Features
Battling the Tea Board and vested trade interests

“Tea Hub” was a toxic proposal that would have hurt pure Ceylon tea
(Excerpted from the Merrill. J. Fernando autobiography)
My fervent appeals to the Tea Board for assistance to local brand builders to develop own brands were, as I said earlier, supported by Victor Santiapillai. My strategy proposal to launch ‘Dilmah’ in Australia as a fully Sri Lankan-owned tea brand was the first such initiative presented to the Tea Board. The Board was enthusiastic and voted the funds I solicited – approximately Australian Dollars 300,000 (Rs. 5.9 million then).
However, the Secretariat bureaucracy, without consulting me, submitted a paper proposing that my project, and all future projects, should be funded on 50/50 basis, between the Board and the exporter. This was, actually, a great blow to my plans, as a tea bagging project is an enormously costly exercise, requiring extensive investment in plant and machinery.
The opposition to my project from the Secretariat is demonstrated by one single fact; the Dilmah initiative went before the Funding Committee – consisting of Government nominees of the Board – no less than 21 times, before it was approved! The many projects which were approved at a single sitting disappeared from view within a short space of time. The Dilmah project, approved so grudgingly by this Funding Committee, is the only such initiative still in successful operation.
Finally, following comprehensive clarifications on brand building and launching expenditure submitted by me to the Tea Board, supported by Santiapillai, as I have mentioned earlier in this chapter, it was agreed that such costs would be shared on an equal basis by the EDB, Tea Board, and Dilmah. Despite the delayed approval, my project continued to be plagued by the tardiness and active opposition by key members of the Secretariat.
The Tea Board share of the promotional costs was unduly delayed, causing me and my distributor in Australia serious embarrassment. Dr. Wickrema Weerasooria, then High Commissioner for Sri Lanka in Australia, had to intervene several times on my behalf with the Chairman of the SLTB, though his appeals were stifled by the Secretariat. At no stage in these painful exercises did I appeal for assistance to the Plantations Minister, Major Jayawickrema, who had ceased to be my father-in-law 12 years previously.
Today, Dilmah carries the message of Pure Ceylon Tea to over 100 countries worldwide. Had I succumbed to the animosity generated against the Dilmah project at the outset, today there would not be one locally-owned label, selling successfully in overseas markets dominated by multinationals. As opposed to that, over the decades the Tea Board has invested millions of dollars, fruitlessly, in a multiplicity of tea promotional projects, but Dilmah remains the only success story, proving beyond doubt that my company was the right partner then for the EDB/SLTB project, to represent Pure Ceylon Tea in an overseas market.
More conflict
One of the main reasons for my numerous conflicts with the long-established trade bodies was their general resistance to change and to my insistence on a more proactive approach from those bodies. The industry in Sri Lanka, on account of its vulnerability to both internal and external dynamics consumption patterns, international financial upheavals, regional conflicts and many more is a highly-volatile system. Our trade governance and regulatory bodies seemed to be entrenched in an archaic mindset, with a singular inability, or reluctance, to offer proactive responses to predictable market disruptions. The tendency seemed to be to jealously guard the status quo.
Once, in a move to change the entrenched ‘clubbiness’ of the CTTA, we enabled the election of Lofty Wijeratne, then a Director of Carsons, as Chairman. Despite requests from many members of the trade, I steadfastly refused to consider the position myself. Lofty, too, was subject to many pressures from vested interests within. I recall a request he made to me, obviously due to compulsion from established
brokers, not to support Ajit Chitty’s application for a tea broker’s license. I disagreed and persisted in my support of Ajit, as I was of the firm view that the trade should encourage the emergence of more local companies. Finally, Ajit entered the broking fraternity with Eastern Brokers and made a very good thing of it.
I am also aware that during this period, when I was involved with numerous issues impacting on the interests of the local exporter, CTTA representatives had been instructed by the relevant British masters to oppose any and all of my initiatives and proposals. In the many years of its existence, the CTTA has, on the whole, done a reasonable job in protecting and fostering industry interests. However, my view is that the constant pressures brought on it by a wide spectrum of industry-related parties and entities has, in recent decades, prevented it from a strict and objective pursuit of its mandate.
