Features
Apportioned Seats in Parliament and the “National List”
by Prof. Savitri Goonesekere
The recent appointment of well known entrepreneur and businessman Dhammika Perera to a seat in Parliament on the resignation of former minister Basil Rajapakse was challenged in several petitions in the Supreme Court. These petitions mainly alleged a violation of the fundamental right to equality, nondiscrimination, and non arbitrary decision making in the filling of a vacancy created in regard to a seat in Parliament occupied (not through election,) but APPORTIONMENT of seats, based on the votes cast at a General election. This concept of apportionment of 29 of the total number of seats in the electoral system of proportional representation was introduced into the Constitution’s provisions governing elections and the Peoples’ franchise, by the 14th Amendment to the Constitution in 1988.
The appointment of Mr. Perera to Parliament on an apportioned seat, in the midst of an unprecedented and grave political and economic crisis generated public controversy. Some considered his appointment a welcome effort to bring entrepreneurial experience into government at this time. Others viewed the appointment negatively and challenged its validity in these petitions in the Supreme Court. Mr. Basil Rajapaksa’s appointment had not been challenged in this manner. Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka had also held an apportioned seat, which had been challenged unsuccessfully in Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) v. Kabir Hashim in SC Appl. 54/2016. The possibility of bringing experts into Parliament through the apportioned seat process on the national list has been discussed even recently as a useful response to the current crisis.
The current petitions are of public concern, as they raised an important issue on the People’s right to franchise, and the meaning of Constitutional and legal regulations applicable to apportionment of seats in Parliament, on the basis of the Peoples’ exercise of their voting rights. The case was an opportunity to clarify the law and practice on this important topic relating to the franchise, as well as the eligibility of persons to occupy 29 apportioned seats in Parliament.
The petitions in the Dhammika Perera case were dismissed by the Supreme Court, at the preliminary procedural stage of granting leave to proceed with the litigation. No reasons were given for the decision, though the court heard arguments of Counsel in support of and in opposition to the petition. However the Court clarified that the refusal of leave to proceed was a split decision, with one dissent in a bench of three judges. Since no reasons were given, the approach of the majority and the dissenting judge to the legal issues raised by Counsel in regard to appointments to apportioned seats in Parliament, remains unknown to the public.
The decision of the court not to write a judgment and give reasons for refusing leave after hearing Counsel in the Dhammika Perera case at this preliminary procedural stage, follows the practice of the Court in exercising the discretion given in Article 126 (2) of the Constitution. The right to obtain relief for violation of a fundamental right is a right guaranteed by Article 17 and Articles 126 (2) and (4). The Supreme Court has been given a discretion by Article 126 (2) to decide whether it will grant leave to proceed with the application for relief and remedy for alleged violations of fundamental rights. This follows a tradition in Common law jurisdictions to ensure that courts are not overburdened in litigation, also reflecting a policy approach on avoiding unnecessary costs of litigation. Yet there is also jurisprudence in the Supreme Court indicating a different approach to the granting of leave to proceed.
In the Shirani Bandaranyake Appointment to the Supreme Court Case (1997 1 SLR 92 ) the Chief Justice decided that the case raised an important issue of “general and public importance” and referred the applications to a bench of seven judges. Justice Mark Fernando speaking for the court said that “having regard to the complexity and gravity of the questions involved, Counsel for both the petitioners and respondents were heard in support of and opposition to the petitions.” (p 93). Justice Fernando and Justice Perera wrote separate judgments, in a unanimous decision of the Court to refuse leave to proceed, creating important jurisprudence on this subject.
If this approach articulated by Justice Mark Fernando guides the Supreme Court, and is clarified in Rules of the Supreme Court, petitioners and the public will know the basis on which the Supreme Court refuses leave to proceed with a Fundamental Rights Application, relating to an important issue of public concern. The issue of apportionment of seats in Parliament is an issue of public concern to voters, just as appointments to high public office, as in the Shirani Bandaranayaka case also raised issues of public concern. Giving reasons can only enhance the stature of the court as an indispensable institution in the administration of justice in a Constitution that perceives the courts as exercising the “judicial power of the People” [Article 4 (c)]. This was also referred to in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Dissolution of Parliament case (2018.) Citing an American case, Baker v Car (1962), His Lordship HNJ Perera CJ said “the court’s authority possessed of neither purse nor sword ultimately rests on sustained public confidence.”(Sampanthan v AG (2018) p 69).
