Features
Improvements to Kelani Valley Railway
By PRIYAL De SILVA
Retd. General Manager, Sri Lanka Railways and Past President Institution of Engineers, Sri Lanka
I personally appreciate the queries, clarifications and various issues brought up by the general public, and our members of the Institution of Engineers, Sri Lanka (IESL). This actually shows the enthusiasm built up over the years among the general public and our members, to get involved in national projects. This, I consider a new phenomenon, a great stride as it is, which us seniors found it difficult to inculcate, especially in the younger professionals.
Engineers are technically competent and they are specialists in their own field once they have worked for many years. However, they possess the ability to evaluate and form their personal opinions on any matter related to engineering, having undergone an academic training in the Universities, leading to an engineering degree. Further, in their life span they would have seen in this country or elsewhere in foreign countries, what solutions have been meted out for engineering problems.
The Kelani Valley Railway Line improvement is such a project, where many problems are encountered and need to be resolved in the most economical manner, considering the solution to be sustainable, the return on investment, and the impact of the solution to the country as a whole, in relation to financing of foreign loans.
For over one year, IESL has made a valiant attempt to convince the consultants on certain recommendations made on the feasibility study for improvements to the Kelani Valley railway line. It could be seen that whatever inferences from the forecasts the consultants have calculated, they have recommended the railway line to be elevated up to Homagama, a distance of 23km. At the first sight itself, without disregarding this recommendation, let us pose the question whether other alternatives such as taking the trace at ground level were not considered. This is because the recommended elevated trace is also following the ground trace with all the existing sharp curves. I believe there were two main excuses to recommend elevation; one was the acquisition of land or let me mention in a more prudent way, it is relocation of encroachments presently occupying railway land, and the second is the number of level crossings presently at-grade.
If we take the first issue, the acquisition or relocation, I am sure many of our members and general public would have visited foreign countries, where railways run through populated areas as well as through city and business centers. I am sure in each of these countries you would have noticed that there is a parallel roadway on each side of the railway tracks, especially in populated areas and business centers, for many reasons such as keeping a safe area from those residing and for movement of public. This access is required to approach the railway track by railway staff in case of fire or any other emergency, and for other maintenance purposes. Hence whether, at ground level or elevated, this space requires to be kept mandatorily for above purposes.
Then in case of level crossings at-grade, it is true that there are around 50 level crossings up to Homagama and each of these require to be protected if no alternative solutions can be meted out. Here again I am sure many of you have visited foreign countries, and would have noted that some level crossings are closed completely for vehicular traffic, and only allowed for non-motorised traffic. These can be in the form of level crossing at grade or as underpasses with 2.0 m headway. At other places, vehicular traffic is allowed with a 3.0m headway where cars, vans, and mini-trucks are allowed with separate lanes for non- motorised traffic. The third category is where all vehicles are allowed where these could be flyovers, underpasses, or crossings at grade.
The consultants for the project need to study the level crossings individually, and also infer what level crossings that can be closed for vehicular traffic completely, what are the alternative roads available. Also, what are the level crossings which are more suitable for underpasses, determining them considering the geography of the area, and also with a possibility of raising the track bed by 1 to 2 m. Also, what requires to be converted to flyovers considering vehicular traffic. If the crossing is near a station, the platforms should be split, so that the train always stops after the crossing.
An underpass connects the two platforms, allowing pedestrians, too, to use it to cross the road as well as the railroad. These are much cheaper solutions to congestion at crossings, compared with elevating the line for 23 km.
It is evident that consultants will be able to reduce the cost of the project immensely if they could carry out an in-depth study on each crossing. As a country, what is really required is an economic return on the investment, and the new infrastructure provided should be able to be utilized for any future extensions beyond Avissawella, and should be maintenance friendly and user friendly. It requires the provision of escalators and elevators for stations in the elevated sections required to be maintained, and in case they are not maintained, the general public will suffer when they have to climb 7m (the height of two floors of a building) to the station platform. Such issues have to be addressed by the consultants.
Features
Vision of Dr. Gamani Corea and the South’s present development policy options
The ‘takes’ were numerous for the perceptive sections of the public from the Dr. Gamani Corea 100th birth anniversary oration delivered at ‘The Lighthouse’ auditorium, Colombo, by Dr. Carlos Maria Correa, Executive Director of the South Centre in Geneva on November 4th. The fact that Dr. Gamani Corea was instrumental in the establishment of the South Centre decades back enhanced the value of the presentation. The event was organized by the Gamani Corea Foundation.
