Features
Inherent inadequacies
Excerpted from the autobiography of Merrill J. Fernando
One of the glaring weaknesses in both the above Boards (Tea Board, Tea Propaganda Board etc.) was the Board members were mainly ex-officio, representing the Chamber Commerce, CTTA, TRI, and the smallholders. None of these people possessed a coherent concept of the tea trade, be it in marketing, branding, or advertising. As a result, the administration of the Secretariat was able to do exactly as it pleased.
The only exception to this distressing generality was Victor Santiapillai, who was then the Director of the Export Development Board (EDB), having relinquished his position as Director, International Trade Centre, Geneva, at the invitation of Dr. Sivali Ratwatte, then Chairman of the EDB, in order to serve the EDB for a three-year period. Santiapillai understood and supported many of the reforms I proposed, but implementation was stifled by the bureaucrats of the SLTB (Sri Lanka Tea Board).
When the Sri Lanka Tea Board Act was prepared, I was requested by the then Minister of Plantations, Dr. Colvin R. de Silva, and his Ministry Secretary, Doric de Souza, to go through the draft of the Act, in discussion with Dr. Jayantha Kelegama, Director of Commerce, and to submit my views. The Minister instructed Dr. Kelegama to incorporate in the Act any proposal I submitted, which he considered worthwhile, without, of course, attributing them to me.
I first met Dr. Kelegama at the Ceylinco Akase Kade and over three meetings thereafter, provided him with many issues to consider. One of my proposals was that ex-officio appointments to such boards, nominated by the Chamber mostly, should not be permitted and that the Minister should have the sole authority, to appoint people with the requisite experience and knowledge. Though this suggestion was accepted and incorporated in the constitution of the SLTB, the Government fell soon afterwards, and the proposals were not implemented.
The Director General of the Tea Board at that time was Dr. R. L. de Silva, from the Tea Research Institute, undoubtedly a competent tea scientist but on account of his ignorance of the important aspects of the international tea trade, a misfit as DG of the Tea Board. The key members of his team, such as Lalith Agalawatte and Sambasivam, were not impressive either.
Conspiracies within
Lalith Agalawatte was, initially, an Assistant Commissioner at the London Tea Centre on Regent Street. Notwithstanding his modest title, I got the clear impression that he wielded a great deal of influence, not only in the centre but at the Tea Board Colombo office as well. He seemed to be well in with TGA Advertising, the France-based agency working for the Ceylon Tea Centre in London, for promotional activities of the Tea Board in Europe.
The ‘The 1868’ project was proposed by the London Tea Centre, to develop a Pure Ceylon Tea bag in France. I participated in this project by supplying the finished product, but with no financial involvement in the project itself. The owners of TGA were introduced to me and on a subsequent visit to Sri Lanka, I advised them on an appropriate blend and, through Printcare, developed high quality packaging for the product. I also advised Agalawatte, in good faith, that this project would eventually fail as a promotional initiative for Ceylon Tea, as, if the brand were to succeed, it would become one more foreign label to compete against genuine Ceylon Tea brands.
Shortly thereafter, a TGA representative arrived in Sri Lanka without my knowledge. I was not surprised when I discovered that Agalawatte, who had by then been transferred to Sri Lanka and appointed to the position of Assistant Director of the CTPB, had invited the TGA representative to Sri Lanka to meet another exporter, who would supply the tea cheaper! We did not receive any more orders. The project was eventually abandoned after 30 tonnes of tea had been exported, with the London Centre spending around Sterling Pounds 150,000 in promotional expenses.
Another instance of this individual’s duplicity was when he obtained my support to pack a brand of tea for a Sri Lanka businessman operating in Japan, whose substantive business interests lay elsewhere. The tea was shipped to Australia. At the same time, I participated in a TV tea commercial at a Commonwealth event in Melbourne, in which, prior to the event, I was made to understand that Dilmah tea was to be featured. When the event got going I discovered that Agalawatte had engineered for the brand supported by him, to be featured at the launch, instead of Dilmah.