The unresolved constitutional issue of appointments to Parliament on apportionment, and the National List.
Article 99A introduced by the 14th Amendment is very clear on the persons eligible to occupy apportioned seats after a general election. The meaning of this Article, in the context of the statute law also regulating elections i.e. the Parliamentary Election Act No. 1 of 1981 was the crux of the case argued by Counsel for the petitioners in the Dhammika Perera case. Geoffrey Alagaratnam PC former President of the Bar Association and other eminent lawyers who supported the petitions drew attention to the need to clarify the law on this important issue of public concern, because of a seeming conflict between the Constitutional provision (Article 99A) and Section 64 (5) of the Parliamentary Elections Act (1981).
Article 99A of the Constitution clearly states that persons allocated apportioned seats in Parliament based on the votes cast at a general election must be persons eligible to be MPs, whose name appears on a list submitted within the period of nominations, to the Commissioner of Elections. This list is now popularly known as the “National List,” from which a person may be nominated to hold a seat on the basis of apportionment and votes cast at the general elections. Article 99A also includes another category of persons who can hold such a seat. This is a person whose name is on an electoral list. Article 99A does not indicate that there is any other requirement of eligibility. It is therefore clear from Article 99A of the Constitution that both defeated candidates and persons on the National List are eligible to occupy apportioned seats.
The issue of defeated candidates occupying these seats is therefore an ethical rather than a legal or Constitutional issue. Consequently Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe is lawfully occupying the seat apportioned to the UNP, though he was defeated at the General Elections (2019) and also publicly stated that candidates defeated at a General election should not occupy seats apportioned to the party. However Article 99A as argued by Counsel in the Dhammika Perera case does not permit persons who are NOT on the National list submitted at the time of nominations, to be allocated apportioned seats in Parliament. The procedure set out in Article 99A is for the Commissioner of Elections to request a Secretary of a party to nominate persons to fill an apportioned seat. The language of 99A does not enable persons outside these categories to be considered eligible to hold these apportioned seats.
The popular idea that a party in Parliament, particularly at this time of a national crisis, can bring to Parliament professionals and others with special expertise, does not conform to the eligibility criterion set out in Article 99A. Therefore, persons who occupied these apportioned seats, whether Basil Rajapaksa or Sarath Fonseka also did not satisfy the Constitutional provision on eligibility to fill an apportioned seat. Article 99A seems to have been ignored in discussions on appointments to Parliament on the national list.
It is also clear that this Article 99A in the Constitution casts a duty and responsibility upon the Commissioner of Elections and the Secretary of a Political Party who nominates a person to an apportioned seat to abide by Article 99A. The Commissioner is a public servant, and he can be sued in a fundamental rights violation case relevant to wrongful allocation of an apportioned seat. The Secretary of a Political party is a Non-State actor but becomes liable for a wrong decision since our courts connect him to the inaction of the State or government agency in ensuring conformity to the Constitution. (Faiz v. AG (1995 1 SL 372).