The presentation proved to be both wide-ranging and lucid. The audience was left in no doubt as to what Dr. Gamani Corea (Dr. GC) bequeathed to the global South by way of developmental policy and thinking besides being enlightened on the historic, institutional foundations he laid for the furtherance of Southern economic and material wellbeing.
For instance, in its essential core Dr. GC’s vision for the South was given as follows: sustainable and equitable growth, a preference for trade over aid, basic structural reform of global economy, enhancement of the collective influence of developing countries in international affairs.
Given the political and economic order at the time, that is the sixties of the last century, these principles were of path-breaking importance. For example, the Cold War was at its height and the economic disempowerment of the developing countries was a major issue of debate in the South. The latter had no ‘say’ in charting their economic future, which task devolved on mainly the West and its prime financial institutions.
Against this backdrop, the vision and principles of Dr. G.C. had the potential of being ‘game changers’ for the developing world. The leadership provided by him to UNCTAD as its long-serving Secretary General and to the Group of 77, now Plus China, proved crucial in, for instance, mitigating some economic inequities which were borne by the South. The Integrated Program for Commodities, which Dr. G.C. helped in putting into place continues to serve some of the best interests of the developing countries.
It was the responsibility of succeeding generations to build on this historic basis for economic betterment which Dr. G.C. helped greatly to establish. Needless to say, all has not gone well for the South since the heyday of Dr. G.C. and it is to the degree to which the South re-organizes itself and works for its betterment as a cohesive and united pressure group that could help the hemisphere in its present ordeals in the international economy. It could begin by rejuvenating the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), for instance.
The coming into being of visionary leaders in the South, will prove integral to the economic and material betterment of the South in the present world order or more accurately, disorder. Complex factors go into the making of leaders of note but generally it is those countries which count as economic heavyweights that could also think beyond self-interest that could feature in filling this vacuum.
A ‘take’ from the Dr. GC memorial oration that needs to be dwelt on at length by the South was the speaker’s disclosure that 46 percent of current global GDP is contributed by the South. Besides, most of world trade takes place among Southern countries. It is also the heyday of multi-polarity and bipolarity is no longer a defining feature of the international political and economic order.
In other words, the global South is now well placed to work towards the realization of some of Dr. GC’s visionary principles. As to whether these aims could be achieved will depend considerably on whether the South could re-organize itself, come together and work selflessly towards the collective wellbeing of the hemisphere.
From this viewpoint the emergence of BRICS could be seen as holding out some possibilities for collective Southern economic betterment but the grouping would need to thrust aside petty intra-group power rivalries, shun narrow national interests, place premium value on collective wellbeing and work towards the development of its least members.
The world is yet to see the latter transpiring and much will depend on the quality of leadership formations such as BRICS could provide. In the latter respect Dr. GC’s intellectual leadership continues to matter. Measuring-up to his leadership standards is a challenge for BRICS and other Southern groupings if at all they visualize a time of relative collective progress for the hemisphere.
However, the mentioned groupings would need to respect the principle of sovereign equality in any future efforts at changing the current world order in favour of all their member countries. Ideally, authoritarian control of such groupings by the more powerful members in their fold would need to be avoided. In fact, progress would need to be predicated on democratic equality.
Future Southern collectivities intent on bettering their lot would also need to bring into sharp focus development in contrast to mere growth. This was also a concern of Dr. G.C. Growth would be welcome, if it also provides sufficiently for economic equity. That is, economic plans would come to nought if a country’s resources are not equally distributed among its people.
The seasoned commentator is bound to realize that this will require a degree of national planning. Likewise, the realization ought to have dawned on Southern governments over the decades that unregulated market forces cannot meet this vital requirement in national development.
Thus, the oration by Dr. Carlos Maria Correa had the effect of provoking his audience into thinking at some considerable length on development issues. Currently, the latter are not in vogue among the majority of decision and policy makers of the South but they will need ‘revisiting’ if the best of Dr. GC’s development thinking is to be made use of.
