Features
Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement-1987 as JR Jayewardene saw it
“A few days later, at a public lunch, when I was congratulated on my escape by a speaker in these words, “Blessed are the Peace-makers for they shall soon be in Heaven,” I replied, “Rajiv missed Heaven by a few inches, and I missed it by a few seconds!”
(Excerpted from Men and Memories by JR Jayewardene)
The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987 was signed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and myself as President on July 29, 1987. It was a Peace Treaty and brought Peace, till one group of the LTTE broke it in October 1987. India then had to oppose them till March 1990, when the Sri Lanka Government took over and this led to a bloody war with the LTTE which still continues (when this was written).
The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was signed on Wednesday, July 29, 1987, by the Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, and myself as President of Sri Lanka. On the next day, when Rajiv was inspecting a Naval Guard of Honour, prior to his departure, a Naval Rating attempted to assassinate him by raising the butt-end of his rifle and bringing it down on Rajiv’s head. Seeing the movement in time, Rajiv bent his head and escaped death by a few inches.
A few weeks later, on August 18, two bombs were thrown at me and Prime Minister Premadasa, while we were sitting at the Chairman’s table at a meeting of the Government Parliamentary Group held in a Committee Room of the Parliamentary Complex. Both bombs missed. One hit our table and bounced off, and the other went over our heads. An official standing behind us was hit by a pellet and fell dead; a Minister sitting where the two bombs burst a few yards away from us, was killed. Several Ministers and Members of Parliament were injured and hospitalized.
A few days later, at a public lunch, when I was congratulated on my escape by a speaker in these words, “Blessed are the Peace-makers for they shall soon be in Heaven,” I replied, “Rajiv missed Heaven by a few inches, and I missed it by a few seconds!”
Though I spoke in a lighter vein of these incidents, it was evident that there was much feeling against Rajiv’s arrival in Sri Lanka. I can understand the opposition to Rajiv at that time for his government had violated our sovereignty by sending food by air and ship to the Jaffna Peninsula against the express refusal of the Government of Sri Lanka to entertain them.
Many of those who caused riots throughout the Island were not interested in the Agreement but opposed Rajiv’s visit. They were against the Indian help to the northern terrorists with arms, money and training. The Agreement itself was forgotten. It, however, brought peace to Sri Lanka. As President Ranasinghe Premadasa said in the Manifesto with which he won the Presidential Election of November 1988:
The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was signed to obtain India’s assistance to restore peace, law and order in the North and East. In the process, we succeeded in strengthening our good relations with India. Its basis is the geopolitics of the region. It put our relations with her on a new and firm footing. Its sincerity is unquestionable. We will build upon its positive achievements through dialogue and reciprocity.
The peace lasted till October 1987, when one of the groups that accepted it, namely, the LTTE, broke it and have continued its lone fight against the Government of Sri Lanka to this day and earlier against the Government of India till the last soldier of the IPKF left in March 1990. Before the Agreement was signed, Sri Lanka fought the LTTE and several other groups aided and abetted by the Government of Tamil Nadu, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the Central Government of India. After the Agreement, the LTTE was left alone and by a strange quirk of fate, the Government of India fought them for a year and a half losing over 1,500 men, 5,000 injured and spending billions of rupees in Sri Lankan currency.
Within a few days after the signing, peace reigned in the North and the East, and I was praised by all. Prime Minister Premadasa said on October 19, 1987, that my “skill of diplomacy had turned the protectors of terrorism to being hunters of terrorism”–referring to India. From America it was said that “India had been turned from a part of the problem to being a part of the solution.”
In these pages I write of the events that preceded the signing of the Agreement, of the Agreement and its aftermath. I kept in mind throughout the words of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, “If your enemy extends a hand, however dishonestly, you grab it. If there is good faith, you have responded. If not, then at least you have one of his hands immobilised!”
There had been negotiations beteween the Sri Lankan and Indian Governments for a few years prior to the signing of the Agreement of July 1987. An Agreement had been reached between the two governments in New Delhi in 1983 and embodied in a document known as “Annexure C” and tabled before the All Party Conference in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka had opposed meeting the separatist and terrorist groups as some of the leaders of these groups wanted by the Police for a wide range of criminal charges. However, they lived in India, protected by the Indian Government.