The PROVISIONS in the Parliamentary Elections Act 1 of 1981 on VACANCIES to one of the 29 APPORTIONED seats in Parliament
The Parliamentary Elections Act (1981) Section 64 was amended consequent to the 14th Amendment in 1988. This provision in the principal enactment of 1981 dealt with filling of vacancies in seats in Parliament. When the 14th Amendment provided in Article 99A for a National list, and apportionment of seats, a new provision Section 64 (5) was introduced into the principal legislation, the Parliamentary Elections Act, to cover the procedure for filling vacancies to these apportioned seats. Section 64 (5) enacted by an amendment of 1988, i.e. the same year as the 14th Amendment, uses the words “Notwithstanding anything in the previous provisions” (ie on vacancies in regard to ordinary seats in the principle enactment of 1981), and sets out a PROCEDURE for filling vacancies in the special APPORTIONED seats created by Article 99A of the 14th Amendment. This 1988 provision Section 64 (5) added to the Parliamentary Elections Act indicates that in the case of persons occupying these apportioned seats, a vacancy is filled by “the Secretary General of Parliament informing the Commissioner of Elections who then requires the Secretary of the Party or leader of the relevant independent group apportioned a seat to nominate a member of such party ” to fill the vacancy. It is this language on PROCEDURE in filling vacancies to apportioned seats, that is now being used to argue that the Secretary of a party or leader of an independent group has complete discretion to appoint a person of his/ her choice to fill a vacancy.
Our Constitution has a controversial Article 16 (1) that has been consistently criticized, which does not permit judicial review of legislation once it is enacted by Parliament. Even in jurisdictions like India, South Africa and Canada, that permit judicial review of legislation for non-conformity with the Constitution, there is a legal concept of “Presumption of Constitutionality of legislation” and “reading down” legislation in order to follow a “purposive” interpretation that seeks to harmonize the basic law of the land, a country’s Constitution and legislation enacted by Parliament.
In Sri Lanka in the in the cases AG v Sampath SC Appeal 17/2013 and SC Ref 3/2008 the Supreme Court refused to follow a provision in the amended Penal Code of 1995 that provided for minimum sentences on the ground that the legislation could not be interpreted as restricting the judicial discretion of the Courts. Both these judgments held that the power of interpretation of law is embedded in the judicial power recognized in Art 4 (c) of the Constitution. This could not be restricted by ordinary law (in this case the amended Penal Code) since the Constitution is the Supreme Law. While this decision may be critiqued as in conflict with the restricted power of post enactment judicial review of legislation in our Constitution, the decisions indicate that there is a rationale for interpretations that seek to give predominance to the Constitution as the basic law of the land.
As Mr. Alagaratnam PC and other Counsel for the petitioners argued in the Dhammika Perera case, interpreting section 64 (5) of the Elections Act as giving an absolute discretion to the Secretary of a Party or the leader of an independent group apportioned a seat, to fill a vacancy in that seat, means that he/she can ignore completely the criterion on eligibility for apportioned seats, so clearly set out in the 14th Amendment, when it introduced a concept of apportioning 29 seats. This is surely a situation where an interpretation must be adopted that recognizes rather than undermines the significance of basic Constitutional provisions on eligibility to occupy a seat in the legislature.
In CPA vs Kabir Hashim, Sripavan CJ delivered a short judgment, when refusing leave to proceed in a petition challenging the nomination of Sarath Fonseka to a vacancy in an apportioned seat. His Lordship held that the issue of filling vacancies was not considered in Article 99A of the Constitution (on apportioned seats). This was regulated by the procedures detailed in Section 64 (5) of the Parliamentary Elections Act which, His Lordship said, gave a discretion to the secretary of the party or the leader of an independent group to nominate the person to fill a vacancy in an apportioned seat. His Lordship did not, with respect, address the substantive requirements for eligibility to occupy an apportioned seat, that were set out in Article 99A, when the 14th Amendment to the Constitution created this new category of seats in our Parliament. His Lordship’s opinion also takes a different approach to ordinary law vis- a-vis the Constitution as the “supreme law of the land,” in the cases referred to earlier.
It is with respect difficult to consider the decision in CPA v. Kabir Hashim as a judicial precedent that binds the Supreme Court, and prevents the matter being considered again in light of the specific language in Article 99A of the Constitution on eligibility to occupy an apportioned seat in Parliament. The Supreme Court has not followed a strict approach to the concept of “stare decisis” or binding precedent in a context where the structure of our courts has changed through both statutes and post independence Constitutions. The capacity of a superior court to contribute to development of the law without being fettered by previous decisions is reflected in important decisions of judges like Basnayaka CJ in Bandahamy v. Senanayake (1960) 62 NLR 313 and Wanasundere J in Walker Sons v Gunathilleke (1978- 19801 SLR 231.
