Features
Big Match: UNP/SJB and SLPP/SLFP
With the Presidential Commission on the Easter Attacks exonerating (though not absolving) Ranil Wickremesinghe and unreservedly indicting Maithripala Sirisena, there’s bound to be a seismic shift in politics in the country. The SLFP’s response to the Commission – a rejection of its findings, basically – and its decision to appoint Mr Sirisena as Party Chairman must be viewed, and placed, firmly in that context.
Ranil Wickremesinghe might not be the best communicator in national politics today, but if his interview with WION about the Commission’s findings is anything to go by, it’s becoming clear he’s attempting a comeback. This is obviously going to have an impact, not just on deteriorating relations between the SLFP and the SLPP, but more importantly on thawing relations between the UNP and the SJB.
What explains the rift between the former two parties and the reconciliation between the latter two parties? Whether in government or in opposition, the SLFP has tended to splinter and divide, and the UNP has tended to unify. If the UNP ever threatened to break apart from within – as it did in the 1980s with the rise of Ranasinghe Premadasa– negotiation usually held it together firmly. No such fate visited the SLFP.
The UNP’s biggest strength in that sense has always been its ability to get the ball rolling again: this helped it return to power in 1960, 1965, 1977, and 1988, putting it a notch above the SLFP and the Left. To understand how it has been able to do this, one must understand the class interests and social bases it panders to.
The UNP continues to be dominated by a compradore-neoliberal clique, despite the present government having co-opted Colombo’s corporate bloc in the run-up to the November 2019 election. The SJB is not really a reflection of the UNP – it is more populist than neoliberal – but as Mr Harin Fernando’s overtures to the parent party and the confidence with which he spoke of a rapprochement show, the one cannot do without the other. To borrow a familiar metaphor, the SJB is like a son trying to mend relations with his estranged father.
Mr Ranjith Maddumabandara’s attempt at downplaying the possibility of such a merger indicates that there is still opposition to it within the SJB, from the Premadasa faction. But his attempt at saving face should be seen for what it is: a move to legitimise Mr Premadasa’s position as leader of a future UNP-SJB alliance, rather than a pushback against the UNP and the SJB coming together at all.
How will this marriage work out? Simple. The UNP represents class interests which can only co-opt, not consolidate, whatever populist credentials the SJB has; this is true with or without Ranil Wickremesinghe in the UNP. If Maddumabandara’s remarks about his disappointment at Wickremesinghe remaining in the latter party are anything to go by, it’s clear that any SJB-UNP merger will have as its outcome his replacement by Premadasa. Once this is done, the SJB will simply no longer matter; its post-bearers will turn into its pall-bearers, and whatever relevance it had will probably fade away, even if the party name sticks.
Does that necessarily make for an alignment of the interests of one party with those of the other? The difference between these two outfits, as things stand, is less one of substance than of degree, but that does not automatically mean the one is the other. Mr Premadasa’s blend of populist rhetoric and meritocratic appeal attracts a bigger slice of the electorate than Mr Wickremesinghe can or ever will, though to rationalise this as some sort of historical and fundamental split between populists and neoliberals in the UNP would be putting the cart before the horse; as the experience of the last 40 or so years shows, neoliberal economics is not always opposed to populist politics. The two can cohabit, as they did under successive UNP regimes and even, to an extent, under Chandrika Kumaratunga.
It must thus be pointed out that its exclusion of the UNP’s leadership from its hierarchy does not necessarily free the SJB from the UNP’s ideology. Far from it. Harin Fernando’s attempt to bring the two back together again must be seen as yet another instance of Premadasa’s stalwarts summoning the spectre of the parent party: to his attempt we can add Harsha de Silva’s valorisation of the UNP’s foreign policy under yahapanalanist rule, one which no less a figure than Premadasa’s Senior International Relations Advisor, Dr Dayan Jayatilleka, has deemed an unmitigated and disastrous failure. The SJB’s relative silence on the issue of the estate workers – it has been far less silent on the burial controversy and the sugar scandal – moreover seems to indicate that, as far as their economic outlook is concerned, they are still stuck in a neoliberal worldview, unable to get out. It is for this reason that, if he aspires for a broad democratic front which is not only multiethnic but also multiclass, Premadasa must do all he can do distance the SJB from the UNP.