What makes Dr. GC’s thinking doubly vital are the current trade issues the majority of Southern countries are beginning to face in the wake of the restrictive trade practices inspired by the US. Dr. GC was an advocate of international cooperation and it is to the degree to which intra-South economic cooperation takes hold that the South could face the present economic challenges successfully by itself as a collectivity. An urgent coming together of Southern countries could no longer be postponed.
Features
Attitude development: Key to national progress
In a developing country like Sri Lanka, one of the main challenges, is developing attitudes and social values of its citizens. Attitudes are the behaviours and beliefs that shape an individual’s or society’s actions. These attitudes have a significant impact on personal and societal development. Therefore, developing the right attitudes is crucial for the progress of a nation.
Why is Attitude Development Important?
Attitude development has a profound impact on various aspects of society. For instance, promoting efficiency, creativity, and innovation can accelerate economic growth. When citizens have a positive attitude towards work and entrepreneurship, they are more likely to contribute to the country’s economic development. Similarly, preserving and promoting social and cultural values can strengthen social harmony and cohesion. A society with a positive attitude towards diversity and inclusivity is more likely to be peaceful and prosperous.
Role of Education in Attitude Development
Education is a key factor in shaping attitudes. A well-educated population is more likely to have a positive attitude towards life, work, and society. Education helps individuals develop critical thinking skills, which enable them to make informed decisions and solve problems effectively. Moreover, education can promote values such as tolerance, empathy, and respect for others, which are essential for building a harmonious society.
Impact of Media on Attitude Development
The media plays a significant role in shaping attitudes. With the advent of social media, people are exposed to a vast amount of information, which can influence their attitudes and behaviours. The media can promote positive attitudes and values, such as kindness, compassion, and social responsibility. However, it can also perpetuate negative attitudes and stereotypes, which can be detrimental to society.
Role of Community Participation in Attitude Development
Community participation is essential for attitude development. When individuals participate in community service and volunteer work, they develop a sense of social responsibility and empathy towards others. Community participation can also promote values such as teamwork, leadership, and communication skills. Moreover, it can help build stronger, more cohesive communities.
Importance of Leadership in Attitude Development
Leadership plays a crucial role in shaping attitudes. Leaders can inspire and motivate individuals to adopt positive attitudes and behaviours. They can promote values such as integrity, accountability, and transparency, which are essential for building trust and confidence in institutions. Moreover, leaders can create a positive work culture that encourages innovation, creativity, and productivity.
Role of Parents and Teachers in Attitude Development
Parents and teachers play a vital role in shaping the attitudes of children. Children learn by observing and imitating adults, so it’s essential for parents and teachers to model positive attitudes and behaviours. They can promote values such as respect, kindness, and responsibility, which are essential for building a positive and productive society.
Benefits of Positive Attitudes
Positive attitudes have numerous benefits for individuals and society. They can improve mental and physical health, increase productivity, and enhance overall well-being. Positive attitudes can also promote better relationships, improve communication skills, and increase resilience. Moreover, they can inspire individuals to achieve their goals and pursue their passions.
Challenges of Developing Positive Attitudes
Developing positive attitudes can be challenging, especially in the face of adversity. It requires effort, commitment, and perseverance. Moreover, individuals may face resistance from others who are not supportive of change. However, with the right mindset and support, individuals can overcome these challenges and develop positive attitudes that benefit themselves and society.
Role of Technology in Attitude Development
Technology can play a significant role in attitude development. Online platforms and social media can provide access to information, resources, and support that can help individuals develop positive attitudes. Technology can also facilitate communication, collaboration, and networking, which are essential for building positive relationships and communities.
Future of Attitude Development
The future of attitude development is promising. With the increasing awareness of the importance of mental health, well-being, and social responsibility, more people are recognising the need to develop positive attitudes. Moreover, technological advancements and innovations can provide new opportunities for attitude development and social impact.
The attitude development is crucial for the progress of a nation. It requires a collective effort from individuals, institutions, and leaders to promote positive attitudes and values. By working together, we can build a society that is more harmonious, productive, and prosperous. By developing positive attitudes, we can overcome challenges, achieve our goals, and create a brighter future for ourselves and future generations.
Recommendations
To promote attitude development in Sri Lanka, we recommend the following:
* Integrate attitude development programmes in schools and universities
* Provide training and resources for parents and teachers to promote positive attitudes in children
* Encourage community participation and volunteer work
* Promote positive attitudes and values through media and social media
* Recognise and reward individuals and organisations that demonstrate positive attitudes and behaviours
By implementing these recommendations, we can create a society that values and promotes positive attitudes and behaviours. This will enable us to build a brighter future for ourselves and future generations.