When the British dominated every aspect of the tea industry, there was no dissent or conflict of interest, as there was tacit agreement that the CTTA and every other trade-related body was committed to the protection of British interests. The Chamber of Commerce too was not free of this type of internal manipulation and inbuilt politicking. One year I was appointed to the committee of the Chamber. At my very first meeting, a very senior member with strong interests in banking brought in a related issue which was not on the agenda. My objection to the discussion of this item, on those very grounds, was accepted and the matter was dropped immediately.
Within two weeks, Suneetha Jayawickreme, who was then Secretary of the Chamber, called me to advise that a regulation of the Chamber precluded two individuals from the same group of companies from serving on the committee simultaneously. He pointed out that Jayasingham of Harrisons & Crossfield and I were both on the Harrisons Travel Services Board, and that in compliance with the Chamber stipulation, I should resign. I immediately did so, without even waiting for a written confirmation of the discussion. I was actually amused that interested parties had used a legitimate convention, though the association was tenuous, to ease out an individual who was, obviously, not prepared to toe the general line.
I must also state that the criticisms I have leveled against all these boards is in connection with their administration and trajectories as of the early 1970s and across the ’80s. That era is now history, though the consequences of both inaction and misdirected strategies of that time were long-term impediments to the development of the country’s tea export trade. The thinking within those entities is far more balanced and enlightened now, the Tea Exporter’s Association excluded, for reasons which I will explain in a subsequent chapter.
An attempted reconciliation
When a group of traders decided that their parochial interests should supersede industry welfare in its totality, and sought to launch the Tea Exporters’ Association (TEA), I believe that all traders, without exception, supported the move. Several senior members invited me to join but I refused, giving them very good reasons for my opposition to it. One of the members was the late Michael de Zoysa, then Managing Director of Lipton and for many years a prime mover in the CTTA.
He and I frequently disagreed with each other on a number of important trade-related issues. After his retirement from Lipton also he approached me on several occasions and tried to persuade me to join the TEA, on the grounds that the trade was now thinking differently and that they would like to consider my views seriously and work together for common goals.
At first I refused to engage in any discussion on the matter but, finally, after several personal approaches by Michael, I agreed to meet a six-member team of trade representatives led by him. During his years at Lipton, our frequently-conflicting views on common trade-related issues had led to a certain frostiness in our relationship, although we had known each other for years.
I appreciated that as a senior manager of a multinational trader, which he had joined straight from school, he was obliged to guard its interests which, however, were generally inconsistent with those of the local exporter of a locally-owned brand. Things between us changed substantially after his retirement, though, and our relationship became more relaxed, particularly because, once freed from the professional obligation of serving the narrow interests of a multinational, he was able to take a more objective and liberal view of the trade.
Fate, however, does not respect human motives or human plans. Tragically, Michael died suddenly and, instead of chairing the meeting that was scheduled to be held at my home on September 30, 2019, I attended his funeral on that day. Along with Michael, the possibility of a reunification of divergent tea trade interests was also laid to rest. Despite our differences, we treated each other with respect, as we were both men with strong opinions on subjects that were also our passion.
The tea hub – a toxic proposal
In my view, in no other concept or proposal, is the venality of many of our tea traders and their submissiveness to colonial and multinational domination, as clearly demonstrated, as in the arguments that have been offered in support of the ‘Tea Hub’ hypothesis. In essence, the Tea Hub concept is an initiative to import cheap Black Tea to Sri Lanka, for blending with our tea and for re-export thereafter. The component of cheap, imported tea in the blend, would reduce the cost of the resulting export and improve the profit margin of the local packer. This concept has a long history.
The cloud in the horizon
In 1979, the then Minister of Trade, the late Lalith Athulathmudali, visited the Rotterdam factory of Van Rees, a multinational trader. It was a centre for the bulking, blending, and packaging of cheap tea from multiple auction centres, sold thereafter in the Netherlands and various other European markets. Minister Athulathmudali, ignorant of the background realities of the local trade, had been deeply impressed by the scale of the Van Rees operation and, on his return, strongly advocated the setting up of a similar facility in Sri Lanka. When his views were made public, I vehemently objected to the proposal, giving reasons for my stance.