If the SJB is trying to reconcile with the UNP, the SLFP seems to be trying to distance itself from the SLPP. The gulf between the latter two has proved to be wider than the gulf between the former two. This is not surprising: populist as it may be, the SJB has at its apex the ex-middle-benchers of the UNP, while the SLFP even now tends to define itself in opposition to the SLPP. To employ that familiar metaphor again, the SLFP is acting more and more like a father trying to disown his son.
The SLPP represents a wide social base ranging from a lower-middle class to a Colombo condominium class, from the heartland of the South to the rimland of the capital. Targeting all these groups did help the party win two elections and secure a two-thirds majority, yet it also hindered it from achieving the stability a monolithic party holding together so many class interests should aspire to. It cannot be a purely populist outfit, nor can it turn into a neo-UNP. Dominated by so many groups, it has become a hostage to them all.
Naturally, such political alliances cannot last without at least the semblance of intra-party conflicts breaking out into the open. And they have. The ruckus over the ECT deal showed that well: while the Jacobin nationalists led by Mr Wimal Weerawansa and the Old Left led by Mr Vasudeva Nanayakkara and Mr Tissa Vitarana opposed the lease-out arrangement along with the SLFP, the nationalist right remained ambivalent towards it: with some of them arguing that any deal was better than no deal and others arguing that no harm could come from a private investor, they seemed less concerned with a transaction involving a strategic asset than with, say, the 13th Amendment. The sugar scandal and the release of the Easter Attacks Commission’s findings have helped escalate these conflicts, while the contradictions the regime has got itself mired in vis-à-vis Geneva 2021 – like its ambivalent attitude towards Muslims, oscillating between aggressive remarks and conciliatory gestures – have escalated them even more. This is Catch-22 at its finest and most unenviable.
To me the fundamental problem with the SLPP is that it is trying to be many things at the same time. No broad coalition can survive without unity and without accommodating dissent views. The Viyath Maga and Eliya (VM-E) coterie which helped Mr Gotabaya Rajapaksa to come to power, which occupies a moderately prominent place in the SLPP, must thus realise that insofar as their contribution was and is significant, it was but a continuum from the broad populist-leftist alliance that in 2015 launched a campaign to bring Mahinda Rajapaksa back as Prime Minister. The latter grouping simply cannot, and should not, be ignored.
The SLPP can let go of what little populist-leftist credentials it has to canvass support from a nationalist middle-class only at the cost of losing the charisma that Mahinda Rajapaksa, as well as Gotabaya Rajapaksa, summons outside that nationalist middle-class, which anyway is no longer the powerfully monolithic bloc it once was. To put that in perspective, no matter how high on economic paradigms the VM-E coterie and the SLPP minus the Left may be, if they consider those paradigms a substitute for a broad, popular political front, they will have to pay the price for their trivialisation of the latter at the ballot box.
The questions to be asked here then are, firstly, to what extent divisions in the SLPP will last, and secondly, to what extent the UNP and the SJB will iron out their differences and come back as one. In both cases – SLPP/SLFP and UNP/SJB – it’s a question of when, not whether, the nationalist-populist parent will disown its nationalist-populist son, and when, not whether, the populist son will return to its neoliberal parent.
Insofar as political divisions go, and if history is a good indicator of where things will end, the neoliberal right has a better chance of unification with the populist right than the nationalist-populist centre-right has with the nationalist-populist centre-left. It is not my call to say which of these eventualities bodes well for us; all I can say is what may happen, and where things are headed. The first task of the political commentator is not to paste this label or that on this political grouping or that, but to sift through varying class interests to find out how they can bring such groupings together and break them apart. Everything else comes later.
