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Going back to pre-2015 Geneva: Part II



President Mahinda Rajapaksa with UNSG Ban Ki-moon in 2009

By Austin Fernando
(Continued from yesterday)

22/1 Proposal (2013-3-21)

A great responsibility was placed on the State officers to implement the proposals in the Resolutions. Unfortunately, the international community did not see this happen. Hence, it decided to submit the 22/1 Resolution on 21 March 2013 by way of registering its protest with Sri Lanka. What it, however, did not understand was that the government was planning to advance a presidential election, and, therefore, committing to implementing the UNHRC would be politically disastrous.

The 22/1 proposal acknowledged the constructive efforts such as the decision to hold the Provincial Council election in the North, infrastructural development, demining and facilitating resettlement of IDPs. However, the National Plan of Action proposed by the LLRC was considered inadequate to address all the findings and constructive recommendations of the Commission. It was also noted that States facing post-conflict situations should abide by international human rights and humanitarian laws. Nationalists did not oppose the earlier actions but resisted the latter which had to do with the military.

The 22/1 Resolution focused on the following salient points:

1 Encouraged the GOSL to implement the recommendations made in the UNHRC Report and to conduct an independent and credible investigation into allegations of violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as applicable.

2 Called upon the GOSL to implement the constructive recommendations of the LLRC Report, and to take all additional steps to fulfill relevant legal obligations and commitment to initiate credible and independent actions to ensure justice, equity, accountability, and reconciliation for all Sri Lankans.

3 Encouraged the GOSL to cooperate with special procedures mandate holders and to respond formally to all outstanding requests.

4 Encouraged the Office of the High Commissioner and relevant special procedures mandate holders to provide, in consultation with and with the concurrence of the GOSL, advice and technical assistance on implementing the above-mentioned steps.

5 Requested the Office of the High Commissioner, with input from relevant special procedure mandate holders, as appropriate, to present an oral update to the Human Rights Council at its twenty-fourth session, and a comprehensive report followed by a discussion on the implementation of the present resolution at its twenty-fifth session.

The implementation of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Laws is the responsibility of any government. But those who duped themselves into believing that ‘internationals can be fooled’ did not want to protect Human Rights or uphold Humanitarian Laws. Although some IDPs were resettled, new military bases sprang up. From the perspective of the Tamils, their legal rights to private lands were denied.

The international community collected data from diplomatic and external sources. It was no secret that they were biased towards the needs and demands of the Tamil community. However, it had a clear understanding of the implementation of the proposals and was concerned about the tardy pace at which it was executed. They understood that the implementation of the proposals could not be expedited. Hence, they went before the UNHRC again.

25/1 Proposal (27.03.2014)

By 2014, the international community sadly believed Sri Lanka was an irresponsible, inert state. Hence the UNHCR, on 27 March 2014, passed the 25/1 Resolution titled ‘Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka’. The main points therein are as follows:

1.   Welcomed the oral update by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to the UNHRC 24th Session and the subsequent report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCR) on promoting reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka and the recommendations and conclusions, including on the establishment of a truth-seeking mechanism and national reparations policy as an integral part of a more comprehensive and inclusive approach to transitional justice.

2.  Called upon the GOSL to conduct an independent and credible investigation into allegations of violations of international human rights and humanitarian laws, as applicable; to hold accountable those responsible for such violations; to end continuing incidents of human rights violations and abuses in Sri Lanka, and to implement the recommendations made in the reports of the OHCR.

3.  Reiterated the earlier call upon the GOSL to implement effectively the constructive recommendations made in the LLRC Report, and to take all additional steps to fulfill its relevant legal obligations and commitments to initiate credible and independent actions to ensure justice, equity, accountability, and reconciliation for all Sri Lankans.

4.  Urged the GOSL to investigate all alleged attacks by individuals and groups on journalists, human rights defenders, members of religious minority groups and other members of civil society, and all places of worship and urged the GOSL to hold perpetrators of such attacks to account and to take steps to prevent such attacks in the future.

5.  Called upon the GOSL to release publicly the results of its investigations into alleged violations by security forces, including the Weliweriya attack, and the report of the Army Court of Inquiry.

6.  Encouraged the GOSL to ensure that all Provincial Councils can operate effectively, in accordance with the 13th Amendment to the Constitution.

7.  Welcomed the visit by the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs in December 2013 and called upon the GOSL to facilitate the effective implementation of durable solutions for all IDPs.

8.  Welcomed the invitation to the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants and the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education.