Athulathmudali was adamant but, fortunately, the then President, J. R. Jayewardene, summoned me, obtained my views, and immediately decided to shelve the idea. To the best of my recollection that was the first public airing of the Tea Hub concept. Since then, from time to time, the proposal has surfaced, on the initiative of traders who believe that selling Ceylon Tea cheap is the way forward.
I also recall that in late 1988, R. M. B. Senanayake, former civil servant and then General Manager of Jafferjee Brothers, in a newspaper article, suggested that whenever Ceylon Tea prices move up, exporters should be permitted to import cheaper tea for blending, in place of Tea. My reaction to it then was consternation, that a man who -lave known better should publicly advocate a policy with such potential for damage to the local tea industry.
New developments
On August 1, 2011, the trade members of the Tea Council of the Sri Lanka Tea Board, acting on behalf of the Tea Exporters’ Association submitted to the Tea Council of which I was then Chairman proposal to lift the existing restrictions on the importation of Orthodox Black Tea. Whilst as Chairman of the council I did not express my opinion on the matter, I refuted the proposal in my personal capacity as an exporter and in the larger interests of the tea industry the country.
In the many adverse opinions that were expressed regarding my position on this issue, and of my subsequent vocal and active opposition to the proposal, what was conveniently ignored by all my opponents was that liberalization of Black Tea imports would be greatly advantageous to my own label, ‘Dilmah’. With the global outreach of that brand and the marketing and distribution network which reinforced its overseas sales in over 100 countries, I stood to gain more than any other local exporter by the liberalization of Black Tea importation.
The provision to import specialty tea, not traditionally manufactured locally, is permitted by statute. If I recall rightly, such importation was first permitted in 1981 and the relevant conditions revised in 1994. The 1981 provision was withdrawn when Montague Jayawickrema, then Minister of Plantations, on a visit to Egypt with a trade delegation, ascertained for himself that exporters had been blending cheap Chinese tea with Ceylon Tea in order to reduce the blend cost and were providing the Egyptian market with a very low quality product, which was being perceived by the consumer as Ceylon Tea.
Ironically, that is a perfect example of the proposed methodology of the Tea Hub and, also, its likely outcome. There is no argument against the limited facilities available to the serious exporter for the importation of specialty tea such Darjeeling, select Assams, or other non-traditional varieties, not normally produced in this country. It is a legitimate and acceptable strategy used by exporters to widen their export product portfolio. Such teas are, invariably, far more costly on an average than Ceylon Tea and the Government permits imports of such varieties without restriction.
The annual importation of specialty tea is around five million kg per year, equivalent to two percent of the average annual Black Tea production of Sri Lanka, and is a volume which has no impact on the local industry. A Tea Hub is of immense attraction to the multinational trader or the local exporter, who packs on his behalf. It will enable the former to source his product at low cost, with zero investment in infrastructure, as that will be provided by his local servant at the latter’s cost.
Foreign label owners have no loyalty, either to the country of operation, the operation itself, or even to the consumer. He is motivated entirely by the bottom line and when appropriate, he will move out to another location which is able to serve his needs at a lower cost. This is an inevitable progression and can be illustrated with real-life examples.
Flawed logic
In their support of the Tea Hub proposal, the TEA submitted a wide range of arguments, all virtuously clothed to project an image of potential advantages to the local tea industry, when the actual intent was simply lowering the cost of their export blend.
One of the major planks of the TEA platform has been the totally unsupported premise, that the Tea Hub would soon result in growing the present annual export value of Ceylon Tea, from USD 1.2 billion to USD 5 billion. This hypothesis was never supported by either strategy, complementing arithmetic, or a financially-verifiable equation, and still remains a pathetic piece of wishful thinking. One of their primary concerns is that the high value of Ceylon Tea is an impediment to the servicing of international markets, and that the local opponents of the concept should not be apprehensive, that importation of cheap tea would devalue equivalent grades at the Colombo Auction.