The writer can be reached at udakdev1@gmail.com
Six months into the term of office of the new government, the main positive achievements continue to remain economic and political stability and the reduction of waste and corruption. The absence of these in the past contributed to a significant degree to the lack of development of the country. The fact that the government is making a serious bid to ensure them is the best prognosis for a better future for the country. There is still a distance to go. The promised improvements that would directly benefit those who are at the bottom of the economic pyramid, and the quarter of the population who live below the poverty line, have yet to materialise. Prices of essential goods have not come down and some have seen sharp increases such as rice and coconuts. There are no mega projects in the pipeline that would give people the hope that rapid development is around the corner.
There were times in the past when governments succeeded in giving the people big hopes for the future as soon as they came to power. Perhaps the biggest hope came with the government’s move towards the liberalisation of the economy that took place after the election of 1977. President J R Jayewardene and his team succeeded in raising generous international assistance, most of it coming in the form of grants, that helped to accelerate the envisaged 30 year Mahaweli Development project to just six years. In 1992 President Ranasinghe Premadasa thought on a macro scale when his government established 200 garment factories throughout the country to develop the rural economy and to help alleviate poverty. These large scale projects brought immediate hope to the lives of people.
More recently the Hambantota Port project, Mattala Airport and the Colombo Port City project promised mega development that excited the popular imagination at the time they commenced, though neither of them has lived up to their envisaged potential. These projects were driven by political interests and commission agents rather than economic viability leading to debt burden and underutilisation. The NPP government would need to be cautious about bringing in similar mega projects that could offer the people the hope of rapid economic growth. During his visits to India and China, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake signed a large number of agreements with the governments of those countries but the results remain unclear. The USD 1 billion Adani project to generate wind power with Indian collaboration appears to be stalled. The USD 3.7 billion Chinese proposal to build an oil refinery also appears to be stalled.
RENEWED GROWTH
The absence of high profile investments or projects to generate income and thereby take the country to a higher level of development is a lacuna in the development plans of the government. It has opened the door to invidious comparisons to be drawn between the new government’s ability to effect change and develop the economy in relation to those in the opposition political parties who have traditionally been in the seats of power. However, recently published statistics of the economic growth during the past year indicates that the economy is doing better than anticipated under the NPP government. Sri Lanka’s economy grew by 5 percent in the year 2024, reversing two years of contraction with the growth rate for the year of 2023 being estimated at negative 2.3 percent. What was particularly creditable was the growth rate for the fourth quarter of 2024 (after the new government took over) being 5.4 percent. The growth figures for the present quarter are also likely to see a continuation of the present trend.
Sri Lanka’s failure in the past has been to sustain its economic growth rates. Even though the country started with high growth rates under different governments, it soon ran into problems of waste and corruption that eroded those gains. During the initial period of President J R Jayawardene’s government in the late 1970s, the economy registered near 8 percent growth with the support of its mega projects, but this could not be sustained. Violent conflict, waste and corruption came to the centre stage which led to the economy getting undermined. With more and more money being spent on the security forces to battle those who had become insurgents against the state, and with waste and corruption skyrocketing there was not much left over for economic development.
The government’s commitment to cut down on waste and corruption so that resources can be saved and added to enable economic growth can be seen in the strict discipline it has been following where expenditures on its members are concerned. The government has restricted the cabinet to 25 ministers, when in the past the figure was often double. The government has also made provision to reduce the perks of office, including medical insurance to parliamentarians. The value of this latter measure is that the parliamentarians will now have an incentive to upgrade the health system that serves the general public, instead of running it down as previous governments did. With their reduced levels of insurance coverage they will need to utilise the public health facilities rather than go to the private ones.