Prabhakaran, the LTTE leader, had been suspected of responsibility for the killing in 1975 of the then Mayor of Jaffna, Mr Duraiappa, a fellow Tamil and Government Party (SLFP) Member of Parliament.
In June 1985, direct talks took place in New Delhi between me and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, on how to deal with Sri Lanka’s Tamil problem. While the Sri Lankan Government agreed to talk to the Tamil groups, there also began a struggle among these groups for leadership and to be recognized as the chief spokesmen.
They were the PLOT, TELO, LTTE, EPRLF and the non-violent group, the TULF. All the terrorist groups were provided with arms, arms training, money and other help, as is now admitted by the Government of Tamil Nadu, with the knowledge and authority of the Central Government of India.
The first round of talks was held in Thimpu, Bhutan in June 1985. The Sri Lanka delegation consisted of a group of senior lawyers led by my brother, H.W. Jayewardene, Q.C. The talks broke down, but a second round of talks were held in August.
For the first time, a system of Provincial Councils was discussed in response to the claim of the representatives of Tamil groups that their right to self-determination be recognized, and along with the right to a Tamil homeland, i.e., the Northern and Eastern Provinces. In regard to the latter, the TULF also joined the terrorist groups. Though the talks did not yield results, the two governments carried on their negotiations with their representatives led by H.W. Jayewardene on one side and the Indian officials led by Romesh Bhandari, who had succeeded G. Parthasarthy, as India’s Foreign Secretary.
From these talks emerged certain decisions, namely that the unit of devolution was to be a Province and not a District and that the powers to be devolved to be wider than had been discussed earlier. A document was initiated, led by Romesh Bhandari on the Indian side and E.F. Dias Abeysinghe, Secretary of the Sri Lanka delegation, for Sri Lanka to go beyond the Delhi Accord of August 1985. Relations between Sri Lanka and India began to improve now with Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minister.
All the while, the Tamil terrorist groups continued to have their training and other facilities from bases in Tamil Nadu. The Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu that time was M.G. Ramachandran, who played a prominent role in these events. After 1985, his health broke down, he could hardly speak but he still continued to govern Tamil Nadu expressing his wishes through lip-reading, and movements of his eyes and hands.
In the meantime, the internecine fighting between the Tamil groups led to a bloody victory for the LTTE over its main rivals in April 1986, especially TELO. The terrorist groups now began to attack more than before the civilian population adjoining the Northern and Eastern Provinces, specially unarmed Sinhalese civilians. In May 1985, in a surprise raid in Anuradhapura, 150 civilians were killed near the Sacred Bo-Tree. Gradually the terrorist groups become a formidable guerrilla force and the Sri Lanka Government spent a large proportion of its annual budget, which rose from Rs 550 million (US$ 18 m) in 1980 to Rs 3,500 million (US $115 m) in 1987, for the expansion and equipping of its armed forces.
The Government of Central India continued to campaign throughout the world against the Government of Sri Lanka. The Indian embassies abroad became centers of support for the terrorists and separatist groups. This led to the reluctance on the part of some of the Western powers to supply arms and other aid to Sri Lanka. They were anxious not to offend India.
In April 1986, the Indian Government sent to Sri Lanka a new delegation led by a Minister of State, P. Chidambaram (40), a young Tamil and Natwar Singh, the Minister of State for External Affairs. An official communique in May 1986, announced that the Sri Lanka Government agreed to make further concessions beyond the Delhi Agreement dealing with Law and Order, Land Settlement etc. Sri Lanka meanwhile, embarked on a new political initiative, the Political Parties’ Conference with eight political parties, that met me on 25 June 25, 1986.
These talks continued in July 1986. A TULF delegation also arrived in Sri Lanka from India and had formal talks with me in July and August 1986. The following Ministers also participated regularly – the Minister of Foreign Affairs, A.C.S. Hameed; the Minister of Finance, Ronnie de Mel; the Minister of National Security, Lalith Athulathmudali; the Minister of Lands, Land Development and Mahaweli Development, Gamini Dissanayake and several others off and on.
The discussions between the Government of Sri Lanka and the TULF and the discussions and debates within the Political Parties Conference, continued for over three months. The SLFP boycotted these discussions. All the other parties, including the traditional Left parties which were not represented in Parliament, also participated in these discussions. The Conference drafted Constitutional Amendments, a Draft Provincial Councils Bill, schedules setting out the Reserved, Concurrent and Provincial lists as well as detailed memoranda dealing with Law and Order, Land and Land Settlement and Education.