9.  Encouraged the GOSL to cooperate with other special procedures mandate holders and to respond formally to all their outstanding requests.

10. Noted the recommendations and conclusions of the High Commissioner regarding ongoing human rights violations and the need for an international inquiry mechanism in the absence of a credible national process with tangible results, and requested the UNHRC:

(a) To monitor the human rights situation in Sri Lanka and to continue to assess progress on relevant national processes.

(b) To undertake a comprehensive investigation into alleged serious violations and abuses of human rights and related crimes by both parties in Sri Lanka during the period covered by the LLRC, and to establish the facts and circumstances of such alleged violations and of the crimes perpetrated to avoid impunity and ensure accountability, with assistance from relevant experts and special procedures mandate holders.

(c) To present an oral update to the Human Rights Council at its 27th session, and a comprehensive report followed by a discussion on the implementation of the present resolution at its 28th Session.

11. Encouraged the UNHRC and relevant special procedure mandate holders to provide, in consultation and the concurrence of the GOSL, to provide advice and technical assistance on implementing the above-mentioned steps.

12. Called upon the GOSL to cooperate with the Office of the High Commissioner in the implementation of the present resolution.

The government did not proceed to implement these recommendations. It chose to ignore Section 10 in particular. The international community, therefore, opted for a strong response at the March 2015 UNHCR meeting. Moves were even afoot to impose economic sanctions.

‘Yahapalana ‘Government and the UNHRC

On 9 January 2018, the ‘Yahapalana’ President was sworn in and Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera asked for more time to implement the UNHRC recommendations. Most of us avoid discussing this background of the UNHCR proposals of 01 October 2015. Even today they discuss, misinterpret, and misrepresent facts.

These proposals did not fall from the sky. They were the result of the unilateral proposals first made on 27 May 2009 by the Rajapaksa government, its failure to implement them, and its lethargic, cavalier attitude and negligence. This led to the ratification of a new set of proposals recommended jointly by a core group of members of the UNHCR and the ‘Yahapalana government, to address the failures of the Rajapaksa government (2009), which was responsible for the 2009 UNHRC resolution.

The international community complied with the Yahapalana government’s request for more time. Had the Rajapaksa government responsible for Resolution 11/1 implemented the recommendations therein in an acceptable manner and responded to the feedback proposals, the country would not have faced the prospect of economic sanctions.

International pressure mounted from 2011-2014 as regards the 11/1 Resolution, and the Yahapalana government had to cooperate as regards the new proposals with the countries that supported Sri Lanka at the UNHCR. It should also be mentioned that such give-and-take policies don’t come without some disadvantages, the accountability mechanism in the 30/1 Resolution being a case in point.

The conceptual basis of the 2015 UNHCR Proposal

The 2015 proposals were based on the internationally accepted principles of reconciliation. As a first step towards initiating the truth and reconciliation process, it was proposed to establish a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ and an “Office on Missing Persons.” Secondly, the importance of demonstrating accountability towards the crimes endured by the affected communities was highlighted. Thirdly, it was required to establish a mechanism for reparation for the victims. Fourthly, it was proposed that constitutional guarantees by Parliament would ensure that such cruelty would not be repeated. Those were the ‘four pillars of reconciliation’.

These proposals were handed over to Prince Al Hussein, UNHCR High Commissioner by GOSL before Resolution 30/1 was tabled.

Withdrawal from UNHRC Resolution 30/1

In a way, it is unfair to blame the Yahapalana government for co-sponsoring Resolution 30/1 at the UNHCR in October 2015 although some people have taken exception to that course of action.

The current SLPP government has withdrawn from the 30/1 proposal and UNHRC’s 34/1 and 40/1 Resolutions—both more of technical nature and adopted without voting. We cannot withdraw from the resolutions or decisions taken between 2011-2014 because they are derived from the 11/1 Resolution. I believe (subject to correction since I am not a lawyer) that GOSL may argue the legality of other proposals if it wishes to withdraw from 11/1. It is the prerogative of the UNHRC to accept such a withdrawal. Even if we presume that such action is possible, the understandings reached in 2009 are still valid.

The question is whether the incumbent GOSL is still committed to implementing the 11/1 and the 27 May 2009 understandings. Since the 11/1 Resolution was unilaterally placed before the UNHRC by the GOSL after the war victory, it cannot argue that it was done under LTTE’s duress. If GOSL feels that 11/1 is now irrelevant, why doesn’t it say so? Did GOSL make the 11/1 proposal to hoodwink the UN Secretary-General? Or, was it another Medamulana ruse?