Prior to this incident he manipulated to withhold a sum of USD 119,00 approved by the Tea Board as its contribution to the advertising and promotional costs of Dilmah, in Australia. Despite verbal assurances given to me by Agalawatte, that the funding disbursement request had been presented to the Chairman for approval, when I contacted Oliver Fernando, then Chairman of the Tea Board, I found that the request had not been submitted to him.
Ironically, this man, who for some time had been currying favour with the then Minister of Plantations, Major Montague Jayawickrema, was able to persuade the Minister to appoint him as the Head of the newly-opened Ceylon Tea Centre in New York. When the proposal to open the centre came up for discussion, I opposed it vehemently, but in the vote that the Minister called from the chair, mine was the only dissenting voice. The proposal was approved and I was so distressed that I refused to speak to the Minister for the next three months.
Agalawatte spent two years in New York, incurring huge expenditure to no purpose, and when there was a call to investigate his activities, the Secretariat sent Agalawatte’s equally-wily colleague, Sambasivam, as the investigator. He returned with the verdict that Agalawatte was doing a fine job and that he was in the process of negotiating a contract with McDonalds for the supply of tea. I cautioned the Board, that it must be a blatant lie as McDonalds would not entertain offshore suppliers for the US. Predictably, that contract never saw the light of day and, soon afterwards, Agalawatte obtained his Green Card and disappeared in the US!
Costly white elephants
In one instance, I proposed that the Ceylon Tea Centres around the world (UK -London and Manchester – Denmark, Italy and so on) be closed down, as they served no useful purpose. As Tony Peries has observed pithily in his writing, the “… UK centre did minimal service to the cause of Ceylon Tea but was better known as a good lunchtime curry house…” (a very accurate evaluation of the contribution that the UK centre made, to the furtherance of the cause of Ceylon Tea!).
My proposal was accepted and the decision was made to close down these centres. However, one year later, when the renewal of the leases on the centre in Japan came up for review, the Board was compelled to renew it on the grounds that there had been a delay in conveying the decision to close down! That centre in particular had been spectacularly unsuccessful in the promotion of Ceylon Tea, with Japanese consumption of coffee increasing in the previous decade by about 400%, whilst tea consumption remained static.
Our overseas Tea Centres had been established during a period when the UK, Australia, and New Zealand consumption of tea was almost 100% Ceylon Tea. Therefore, those centres performed a largely public relations function in a market basically saturated with Ceylon Tea, in which promotion was not a requirement. Ironically, despite the presence of the Tea Centres in those countries, Ceylon Tea gradually lost almost total market share!
The Head of the Ceylon Tea Centre in Regent Street, London was Ernest Jesudasan, a British national, with minimal links to Ceylon; a nice, well-meaning gentleman with, in my view, little practical knowledge of tea or tea marketing, despite having served earlier as Director of the CTPB. The Head of the Ceylon Tea Propaganda Board then was Clarence Cooray, who, owing to the lack of Ceylonese with sound overseas tea marketing knowledge, was entirely dependent on British tea interests in Ceylon for advice on the promotion of the cause of Ceylon Tea!
The Sri Lanka Tea Board had more teeth than the CTPB, but it was equally impotent in the promotion of Sri Lankan interests via trademarks. However, after intense lobbying by the trade, the Sri Lankan Government of the day was made aware of the need for establishing Sri Lankan-owned brands and, in August 1980, appointed an Advisory Committee on the promotion and marketing of Ceylon Tea.
The remit of the Advisory Committee, appointed under the guidance of the then Minister, Major Jayawickrema, was, briefly, “to review and report on the existing strategies for marketing of Ceylon Tea and to recommend a comprehensive package of proposals to ensure the effective development of Ceylon Tea in the international market”.