Such arguments defy the simplest concepts of product supply, demand, and price dynamics, and do not merit an elaborate rebuttal. The Tea Hub proposal is based on plain self-delusion, garnished by unverifiable and statistically-unsupportable assumptions. A favourite theory of many economists and marketing consultants with absolutely no practical knowledge of the local tea industry in its totality is based on the feeble assumption that Sri Lankans are not capable of building brands and, therefore, the best option is to reduce Pure Ceylon Tea to the status of a commodity, or a raw material, for branding and value addition elsewhere.
Annually, we produce around 300 million kg of tea and sell all of it at the Colombo Auction, at the highest average price of any auction centre. On an average, we are generally around USD 1 higher than the second highest auction centre, Nairobi. With their wide-ranging arguments for a Tea Hub, that is the real issue that its proponents wish to address; the relatively high auction price in Colombo. The trader who is exporting a cheap commodity at Rs. 500 – Rs. 600 per kg is unable to compete with the local entrepreneur who is exporting a genuine good quality Ceylon Tea, with value added, at Rs. 1,000 per kg or more.
Even the Tea Hub proponents agree that Pure Ceylon Tea is of the finest quality. It does not require marketing expertise to conclude that a product which justifiably claims to be the best in quality must then be marketed at a commensurate price. That is an argument which any consumer will accept. For instance, there there are markets for both `Plonk’ and for high quality wine, with a massive price differential between the two. The Unique Selling Point of the former is price, whilst that of the latter is quality, which is where quality Ceylon Tea belongs.
Another argument that the Tea Hub offers is the increase of export volume, through importation and re-export after blending. Judging the effectiveness of an export operation by volume alone is a serious mistake, as it distorts realities. What is relevant is not the volume and foreign exchange earned, but the contribution to actual value. Heavy exports of bulk tea and crudely-presented small packs, meant for cheap markets, bring little or no return to the exporter.
Those are simply services provided to the multinational trader, by the local packer, with marginal corresponding benefits to the country of production. Value addition to the home-grown product, in the country of origin, is the only strategy which will ensure that all those in the commercial chain, from the farmer to the exporter, reap equitable benefits.
Features
First leftist Mayor after NM: SJB, UNP beaten at their own game

What’s in a vote? That which we call a show of hands could still be as concealed as a secret vote. The newly elected Colombo Municipal Council has chosen the NPP’s Vraie Cally Balthazaar as the City’s new Mayor, but on a secret vote and not in an open show of hands. The secret vote route appears to have caused much consternation among the SJB-UNP opposition forces at the Town Hall. The latter openly preferred an open show and are blaming the secret vote for the defeat of their candidate Riza Zarook.
On the face of it, the NPP with 49 of the 117 Councillors has a more legitimate claim to have one of own as Mayor rather than the SJB with 29 Councillors. In what has been described as a “desperate move”, the SJB forged a mayoral united front by fusing its 29 members with the UNP’s 13, the SLPP’s five and the singular member of the People’s Alliance (whoever the PA now is).
The beefed up SJB mayoral front total of 48 was close enough to the NPP’s 49 for claims of legitimacy, and both sides needed the support at least another 11 or 10 from the remaining 20 members to get the required majority of 59 votes. In the secret vote, the NPP’s candidate presumably got 12 of the non-allied votes to get 61 votes in total. The SJB mayoral front got only six for a total 54 votes. Two votes, there’s no certainty as to whose, were rejected.
Would the result have gone the other way if this municipal conclave had decided on an open show instead of papal secrecy? You do not need supernatural powers to determine that. Let alone a clairvoyant like Gota’s Gnanaka! The commonplace supposition would be that a secret vote may have allowed secret transactions to secure support with hidden hands.
But no one is accusing the JVP-NPP of resorting to such time-(dis)honoured tactics perfected for over 75 years by the UNP and later copied by all others, and most vigorously by the Rajapaksas. If I remember right or not mistaken, the Sunday Times Political Editor made the point after the May LG elections that there was no hanky-panky meddling in the elections by the NPP government – unlike (this is my parentheses) all previous governments in all previous elections.
