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Courting Parthasarathy for JRJ, equation changes after Indira’s assassination

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(Excerpted from volume ii of the Sarath Amunugama autobiography)

During one of my visits to Colombo I got a call to see the President at ‘Breamar’. Gamini Dissanayake had told him of my friendship with Parathasarathy and he wanted me to help him repair the damage done to their friendship due to the abuse heaped on GP when he came on a “peace mission” to Colombo.

JRJ had thrown his interlocutor into the ‘deep end’ by arranging a consultation for him with leading monks including Walpola Rahula. The monks had been particularly hard on GP as he was peddling the TULF line. GP was shocked because he had a vision of a peace loving and amiable ‘Sangho.’ that he was used to. Vietnamese Buddhist monks had supported him in his negotiations in Vietnam as Nehru’s envoy.

He had been shocked by this encounter with the monks and tended to think that JRJ had set them up. This was a time when JRJ was disoriented and perturbed by the spectre of 1956 which saw the decimation of the UNP. When I called over the following day at his residence the President was most cordial and inquired about my relations with GP.

He then pulled out a file in which he had gathered information from the time that GP had represented Madras State as a cricketer in the Gopalan Trophy, probably in the 1940s. GP had visited Colombo several times to play against the Ceylon eleven for the trophy. I remember that the news report from the Lake House archives had identified GP as a googly bowler; a good specialty for a future diplomat.

GP had later worked as a journalist in Madras till he moved to New Delhi to join Nehru’s entourage. He was so trusted by India Gandhi that she had appointed him to be the first Chancellor of the Jawaharlal Nehru University [JNU] then being built in the outskirts of Delhi. Since Parthasarathy had left Colombo a disappointed man, JRJ was keen to assure him that the Sri Lanka Government was ready to mend fences and start talking again.

This was a difficult undertaking because the July 1983 riots had severely embarrassed the Indian Government which was being pressurized by the Tamil Nadu politicians and the TULF to intervene. TULF leaders who fled after the riots were housed in Ashok Hotel in New Delhi and were able to get GP to promote their proposals.

Parathasarathy

I collected JRJ’s dossier and flew to New Delhi on my way to Paris GP was most cordial to me and invited me to have breakfast with him at his Lodhi Gardens home. Lodhi Gardens is located in a posh area of the Indian Capital. It housed many of the top officials of the Government. GP’s breakfasts were well known among Indian politicians and bureaucrats because many backroom discussions took place there.

It was a very English breakfast with a butler in atteendance. While breakfasting he assured me that he had no grudge with JRJ though his early goodwill when he accepted the assignment at Indira’s urging had been severely tested. He was agreeable to the idea that I telephone JRJ with that assurance of goodwill. He then pulled a rabbit out of his hat. He wanted me to ioin him on a visit to Ashok Hotel where the Indian Government had housed the leaders of the TULF after they were forced to flee the country following the July riots.

I had no hesitation in joining him as I knew some of these leaders, particularly Sampanthan with whom I had worked in Trincomalee when we demarcated the tourist zones for the Tourist Board. Perhaps GP, being a diplomat, wanted to show me the complex situation confronting Indian decision makers in view of the rapidly changing scenario in Sri Lanka.

Surprisingly the TULF leaders were keen to get back home. Though they were not short of creature comforts in the hotel they were not happy to be virtually incarcerated there without the chance of politicking in the North and East. In their absence the militants were making headway. Since their houses and other possessions in Colombo had been burnt or looted, they were in a state of shock.

Sampanthan told me that what he missed most was his library of books painstakingly collected over a lifetime. His library had been burnt down to the ground. I returned to Paris and telephoned JRJ who was happy that GP had responded that way. He wanted me to keep in touch with my Indian friends so that his position would not be misunderstood.

The Sri Lanka High Commision in New Delhi was not of much use and Hameed the Foreign Minister was asked not to interfere in the negotiations with India. Foreign Secretary Jayasinghe, though a good bureaucrat with strong connections with the Indian immigration officials, made no contribution in helping the President.