The subjects of Finance and Administration were discussed in detail but no final agreements were reached. An official statement issued by the Sri Lanka Government on 26 November 26, 1986 stated that apart from subjects not finalized, these proposals constituted a package which would have been a reasonable basis of settlement fair to all sections of the people of Sri Lanka.
The agreed to proposals formed the basis of discussions between me and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi when we met in Bangalore at the SAARC Summit on November 17 and 18, 1986. At the end of the Conference, it was announced that apart from the subjects of Finance and Administration, which were not clarified by the TULF, the matters which required further modification and agreement, were fully set out in a working paper on the Bangalore discussions dated November 19, 1986. The LTTE alone refused to accept these proposals.
For the first time, the Indian Government imposed restrictions on Sri Lanka Tamil terrorists operating from Indian territory. These were nullified by the Tamil Nadu Government’s noncooperation in these moves. Attempts were made by the Central Government to prevent the LTTE leader Prabhakaran from leaving India for Jaffna, unsuccessfully. A time-table was worked out between the two governments for signing an Accord based on these proposals to take place preferably in January 1987.
Features
Meet the women protecting India’s snow leopards
In one of India’s coldest and most remote regions, a group of women have taken on an unlikely role: protecting one of Asia’s most elusive predators, the snow leopard.
Snow leopards are found in just 12 countries across Central and South Asia. India is home to one of the world’s largest populations, with a nationwide survey in 2023 – the first comprehensive count ever carried out in the country – estimating more than 700 animals, .
One of the places they roam is around Kibber village in Himachal Pradesh state’s Spiti Valley, a stark, high-altitude cold desert along the Himalayan belt. Here, snow leopards are often called the “ghosts of the mountains”, slipping silently across rocky slopes and rarely revealing themselves.
For generations, the animals were seen largely as a threat, for attacking livestock. But attitudes in Kibber and neighbouring villages are beginning to shift, as people increasingly recognise the snow leopard’s role as a top predator in the food chain and its importance in maintaining the region’s fragile mountain ecosystem.
Nearly a dozen local women are now working alongside the Himachal Pradesh forest department and conservationists to track and protect the species, playing a growing role in conservation efforts.
Locally, the snow leopard is known as Shen and the women call their group “Shenmo”. Trained to install and monitor camera traps, they handle devices fitted with unique IDs and memory cards that automatically photograph snow leopards as they pass.
“Earlier, men used to go and install the cameras and we kept wondering why couldn’t we do it too,” says Lobzang Yangchen, a local coordinator working with a small group supported by the non-profit Nature Conservation Foundation (NCF) in collaboration with the forest department.
Yangchen was among the women who helped collect data for Himachal Pradesh’s snow leopard survey in 2024, which found that the state was home to 83 snow leopards – up from 51 in 2021.

The survey documented snow leopards and 43 other species using camera traps spread across an area of nearly 26,000sq km (10,000sq miles). Individual leopards were identified by the unique rosette patterns on their fur, a standard technique used for spotted big cats. The findings are now feeding into wider conservation and habitat-management plans.
“Their contribution was critical to identifying individual animals,” says Goldy Chhabra, deputy conservator of forests with the Spiti Wildlife Division.
Collecting the data is demanding work. Most of it takes place in winter, when heavy snowfall pushes snow leopards and their prey to lower altitudes, making their routes easier to track.
On survey days, the women wake up early, finish household chores and gather at a base camp before travelling by vehicle as far as the terrain allows. From there, they trek several kilometres to reach camera sites, often at altitudes above 14,000ft (4,300m), where the thin air makes even simple movement exhausting.
The BBC accompanied the group on one such trek in December. After hours of walking in biting cold, the women suddenly stopped on a narrow trail.
Yangchen points to pugmarks in the dust: “This shows the snow leopard has been here recently. These pugmarks are fresh.”

Along with pugmarks, the team looks for other signs, including scrapes and scent‑marking spots, before carefully fixing a camera to a rock along the trail.
One woman then carries out a “walk test”, crawling along the path to check whether the camera’s height and angle will capture a clear image.