As well, we may turn the question around and ask about the insistence on an open show of hands as against a secret vote. Is it because the SJB is now all for keeping its hands clean and asking others to show their hands of support in the open without receiving undue incentives? OR is it because the SJB and its allies wanted to see in the open which of the NPP councillors, who may have been beneficiaries of earlier incentives, would now betray them and support the NPP candidate?
Put another way, was it a stratagem to ask for a show of hands to see the breach of loyalty in the open in spite of past IOUs? The latter hypothesis has greater credibility because of the blessings given to the SJB alliance by two former presidents representing two fallen political houses.
No matter what happened secretly and how, the eventual victory of Ms. Balthazar as NPP Mayor chalks up a rare non-UNP victory in the history of Colombo Town Hall politics. After independence there have been only two non-UNP Mayors in Colombo. The first came as a progressive breakthrough when NM Perera became Mayor in 1954. The second came as a comical farce in 2006, when Uvais Mohamed Imitiyas, the leader of an independent group put up by the UNP after its botched up list of candidates had been rejected by the Election Commissioner. Ms. Balthazar is also the City’s second female mayor in quick succession after Rosy Senanayake herself an old school UNPer.
In NM’s Footsteps
News commentaries on Ms. Balthazar’s victory have made mention of the fact that she is the first leftist Mayor of Colombo in 70 years. The first and the last leftist Mayor so far has been Dr. NM Perera, the LSSP leader. NM had been a CMC member from July 1948 and became Mayor on 13 August 1954 after the municipal election on 24 July 1954. A New York Times news report called him the world’s first Trotskyite Mayor, a tongue-in-cheek shot that was characteristic of the Cold War era.
An era that the world badly misses now with an unstoppable Netanyahu and TACO (Trump always chickens out) Trump running amok. In this instance, with Middle East burning, Trump has chickened out to the war schemes of Netanyahu.
Back to Colombo of the 1950s, the LSSP fared well in the LG elections of 1954 including Colombo, a number of Urban Councils and many village councils. In Colombo, NM was accompanied by a strong LSSP contingent that included stalwarts like Bernard Soysa Osmund Jayaratne and a well known architect of the era, J. E. Devapura. Some years ago, Stanley Abeynaike recounted the saga of NM’s Mayorship in the Sunday Observer. Last week, Nandana Weerarathne (Nandana Substack) has recalled the old NM story in the current context.
The initiatives that NM spearheaded as Mayor are worthy of emulation even today. The first order of business was ridding Town Hall of bribery and corruption and implementing a purposeful budget. He took on the private omnibus system within Colombo, replacing it by a public trolley-bus service; and started planning a public bus service for the city and suburban travellers in collaboration with the local authorities of Kolonnawa, Wattala, Dehiwela, Mount-Lavinia and Kotte. City cleanup, slum clearance, small housing schemes, upkeep of rental housing neglected by landlords, and transferring ownership of rental housing to tenants after 30 years of occupancy – were among the progressive measures that were rapidly rolled out during NM’s methodical mayorship.
But all those initiatives of NM riled up the landlords and the private bus owners, and through them the entire UNP government of Prime Minister Kotelawala. Sir John and his cabal were not going to let NM to be the Mayor of Colombo’s even as the country was heading to the general election in 1956. A conspiracy was hatched, and a resolution was passed at an emergency UNP meeting at Sri Kotha, the UNP headquarters, “to remove the Colombo Mayor, Dr. NM Perera.” Even the courts got in on the act to facilitate a resolution at Council against NM as Mayor.
When the resolution to remove NM as Mayor finally came to the floor, Bernard Soysa, Osmund Jayaratne and JE Devapura took turns speaking for hours on end against the resolution. They were hoping to run the clock until the Supreme Court ruling came. But to no avail, and the resolution was passed on October 1st, 1955 by a majority of two votes. One of them was the Communist Party’s Kotahena Member Anthony Marcellus who was brought over to the UNP to vote against NM. Orchestrating the moves was R. Premadasa (father of the current SJB leader) who was brought from outside to oversee matters inside, replacing then Deputy Mayor T. Rudra, who was obliged to resign. All of that in time for the April 1956 election that the UNP lost anyway.