This was partly because the President was personally handling foreign policy issues. The lack of coordination in this sphere with a belligerent Lalith Athulathmudali playing a big role through his new Ministry, was beginning to extract its toll Lalith was quickly building up his popularity with the Sinhala voter by adopting a hardline and was being anxiously viewed be Premadasa, Gamini and Ronnie de Mel who could smell a rival when they saw one. The latter two were taking a more conciliatory approach which was welcomed by the Indian authorities.

Esmond’s Testimony

The periodic arrival of Esmond Wickremesinghe to Paris for International Programme for Development Communications (IPDC) meetings helped us to gather more information above the growing ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka. He told us that JRJ did not anticipate that the events of July would spiral out of control as Cyril Mathew had overstepped his brief Esmond said that he had breakfast with the President the day after the Kanatte incident. JRJ had collapsed at the breakfast table thinking that the Sinhala reaction would turn into a huge bloodbath which would be the end of his government.

He was fearful of a violent overthrow of his regime. That was why he prevaricated and did not address the nation immediately and put a stop to the violence. He hesitated and even in his broadcast he seemed to be lukewarm in condemning the Sinhala rioters and offering solace to the Tamils who were terrified and shocked. JRJ was perhaps right in feeling that this marked a watershed in his regime so early in his second term.

Soon after, all the energies of the Government were diverted to resettlement of refugees, funding them and attempting to recalibrate our economic and foreign policies to accommodate a solution to the ethnic problem. K.M. de Silva and Howard Wriggins in their biography of JRJ mark this as a turning point. “From this time to the end of his tenure of office as the Executive President at the end of December 1988. JR had to live with and deal with the consequences that flowed from the riots of 1983”.

As mentioned by writers like Rajiva Wijesinha, this crisis affected the Esmond Wickremesinghe family in different ways. Esmond’s brother Lakshman, who was the Bishop of Kurunegala, was devastated by the violence. He pleaded for reconciliation, but his cry was ignored. He died of a heart attack a few months later. Ranil Wickremesinghe on the other hand did not want to antagonize the Sinhala nationalist voters and tended to side with Mathew who had a strong base in the Kelaniya-Biyagama area.

Esmond while being disturbed by these events evaded the issue by dealing with the technical aspects of the problem on behalf of JRJ. Unlike his brother he was not disturbed by the moral dimension of the fratricidal violence. He felt that he could not abandon his friend at this critical juncture. Like Rajiva Wijesinha I did not see any remorse in Esmond regarding this collective moral failure. In his latest book Rajiva draws an unflattering picture of JRJ in relation to the ethnic and human rights issues.

Esmond briefed us of the Parathsarathy proposals which at that time was hotly opposed by many including the monks like Walpola Rahula and the Mahanayake of Asgiriya, Palipane Chandananda. The Parthasarathy proposals were for the setting up of Provincial Councils in a merged North and East. He was a proponent of devolution of powers within a sovereign state.

When we met the TULF in Ashok Hotel he told the Tamil leaders that he had held the Assamese student leaders incommunicado in Delhi till they agreed to his proposals. This may have put fear in the heads of the TULF leaders who may be forgiven for thinking that they too were being held in Delhi to receive the Assamese treatment. They wanted to get back to Sri Lanka as early as possible.

But as we saw earlier, GP was heavily biased towards the TULF position and its leaders need not have entertained any fears. They were safe with GP. It was only with his departure that a more flexible solution became feasible. His departure was a direct consequence of the death of Indira. Her demise had a direct bearing on JRJ and Sri Lanka’s fortunes.

As the TULF leaders lamented there were “orphaned by her death”. India entered a new phase Of her destiny with the death of Indira or ‘Goddess Durga’ as her numerous enemies called her. It marked a sea change in India’s policy towards Sri Lanka.

Death of Indira

The tragic death of her favourite younger son Sanjay in an air accident affected Indira deeply. He was her choice to succeed her to the `gadi’. But tragedy was to strike the Nehru family again and again. With the death of Sanjay, Indira began to turn to Hinds mystics – particularly to a handsome Sadhu, which association had the gossip prone Delhi on overdrive. She also increasingly became autocratic.