By Jayantha K. Pathirana (M.A)
(Former Principal of Katuwana National School)
Features
Amid Winds and Waves: Sri Lanka and the Indian Ocean – IV
(Part III of this article appeared yesterday (04)
Maritime Security and the Blue Economy amid Winds and Waves
The post-war reconfiguration of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy inevitably drew the country’s gaze toward the sea. As the island sought to redefine its global relevance beyond the narratives of conflict and sovereignty, the Indian Ocean emerged as both opportunity and test. Strategic geography, once a source of vulnerability, began to be reframed as a foundation for growth, connectivity, and influence. The maritime domain offered a new framework through which Sri Lanka could integrate security, development, and diplomacy — a shift from land-locked anxieties to ocean-oriented aspiration. It is within this context that Colombo’s engagement with the Blue Economy and maritime security took shape, reflecting an effort to navigate the winds and waves of regional competition while reclaiming the sea as a space of national renewal and international partnership.
Across decades, Sri Lanka’s small-state strategy reveals a consistent pattern: the blending of prudence with principle, and the translation of anxiety into diplomacy. The island’s leaders—regardless of ideological orientation—have confronted the same structural dilemma: how to engage the world without being engulfed by it. Strategic ambiguity, embedded in a besieged mentality yet sustained by a peace drive, has been the enduring response.
The persistence of this strategy underscores a central paradox of Sri Lankan foreign policy: that autonomy must be defended not through isolation, but through participation on carefully negotiated terms. For Sri Lanka, the ocean is both lifeline and frontier—the defining feature of its geography and the principal determinant of its security and prosperity. The island’s position astride the main east–west maritime artery renders it uniquely exposed to shifts in global commerce, naval presence, and ecological change. Yet this same exposure also endows Sri Lanka with strategic visibility and economic potential. The sea, in Sri Lanka’s worldview, is not merely a boundary but a medium through which power, trade, and ideas flow.
For a small island state such as Sri Lanka, maritime security extends beyond the traditional concerns of safeguarding territorial waters, sea-lanes, and coastal infrastructure. It involves the broader task of reducing vulnerabilities and strengthening the capacity to respond to emerging maritime threats—ranging from piracy, illegal fishing, and environmental degradation to strategic competition among major powers. The modes of operation available to small states in meeting these challenges are inevitably shaped by the moral and material resources at their disposal, as well as by their geopolitical location. In recent years, the notion of maritime security has expanded to encompass the sustainable use of marine resources, the protection of ocean ecosystems, and the responsible exploration of seabed mineral resources that hold both promise and peril. Within this evolving framework, the Blue Economy has emerged as a key integrative concept, linking security, environmental stewardship, and economic diversification. It underscores the understanding that maritime stability and national prosperity are mutually reinforcing—and that enduring security for small states like Sri Lanka depends as much on prudent management and cooperation as on deterrence and defense.
From Vulnerability to Resource Governance
For small island states such as Sri Lanka, vulnerability is not merely an episodic condition but a structural reality shaped by geography, resource endowment, and external dependence. Two interrelated dimensions define this predicament: resource vulnerability and strategic vulnerability. Resource vulnerability arises from the inability to manage, monitor, and exploit oceanic assets effectively, leaving them susceptible to overuse, external extraction, or environmental degradation. Strategic vulnerability, in turn, stems from the asymmetries of power that shape maritime interactions in the Indian Ocean—where the interests of major powers, often couched in scientific or commercial terms, intersect with the sovereign space of smaller coastal states
For small island states such as Sri Lanka, vulnerability is not merely an episodic condition but a structural reality shaped by geography, resource endowment, and external dependence. Two interrelated dimensions define this predicament: resource vulnerability and strategic vulnerability. Resource vulnerability arises from the inability to manage, monitor, and exploit oceanic assets effectively, leaving them susceptible to overuse, external extraction, or environmental degradation. Strategic vulnerability, in turn, stems from the asymmetries of power that shape maritime interactions in the Indian Ocean—where the interests of major powers, often couched in scientific or commercial terms, intersect with the sovereign space of smaller coastal states.
