiran alias Robert was sniped to death in June 2003. Robert was engaged in routine morning exercises on the top floor of the two-storeyed EPRLF office, on the hospital road, Jaffna, when an LTTE sniper took him out from the nearby Vembadi Girls’ high school. The operation of the Norway managed Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) made no difference as the LTTE removed Robert who led the party here in the absence of leader Varatharaja Perumal, the first and the only Chief Minister of the North-Eastern Province.

In terms of the CFA that had been signed by Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe and LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, in Feb. 2002, the government agreed to disarm all paramilitary personnel. Many wouldn’t remember now that during Premadasa’s honeymoon with the LTTE, the Army facilitated the LTTE onslaught on paramilitary groups in selected areas.

Muthaliff’s role

During the ‘Balaya’ discussion, the contentious issue of who shot JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera came up. Nandana Gunatilleke, who contested the 1999 Dec. presidential election. as the JVP candidate, pointing to an article carried in the party organ that dealt with Wijeweera’s assassination said that he wrongly named Gaffoor as one of the persons who shot their leader whereas the actual shooter was Muthaliff. The headline named Thoradeniya and Gaffoor as the perpetrators.

Declaring that he personally wrote that article on the basis of information provided by Indrananda de Silva, Gunatilleke named Asoka Thoradeniya and Tuan Nizam Muthaliff of the Army as the perpetrators of the crime. Thoradeniya served as Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in the Maldives during the Yahapalana administration, while Muthaliff was killed by the LTTE in Colombo in late May 2005. The shooting took place at Polhengoda junction, Narahenpita. Muthaliff was on his way from Manning town, Narahenpita, to the Kotelawala Defence University.

The programme was told that the JVP had over the years developed close relationship with Thoradeniya while Indrananda de Silva accused Dr. Wasantha Bandara of duplicity regarding Muthaliff. How could you recognize Muthaliff, slain by the LTTE, as a war hero as he was actually one of the persons who shot Rohana Wijeweera, the latter asked.

At the time of his assassination, Muthaliff served as the Commanding Officer, 1 st Regiment Sri Lanka Military Intelligence Corps. The then parliamentarian Wimal Weerawansa was among those who paid last respects to Maj. Muthaliff.

At the time of Rohana Wijeweera’s arrest, Muthaliff served as Lieutenant while Thoradeniya was a Major. Indrananda de Silva strongly stressed that atrocities perpetrated by the police and military in the South or in the northern and eastern regions must be dealt with regardless of whom they were conducting operations against. The former JVPer recalled the Army massacre in the east in retaliation for the landmine blast that claimed the lives of Northern Commander Maj. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa and a group of senior officers, including Brigadier Wijaya Wimalaratne, in early Aug. 1990 in Kayts.

Dr. Wasantha Bandara warned of the Western powers taking advantage of what he called false narrative to push for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

It would be pertinent to mention that the LTTE also used the underworld as well as some corrupt Army personnel in planning high profile assassinations. Investigations into the assassination of Muthaliff, as well as Maj. Gen. Parami Kulatunga, killed in a suicide attack at Pannipitiya, in June 2006, revealed the direct involvement of military personnel with the LTTE.

Indrananda de Silva disclosed that soon after Anura Kumara Dissanayake won the presidential election last September, the FSP, in writing, requested the JVP leader to inquire into killings during that period, including that of Rohana Wijeweera. The FSPer alleged that President Dissanayake refrained from even acknowledging their letter. Indrananda de Silva emphasized that Al Jazeera never disclosed anything new as regards Batalanda as he exposed the truth years ago. The former JVPer ridiculed the ruling party tabling the Batalanda Commission report in the wake of Wickremesinghe’s Al Jazeera interview whereas the matter was in the public domain for quite some time.

Indrananda de Silva and Nandana Gunatilleke exchanged words over the latter’s declaration that the JVP, too, was subjected to investigation for violence unleashed during the 1987-1990 period. While the FSPer repeatedly declared that those who carried out directives issued by the party were arrested and in some cases killed, Nandana Gunatilleke took up the position that the party should be held accountable for crimes perpetrated during that period.

The interviewer posed Nandana Gunatilleke the question whether he was betraying his former comrades after joining the UNP. Nandana Gunatilleke shot back that he joined the UNP in 2015 whereas the JVP joined UNP as far back as 2009 to promote retired Army Chef Sarath Fonseka’s presidential ambition even though he wiped out the JVP presence in Trincomalee region during the second insurgency.

JVP’s accountability

Nandana Gunatilleke is adamant that the party should accept responsibility for the killings carried out at that time. The former JVPer declared that Vijaya Kumaratunga (Feb. 16, 1988), first Vice Chancellor of the Colombo University (March 08, 1989) Dr. Stanley Wijesundera, Ven. Kotikawatte Saddhatissa thera (Aug. 03, 1988) and Chairperson of the State Pharmaceutical Corporation Gladys Jayewardene (Sept. 12, 1989) were among those assassinated by the JVP. SPC Chairperson was killed for importing medicine from India, the former Marxist aligned with the UNP said, while actor-turned-politician Kumaratunga’s assassination was attributed to his dealings with President J.R. Jayewardene.