Even the 2006 election of Uvais Mohamed Imitiyas, a political nondescript, as mayor, was the result of the backfiring of a UNP plan to prevent Vasudeva Nanayakkara, another LSSPer, from becoming Mayor. The UNP even got the better of Milinda Moragoda, one time Wickremesinghe confidant, when he chose to make a run for the Mayorship with the support of the Rajapaksas in 2011. UNP fielded its own candidate, AJM Muzammil, who defeated Moragoda and stayed on as Mayor until Rosie Senanayake succeeded him as the next, and now likely the last, UNP Mayor.
So, one can imagine the consternation of Ranil Wickremesinghe in seeing even the last bastion of the UNP’s power legacy being taken away by the upstart NPP. After 1977, through constitutional chicanery and electoral subterfuge the UNP established its supremacy at all levels of government and in all elections. After Chandrika Kumaratunga’s spectacular victories in 1994, the UNP’s electoral superstructure has been steadily dismantled and the only elected body that has survived this debacle is the Colombo Municipality. Until now, that is.
And all of this has been on Ranil Wickremesinghe’s watch. He has been quintessentially a Colombo politician, albeit with an elitist base like JR Jayewardene, unlike the likes of Pieter Keuneman, Bernard Soysa or R. Premadasa who reached out to a broader cross-section of people in the City. Losing Colombo would be the bitterest pill to swallow.
If you are inclined to feel sorry for Mr. Wickremesinghe, save yourself some space to feel good about the future of the City and even the country. Leaving Colombo in the hands of an opportunistically cobbled up SJB-UNP-SLPP alliance would have been both an insult and an injury. The NPP deserved to have one from its ranks as Mayor and it has beaten the UNP in its own game to seal its victory. But having won to govern, will the NPP govern to win – again? That is the question.
by Rajan Philips ✍️
Features
Criminalise war and work tirelessly for peace: Dr. Mahathir Mohamad

Soon to be 100-years ( July 10 th 1925) the two times former Prime Minister of Malaysia’s advice to the world is to “Criminalize War” and work tirelessly for peace.
Q: What is the secret to your healthy happy life?
A: People ask me that question all the time and I say I think its just my good luck. If I have suffered from some kind of fatal disease like cancer, of course life would be different.
I have had heart attacks, and both times I had open heart surgery, but nowadays they don’t open your heart. They use stents. I survived and I recovered and I was able to function. After that I am more careful with what I eat. I keep my weight steady. I do not increase my weight.
In this world, food is the problem. On the one hand you have people who are obese and on the other hand, we have a world that is starving. So, I avoid being obese and eat only very little every day.
Q: What is your advice to the younger generation?
A: My advice is to be active. Active means not only physically active. The brain is an amazing muscle. You need to use it every single day. If you see weight lifters, they have big muscles because they do exercise, You must not become sedentary. Brain must be constantly exercised.
Q: Now that you have retired, what is your day like?
A: I want to take it easy, but most of the time, I come to work almost daily. Usually, people try to retire at 55 or 56. But they must not do that. I keep my body and mind active all the time. I still read, write and do whatever is needed of me.
Q: About the world and with all that is going on around us, what would your advice be to all nations, specially to the nations that are at war?
A: When I stepped down from being Prime Minister, I started a movement to ‘Criminalize War” to make war a crime. There was some support, it took a long time. I believe that any conflict should be resolved. Not through killing each other. You should resolve conflicts through peaceful means like negotiations. That is what we practice here. We are a multinational country, normally there would be many conflicts, but we do not have war in Malaysia. We sit down and talk.
Q: If you had one more opportunity to be Prime Minister of Malaysia, what would you do differently this time?