As PM she had to face the growing strength of the Sikhs who had been assiduously wooed and pacified by her father. The Sikh leaders were pampered by Nehru who admired their commitment to the Indian Congress during the Independence movement. The ‘green revolution’ had turned the Punjab into the `granary of India’, which was growing more prosperous by the day.

Also, the out migration of Sikhs to western countries had created pockets of political influence abroad supporting the call for Khalistan – an independent Sikh state. RAW with Indira’s backing was creating local leaders like Bhindranwale,  to undercut the troublesome independence seeking Akhali leaders. Standing firm on the Punjab was of the greatest strategic importance for her. As Indira was successful in creating a Bangladesh, could not her enemies, particularly Pakistan, create a Khalistan as tit for tat? In a way the notion of a sovereign Khalistan and Kashmir put a brake on RAW scenarios of an independent Eelam. Eelam could trigger other frightful prospects like a bigger `rogue’ Tamil Nadu outside the Indian Union. Khalistan was a litmus test for the integrity of the Indian Union and Indira unleashed her total strength against the Sikh separatists, led by a RAW invented religious leader Bhindranwale [a la Prabhakaran] who had now turned on his masters.

Indira authorized operation ‘Blue Star’ which was an all-out attack on the extremists holed up in the famous Golden Temple of the Sikhs in Amritsar. It was a murderous, no holds barred attack. The offensive succeeded, the rebels were flushed out and killed, the rebellion was aborted and the majority of Sikhs looked on Indira as a monster who had defiled their holiest site.

The direct result of Operation Blue Star was the assassination of Indira by her Sikh bodyguards when she had left her home on foot to her office a few yards away for a TV interview with BBC. Delhi erupted in an orgy of communal rioting in which thousands of Sikhs were killed and their houses torched. As many studies have shown-including Stanley Tambiah’s ‘Levelling Crowds’ – this was rioting on a mega scale.

It was difficult for Indian diplomats to point their finger at Colombo riots, under these circumstances. The death of Indira meant the end of GP’s leadership of the Sri Lanka negotiations. He was replaced by Romesh Bandari, the Foreign Secretary and personal friend of the new PM. Under Rajiv, who reluctantly succeeded his mother, other players in addition to Bandari entered the scene. They were R Chidambaram, a Harvard trained lawyer from Madurai and N. Ram from the famous Kasturi family – the owners of `The Hindu’.

Ram was a journalist, a Cambridge graduate and a cricketer. In the wings was Venkateshwaran of the Foreign Office who was briefly Foreign Secretary. An admirer of Krishna Menon, Venkateshwaran was a hardliner on the Tamil issue and was sacked summarily by Rajiv Gandhi. The monopoly of Tamilians over Foreign policy was broken. This change of guard brought about a rethinking on India’s Sri Lanka policy.

It was an overall change of direction by Rajiv Gandhi who was moving towards an open economy and dismantling many socialist controls which had fast become dysfunctional during his mother’s ideologically rigid regime. Several of her socialist oriented officials, who were anyway superannuated by now, were shunted aside and a more technology oriented American educated coterie were assembled around the new Prime Minister.

The death of Indira was a blow to the hawks in her entourage who wanted a decisive push against JRJ and the Sri Lankan government. Indira had been looking for a political coup for her Congress party which for the first time since Independence was being challenged by the Janata Party led by former stalwarts of the Congress like Jayaprakash Narayan. She had tried to do something big in the South to bolster her strength and checkmate her political opponents. Her death was therefore a misfortune for the Tamil ‘Ultras’, as Rajiv did not have the same commitment towards them. The LTTE confirmed this set back by planning to assassinate him.



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Misinterpreting President Dissanayake on National Reconciliation

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President Dissanayake

President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has been investing his political capital in going to the public to explain some of the most politically sensitive and controversial issues. At a time when easier political choices are available, the president is choosing the harder path of confronting ethnic suspicion and communal fears. There are three issues in particular on which the president’s words have generated strong reactions. These are first with regard to Buddhist pilgrims going to the north of the country with nationalist motivations. Second is the controversy relating to the expansion of the Tissa Raja Maha Viharaya, a recently constructed Buddhist temple in Kankesanturai which has become a flashpoint between local Tamil residents and Sinhala nationalist groups. Third is the decision not to give the war victory a central place in the Independence Day celebrations.