The ocean’s promise is thus shadowed by vulnerability. Offshore and seabed mineral resources exemplify this duality. For Sri Lanka, the potential wealth of the seabed—ranging from hydrocarbons to cobalt-rich deposits—offers significant prospects for diversification and growth. Yet, this same promise can become a liability when exploration activities invite external involvement that outpaces national regulatory or scientific capacity. The entry of Chinese research vessels into Sri Lanka’s territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has underscored how scientific exploration can blur into geopolitical maneuvering, generating domestic anxiety and diplomatic tension. Similarly, the competing claims by India and Sri Lanka over two tracts in the cobalt-rich Afanasy–Nikitin Seamount demonstrate how overlapping ambitions in resource exploration can translate into strategic contestation, testing the resilience of regional cooperation frameworks.
Sri Lanka’s maritime domain faces multiple pressures: illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing; competition over undersea resources; piracy and trafficking; and the long-term threat of climate change and sea-level rise. These challenges intersect with great-power competition in the Indian Ocean, where naval deployments, port access agreements, and infrastructure financing often blur the line between economic development and strategic dependency. In this environment, maritime security becomes inseparable from resource governance. Sri Lanka’s EEZ—almost eight times its land area—contains vast potential for fisheries, minerals, and renewable energy. However, the capacity to monitor, regulate, and exploit these resources responsibly remains limited. External assistance, while necessary, introduces new asymmetries of dependence.
The path from vulnerability to governance therefore requires institutional strengthening, regional cooperation, and a redefinition of Sri Lanka’s maritime constabulary role—not merely as a defensive function but as a mechanism of stewardship and sovereignty. Effective resource governance is thus both a developmental and a strategic imperative: it enables small states to transform exposure into agency, and to convert the ocean’s uncertainty into a managed space of opportunity.
Blue Economy as Strategic and Developmental Framework
The Blue Economy has emerged as both an economic paradigm and a strategic doctrine for oceanic and coastal states. Broadly defined, it refers to the sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods, and ecosystem health. For small states such as Sri Lanka, the Blue Economy extends the logic of the Green Economy into the maritime sphere—combining environmental stewardship with developmental and geopolitical agency. It recognizes that the sea is not merely a frontier of extraction or defense, but a living system whose long-term health underpins national security and prosperity alike.
For Sri Lanka, located at the heart of the Indian Ocean, the Blue Economy offers a framework to transform vulnerability into opportunity. It links sustainability to sovereignty: by managing marine resources responsibly, the island can assert agency in a domain where traditional hard power is limited. This framework encourages diversification away from dependency on land-based and low-value exports toward ocean-based industries such as marine biotechnology, renewable ocean energy, sustainable fisheries, and coastal tourism. By integrating innovation and environmental ethics, Sri Lanka can build resilience against the twin shocks of climate change and external economic volatility.
The Blue Economy should therefore be viewed not only as a developmental agenda but as a key pillar of Sri Lanka’s maritime strategy. It provides a peaceful and cooperative means of leveraging geographic advantage—turning the Indian Ocean from a theatre of vulnerability into a space of managed opportunity. The island’s active participation in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), particularly in working groups on fisheries, maritime safety, and blue carbon ecosystems, reflects its emerging role as a norm entrepreneur. By promoting sustainable resource management and equitable access, Sri Lanka projects moral authority within regional diplomacy, consistent with its historical commitment to peace and neutrality.
Nevertheless, the realization of a genuinely “blue” economy remains constrained by several factors. Limited technological capacity, inadequate maritime governance frameworks, and fragmented institutional coordination hinder progress. External financing—while essential for developing port and ocean energy infrastructure—can also reproduce patterns of strategic dependence. Meanwhile, overfishing, marine pollution, and the slow pace of adaptation to climate change threaten both livelihoods and ecosystems. Sri Lanka’s successes include early policy recognition of the Blue Economy’s potential, regional leadership within IORA, and emerging partnerships in ocean observation and renewable energy. Yet, its challenges lie in translating these commitments into enforceable regulations, scientific capacity, and integrated governance mechanisms.
The way forward requires Sri Lanka to consolidate its Blue Economy strategy around three priorities: first, investing in marine science and data infrastructure to enhance resource governance; second, fostering public–private partnerships that align innovation with sustainability; and third, deepening regional and multilateral cooperation to ensure that the Indian Ocean remains a space of shared prosperity rather than strategic rivalry. By doing so, Sri Lanka can make the Blue Economy not only a developmental framework but also a foundation for a new, peace-oriented maritime order.