The group then moves on to older sites, retrieving memory cards and replacing batteries installed weeks earlier.
By mid-afternoon, they return to camp to log and analyse the images using specialised software – tools many had never encountered before.
“I studied only until grade five,” says Chhering Lanzom. “At first, I was scared to use the computer. But slowly, we learned how to use the keyboard and mouse.”
The women joined the camera-trapping programme in 2023. Initially, conservation was not their motivation. But winters in the Spiti Valley are long and quiet, with little agricultural work to fall back on.
“At first, this work on snow leopards didn’t interest us,” Lobzang says. “We joined because we were curious and we could earn a small income.”
The women earn between 500 ($5.46; £4) and 700 rupees a day.
But beyond the money, the work has helped transform how the community views the animal.

“Earlier, we thought the snow leopard was our enemy,” says Dolma Zangmo, a local resident. “Now we think their conservation is important.”
Alongside survey work, the women help villagers access government insurance schemes for their livestock and promote the use of predator‑proof corrals – stone or mesh enclosures that protect animals at night.
Their efforts come at a time of growing recognition for the region. Spiti Valley has recently been included in the Cold Desert Biosphere Reserve, a Unesco-recognised network aimed at conserving fragile ecosystems while supporting local livelihoods.
As climate change reshapes the fragile trans-Himalayan landscape, conservationists say such community participation will be crucial to safeguarding species like the snow leopard.
“Once communities are involved, conservation becomes more sustainable,” says Deepshikha Sharma, programme manager with NCF’s High Altitudes initiative.
“These women are not just assisting, they are becoming practitioners of wildlife conservation and monitoring,” she adds.
As for the women, their work makes them feel closer to their home, the village and the mountains that raised them, they say.
“We were born here, this is all we know,” Lobzang says. “Sometimes we feel afraid because these snow leopards are after all predatory animals, but this is where we belong.”
[BBC]
Features
Freedom for giants: What Udawalawe really tells about human–elephant conflict
If elephants are truly to be given “freedom” in Udawalawe, the solution is not simply to open gates or redraw park boundaries. The map itself tells the real story — a story of shrinking habitats, broken corridors, and more than a decade of silent but relentless ecological destruction.
“Look at Udawalawe today and compare it with satellite maps from ten years ago,” says Sameera Weerathunga, one of Sri Lanka’s most consistent and vocal elephant conservation activists. “You don’t need complicated science. You can literally see what we have done to them.”
What we commonly describe as the human–elephant conflict (HEC) is, in reality, a land-use conflict driven by development policies that ignore ecological realities. Elephants are not invading villages; villages, farms, highways and megaprojects have steadily invaded elephant landscapes.
Udawalawe: From Landscape to Island
Udawalawe National Park was once part of a vast ecological network connecting the southern dry zone to the central highlands and eastern forests. Elephants moved freely between Udawalawe, Lunugamvehera, Bundala, Gal Oya and even parts of the Walawe river basin, following seasonal water and food availability.
Today, Udawalawe appears on the map as a shrinking green island surrounded by human settlements, monoculture plantations, reservoirs, electric fences and asphalt.
“For elephants, Udawalawe is like a prison surrounded by invisible walls,” Sameera explains. “We expect animals that evolved to roam hundreds of square nationakilometres to survive inside a box created by humans.”
Elephants are ecosystem engineers. They shape forests by dispersing seeds, opening pathways, and regulating vegetation. Their survival depends on movement — not containment. But in Udawalawa, movement is precisely what has been taken away.
Over the past decade, ancient elephant corridors have been blocked or erased by:
Irrigation and agricultural expansion
Tourism resorts and safari infrastructure
New roads, highways and power lines
Human settlements inside former forest reserves
“The destruction didn’t happen overnight,” Sameera says. “It happened project by project, fence by fence, without anyone looking at the cumulative impact.”
The Illusion of Protection
Sri Lanka prides itself on its protected area network. Yet most national parks function as ecological islands rather than connected systems.
“We think declaring land as a ‘national park’ is enough,” Sameera argues. “But protection without connectivity is just slow extinction.”
Udawalawe currently holds far more elephants than it can sustainably support. The result is habitat degradation inside the park, increased competition for resources, and escalating conflict along the boundaries.
“When elephants cannot move naturally, they turn to crops, tanks and villages,” Sameera says. “And then we blame the elephant for being a problem.”