Even in the opposition, when his party held only three seats in parliament, Anura Kumara Dissanayake took his role as a public educator seriously. He used to deliver lengthy, well researched and easily digestible speeches in parliament. He continues this practice as president. It can be seen that his statements are primarily meant to elevate the thinking of the people and not to win votes the easy way. The easy way to win votes whether in Sri Lanka or elsewhere in the world is to rouse nationalist and racist sentiments and ride that wave. Sri Lanka’s post independence political history shows that narrow ethnic mobilisation has often produced short term electoral gains but long term national damage.

Sections of the opposition and segments of the general public have been critical of the president for taking these positions. They have claimed that the president is taking these positions in order to obtain more Tamil votes or to appease minority communities. The same may be said in reverse of those others who take contrary positions that they seek the Sinhala votes. These political actors who thrive on nationalist mobilisation have attempted to portray the president’s statements as an abandonment of the majority community. The president’s actions need to be understood within the larger framework of national reconciliation and long term national stability.

Reconciler’s Duty

When the president referred to Buddhist pilgrims from the south going to the north, he was not speaking about pilgrims visiting long established Buddhist heritage sites such as Nagadeepa or Kandarodai. His remarks were directed at a specific and highly contentious development, the recently built Buddhist temple in Kankesanturai and those built elsewhere in the recent past in the north and east. The temple in Kankesanturai did not emerge from the religious needs of a local Buddhist community as there is none in that area. It has been constructed on land that was formerly owned and used by Tamil civilians and which came under military occupation as a high security zone. What has made the issue of the temple particularly controversial is that it was established with the support of the security forces.

The controversy has deepened because the temple authorities have sought to expand the site from approximately one acre to nearly fourteen acres on the basis that there was a historic Buddhist temple in that area up to the colonial period. However, the Tamil residents of the area fear that expansion would further displace surrounding residents and consolidate a permanent Buddhist religious presence in the present period in an area where the local population is overwhelmingly Hindu. For many Tamils in Kankesanturai, the issue is not Buddhism as a religion but the use of religion as a vehicle for territorial assertion and demographic changes in a region that bore the brunt of the war. Likewise, there are other parts of the north and east where other temples or places of worship have been established by the military personnel in their camps during their war-time occupation and questions arise regarding the future when these camps are finally closed.

There are those who have actively organised large scale pilgrimages from the south to make the Tissa temple another important religious site. These pilgrimages are framed publicly as acts of devotion but are widely perceived locally as demonstrations of dominance. Each such visit heightens tension, provokes protest by Tamil residents, and risks confrontation. For communities that experienced mass displacement, military occupation and land loss, the symbolism of a state backed religious structure on contested land with the backing of the security forces is impossible to separate from memories of war and destruction. A president committed to reconciliation cannot remain silent in the face of such provocations, however uncomfortable it may be to challenge sections of the majority community.

High-minded leadership

The controversy regarding the president’s Independence Day speech has also generated strong debate. In that speech the president did not refer to the military victory over the LTTE and also did not use the term “war heroes” to describe soldiers. For many Sinhala nationalist groups, the absence of these references was seen as an attempt to diminish the sacrifices of the armed forces. The reality is that Independence Day means very different things to different communities. In the north and east the same day is marked by protest events and mourning and as a “Black Day”, symbolising the consolidation of a state they continue to experience as excluding them and not empathizing with the full extent of their losses.

By way of contrast, the president’s objective was to ensure that Independence Day could be observed as a day that belonged to all communities in the country. It is not correct to assume that the president takes these positions in order to appease minorities or secure electoral advantage. The president is only one year into his term and does not need to take politically risky positions for short term electoral gains. Indeed, the positions he has taken involve confronting powerful nationalist political forces that can mobilise significant opposition. He risks losing majority support for his statements. This itself indicates that the motivation is not electoral calculation.