Despite the cooperative rhetoric surrounding the Blue Economy as a strategic and developmental framework, its security dimension remains inescapable. The Indo-Pacific discourse has intensified naval activity and security partnerships across the Indian Ocean, at times reducing smaller coastal states to little more than strategic real estate. For Sri Lanka, the challenge lies in participating in these frameworks—through exercises, information-sharing, and maritime domain awareness—without being drawn into alliance politics.
In recent years, Colombo has pursued a delicate equilibrium: engaging with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) countries on maritime safety while sustaining defence cooperation with China and aligning with India’s Neighbourhood First policy. This calibrated engagement reflects the broader pattern of strategic ambiguity typical of small-state behaviour. It enables Sri Lanka to derive capacity-building benefits from multiple partners while avoiding deeper entanglements.
Here again, the island’s besieged mentality resurfaces—not as paralysis but as prudence. The lingering fear of encirclement translates into a strategy of controlled openness: welcoming maritime partnerships but resisting their militarization. By emphasizing the Blue Economy, Colombo shifts the discourse from confrontation to cooperation, repositioning itself not as a pawn in great-power rivalries but as a facilitator of inclusive ocean governance.
The Ocean as Moral and Strategic Space
The moral geography of the Indian Ocean is also reflected in the island’s collective psychology—a continuous oscillation between a besieged mentality and cosmopolitanism. The sea evokes both fear and freedom: the fear of encirclement and exploitation, and the freedom of connection and exchange. This dual consciousness, formed through centuries of colonial intrusion and maritime coexistence, continues to inform Sri Lanka’s strategic imagination. To perceive the ocean as moral space is, therefore, to reconcile these inner contradictions—to convert the anxiety of smallness into an ethic of responsible openness.
For Sri Lanka, the sea is not only an economic and security frontier but also a moral geography. The island’s historical experience has always been marked by duality: exposure and connection, vulnerability and possibility. As an island, Sri Lanka has lived with the perpetual tension between openness and insecurity—its shores have invited commerce, migration, and cultural fertilization, yet also conquest and exploitation. This tension gives moral depth to the maritime imagination: the ocean is not merely a space of movement or material extraction but a field where moral choices are enacted—between domination and reciprocity, extraction and stewardship, isolation and coexistence. The moral properties of this space arise from its capacity to bind peoples and histories across differences, to remind coastal societies of their interdependence, and to reveal the ethical consequences of maritime engagement. In this sense, Sri Lanka’s relationship with the Indian Ocean has never been simply strategic; it has been existential—a dialogue between geography and responsibility.
Beneath this duality lies a deeper social–psychological rhythm: the interplay between a besieged mentality and a cosmopolitan impulse. The sea has long evoked for Sri Lankans both fear and fascination—the fear of encirclement, invasion, and dependency, and the fascination with connection, exchange, and self-renewal.
The besieged mentality stems from the memory of colonial exploitation and from the perpetual sense of smallness in a world dominated by larger powers. Yet, alongside this anxiety runs a countercurrent of cosmopolitanism rooted in centuries of maritime coexistence—Arab, Malay, Indian, European, and African influences that made the island a microcosm of the Indian Ocean world. These two sensibilities—protective insularity and ethical openness—have coexisted, shaping Sri Lanka’s moral geography of the sea. To imagine the Indian Ocean as a moral space is thus to reconcile these inner contradictions: to transform the fear of exposure into a philosophy of connection, and to redefine security as the practice of responsible engagement.
Understanding the ocean as moral space also means acknowledging its place in the making of maritime moral geography. Across centuries, the Indian Ocean has been a medium of moral and cultural exchange: the spread of Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity; the circulation of traders, monks, and ideas; the coexistence of diverse communities bound by the ethics of navigation and hospitality. These histories form a counter-narrative to imperial cartographies that reduced the sea to a zone of control. By reclaiming this moral geography, Sri Lanka situates itself within a long tradition of ethical connectivity—one that predates and transcends the modern nation-state. The island’s strategic choices, therefore, cannot be divorced from this inheritance: to act justly in the oceanic realm is to honor a legacy of coexistence and shared stewardship.