Two UNHRC resolutions call for the implementation of the LLRC’s constructive recommendations. The lack of commitment on the part of the Rajapaksa government to do so is unjustifiable.

Following the March 2021 Resolution in Geneva, the UNHRC has been empowered to “consolidate, analyze and preserve information and evidence” for “future accountability processes for gross violations of human rights or serious violations of international humanitarian law, to advocate for victims and survivors, and to support relevant judicial proceedings in the Member States with competent jurisdiction.”

However, some commentators opine that the Secretariat thus established will not be permitted to visit Sri Lanka like the Darusman Committee and that could hamper reporting. As stated earlier, information is freely available internationally. As a political columnist has aid recently, “it should not be forgotten that the Human Rights Commissioner’s office claims it already has trophy evidence which would be utilized.”

There are so many unanswered questions. But the demands made on behalf of the victims are still alive. Just a few days ago, didn’t MA Sumanthiran, MP, state so albeit in different words? It is these demands that drive the UNHCR and the European Union and even others to push GOSL against the wall.

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President’s efforts require parliamentary support



President Ranil Wickremesinghe

By Jehan Perera

With less than a year and half to the presidential elections, President Ranil Wickremesinghe has a tight deadline to meet if he is to attain his aspirations for the country.  His visit last week to Japan where he sought to renew ties which had made it Sri Lanka’s largest aid donor for decades, was reported to be highly successful.  During his visit, the President had apologized to the Japanese government leaders regarding the cancellation of the Light Rail Transit project which was subsequently delivered by Japan to Bangladesh.   The completion of the elevated railroad would have significantly reduced Colombo’s traffic jams. The disastrous mistake the previous government made in crudely cancelling the project unilaterally and without rational reason lost Sri Lanka the goodwill of Japan which will not be easy to get back.  Getting Japan back as a donor partner would be a great boon.  Overcoming the serious economic crisis that besets the country and its people would require a massive infusion of foreign assistance if the period of recovery is to be kept short and not prolonged indefinitely.

President Wickremesinghe’s leadership is also being credited with the structural economic reforms that the country is undertaking with regard to revenue generation and cost cutting.  Undertaking economic reforms that would streamline the economy has been a long term desire on the part of the President and seen during his past stints as Prime Minister.  During the period 2001 to 2004, when he effectively led the government as Prime Minister and entered into the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE, he tried to implement the same set of economic reforms.  Both of these radical measures proved to be too much for the population to bear and he suffered defeat at the elections that followed. Typically, the reform measures he presents is based on the “trickle down” theory, which, in highly corrupt polities, like Sri Lanka, means that the poor have to be content with the crumbs falling off the table. Once again, and unfazed, he is taking up the challenge of taking up unpopular economic measures, such as cutting subsidies, increasing taxes and privatizing state owned enterprises.

As part of the IMF recovery plan for the country, the government, under his leadership, is putting in place anti-corruption legislation that is required by the IMF.  It appears that this legislation, which is still in its draft form, is being pushed more by the President than by the government.  This was evident when a civil society group, led by the anti-corruption watchdog Transparency International, held a meeting for parliamentarians of all parties within the parliamentary complex.  The attendance from the government side was limited, though the Opposition participated in strength.  The top leadership of most of the Opposition parties, was in attendance, especially the largest Opposition party, the SJB, whose leader Sajith Premadasa also made an appearance.  They gave an inkling of the change of faces that needs to accompany any “system change.” The consensus of the discussion was that the draft legislation was a positive addition to the fight against corruption.


The situation on the ground, in terms of implementation of the laws pertaining to good governance and accountability, continue to be highly unsatisfactory.  The protest movement that was in evidence a year ago, gave its attention to issues of corruption and economic mismanagement for the reason that it had led to the economic collapse of the country that affected the entirety of its population. Both corruption and economic mismanagement had been facilitated by the concentration of political power in the executive.  One of President Wickremesinghe’s first actions was to give astute political leadership to the passage of the 21st Amendment which sought to restore the independence of key state institutions necessary for a check and balance function.  The most important aspect of the 21st Amendment is to protect those who are in charge of oversight bodies from interference by the political authority.