According to Nandana Gunatilleke, except for a few killings such as General Secretaries of the UNP Harsha Abeywickrema (Dec 23, 1987) and Nandalal Fernando (May 20, 1988), the vast majority of others were ordinary people like grama sevakas killed on mere accusation of being informants. The deaths were ordered on the basis of hearsay, Nandana Gunatilleke said, much to the embarrassment of others who represented the interest of the JVP at that time.

One quite extraordinary moment during the ‘Balaya’ programme was when Nandana Gunatilleke revealed their (JVP’s) direct contact with the Indian High Commission at a time the JVP publicly took an extremely anti-Indian stance. In fact, the JVP propagated a strong anti-Indian line during the insurgency. Turning towards Dr. Wasantha Bandara, Gunatilleke disclosed that both of them had been part of the dialogue with the Indian High Commission.

It reminds me of the late Somawansa Amarasinghe’s first public address delivered at a JVP rally in late Nov. 2001 after returning home from 12 years of self-imposed exile. Of the top JVP leadership, Somawansa Amarasinghe, who had been married to a close relative of powerful UNP Minister Sirisena Cooray, was the only one to survive combined police/military/paramilitary operations.

Amarasinghe didn’t mince his words when he declared at a Kalutara rally that his life was saved by Indian Premier V.P. Singh. Soft spoken Amarasinghe profusely thanked India for saving his life. Unfortunately, those who discuss issues at hand conveniently forget crucial information in the public domain. Such lapses can be both deliberate and due to negligence.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Midweek Review

Independent Monitor

Published

1 day ago

2025/03/26

Sahan Weerasooriya

You may think sloth comes very easy,

To your kingly monitor of the shrinking marsh,

As he lies basking smugly in the morn sun,

But he is organized and alert all the while,

As he awaits his prey with patience infinite,

Free of malice, a professional of a kind,

His cumbrous body not slowing his sprite….

But note, he’s no conspirator spitting guile,

And doesn’t turn nasty unless crossed,

Nor by vengeful plans is he constantly dogged,

Unlike those animals of a more rational kind,

Whose ways have left behind a state so sorry.

By Lynn Ockersz

Midweek Review

Rajiva on Batalanda controversy, govt.’s failure in Geneva and other matters

Published

1 week ago

2025/03/19

Sahan Weerasooriya

Wickremesinghe responds to Hasan during the controversial interview recorded in London

Former President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s recent interview with Mehdi Hasan on Al Jazeera’s ‘Head-to-Head’ series has caused controversy, both in and outside Parliament, over the role played by Wickremesinghe in the counter-insurgency campaign in the late’80s.

The National People’s Power (NPP) seeking to exploit the developing story to its advantage has ended up with egg on its face as the ruling party couldn’t disassociate from the violent past of the JVP. The debate on the damning Presidential Commission report on Batalanda, on April 10, will remind the country of the atrocities perpetrated not only by the UNP, but as well as by the JVP.

The Island sought the views of former outspoken parliamentarian and one-time head of the Government Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha on a range of issues, with the focus on Batalanda and the failure on the part of the war-winning country to counter unsubstantiated war crimes accusations.

The former President and UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe’s interview with Al Jazeera exposed the pathetic failure on the part of Sri Lanka to address war crimes accusations and accountability issues. In the face of aggressive interviewer Mehdi Hasan on ‘Head-to-Head,’ Wickremesinghe struggled pathetically to counter unsubstantiated accusations. Six-time Premier Wickremesinghe who also served as President (July 2022-Sept. 2024) seemed incapable of defending the war-winning armed forces. However, the situation wouldn’t have deteriorated to such an extent if President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who gave resolute political leadership during that war, ensured a proper defence of our armed forces in its aftermath as well-choreographed LTTE supporters were well in place, with Western backing, to distort and tarnish that victory completely. As wartime Secretary General of the Government’s Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (since June 2007 till the successful conclusion of the war) and Secretary to the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights (since Jun 2008) what do you think of Wickremesinghe’s performance?

It made him look very foolish, but this is not surprising since he has no proper answers for most of the questions put to him. Least surprising was his performance with regard to the forces, since for years he was part of the assault forces on the successful Army, and expecting him to defend them is like asking a fox to stand guard on chickens.