A: When I stepped down after 22 years, there was still a lot of things to be done. These 22 years were a time of very high tension that came from developed countries. So, at that time, I had to know how things should be done and when things should be done. When I stepped down, unfortunately, my successors were focused on other things. In fact, making money became their priority, so the focus on the country, diminished.
Q: What is the one thing you would like to see happen in your country or in the world as a whole?
A: There are developed countries and there are under developed countries. We want to be a developed country. Developed countries have many assets. For example, economically our people have a fairly good life, our people are involved in activities that contribute to the wellbeing of each other and to other nations. Countries need to help each other, for example in the sciences. There are many areas of research that still need to be done. I would like to see developed countries, reach out to developing countries and form healthy alliances to make each other prosperous.
I have lived a fruitful life. I am happy and I wish to see all nations prosperous and live in peace.
Anusha Rayen, Freenlance Journalist (Formerly ‘The Island Newspaper’ staff member & Parliament reporter) sits for an exclusive interview with former PM of Malaysia Dr. Mahathir Mohamad in Puthrajaya.
Features
Price of Netanyahu’s Iran Offensive

That was brutal, and predicated on years of fabricated deceit. But that is how power operates. Netanyahu is not acting in isolation; he was ushered into this calamity with calculated endorsement from the West. For both Iran and Israel, this is a zero-sum confrontation—a tragic entanglement where ancient antagonisms, contemporary geopolitics, and enduring colonial residues violently intersect. What is most intellectually arresting is the glaring paradox Western powers routinely embrace. When Netanyahu launches a premeditated and unlawful assault on Iran, it is euphemistically labelled as a measure of self-defence. Yet when Vladimir Putin deploys forces into Ukraine, the West decries it as an unprovoked invasion. This hypocrisy in moral reasoning illustrates the incoherence of Western ethical frameworks—marked by selective outrage, selective jurisprudence, and selective memory.
Netanyahu is actively courting American bombardment of Tehran, even venturing so far as to suggest the types of ordnance most suitable for maximum devastation. Trump, meanwhile, hesitates—not over Iran’s fate, but because the ensuing ramifications will inevitably encircle him. This cynical arithmetic typifies the geopolitical stage on which empires perform their cruelties. A week has now passed since Netanyahu’s incursion into Iran—a deliberate campaign tacitly sanctioned by the United States and its constellation of affluent allies, whose modern prosperity is inseparable from centuries of extraction and systemic plunder. War, whether desirable or not, remains the central mechanism by which empires assert dominion, redraw territories, and dismantle resistance. Israel’s open defiance of international law—manifest in its missile barrage on Iranian soil—lays bare an unsettling truth: if global powers truly revered international legal norms, Netanyahu’s actions would face unequivocal denunciation. Instead, one could argue—chillingly—that he affirms history’s most ominous prophecies.
Western media, complicit in sanitising this act of aggression, frames it as an “unprecedented” strike—yet again resorting to euphemism to mask illegality. This was not an improvisational operation; it was the culmination of extensive clandestine preparation by Netanyahu and his ultranationalist Orthodox coalition. Israel’s intelligence apparatus has, over decades, embedded itself within the architecture of Iranian society, executing key figures and orchestrating strategic assassinations. The latest Friday strikes were not merely military engagements—they constituted a coordinated political decapitation, targeting senior officials central to the Iranian state.
Iranian society today endures compounded crises. Their tenacity and national pride remain steadfast, yet they are economically suffocated by Western sanctions, which have induced runaway inflation and scarcity. From first-hand experience in Tehran, Iranians are not consumed by a siege mentality; rather, they display a cautious hospitality that, once trust is earned, transforms into deep generosity—qualities starkly misrepresented in Western discourse. In contrast, Israelis are socialised into a perpetual state of existential fear. “Security” is not merely policy—it is a psychological infrastructure, permeating every aspect of public and private life. Israel’s economy thrives not only through sanctioned trade but through its robust arms industry and cyber-warfare enterprises, often exported under the guise of national expertise. This divergence in societal conditioning is critical: it reflects distinct historical wounds and geopolitical compulsions.