This group comprised I. O. K. G. Fernando (Chairman, SLTB), C. Chanmugam (Deputy Secretary, Treasury), W. L. P. de Mel (Secretary, Ministry of Trade and Shipping), G. Cumaranatunga (Add. Sec., Ministry of Trade and Shipping), the writer (then Managing Director, M.J.F. Exports), V. Santiapillai (Chairman, EDB), and Dr. R. L. de Silva (Director-General, SLTB). The committee co-opted S. Nanayakkara (Director, Commerce), S. Kulatunga (Director-General, EDB), T. Sambasivam (Dep. Director, SLTB), and L. Agalawatte (Actg. Director, SLTB).
At that time the Tea Promotion Bureau, the division of the SLTB responsible for promotion, operated offices in London, Cairo, Dubai, Sydney, Tokyo, Auckland, and Johannesburg. In addition, some of these centres also operated restaurants or catering services, as ancillaries to the promotional work. The committee recommendation was that these catering services should be phased out, subject to the terms of the respective leases.
The committee also made wide-ranging recommendations in regard to State promotional support for Ceylon Tea in the world market (subject to minimum quality standards and conformity of the product), with highest priority given to tea packed and bagged in Sri Lanka and, secondly, to Pure Ceylon Tea packed overseas in Joint Venture operations.
The proposals also covered issues of generic promotion, government incentives for processing and export marketing of value-added tea, fixing of export duties for tea bags and packets, duty rebates on imported packaging materials, concessionary export duties for packeted tea within specified weight ranges, rebates for tea bag exporters to encourage that aspect of the trade, maintenance of minimum quality standards of product, and the use of symbols for promotional work. The use of the Lion logo was discussed exhaustively.
Futile exercises, the Lion logo controversy
One of the most contentious issues before the tea trade then was the use of the Lion logo. The Secretariat was relentless in its efforts to mandate the use of the Lion logo on all tea packets intended for export, on the premise that the Lion symbol identified Ceylon, the origin, only. I completely opposed this notion, instead taking up the position, that the Lion symbol should represent only good quality Ceylon Tea, and not be symbolic of any and every tea originating from Ceylon, irrespective of quality.
Here too, as (Tony) Peries has observed in his writing, “…the major packers were in the excellent position of benefiting from tea (not Ceylon) advertising, at no cost to themselves…, through our promotion under the ‘Lion’ logo”.
Theoretically, the launching of the ‘Lion’ logo was a masterful marketing strategy. It would have been the eloquent voice of the cause of quality Pure Ceylon Tea, had the pack bearing the logo consisted of the genuine product. However, the reality of the marketplace was quite different.
There was absolutely no reliable method to determine the proportion of genuine Ceylon Tea in a pack carrying the Lion logo. It could be either as high as 90%, or as low as 10%. Therefore, irrespective of the Ceylon Tea content, Lion logo packs prospered from the identification with Ceylon Tea. At one point, there were as many as 355 brands carrying the Lion logo, though Ceylon Tea imports to the UK had dwindled rapidly.
Whilst the diminishing UK imports of Ceylon Tea over the years reflected the ineffectiveness of the Lion logo campaign, absolutely no action had been taken to change the strategy, nor was there any indication, that this serious market erosion was receiving any attention from the SLTPB. Had the Lion logo been leveraged judiciously to promote the interests of Pure Ceylon Tea, the British market would probably still represent the highest consumption of Ceylon Tea in the world, as it did in the days of Thomas Lipton!
Though it had been developed and sustained at considerable expense, the Lion logo was not associated with a genuine quality standard. As a result of a combination of unfavourable and conflicting factors, the development and promotional strategy purported to be the saviour of Ceylon Tea, eventually became its nemesis, because of the indiscriminate use of the logo. The committee recommendation was that. gradually, the Lion logo should be phased out.
Features
Meet the women protecting India’s snow leopards
In one of India’s coldest and most remote regions, a group of women have taken on an unlikely role: protecting one of Asia’s most elusive predators, the snow leopard.