 A notable feature of the present is that the parliamentary majority has shown itself to be willing to follow President Wickremesinghe’s lead when it comes to putting frameworks of good governance and accountability in place for the future.  But when it comes to implementing them in the present, the ruling party, in particular, works in its own self-interest and to protect its own.  Unfortunately, there are a growing number of instances in which it can be seen that the parliamentary majority, led by the ruling party, continues to flout the spirit of the law and practices of good governance.  This was seen in the manner in which the Chairman of the Public Utilities Commission was forced out of his position through a majority vote in Parliament.  Regrettably, the protections afforded by the 21st Amendment could not protect the Chairman of the regulatory authority who opposed the electricity price hikes that led to the price hike to the poorest being up to 500 percent, while to the super rich and companies it was only 50 percent.

The second incident, in the same week, has been the apprehension of a parliamentarian at the airport for gold smuggling who was let off with a fine that was much less than the fine provided for by law for such offenses.  The parliamentarian himself has shown no remorse whatsoever and on the contrary has argued with considerable gumption that he is a victim of injustice as he did not pack his own bag and it was done by another.  The very same day that he paid his fine and was released by the Customs he went to Parliament, as if he had no problems. Opposition parliamentarians have urged that the parliamentarian, caught gold smuggling, should resign, but so far to no avail.  The question is whether he will be held accountable for the discredit he has brought upon himself, his political party, Parliament and the country or whether he will be judged to be no worse than many of his peers and the matter put aside.


The third incident, in the same week, is that of a foreign national who entered the country, on a forged passport, and was apprehended, at the airport, by Immigration officers.  They were instructed by a government minister to release the foreign person on the grounds that he was a businessman who had come to invest in the country.  However, when the incident was reported in the media, the government decided to deport him and said it will take action against the Immigration officers who had followed illegal orders in releasing him.  The media reported that no inquiry will be held against the Minister for influencing the Immigration officials to release the arrested foreign national as anybody could make a request like that but that an inquiry should be held against the Immigration officials for obeying the wrong instructions.

President Wickremesinghe has won many plaudits for his willingness to take up the challenge of rescuing the country from the abyss when he accepted former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s offer to become Prime Minister. It has now become clear that the President is determined to set laws and frameworks for the future. Unfortunately, it appears that the implementation of good governance practices and accountability is simply impossible in a context in which the parliamentary majority is not willing to follow them.  As a result, the crackdown on corruption and abuse of power that was hoped for when President Wickremesinghe took over has not manifested itself on the ground.

There is still little or no evidence that President Wickremesinghe is able or willing to take action against those within his government who violate the laws and frameworks of good governance that he is setting for the future of the country.  Up to now, the President has only been able to use the security forces and the parliamentary majority to crack down on the protest movement which demanded an end to corruption and accountability for abuse of power. If this situation continues, the President will lose both credibility and authority while those who engage in corruption and abuse of power will once again entrench themselves and become impossible to dislodge to the detriment of the national interest.  There is a need for all in the polity, both government and opposition, to strengthen the hand of the President to make a break with the past so that the resources of the country will be used for the common good rather than end up in private pockets.

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Sri Lanka’s ignorance matches that of US – II



LTTE training forcibly recruited civilians

Human Rights and war crimes:

By Daya Gamage
Foreign Service National Political Specialist (ret.)
US Department of State

(Continued from yesterday)

It is essential to note the most fundamental divide in the country is between rural and urban populations. Sri Lanka’s economy has always been essentially agricultural and even today some 77 percent of the population lives in rural districts. The ratio of Sinhalese to Tamils living in rural districts nationally approximates their ratio in the population at large.  Rural areas include Tamil-majority parts of Vanni (Mannar, Mullaitivu and Vavuniya Districts) and the Kilinochchi District in the Northern Province.  Similarly, such Sinhalese-majority districts as Monaragala and Badulla in the southern province of Uva, and Hambantota in the south are mostly rural.  During the colonial period and until the early 1970s the economic and political elites of Sri Lanka were almost exclusively a subset of the approximately 19 percent of the population living in urban areas.

These areas were privileged in terms of better economic infrastructure, better health and other government services, and better educational and employment opportunities.  These advantages were shared by all communities living in the cities: Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims, who coexisted and cooperated in general harmony.  Again, all three ethnic communities in the rural sector face inadequate educational facilities, less economic infrastructure and employment opportunities.

Post-Independence dilemma

Post-independence leaders faced a prickly dilemma: the economic development and broadened enfranchisement demanded by democratic politics required that more resources and opportunities be shared with the countryside, which would dilute the power and privileges of the 19 percent. All sections of the educated urban class were threatened by this, and none more than urban Tamils.  Not surprisingly, political leaders reacted to this broadening competition for national resources by reaching out to their ethnic constituencies for support in defending their privileges.