COMMITTED GOVERNMENT
The most positive feature of the present time is that the government is making a serious effort to root out corruption. This is to be seen in the invigoration of previously dormant institutions of accountability, such as the Bribery and Corruption Commission, and the willingness of the Attorney General’s Department to pursue those who were previously regarded as being beyond the reach of the law due to their connections to those in the seats of power. The fact that the Inspector General of Police, who heads the police force, is behind bars on a judicial order is an indication that the rule of law is beginning to be taken seriously. By cost cutting, eliminating corruption and abiding by the rule of law the government is removing the obstacles to development. In the past, the mega development projects failed to deliver their full benefits because they got lost in corrupt and wasteful practices including violent conflict.
There is a need, however, for new and innovative development projects that require knowledge and expertise that is not necessarily within the government. So far it appears that the government is restricting its selection of key decision makers to those it knows, has worked with and trusts due to long association. Two of the committees that the government has recently appointed, the Clean Lanka task force and the Tourism advisory committee are composed of nearly all men from the majority community. If Sri Lanka is to leverage its full potential, the government must embrace a more inclusive approach that incorporates women and diverse perspectives from across the country’s multiethnic and multireligious population, including representation from the north and east. For development that includes all, and is accepted by all, it needs to tap into the larger resources that lie outside itself.
By ensuring that women and ethnic minorities have representation in decision making bodies of the government, the government can harness a broader range of skills, experiences, and perspectives, ultimately leading to more effective and sustainable development policies. Sustainable development is not merely about economic growth; it is about inclusivity and partnership. A government that prioritises diversity in its leadership will be better equipped to address the challenges that can arise unexpectedly. By widening its advisory base and integrating a broader array of voices, the government can create policies that are not only effective but also equitable. Through inclusive governance, responsible economic management, and innovative development strategies the government will surely lead the country towards a future that benefits all its people.
by Jehan Perera
Former Minister Ali Sabry’s recent op-ed, “Why Sri Lanka must continue to pursue a non-aligned, yet multi-aligned foreign policy,” published in the Daily FT on 3 March, offers a timely reflection on Sri Lanka’s foreign policy trajectory in an increasingly multipolar world. Sabry’s articulation of a “non-aligned yet multi-aligned” approach is commendable for its attempt to reconcile Sri Lanka’s historical commitment to non-alignment with the realities of contemporary geopolitics. However, his framework raises critical questions about the principles of non-alignment, the nuances of multi-alignment, and Sri Lanka’s role in a world shaped by great power competition. This response seeks to engage with Sabry’s arguments, critique certain assumptions, and propose a more robust vision for Sri Lanka’s foreign policy.
Sabry outlines five key pillars of a non-aligned yet multi-aligned foreign policy:
- No military alignments, no foreign bases: Sri Lanka should avoid entangling itself in military alliances or hosting foreign military bases.
- Economic engagement with all, dependency on none
: Sri Lanka should diversify its economic partnerships to avoid over-reliance on any single country.
* Diplomatic balancing
: Sri Lanka should engage with multiple powers, leveraging relationships with China, India, the US, Europe, Japan, and ASEAN for specific benefits.
- Leveraging multilateralism
: Sri Lanka should participate actively in regional and global organisations, such as UN, NAM, SAARC, and BIMSTEC.
- Resisting coercion and protecting sovereignty
: Sri Lanka must resist external pressures and assert its sovereign right to pursue an independent foreign policy.
While pillars 1, 2, and 5 align with the traditional principles of non-alignment, pillars 3 and 4 warrant closer scrutiny. Sabry’s emphasis on “diplomatic balancing” and “leveraging multilateralism” raises questions about the consistency of his approach with the spirit of non-alignment and whether it adequately addresses the challenges of a multipolar world.
Dangers of over-compartmentalisation
Sabry’s suggestion that Sri Lanka should engage with China for infrastructure, India for regional security and trade, the US and Europe for technology and education, and Japan and ASEAN for economic opportunities reflects a pragmatic approach to foreign policy. However, this compartmentalisation of partnerships risks reducing Sri Lanka’s foreign policy to a transactional exercise, undermining the principles of non-alignment.