Snow leopards are found in just 12 countries across Central and South Asia. India is home to one of the world’s largest populations, with a nationwide survey in 2023 – the first comprehensive count ever carried out in the country – estimating more than 700 animals, .
One of the places they roam is around Kibber village in Himachal Pradesh state’s Spiti Valley, a stark, high-altitude cold desert along the Himalayan belt. Here, snow leopards are often called the “ghosts of the mountains”, slipping silently across rocky slopes and rarely revealing themselves.
For generations, the animals were seen largely as a threat, for attacking livestock. But attitudes in Kibber and neighbouring villages are beginning to shift, as people increasingly recognise the snow leopard’s role as a top predator in the food chain and its importance in maintaining the region’s fragile mountain ecosystem.
Nearly a dozen local women are now working alongside the Himachal Pradesh forest department and conservationists to track and protect the species, playing a growing role in conservation efforts.
Locally, the snow leopard is known as Shen and the women call their group “Shenmo”. Trained to install and monitor camera traps, they handle devices fitted with unique IDs and memory cards that automatically photograph snow leopards as they pass.
“Earlier, men used to go and install the cameras and we kept wondering why couldn’t we do it too,” says Lobzang Yangchen, a local coordinator working with a small group supported by the non-profit Nature Conservation Foundation (NCF) in collaboration with the forest department.
Yangchen was among the women who helped collect data for Himachal Pradesh’s snow leopard survey in 2024, which found that the state was home to 83 snow leopards – up from 51 in 2021.

The survey documented snow leopards and 43 other species using camera traps spread across an area of nearly 26,000sq km (10,000sq miles). Individual leopards were identified by the unique rosette patterns on their fur, a standard technique used for spotted big cats. The findings are now feeding into wider conservation and habitat-management plans.
“Their contribution was critical to identifying individual animals,” says Goldy Chhabra, deputy conservator of forests with the Spiti Wildlife Division.
Collecting the data is demanding work. Most of it takes place in winter, when heavy snowfall pushes snow leopards and their prey to lower altitudes, making their routes easier to track.
On survey days, the women wake up early, finish household chores and gather at a base camp before travelling by vehicle as far as the terrain allows. From there, they trek several kilometres to reach camera sites, often at altitudes above 14,000ft (4,300m), where the thin air makes even simple movement exhausting.
The BBC accompanied the group on one such trek in December. After hours of walking in biting cold, the women suddenly stopped on a narrow trail.
Yangchen points to pugmarks in the dust: “This shows the snow leopard has been here recently. These pugmarks are fresh.”

Along with pugmarks, the team looks for other signs, including scrapes and scent‑marking spots, before carefully fixing a camera to a rock along the trail.
One woman then carries out a “walk test”, crawling along the path to check whether the camera’s height and angle will capture a clear image.
The group then moves on to older sites, retrieving memory cards and replacing batteries installed weeks earlier.
By mid-afternoon, they return to camp to log and analyse the images using specialised software – tools many had never encountered before.
“I studied only until grade five,” says Chhering Lanzom. “At first, I was scared to use the computer. But slowly, we learned how to use the keyboard and mouse.”
The women joined the camera-trapping programme in 2023. Initially, conservation was not their motivation. But winters in the Spiti Valley are long and quiet, with little agricultural work to fall back on.
“At first, this work on snow leopards didn’t interest us,” Lobzang says. “We joined because we were curious and we could earn a small income.”
The women earn between 500 ($5.46; £4) and 700 rupees a day.
But beyond the money, the work has helped transform how the community views the animal.

“Earlier, we thought the snow leopard was our enemy,” says Dolma Zangmo, a local resident. “Now we think their conservation is important.”
Alongside survey work, the women help villagers access government insurance schemes for their livestock and promote the use of predator‑proof corrals – stone or mesh enclosures that protect animals at night.