Let’s turn to war crimes and human rights violations the 18 May 2023 US House of Representative Resolution and the Canadian prime minister were referring to. The data and facts given below could be new to policymakers and lawmakers in Sri Lanka as well as to their counterparts in Washington. I say this because there was no evidence that Sri Lanka ever presented these factual data to the West. If the policymakers and lawmakers in Washington were aware of the following data the Resolution would have taken a different tone.

The question of war crimes—and related charges of crimes against humanity and even of genocide—are a telling example of the frequent gulf between complex facts and simplistic popular beliefs that has distorted perceptions of the Sri Lankan civil war and, one would argue, US policy towards Sri Lanka. In a broader sense, this writer believes that the persistent fictions that have grown up around the separatist conflict are symptomatic of a larger problem in the crafting of policy toward countries that are insufficiently or incorrectly understood.

In the case of Sri Lanka, the tendency of international observers to rush to judgment— and censure—under worst-case assumptions is evidenced by the civilian fatalities figure cited extensively in print and public discourse. This figure of 40,000 is alleged to be the number of unarmed Tamils who were killed during the final stage of the war (January–May 2009). These deaths are blamed largely on the Sri Lankan military, which is accused of using excessive and indiscriminate force, and thereby of committing war crimes. The 40,000 figure became an item of international orthodoxy after it was mentioned in the report, often referred to as the Darusman Report, by an “unofficial” panel of experts appointed by U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. The figure was arrived at by simply subtracting the number of internally displaced civilians who were administratively processed after the hostilities from the UN’s estimate of the number of civilians caught up in the final offensive.

To be precise, the March 2011 Darusman report conceded that “there is still no reliable figure for civilian deaths” but stated that the figure of 40,000 “cannot be ruled out” and needs further investigation.  The report did not refer to “credible evidence,” much less adduce any, using instead the vague expression “credible allegations.” This verdict was not voted upon or endorsed by the United Nations as an organisation, and despite its questionable logic and conflicting figures from other sources, the UN Secretary General pronounced the figure of 40,000 to be definitive. In a strange case of groupthink, most western governments and international NGOs have accepted it unquestioningly and wielded it rhetorically.

Disputed death count

The currency and obduracy of the death count, to which the Darusman Report gave birth, is all the more mystifying because it represents a major departure from calculations made not only by other reputable observers but even by UN staff on the ground in Sri Lanka. On March 9 (2009), the country team of the UN mission in Colombo briefed local diplomats for the first and only time on the civilian casualty figures it had collected from its Humanitarian Convoy.

 According to this briefing, 2,683 civilians had died between January 20 and March 7, and 7241 had been wounded. The UN country team did not indicate to the diplomats that the majority of these casualties were due to government shelling.  According to a cable from the US embassy in April 2009, the UN had estimated that from January 20 to April 6 civilian fatalities numbered 4,164, plus a further 10,002 wounded.  The International Crisis Group is quoted as reporting that “U.N. agencies, working closely with officials and aid workers located in the conflict zone, documented nearly 7,000 civilians killed from January to April 2009.

Those who compiled these internal numbers deemed them reliable to the extent they reflected actual conflict deaths but maintain it was a work in progress and incomplete.” Some three weeks before the end of the war, Reuters reported that “A UN working document, a copy of which was obtained by Reuters, says 6,432 civilians have been killed and 13,946 wounded in fighting since the end of January.” An unpublished report by the United Nations country team in Sri Lanka stated that from August 2008 to May 13, 2009 (five days before the war ended), the number of civilians killed was 7,721. Even if the UN Secretary General chose to ignore reporting from his own staff in the field, there were reports from other sources that should have tempered the figures adopted by other international organizations and governments with diplomatic representation in Colombo.

The International Committee of the Red Cross, the only outside agency present in the war zone during the final phase, used various statistical indicators to conclude that the total number of noncombatants killed was around 7,000.  Lord Naseby, a British parliamentarian and longtime advocate for Sri Lanka, announced in the House of Lords in November 2017 that he had managed to pry classified documents out of the Foreign Office through a freedom of information inquiry. These documents, which were dispatched from the British Defense Attaché in Colombo during the final days of the war, reported that about 7000 people had been killed.  Amnesty International wrote that . . . “derived independently from eyewitness testimony and information from aid workers [we estimate that] at least 10,000 civilians were killed.” This figure is in line with the estimate of an anthropologist working in Australia who questioned LTTE government servants and others who survived the final battles. This academician estimates that total fatalities from January 1 to May 19 ranged from 15,000 to 16,000, including some 5,000 Tiger dead. He cautions that any final figure must take into account the 600-900 deaths due to non-military causes that would be expected at standard death rates for a population of several hundred thousand over a period of five months, especially under very difficult conditions. He emphasizes that it was very difficult to distinguish civilians from combatants because the latter often did not wear uniforms.