Sabry’s framework, curiously, excludes China from areas like technology, education, and regional security, despite China’s growing capabilities in these domains. For instance, China is a global leader in renewable energy, artificial intelligence, and 5G technology, making it a natural partner for Sri Lanka’s technological advancement. Similarly, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) offers significant opportunities for economic development and regional connectivity. By limiting China’s role to infrastructure, Sabry’s approach risks underutilising a key strategic partner.
Moreover, Sabry’s emphasis on India for regional security overlooks the broader geopolitical context. While India is undoubtedly a critical partner for Sri Lanka, regional security cannot be addressed in isolation from China’s role in South Asia. The Chinese autonomous region of Xizang (Tibet) is indeed part of South Asia, and China’s presence in the region is a reality that Sri Lanka must navigate. A truly non-aligned foreign policy would seek to balance relationships with both India and China, rather than assigning fixed roles to each.
Sabry’s compartmentalisation of partnerships risks creating silos in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, limiting its flexibility and strategic depth. For instance, by relying solely on the US and Europe for technology and education, Sri Lanka may miss out on opportunities for South-South cooperation with members of BRICS.
Similarly, by excluding China from regional security discussions, Sri Lanka may inadvertently align itself with India’s strategic interests, undermining its commitment to non-alignment.
Limited multilateralism?
Sabry’s call for Sri Lanka to remain active in organisations like the UN, NAM, SAARC, and BIMSTEC is laudable. However, his omission of the BRI, BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is striking. These platforms represent emerging alternatives to the Western-dominated global order and offer Sri Lanka opportunities to diversify its partnerships and enhance its strategic autonomy.
The BRI is one of the most ambitious infrastructure and economic development projects in history, involving over 140 countries. For Sri Lanka, the BRI offers opportunities for infrastructure development, trade connectivity, and economic growth. By participating in the BRI, Sri Lanka can induce Chinese investment to address its infrastructure deficit and integrate into global supply chains. Excluding the BRI from Sri Lanka’s foreign policy framework would be a missed opportunity.
BRICS and the SCO represent platforms for South-South cooperation and multipolarity. BRICS, in particular, has emerged as a counterweight to such Western-dominated institutions as the IMF and World Bank, advocating for a more equitable global economic order. The SCO, on the other hand, focuses on regional security and counterterrorism, offering Sri Lanka a platform to address its security concerns in collaboration with major powers like China, Russia, and India. By engaging with these organisations, Sri Lanka can strengthen its commitment to multipolarity and enhance its strategic autonomy.
Non-alignment is not neutrality
Sabry’s assertion that Sri Lanka must avoid taking sides in major power conflicts reflects a misunderstanding of non-alignment. Non-alignment is not about neutrality; it is about taking a principled stand on issues of global importance. During the Cold War, non-aligned countries, like Sri Lanka, opposed colonialism, apartheid, and imperialism, even as they avoided alignment with either the US or the Soviet Union.
Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, under leaders like S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and Sirimavo Bandaranaike, was characterised by a commitment to anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, opposing racial segregation and discrimination in both its Apartheid and Zionist forms. Sri Lanka, the first Asian country to recognise revolutionary Cuba, recognised the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, supported liberation struggles in Africa, and opposed the US military base in Diego Garcia. These actions were not neutral; they were rooted in a principled commitment to justice and equality.
Today, Sri Lanka faces new challenges, including great power competition, economic coercion, and climate change. A truly non-aligned foreign policy would require Sri Lanka to take a stand on issues like the genocide in Gaza, the colonisation of the West Bank, the continued denial of the right to return of ethnically-cleansed Palestinians and Chagossians, the militarisation of the Indo-Pacific, the use of economic sanctions as a tool of coercion, and the need for climate justice. By avoiding these issues, Sri Lanka risks becoming the imperialist powers’ cringing, whingeing client state.
The path forward
Sabry’s use of the term “multi-alignment” reflects a growing trend in Indian foreign policy, particularly under the BJP Government. However, multi-alignment is not the same as multipolarity. Multi-alignment implies a transactional approach to foreign policy, where a country seeks to extract maximum benefits from multiple partners without a coherent strategic vision. Multipolarity, on the other hand, envisions a world order where power is distributed among multiple centres, reducing the dominance of any single power.