President Dissanayake has recognized that Sri Lanka’s long term political stability and economic recovery depend on building trust among communities that once peacefully coexisted and then lived through decades of war. Political leadership is ultimately tested by the willingness to say what is necessary rather than what is politically expedient. The president’s recent interventions demonstrate rare national leadership and constitute an attempt to shift public discourse away from ethnic triumphalism and toward a more inclusive conception of nationhood. Reconciliation cannot take root if national ceremonies reinforce the perception of victory for one community and defeat for another especially in an internal conflict.

BY Jehan Perera

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Recovery of LTTE weapons

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Sri Lanka Navy in action

I have read a newspaper report that the Special Task Force of Sri Lanka Police, with help of Military Intelligence, recovered three buried yet well-preserved 84mm Carl Gustaf recoilless rocket launchers used by the LTTE, in the Kudumbimalai area, Batticaloa.

These deadly weapons were used by the LTTE SEA TIGER WING to attack the Sri Lanka Navy ships and craft in 1990s. The first incident was in February 1997, off Iranativu island, in the Gulf of Mannar.

Admiral Cecil Tissera took over as Commander of the Navy on 27 January, 1997, from Admiral Mohan Samarasekara.

The fight against the LTTE was intensified from 1996 and the SLN was using her Vanguard of the Navy, Fast Attack Craft Squadron, to destroy the LTTE’s littoral fighting capabilities. Frequent confrontations against the LTTE Sea Tiger boats were reported off Mullaitivu, Point Pedro and Velvetiturai areas, where SLN units became victorious in most of these sea battles, except in a few incidents where the SLN lost Fast Attack Craft.

Carl Gustaf recoilless rocket launchers

The intelligence reports confirmed that the LTTE Sea Tigers was using new recoilless rocket launchers against aluminium-hull FACs, and they were deadly at close quarter sea battles, but the exact type of this weapon was not disclosed.

The following incident, which occurred in February 1997, helped confirm the weapon was Carl Gustaf 84 mm Recoilless gun!

DATE: 09TH FEBRUARY, 1997, morning 0600 hrs.

LOCATION: OFF IRANATHIVE.

FACs: P 460 ISRAEL BUILT, COMMANDED BY CDR MANOJ JAYESOORIYA

P 452 CDL BUILT, COMMANDED BY LCDR PM WICKRAMASINGHE (ON TEMPORARY COMMAND. PROPER OIC LCDR N HEENATIGALA)

OPERATED FROM KKS.

CONFRONTED WITH LTTE ATTACK CRAFT POWERED WITH FOUR 250 HP OUT BOARD MOTORS.

TARGET WAS DESTROYED AND ONE LTTE MEMBER WAS CAPTURED.

LEADING MARINE ENGINEERING MECHANIC OF THE FAC CAME UP TO THE BRIDGE CARRYING A PROJECTILE WHICH WAS FIRED BY THE LTTE BOAT, DURING CONFRONTATION, WHICH PENETRATED THROUGH THE FAC’s HULL, AND ENTERED THE OICs CABIN (BETWEEN THE TWO BUNKS) AND HIT THE AUXILIARY ENGINE ROOM DOOR AND HAD FALLEN DOWN WITHOUT EXPLODING. THE ENGINE ROOM DOOR WAS HEAVILY DAMAGED LOOSING THE WATER TIGHT INTEGRITY OF THE FAC.

THE PROJECTILE WAS LATER HANDED OVER TO THE NAVAL WEAPONS EXPERTS WHEN THE FACs RETURNED TO KKS. INVESTIGATIONS REVEALED THE WEAPON USED BY THE ENEMY WAS 84 mm CARL GUSTAF SHOULDER-FIRED RECOILLESS GUN AND THIS PROJECTILE WAS AN ILLUMINATER BOMB OF ONE MILLION CANDLE POWER. BUT THE ATTACKERS HAS FAILED TO REMOVE THE SAFETY PIN, THEREFORE THE BOMB WAS NOT ACTIVATED.