According to some commentators, the prevalence and resilience of the 40,000-fatality figure can be attributed in significant measure to the publicity given to it by Gordon Weiss, an Australian journalist, who served as spokesperson for the UN mission in Sri Lanka from 2006 to 2009. In that official capacity Weiss reportedly used the fatality figure of 7,000 for 2009 and noted that, for the Sri Lankan Army, it made no tactical sense to kill civilians. Yet, in interviews to promote his popular book on the final days of the war, he used the unsubstantiated figure of 40,000, presumably for its shock value. When the book was published, the fatality figure had been reduced to 10,000.

ICRC figures 

On July 9, 2009, the US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, John Clint Williamson, met in Geneva with Jacques de Maio, Head of Operations for South Asia for the International Committee of the Red Cross. Williamson requested the meeting in order to collect information required for reporting to the US Congress. This information was invaluable because the ICRC was the only international organisation allowed by the GSL onto the northeastern battlefield for humanitarian work. In his diplomatic cable to Washington on that meeting, Williamson quoted de Maio as saying that “the Sri Lankan military was somewhat responsive to accusations of violations of international humanitarian law and was open to adapting its actions to reduce casualties.” The ambassador added that de Maio . . . “could cite examples of where the Army had stopped shelling when ICRC informed them it was killing civilians. In fact, the Army actually could have won the military battle faster with higher civilian casualties, yet chose a slower approach which led to a greater number of Sri Lankan military deaths …. On the LTTE, de Maio said that it had tried to keep civilians in the middle of a permanent state of violence. It saw the civilian population as a ‘protective asset’ and kept its fighters embedded amongst them.

De Maio said that the LTTE commanders’ objective had been to keep the distinction between civilian and military assets blurred.”  In April, as the fighting was nearing its climax, both the United Nations and the Group of Eight nations strongly condemned the LTTE for using civilians as human shields.

This writer can assure that the manuscript he is preparing with the retired Senior Foreign Service and Intelligence Officer of the Department of State Dr. Robert K. Boggs will disclose startling evidence of Washington’s foreign policy trajectory toward Sri Lanka, and how successive governments in Sri Lanka since 1980 – to date – displayed their utter ignorance that led to the infantile foreign policy approaches.

(The writer, Daya Gamage, is a retired Foreign Service National Political Specialist of the U.S. Department of State accredited to the Political Section of the American Embassy in Colombo, Sri Lanka)

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Excitement galore for Janaka



Janaka Palapathwala…a new identity soon!

Another artiste who is very much in the limelight, these days, is singer Janaka Palapathwala, who specializes in the golden hits of the past, made popular by Engelbert Humperdinck, Elvis, Tom Jones, Jim Reeves, and the like.

He has been seen crooning away at some of the prestigious events, in Colombo, and is now ready to entertain those who love the golden oldies…in Canada and the States.

Janaka, who plans to reveal a new identity soon, indicated to us that he is eagerly looking forward to this particular overseas tour as he has already been informed that the opener, on 3rd June, in Washington D.C., is a ‘sold out’ event.

“Summer Mega Blast’, on 3rd June, will have in attendance the band Binara & The Clan and DJ Shawn Groove.

Dynasty (Apple Green)…in action at ‘Memories Are Made Of This’

On 16th June, he will be in Toronto, Canada, for ‘Starlight Night’, with the band 7th String.

He has two dates in New York, on 24th June and 28th July (‘Welcome To My World’); Nebraska, 4th July (‘An Evening With Janaka’): Los Angeles, 15th July, and San Francisco, 22nd July.

Both the Los Angeles and San Francisco events are titled ‘Memories Are Made Of This’ and Janaka will perform, backed by the group Dynasty (Apple Green).

On his return home, he says he has to do the St. Peter’s College Welfare Society Dinner Dance, “Wild West’, scheduled for 26th July.

There will be plenty of action at this Peterite event, with the bands Misty, and Genesis, Shawn Groove, Frank David, Mazo, Ricardo Deen, Dinesh Subasinghe and Clifford Richards.

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