In spite of trying to overwhelm Wickremesinghe before a definitely pro-LTTE audience at London’s Conway Hall, Hasan further exposed the hatchet job he was doing by never referring to the fact that the UNP leader, in his capacity as the Yahapalana Premier, co-sponsored the treacherous Geneva Resolution in Oc., 2015, against one’s own victorious armed forces. Hasan, Wickremesinghe and three panelists, namely Frances Harrison, former BBC-Sri Lanka correspondent, Director of International Truth and Justice Project and author of ‘Still Counting the Dead: Survivors of Sri Lanka’s Hidden War,’ Dr. Madura Rasaratnam, Executive Director of PEARL (People for Equality and Relief in Lanka) and former UK and EU MP and Wickremesinghe’s presidential envoy, Niranjan Joseph de Silva Deva Aditya, never even once referred to India’s accountability during the programme recorded in late February but released in March. As a UPFA MP (2010-2015) in addition to have served as Peace Secretariat Chief and Secretary to the Disaster Management and Human Rights Ministry, could we discuss the issues at hand leaving India out?

I would not call the interview a hatchet job since Hasan was basically concerned about Wickremesinghe’s woeful record with regard to human rights. In raising his despicable conduct under Jayewardene, Hasan clearly saw continuity, and Wickremesinghe laid himself open to this in that he nailed his colours to the Rajapaksa mast in order to become President, thus making it impossible for him to revert to his previous stance. Sadly, given how incompetent both Wickremesinghe and Rajapaksa were about defending the forces, one cannot expect foreigners to distinguish between them.

You are one of the many UPFA MPs who backed Maithripala Sirisena’s candidature at the 2015 presidential election. The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe duo perpetrated the despicable act of backing the Geneva Resolution against our armed forces and they should be held responsible for that. Having thrown your weight behind the campaign to defeat Mahinda Rajapaksa’s bid to secure a third term, did you feel betrayed by the Geneva Resolution? And if so, what should have the Yahapalana administration done?

By 2014, given the total failure of the Rajapaksas to deal firmly with critiques of our forces, resolutions against us had started and were getting stronger every year. Mahinda Rajapaksa laid us open by sacking Dayan Jayatilleke who had built up a large majority to support our victory against the Tigers, and appointed someone who intrigued with the Americans. He failed to fulfil his commitments with regard to reforms and reconciliation, and allowed for wholesale plundering, so that I have no regrets about working against him at the 2015 election. But I did not expect Wickremesinghe and his cohorts to plunder, too, and ignore the Sirisena manifesto, which is why I parted company with the Yahapalanaya administration, within a couple of months.

I had expected a Sirisena administration to pursue some of the policies associated with the SLFP, but he was a fool and his mentor Chandrika was concerned only with revenge on the Rajapaksas. You cannot talk about betrayal when there was no faith in the first place. But I also blame the Rajapaksas for messing up the August election by attacking Sirisena and driving him further into Ranil’s arms, so that he was a pawn in his hands.

Have you advised President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government how to counter unsubstantiated war crimes allegations propagated by various interested parties, particularly the UN, on the basis of the Panel of Experts (PoE) report released in March 2011? Did the government accept your suggestions/recommendations?

Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha

I kept trying, but Mahinda was not interested at all, and had no idea about how to conduct international relations. Sadly, his Foreign Minister was hanging around behind Namal, and proved incapable of independent thought, in his anxiety to gain further promotion. And given that I was about the only person the international community, that was not prejudiced, took seriously – I refer to the ICRC and the Japanese with whom I continued to work, and, indeed, the Americans, until the Ambassador was bullied by her doctrinaire political affairs officer into active undermining of the Rajapaksas – there was much jealousy, so I was shut out from any influence.

But even the admirable effort, headed by Godfrey Gunatilleke, was not properly used. Mahinda Rajapaksa seemed to me more concerned with providing joy rides for people rather than serious counter measures, and representation in Geneva turned into a joke, with him even undermining Tamara Kunanayagam, who, when he supported her, scored a significant victory against the Americans, in September 2011. The Ambassador, who had been intriguing with her predecessor, then told her they would get us in March, and with a little help from their friends here, they succeeded.

As the writer pointed out in his comment on Wickremesinghe’s controversial Al Jazeera interview, the former Commander-in-Chief failed to mention critically important matters that could have countered Hasan’ s line of questioning meant to humiliate Sri Lanka?

How could you have expected that, since his primary concern has always been himself, not the country, let alone the armed forces?

Do you agree that Western powers and an influential section of the international media cannot stomach Sri Lanka’s triumph over separatist Tamil terrorism?

There was opposition to our victory from the start, but this was strengthened by the failure to move on reconciliation, creating the impression that the victory against the Tigers was seen by the government as a victory against Tamils. The failure of the Foreign Ministry to work with journalists was lamentable, and the few exceptions – for instance the admirable Vadivel Krishnamoorthy in Chennai or Sashikala Premawardhane in Canberra – received no support at all from the Ministry establishment.