Sea Tigers

Carl Gustaf 84 mm recoilless gun was named after Carl Gustaf Stads Gevärsfaktori, which, initially, produced it. Sweden later developed the 84mm shoulder-fired recoilless gun by the Royal Swedish Army Materiel Administration during the second half of 1940s as a crew served man- portable infantry support gun for close range multi-role anti-armour, anti-personnel, battle field illumination, smoke screening and marking fire.

It is confirmed in Wikipedia that Carl Gustaf Recoilless shoulder-fired guns were used by the only non-state actor in the world – the LTTE – during the final Eelam War.

It is extremely important to check the batch numbers of the recently recovered three launchers to find out where they were produced and other details like how they ended up in Batticaloa, Sri Lanka?

By Admiral Ravindra C. Wijegunaratne
WV, RWP and Bar, RSP, VSV, USP, NI (M) (Pakistan), ndc, psn, Bsc (Hons) (War Studies) (Karachi) MPhil (Madras)
Former Navy Commander and Former Chief of Defence Staff
Former Chairman, Trincomalee Petroleum Terminals Ltd
Former Managing Director Ceylon Petroleum Corporation
Former High Commissioner to Pakistan

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Yellow Beatz … a style similar to K-pop!

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Yes, get ready to vibe with Yellow Beatz, Sri Lanka’s awesome girl group, keen to take Sri Lankan music to the world with a style similar to K-pop!

With high-energy beats and infectious hooks, these talented ladies are here to shake up the music scene.

Think bold moves, catchy hooks, and, of course, spicy versions of old Sinhala hits, and Yellow Beatz is the package you won’t want to miss!

According to a spokesman for the group, Yellow Beatz became a reality during the Covid period … when everyone was stuck at home, in lockdown.

“First we interviewed girls, online, and selected a team that blended well, as four voices, and then started rehearsals. One of the cover songs we recorded, during those early rehearsals, unexpectedly went viral on Facebook. From that moment onward, we continued doing cover songs, and we received a huge response. Through that, we were able to bring back some beautiful Sri Lankan musical creations that were being forgotten, and introduce them to the new generation.”

The team members, I am told, have strong musical skills and with proper training their goal is to become a vocal group recognised around the world.

Believe me, their goal, they say, is not only to take Sri Lanka’s name forward, in the music scene, but to bring home a Grammy Award, as well.

“We truly believe we can achieve this with the love and support of everyone in Sri Lanka.”

The year 2026 is very special for Yellow Beatz as they have received an exceptional opportunity to represent Sri Lanka at the World Championships of Performing Arts in the USA.

Under the guidance of Chris Raththara, the Director for Sri Lanka, and with the blessings of all Sri Lankans, the girls have a great hope that they can win this milestone.

“We believe this will be a moment of great value for us as Yellow Beatz, and also for all Sri Lankans, and it will be an important inspiration for the future of our country.”

Along with all the preparation for the event in the USA, they went on to say they also need to manage their performances, original song recordings, and everything related.

The year 2026 is very special for Yellow Beatz

“We have strong confidence in ourselves and in our sincere intentions, because we are a team that studies music deeply, researches within the field, and works to take the uniqueness of Sri Lankan identity to the world.”

At present, they gather at the Voices Lab Academy, twice a week, for new creations and concert rehearsals.

This project was created by Buddhika Dayarathne who is currently working as a Pop Vocal lecturer at SLTC Campus. Voice Lab Academy is also his own private music academy and Yellow Beatz was formed through that platform.

Buddhika is keen to take Sri Lankan music to the world with a style similar to K-Pop and Yellow Beatz began as a result of that vision. With that same aim, we all work together as one team.

“Although it was a little challenging for the four of us girls to work together at first, we have united for our goal and continue to work very flexibly and with dedication. Our parents and families also give their continuous blessings and support for this project,” Rameesha, Dinushi, Newansa and Risuri said.

Last year, Yellow Beatz released their first original song, ‘Ihirila’ , and with everything happening this year, they are also preparing for their first album.

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