The Other Side of the Map: Wanni and Hambantota
Sameera often points to the irony visible on the very same map. While elephants are squeezed into overcrowded parks in the south, large landscapes remain in the Wanni, parts of Hambantota and the eastern dry zone where elephant density is naturally lower and ecological space still exists.
“We keep talking about Udawalawe as if it’s the only place elephants exist,” he says. “But the real question is why we are not restoring and reconnecting landscapes elsewhere.”
The Hambantota MER (Managed Elephant Reserve), for instance, was originally designed as a landscape-level solution. The idea was not to trap elephants inside fences, but to manage land use so that people and elephants could coexist through zoning, seasonal access, and corridor protection.
“But what happened?” Sameera asks. “Instead of managing land, we managed elephants. We translocated them, fenced them, chased them, tranquilised them. And the conflict only got worse.”
The Failure of Translocation
For decades, Sri Lanka relied heavily on elephant translocation as a conflict management tool. Hundreds of elephants were captured from conflict zones and released into national parks like Udawalawa, Yala and Wilpattu.
The logic was simple: remove the elephant, remove the problem.
The reality was tragic.
“Most translocated elephants try to return home,” Sameera explains. “They walk hundreds of kilometres, crossing highways, railway lines and villages. Many die from exhaustion, accidents or gunshots. Others become even more aggressive.”
Scientific studies now confirm what conservationists warned from the beginning: translocation increases stress, mortality, and conflict. Displaced elephants often lose social structures, familiar landscapes, and access to traditional water sources.
“You cannot solve a spatial problem with a transport solution,” Sameera says bluntly.
In many cases, the same elephant is captured and moved multiple times — a process that only deepens trauma and behavioural change.
Freedom Is Not About Removing Fences
The popular slogan “give elephants freedom” has become emotionally powerful but scientifically misleading. Elephants do not need symbolic freedom; they need functional landscapes.
Real solutions lie in:
Restoring elephant corridors
Preventing development in key migratory routes
Creating buffer zones with elephant-friendly crops
Community-based land-use planning
Landscape-level conservation instead of park-based thinking
“We must stop treating national parks like wildlife prisons and villages like war zones,” Sameera insists. “The real battlefield is land policy.”
Electric fences, for instance, are often promoted as a solution. But fences merely shift conflict from one village to another.
“A fence does not create peace,” Sameera says. “It just moves the problem down the line.”
A Crisis Created by Humans
Sri Lanka loses more than 400 elephants and nearly 100 humans every year due to HEC — one of the highest rates globally.
Yet Sameera refuses to call it a wildlife problem.
“This is a human-created crisis,” he says. “Elephants are only responding to what we’ve done to their world.”
From expressways cutting through forests to solar farms replacing scrublands, development continues without ecological memory or long-term planning.
“We plan five-year political cycles,” Sameera notes. “Elephants plan in centuries.”
The tragedy is not just ecological. It is moral.
“We are destroying a species that is central to our culture, religion, tourism and identity,” Sameera says. “And then we act surprised when they fight back.”
The Question We Avoid Asking
If Udawalawe is overcrowded, if Yala is saturated, if Wilpattu is bursting — then the real question is not where to put elephants.
The real question is: Where have we left space for wildness in Sri Lanka?
Sameera believes the future lies not in more fences or more parks, but in reimagining land itself.
“Conservation cannot survive as an island inside a development ocean,” he says. “Either we redesign Sri Lanka to include elephants, or one day we’ll only see them in logos, statues and children’s books.”
And the map will show nothing but empty green patches — places where giants once walked, and humans chose. roads instead.
By Ifham Nizam
Features
Challenges faced by the media in South Asia in fostering regionalism
SAARC or the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation has been declared ‘dead’ by some sections in South Asia and the idea seems to be catching on. Over the years the evidence seems to have been building that this is so, but a matter that requires thorough probing is whether the media in South Asia, given the vital part it could play in fostering regional amity, has had a role too in bringing about SAARC’s apparent demise.
That South Asian governments have had a hand in the ‘SAARC debacle’ is plain to see. For example, it is beyond doubt that the India-Pakistan rivalry has invariably got in the way, particularly over the past 15 years or thereabouts, of the Indian and Pakistani governments sitting at the negotiating table and in a spirit of reconciliation resolving the vexatious issues growing out of the SAARC exercise. The inaction had a paralyzing effect on the organization.