Their efforts come at a time of growing recognition for the region. Spiti Valley has recently been included in the Cold Desert Biosphere Reserve, a Unesco-recognised network aimed at conserving fragile ecosystems while supporting local livelihoods.
As climate change reshapes the fragile trans-Himalayan landscape, conservationists say such community participation will be crucial to safeguarding species like the snow leopard.
“Once communities are involved, conservation becomes more sustainable,” says Deepshikha Sharma, programme manager with NCF’s High Altitudes initiative.
“These women are not just assisting, they are becoming practitioners of wildlife conservation and monitoring,” she adds.
As for the women, their work makes them feel closer to their home, the village and the mountains that raised them, they say.
“We were born here, this is all we know,” Lobzang says. “Sometimes we feel afraid because these snow leopards are after all predatory animals, but this is where we belong.”
[BBC]
Features
Freedom for giants: What Udawalawe really tells about human–elephant conflict
If elephants are truly to be given “freedom” in Udawalawe, the solution is not simply to open gates or redraw park boundaries. The map itself tells the real story — a story of shrinking habitats, broken corridors, and more than a decade of silent but relentless ecological destruction.
“Look at Udawalawe today and compare it with satellite maps from ten years ago,” says Sameera Weerathunga, one of Sri Lanka’s most consistent and vocal elephant conservation activists. “You don’t need complicated science. You can literally see what we have done to them.”
What we commonly describe as the human–elephant conflict (HEC) is, in reality, a land-use conflict driven by development policies that ignore ecological realities. Elephants are not invading villages; villages, farms, highways and megaprojects have steadily invaded elephant landscapes.
Udawalawe: From Landscape to Island
Udawalawe National Park was once part of a vast ecological network connecting the southern dry zone to the central highlands and eastern forests. Elephants moved freely between Udawalawe, Lunugamvehera, Bundala, Gal Oya and even parts of the Walawe river basin, following seasonal water and food availability.
Today, Udawalawe appears on the map as a shrinking green island surrounded by human settlements, monoculture plantations, reservoirs, electric fences and asphalt.
“For elephants, Udawalawe is like a prison surrounded by invisible walls,” Sameera explains. “We expect animals that evolved to roam hundreds of square nationakilometres to survive inside a box created by humans.”
Elephants are ecosystem engineers. They shape forests by dispersing seeds, opening pathways, and regulating vegetation. Their survival depends on movement — not containment. But in Udawalawa, movement is precisely what has been taken away.
Over the past decade, ancient elephant corridors have been blocked or erased by:
Irrigation and agricultural expansion
Tourism resorts and safari infrastructure
New roads, highways and power lines
Human settlements inside former forest reserves
“The destruction didn’t happen overnight,” Sameera says. “It happened project by project, fence by fence, without anyone looking at the cumulative impact.”
The Illusion of Protection
Sri Lanka prides itself on its protected area network. Yet most national parks function as ecological islands rather than connected systems.
“We think declaring land as a ‘national park’ is enough,” Sameera argues. “But protection without connectivity is just slow extinction.”
Udawalawe currently holds far more elephants than it can sustainably support. The result is habitat degradation inside the park, increased competition for resources, and escalating conflict along the boundaries.
“When elephants cannot move naturally, they turn to crops, tanks and villages,” Sameera says. “And then we blame the elephant for being a problem.”
The Other Side of the Map: Wanni and Hambantota
Sameera often points to the irony visible on the very same map. While elephants are squeezed into overcrowded parks in the south, large landscapes remain in the Wanni, parts of Hambantota and the eastern dry zone where elephant density is naturally lower and ecological space still exists.
“We keep talking about Udawalawe as if it’s the only place elephants exist,” he says. “But the real question is why we are not restoring and reconnecting landscapes elsewhere.”
The Hambantota MER (Managed Elephant Reserve), for instance, was originally designed as a landscape-level solution. The idea was not to trap elephants inside fences, but to manage land use so that people and elephants could coexist through zoning, seasonal access, and corridor protection.