Sri Lanka should advocate for a multipolar world order that reflects the diversity of the global South. This would involve strengthening platforms like BRICS, the SCO, and the NAM, while also engaging with Western institutions like the UN and the WTO. By promoting multipolarity, Sri Lanka can contribute to a more equitable and just global order, in line with the principles of non-alignment.
Ali Sabry’s call for a non-aligned, yet multi-aligned foreign policy falls short of articulating a coherent vision for Sri Lanka’s role in a multipolar world. To truly uphold the principles of non-alignment, Sri Lanka must:
* Reject compartmentalisation
: Engage with all partners across all domains, including technology, education, and regional security.
* Embrace emerging platforms
: Participate in the BRI, BRICS, and SCO to diversify partnerships and enhance strategic autonomy.
* Take principled stands
: Advocate for justice, equality, and multipolarity in global affairs.
* Promote South-South cooperation
: Strengthen ties with other Global South countries to address shared challenges, like climate change and economic inequality.
By adopting this approach, Sri Lanka can reclaim its historical legacy as a leader of the non-aligned movement and chart a course toward a sovereign, secure, and successful future.
(Vinod Moonesinghe read mechanical engineering at the University of Westminster, and worked in Sri Lanka in the tea machinery and motor spares industries, as well as the railways. He later turned to journalism and writing history. He served as chair of the Board of Governors of the Ceylon German Technical Training Institute. He is a convenor of the Asia Progress Forum, which can be contacted at asiaprogressforum@gmail.com.)
by Vinod Moonesinghe
Cancellation of shows has turned out to be a regular happening where former Backstreet Boys Nick Carter is concerned. In the past, it has happened several times.
If Nick Carter is not 100 percent fit, he should not undertake these strenuous world tours, ultimately disappointing his fans.
It’s not a healthy scene to be cancelling shows on a regular basis.
In May 2024, a few days before his scheduled visit to the Philippines, Carter cancelled his two shows due to “unforeseen circumstances.”
The promoter concerned announced the development and apologised to fans who bought tickets to Carter’s shows in Cebu, on May 23, and in Manila, on May 24.
The dates were supposed to be part of the Asian leg of his ‘Who I Am’ 2024 tour.
Carter previously cancelled a series of solo concerts in Asia, including Jakarta, Mumbai, Singapore, and Taipei. And this is what the organisers had to say:
“Due to unexpected matters related to Nick Carter’s schedule, we regret to announce that Nick’s show in Asia, including Jakarta on May 26 (2024), has been cancelled.
His ‘Who I Am’ Japan tour 2024 was also cancelled, with the following announcement:
Explaining, on video, about the
cancelled ‘Who I Am’ shows
“We regret to announce that the NICK CARTER Japan Tour, planned for June 4th at Toyosu PIT (Tokyo) and June 6th at Namba Hatch (Osaka), will no longer be proceeding due to ‘unforeseen circumstances.’ We apologise for any disappointment.
Believe me, I had a strange feeling that his Colombo show would not materialise and I did mention, in a subtle way, in my article about Nick Carter’s Colombo concert, in ‘StarTrack’ of 14th January, 2025 … my only worry (at that point in time) is the HMPV virus which is reported to be spreading in China and has cropped up in Malaysia, and India, as well.
Although no HMPV virus has cropped up, Carter has cancelled his scheduled performance in Sri Lanka, and in a number of other countries, as well, to return home, quoting, once again, “unforeseen circumstances.”
“Unforeseen circumstances” seems to be his tagline!
There is talk that low ticket sales is the reason for some of his concerts to be cancelled.
Yes, elaborate arrangements were put in place for Nick Carter’s trip to Sri Lanka – Meet & Greet, Q&A, selfies, etc., but all at a price!
Wonder if there will be the same excitement and enthusiasm if Nick Carter decides to come up with new dates for what has been cancelled?
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