Unfortunately the rest of South Asian governments too have not seen it to be in the collective interest of the region to explore ways of jump-starting the SAARC process and sustaining it. That is, a lack of statesmanship on the part of the SAARC Eight is clearly in evidence. Narrow national interests have been allowed to hijack and derail the cooperative process that ought to be at the heart of the SAARC initiative.
However, a dimension that has hitherto gone comparatively unaddressed is the largely negative role sections of the media in the SAARC region could play in debilitating regional cooperation and amity. We had some thought-provoking ‘takes’ on this question recently from Roman Gautam, the editor of ‘Himal Southasian’.
Gautam was delivering the third of talks on February 2nd in the RCSS Strategic Dialogue Series under the aegis of the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, at the latter’s conference hall. The forum was ably presided over by RCSS Executive Director and Ambassador (Retd.) Ravinatha Aryasinha who, among other things, ensured lively participation on the part of the attendees at the Q&A which followed the main presentation. The talk was titled, ‘Where does the media stand in connecting (or dividing) Southasia?’.
Gautam singled out those sections of the Indian media that are tamely subservient to Indian governments, including those that are professedly independent, for the glaring lack of, among other things, regionalism or collective amity within South Asia. These sections of the media, it was pointed out, pander easily to the narratives framed by the Indian centre on developments in the region and fall easy prey, as it were, to the nationalist forces that are supportive of the latter. Consequently, divisive forces within the region receive a boost which is hugely detrimental to regional cooperation.
Two cases in point, Gautam pointed out, were the recent political upheavals in Nepal and Bangladesh. In each of these cases stray opinions favorable to India voiced by a few participants in the relevant protests were clung on to by sections of the Indian media covering these trouble spots. In the case of Nepal, to consider one example, a young protester’s single comment to the effect that Nepal too needed a firm leader like Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was seized upon by the Indian media and fed to audiences at home in a sensational, exaggerated fashion. No effort was made by the Indian media to canvass more opinions on this matter or to extensively research the issue.
In the case of Bangladesh, widely held rumours that the Hindus in the country were being hunted and killed, pogrom fashion, and that the crisis was all about this was propagated by the relevant sections of the Indian media. This was a clear pandering to religious extremist sentiment in India. Once again, essentially hearsay stories were given prominence with hardly any effort at understanding what the crisis was really all about. There is no doubt that anti-Muslim sentiment in India would have been further fueled.
Gautam was of the view that, in the main, it is fear of victimization of the relevant sections of the media by the Indian centre and anxiety over financial reprisals and like punitive measures by the latter that prompted the media to frame their narratives in these terms. It is important to keep in mind these ‘structures’ within which the Indian media works, we were told. The issue in other words, is a question of the media completely subjugating themselves to the ruling powers.
Basically, the need for financial survival on the part of the Indian media, it was pointed out, prompted it to subscribe to the prejudices and partialities of the Indian centre. A failure to abide by the official line could spell financial ruin for the media.
A principal question that occurred to this columnist was whether the ‘Indian media’ referred to by Gautam referred to the totality of the Indian media or whether he had in mind some divisive, chauvinistic and narrow-based elements within it. If the latter is the case it would not be fair to generalize one’s comments to cover the entirety of the Indian media. Nevertheless, it is a matter for further research.
However, an overall point made by the speaker that as a result of the above referred to negative media practices South Asian regionalism has suffered badly needs to be taken. Certainly, as matters stand currently, there is a very real information gap about South Asian realities among South Asian publics and harmful media practices account considerably for such ignorance which gets in the way of South Asian cooperation and amity.
Moreover, divisive, chauvinistic media are widespread and active in South Asia. Sri Lanka has a fair share of this species of media and the latter are not doing the country any good, leave alone the region. All in all, the democratic spirit has gone well into decline all over the region.
The above is a huge problem that needs to be managed reflectively by democratic rulers and their allied publics in South Asia and the region’s more enlightened media could play a constructive role in taking up this challenge. The latter need to take the initiative to come together and deliberate on the questions at hand. To succeed in such efforts they do not need the backing of governments. What is of paramount importance is the vision and grit to go the extra mile.
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