“But what happened?” Sameera asks. “Instead of managing land, we managed elephants. We translocated them, fenced them, chased them, tranquilised them. And the conflict only got worse.”
The Failure of Translocation
For decades, Sri Lanka relied heavily on elephant translocation as a conflict management tool. Hundreds of elephants were captured from conflict zones and released into national parks like Udawalawa, Yala and Wilpattu.
The logic was simple: remove the elephant, remove the problem.
The reality was tragic.
“Most translocated elephants try to return home,” Sameera explains. “They walk hundreds of kilometres, crossing highways, railway lines and villages. Many die from exhaustion, accidents or gunshots. Others become even more aggressive.”
Scientific studies now confirm what conservationists warned from the beginning: translocation increases stress, mortality, and conflict. Displaced elephants often lose social structures, familiar landscapes, and access to traditional water sources.
“You cannot solve a spatial problem with a transport solution,” Sameera says bluntly.
In many cases, the same elephant is captured and moved multiple times — a process that only deepens trauma and behavioural change.
Freedom Is Not About Removing Fences
The popular slogan “give elephants freedom” has become emotionally powerful but scientifically misleading. Elephants do not need symbolic freedom; they need functional landscapes.
Real solutions lie in:
Restoring elephant corridors
Preventing development in key migratory routes
Creating buffer zones with elephant-friendly crops
Community-based land-use planning
Landscape-level conservation instead of park-based thinking
“We must stop treating national parks like wildlife prisons and villages like war zones,” Sameera insists. “The real battlefield is land policy.”
Electric fences, for instance, are often promoted as a solution. But fences merely shift conflict from one village to another.
“A fence does not create peace,” Sameera says. “It just moves the problem down the line.”
A Crisis Created by Humans
Sri Lanka loses more than 400 elephants and nearly 100 humans every year due to HEC — one of the highest rates globally.
Yet Sameera refuses to call it a wildlife problem.
“This is a human-created crisis,” he says. “Elephants are only responding to what we’ve done to their world.”
From expressways cutting through forests to solar farms replacing scrublands, development continues without ecological memory or long-term planning.
“We plan five-year political cycles,” Sameera notes. “Elephants plan in centuries.”
The tragedy is not just ecological. It is moral.
“We are destroying a species that is central to our culture, religion, tourism and identity,” Sameera says. “And then we act surprised when they fight back.”
The Question We Avoid Asking
If Udawalawe is overcrowded, if Yala is saturated, if Wilpattu is bursting — then the real question is not where to put elephants.
The real question is: Where have we left space for wildness in Sri Lanka?
Sameera believes the future lies not in more fences or more parks, but in reimagining land itself.
“Conservation cannot survive as an island inside a development ocean,” he says. “Either we redesign Sri Lanka to include elephants, or one day we’ll only see them in logos, statues and children’s books.”
And the map will show nothing but empty green patches — places where giants once walked, and humans chose. roads instead.
By Ifham Nizam
Features
Challenges faced by the media in South Asia in fostering regionalism
SAARC or the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation has been declared ‘dead’ by some sections in South Asia and the idea seems to be catching on. Over the years the evidence seems to have been building that this is so, but a matter that requires thorough probing is whether the media in South Asia, given the vital part it could play in fostering regional amity, has had a role too in bringing about SAARC’s apparent demise.
That South Asian governments have had a hand in the ‘SAARC debacle’ is plain to see. For example, it is beyond doubt that the India-Pakistan rivalry has invariably got in the way, particularly over the past 15 years or thereabouts, of the Indian and Pakistani governments sitting at the negotiating table and in a spirit of reconciliation resolving the vexatious issues growing out of the SAARC exercise. The inaction had a paralyzing effect on the organization.
Unfortunately the rest of South Asian governments too have not seen it to be in the collective interest of the region to explore ways of jump-starting the SAARC process and sustaining it. That is, a lack of statesmanship on the part of the SAARC Eight is clearly in evidence. Narrow national interests have been allowed to hijack and derail the cooperative process that ought to be at the heart of the SAARC initiative.