A couple of months after the 2019 presidential election, Gotabaya Rajapaksa declared his intention to withdraw from the Geneva process. On behalf of Sri Lanka that announcement was made in Geneva by the then Foreign Minister Dinesh Gunawardena, who became the Premier during Wickremesinghe’s tenure as the President. That declaration was meant to hoodwink the Sinhala community and didn’t alter the Geneva process and even today the project is continuing. As a person who had been closely involved in the overall government response to terrorism and related matters, how do you view the measures taken during Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s short presidency to counter Geneva?

What measures? I am reminded of the idiocy of the responses to the Darusman report by Basil and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who went on ego trips and produced unreadable volumes trying to get credit for themselves as to issues of little interest to the world. They were planned in response to Darusman, but when I told Gotabaya that his effort was just a narrative of action, he said that responding to Darusman was not his intention. When I said that was necessary, he told me he had asked Chief-of-Staff Roshan Goonetilleke to do that, but Roshan said he had not been asked and had not been given any resources.

My own two short booklets which took the Darusman allegations to pieces were completely ignored by the Foreign Ministry.

Against the backdrop of the Geneva betrayal in 2015 that involved the late Minister Mangala Samaraweera, how do you view President Wickremesinghe’s response to the Geneva threat?

A: Wickremesinghe did not see Geneva as a threat at all. Who exactly is to blame for the hardening of the resolution, after our Ambassador’s efforts to moderate it, will require a straightforward narrative from the Ambassador, Ravinatha Ariyasinha, who felt badly let down by his superiors. Geneva should not be seen as a threat, since as we have seen follow through is minimal, but we should rather see it as an opportunity to put our own house in order.

President Anura Kumara Dissanayake recently questioned both the loyalty and professionalism of our armed forces credited with defeating Northern and Southern terrorism. There hadn’t been a previous occasion, a President or a Premier, under any circumstances, questioned the armed forces’ loyalty or professionalism. We cannot also forget the fact that President Dissanayake is the leader of the once proscribed JVP responsible for death and destruction during 1971 and 1987-1990 terror campaigns. Let us know of your opinion on President Dissanayake’s contentious comments on the armed forces?

A: I do not see them as contentious, I think what is seen as generalizations was critiques of elements in the forces. There have been problems, as we saw from the very different approach of Sarath Fonseka and Daya Ratnayake, with regard to civilian casualties, the latter having planned a campaign in the East which led to hardly any civilian deaths. But having monitored every day, while I headed the Peace Secretariat, all allegations, and obtained explanations of what happened from the forces, I could have proved that they were more disciplined than other forces in similar circumstances.

The violence of the JVP and the LTTE and other such groups was met with violence, but the forces observed some rules which I believe the police, much more ruthlessly politicized by Jayewardene, failed to do. The difference in behaviour between the squads led for instance by Gamini Hettiarachchi and Ronnie Goonesinghe makes this clear.

Mehdi Hasan also strenuously questioned Wickremesinghe on his role in the UNP’s counter-terror campaign during the 1987-1990 period. The British-American journalists of Indian origins attacked Wickremesinghe over the Batalanda Commission report that had dealt with extra-judicial operations carried out by police, acting on the political leadership given by Wickremesinghe. What is your position?

Wickremesinghe’s use of thugs’ right through his political career is well known. I still recall my disappointment, having thought better of him, when a senior member of the UNP, who disapproved thoroughly of what Jayewardene had done to his party, told me that Wickremesinghe was not honest because he used thugs. In ‘My Fair Lady,’ the heroine talks about someone to whom gin was mother’s milk, and for Wickremesinghe violence is mother’s milk, as can be seen by the horrors he associated with.

The latest revelations about Deshabandu Tennakoon, whom he appointed IGP despite his record, makes clear his approval for extra-judicial operations.

Finally, will you explain how to counter war crimes accusations as well as allegations with regard to the counter-terror campaign in the’80s?

I do not think it is possible to counter allegations about the counter-terror campaign of the eighties, since many of those allegations, starting with the Welikada Prison massacre, which Wickremesinghe’s father admitted to me the government had engendered, are quite accurate. And I should stress that the worst excesses, such as the torture and murder of Wijeyedasa Liyanaarachchi, happened under Jayewardene, since there is a tendency amongst the elite to blame Premadasa. He, to give him his due, was genuine about a ceasefire, which the JVP ignored, foolishly in my view though they may have had doubts about Ranjan Wijeratne’s bona fides.

With regard to war crimes accusations, I have shown how, in my ‘Hard Talk’ interview, which you failed to mention in describing Wickeremesinghe’s failure to respond coherently to Hasan. The speeches Dayan Jayatilleke and I made in Geneva make clear what needed and still needs to be done, but clear sighted arguments based on a moral perspective that is more focused than the meanderings, and the frequent hypocrisy, of critics will not now be easy for the country to furnish.

By Shamindra Ferdinando