To grasp Israel’s war on Iran, one must situate it within the long arc of Western imperial entrenchment in West Asia. This history is punctuated by covert operations, artificial borders, and a strategy of managed chaos. The 1953 CIA-backed coup in Iran—toppling the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and reinstating the autocratic Shah—is emblematic of this trajectory. For decades, Western powers suppressed indigenous sovereignty while installing compliant strongmen. The 1979 Islamic Revolution was not merely theological upheaval; it was a radical assertion of national agency forged in the crucible of sustained foreign domination. In the revolution’s wake, Iranian society was reconstituted through a deep-rooted collectivism and assertive nationalism that continues to shape its resistance against external coercion.
Viewed through this prism, Netanyahu’s tenure may be remembered as one of the most corrosive in Israel’s history. By fusing religious chauvinism with militaristic expansionism, he has eviscerated Israel’s democratic ethos, transforming “security” into a tool of territorial expropriation and systemic Palestinian disenfranchisement. His escalation against Iran is not merely a tactical error; it is an incitement to regional disintegration. Framed as a crusade for “unconditional surrender,” his belligerence risks igniting a broader conflagration whose consequences will inevitably recoil upon Israel itself. Netanyahu, then, appears less as a strategist than as a provocateur, recklessly agitating the region’s deepest historical and sectarian fissures.
According to Haaretz, an independent Israeli media outlet operating despite a severely censored and often propagandistic Israeli media environment, several prominent progressive Jewish groups were notably absent from the so-called “joint unity statement” backing Israel’s strikes on Iran. These groups contend that while Iran should not acquire nuclear weapons, military action will at best delay the threat and more likely strengthen hardliners. They argue that diplomacy, not bombs, has proven effective in preventing nuclear proliferation—revealing significant divisions within the Jewish community over Netanyahu’s war.
Meanwhile, a report in the Financial Times captures the civil dimension of this confrontation. Despite sustained bombardment, millions of Iranians remain in Tehran. “Trump and Netanyahu say ‘evacuate’ as if they care about our health. How can a city of 10 million evacuate? My husband and I are not going to pave the ground for them. Let them kill us,” Shirin, a private sector employee told the newspaper. Their refusal to flee is not naïveté—it is a visceral affirmation of identity and resistance. The Iranian public consciousness, hardened by decades of war, sanctions, and subterfuge, manifests a collective defiance often misread in the West. The state’s nationalist discourse resonates beyond clerical authority; it channels a cultural memory of resistance against imperial intrusion.
Moreover, the disproportionate risk to civilians is staggering. Israeli operations ostensibly targeting senior military personnel inevitably endanger entire urban populations, as these individuals live and operate within densely populated civilian zones. The echoes of Israel’s operations in Lebanon—where missile strikes against Hezbollah figures claimed high civilian casualties—are unmistakable. The Iranian Health Ministry’s figure of nearly 1,500 casualties reveals the raw human cost beneath the rhetoric of strategic necessity.
This episode also exposes the profound hypocrisy embedded in Western narratives on nuclear proliferation. The International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly found no conclusive evidence that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon systematically. Yet, Western powers wield this unverified threat as a pretext for military aggression. The contradictory statements from US officials—from intelligence directors denying Iran’s weaponisation efforts to presidents asserting Tehran is “very close” to the bomb—reflect a politicisation of intelligence designed to justify interventionism.
History has shown the futility of liberal interventionist fantasies: that democracy can be air-dropped or imposed through market restructuring. The Arab Spring, once heralded as a democratic revival, instead expedited the collapse of fragile states and exacerbated regional instability. The supposed liberal order in West Asia has devolved into a transactional, militarised regime wherein peace is manufactured, not cultivated.
Netanyahu’s war on Iran is not an anomaly—it is the terminal result of accumulated imperial failures, ideological rigidity, and historical amnesia. It confirms a grim axiom: when utopias collapse, it is always the powerless who bleed. His offensive, cloaked in the pieties of national security, belongs to a longer, darker chronicle—one whose conclusion will define the fate of West Asia and the very contours of justice in our century.
by Nilantha Ilangamuwa ✍️
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