However, a dimension that has hitherto gone comparatively unaddressed is the largely negative role sections of the media in the SAARC region could play in debilitating regional cooperation and amity. We had some thought-provoking ‘takes’ on this question recently from Roman Gautam, the editor of ‘Himal Southasian’.
Gautam was delivering the third of talks on February 2nd in the RCSS Strategic Dialogue Series under the aegis of the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, at the latter’s conference hall. The forum was ably presided over by RCSS Executive Director and Ambassador (Retd.) Ravinatha Aryasinha who, among other things, ensured lively participation on the part of the attendees at the Q&A which followed the main presentation. The talk was titled, ‘Where does the media stand in connecting (or dividing) Southasia?’.
Gautam singled out those sections of the Indian media that are tamely subservient to Indian governments, including those that are professedly independent, for the glaring lack of, among other things, regionalism or collective amity within South Asia. These sections of the media, it was pointed out, pander easily to the narratives framed by the Indian centre on developments in the region and fall easy prey, as it were, to the nationalist forces that are supportive of the latter. Consequently, divisive forces within the region receive a boost which is hugely detrimental to regional cooperation.
Two cases in point, Gautam pointed out, were the recent political upheavals in Nepal and Bangladesh. In each of these cases stray opinions favorable to India voiced by a few participants in the relevant protests were clung on to by sections of the Indian media covering these trouble spots. In the case of Nepal, to consider one example, a young protester’s single comment to the effect that Nepal too needed a firm leader like Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was seized upon by the Indian media and fed to audiences at home in a sensational, exaggerated fashion. No effort was made by the Indian media to canvass more opinions on this matter or to extensively research the issue.
In the case of Bangladesh, widely held rumours that the Hindus in the country were being hunted and killed, pogrom fashion, and that the crisis was all about this was propagated by the relevant sections of the Indian media. This was a clear pandering to religious extremist sentiment in India. Once again, essentially hearsay stories were given prominence with hardly any effort at understanding what the crisis was really all about. There is no doubt that anti-Muslim sentiment in India would have been further fueled.
Gautam was of the view that, in the main, it is fear of victimization of the relevant sections of the media by the Indian centre and anxiety over financial reprisals and like punitive measures by the latter that prompted the media to frame their narratives in these terms. It is important to keep in mind these ‘structures’ within which the Indian media works, we were told. The issue in other words, is a question of the media completely subjugating themselves to the ruling powers.
Basically, the need for financial survival on the part of the Indian media, it was pointed out, prompted it to subscribe to the prejudices and partialities of the Indian centre. A failure to abide by the official line could spell financial ruin for the media.
A principal question that occurred to this columnist was whether the ‘Indian media’ referred to by Gautam referred to the totality of the Indian media or whether he had in mind some divisive, chauvinistic and narrow-based elements within it. If the latter is the case it would not be fair to generalize one’s comments to cover the entirety of the Indian media. Nevertheless, it is a matter for further research.
However, an overall point made by the speaker that as a result of the above referred to negative media practices South Asian regionalism has suffered badly needs to be taken. Certainly, as matters stand currently, there is a very real information gap about South Asian realities among South Asian publics and harmful media practices account considerably for such ignorance which gets in the way of South Asian cooperation and amity.
Moreover, divisive, chauvinistic media are widespread and active in South Asia. Sri Lanka has a fair share of this species of media and the latter are not doing the country any good, leave alone the region. All in all, the democratic spirit has gone well into decline all over the region.
The above is a huge problem that needs to be managed reflectively by democratic rulers and their allied publics in South Asia and the region’s more enlightened media could play a constructive role in taking up this challenge. The latter need to take the initiative to come together and deliberate on the questions at hand. To succeed in such efforts they do not need the backing of governments. What is of paramount importance is the vision and grit to go the extra mile.
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