From this perspective, framing the Indian Ocean as a space of peace, sustainability, and shared heritage becomes both a moral and strategic act. It enables Sri Lanka to transform its geopolitical vulnerabilities into a diplomatic asset—an articulation of responsibility rather than merely of interest. This approach has situated the island within the Global South’s broader moral economy of international relations: an effort to humanize strategy through principles of equity, care, and cooperation. The Blue Economy, in this light, becomes not only policy but philosophy—a moral response to the ecological and political anxieties of smallness. It seeks to reimagine security as coexistence, and prosperity as stewardship, turning the Indian Ocean into a living archive of ethical possibility. By projecting a moral vision of the sea, Sri Lanka asserts that strategy itself can be a form of moral imagination—one that binds survival to responsibility and geography to conscience
The Indian Ocean: Moral Geography and the Global South Perspective
The moral geography of the Indian Ocean, as seen through Sri Lanka’s experience, offers a vital lens for understanding how the Global South imagines space, agency, and ethics. For Sri Lanka, the ocean has always been more than a route of trade or a theatre of strategy—it has been a living archive of connection and vulnerability, a mirror of its historical condition as both a crossroads and a frontier. This maritime consciousness has located Sri Lanka within a broader Global South tradition that seeks to reclaim moral agency from the margins of global politics. In this context, the Indian Ocean becomes a space through which postcolonial societies articulate a humane alternative to the dominant logic of power—an attempt to redefine the global order through the language of reciprocity, stewardship, and coexistence (Acharya 2014; Bose 2006).
The Indian Ocean has long functioned as an ethical commons of the Global South—a space that historically linked African, Arab, South Asian, and Southeast Asian societies in networks of exchange, pilgrimage, and pluralism. Before the colonial era imposed boundaries and hierarchies, the ocean connected communities through practices of trade and mutual care that reflected a shared moral economy (Chaudhuri 1985). Sri Lanka was integral to this oceanic world: its ports from Manthai to Galle were nodes of cosmopolitan encounter, where diverse peoples negotiated differences through hospitality and cultural translation. This deep history of connectivity offers an ethical counterpoint to the militarized and extractive geographies imposed during the colonial and Cold War periods. To retrieve this past is to affirm the Global South’s claim to historical agency and to challenge the reduction of the ocean to a mere space of rivalry or resource competition (Bose 2006).
From a Sri Lankan perspective, moral geography provides an idiom for transforming the anxieties of smallness into a vision of ethical leadership. The island’s postcolonial diplomacy—particularly its advocacy of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace in the 1970s and its later embrace of the Blue Economy—reflects this enduring aspiration to balance survival with moral responsibility (Gunasekara 2021). These initiatives exemplify the Global South’s wider effort to humanize international relations: to shift the vocabulary of strategy from control to coexistence, from competition to cooperation. For Sri Lanka, the moral geography of the sea thus becomes a method of asserting presence in global affairs without recourse to dominance—what could be termed strategic ethics, or the art of wielding moral imagination as a form of soft power.
This moral reorientation resonates with broader Global South perspectives that critique the moral asymmetries of the international system. As Amitav Acharya (2014) argues, Global South approaches to world order seek to pluralize international relations by foregrounding non-Western traditions of thought and coexistence. Similarly, Walter Mignolo (2011) and others have described this as border thinking—the effort to imagine global ethics from the margins, drawing from subaltern histories of encounter and exchange. In this sense, Sri Lanka’s oceanic worldview embodies a form of Southern cosmopolitanism: grounded in local experience but open to the universal, protective yet participatory. It extends the moral geography of the Indian Ocean into a planetary register, proposing that the future of maritime order must be built on the ethical lessons of its past.
In the end, to conceive the Indian Ocean as a moral space is to articulate a Global South vision of world order—one that binds geography to responsibility and history to justice. The sea becomes not merely a surface of strategy but a metaphor for relational being: fluid, interconnected, and morally consequential. Sri Lanka’s perspective, shaped by both exposure and resilience, exemplifies how small states can contribute to the moral imagination of the Global South. By invoking the Indian Ocean as a shared moral frontier, Sri Lanka gestures toward a post-hegemonic internationalism—an oceanic humanism that reclaims the sea as a site of ethical possibility and cooperative survival. The Global South does not merely navigate the world; it redefines what it means to inhabit it together.
(To be concluded tomorrow)
Prof. Gamini Keerawella
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