Conclusion
It is in the public interest that the meaning of Article 99A and the policy on apportioning 29 seats in Parliament is clarified and addressed in any further amendments to the Constitution. Giving a complete discretion to a non-State official like a Party Secretary to choose persons entitled to fill vacancies in apportioned seats based on electoral votes, undermines voting rights. There is also the public interest in having persons qualified to occupy these apportioned seats being nominated initially, or in filling vacancies that are created later. More specific criterion of eligibility to take apportioned seats will also address the public interest in bringing a diverse range of experience to the legislature of the country through the National list. Such an amendment should also clearly make defeated candidates not eligible to occupy such seats.
The Dhammika Perera case raises once again an issue of public concern in regard to filling vacancies in the 29 apportioned seats in Parliament, either through the national or electoral list. Clarifying the law can be done without delay through the contemplated current Constitutional reforms. If this is not done, it seems important for the Chief Justice to appoint at least a Divisional Bench to provide a clear interpretation of Article 99A of the Constitution or point to the important need for clarity on this matter through a Constitutional amendment.
Litigation in the courts and ground realities indicate that there are many important unresolved issues that require constitutional reform. Even within the current Presidential system, the cumbersome procedure for impeachment of a President and also judges of the Supreme Court, and appointments on the National List, clearly require significant review and reform. And yet, ad hoc constitutional reform efforts like the 19th Amendment, 20th Amendment and the proposed 21st Amendment, seem to ignore public concern for reforms in these important areas. There should be public advocacy to ensure that all these areas are addressed immediately in the current constitutional reform process.
Features
Trials-at-Bar in Sri Lanka: Use and abuse
It is reported that a Trial-at-Bar is being contemplated in respect of allegations against former President Ranil Wickremesinghe regarding misuse of state resources for a visit to a British university on his return from attending sessions of the United Nations in New York and an official visit to Cuba. If this is correct, it would make legal history in our country, because there has been no previous instance of the procedure of a Trial-at- Bar being invoked against a former Head of State.
In view of the constitutional importance of the issues involved, the attempt is opportune to consider the conceptual and statutory foundations of our law relating to Trials-at-Bar, the boundaries of its application in practice, and the nature of the responsibilities attributed to the principal functionaries with regard to the conduct of these proceedings.
I. The Statutory Framework
A Trial-at-Bar is an extraordinary procedure operating over and above proceedings in regular courts exercising criminal jurisdiction at first instance. Its form is that of three judges of the High Court, sitting usually without a jury, to try an indictable offence. The main provision is contained in Section 12 of the Judicature Act, No. 2 of 1978: “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act or any other written law, a Trial-at-Bar shall be held by the High Court in accordance with law for offences punishable under the Penal Code and other laws”.
The law of Sri Lanka makes provision for Trials-at-Bar in two different contexts.
(a) Mandatory
The trial of any person for the gravest offences against the State, constituted by Sections 114, 115, and 116 of the Penal Code, must in all circumstances be held before the High Court at Bar by three judges without a jury, despite any other law. This is the effect of Section 450 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Act No. 15 of 1979.
The gist of offences to which this provision is applicable is conspiracy or preparation to overthrow, by unlawful means, the Government of Sri Lanka. This provision was applied in the case of 24 persons alleged to have attempted a coup d’état against the Government of Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, a year after its election in July 1960 (R v. Liyanage).
(b) Discretionary
Outside this category, where recourse to a Trial-at-Bar is compulsory, there are other situations in which, as a matter of discretion, the Chief Justice may order use of this procedure. This course of action may be resorted to “in the interest of justice and based on the nature or circumstances of the offence”.
Trials-at-Bar, which may proceed either on indictment or on an information exhibited by the Attorney-General, are required to be held as speedily as possible, and generally in the manner of a High Court trial without a jury.
The power of appointment of High Court judges conducting a Trial-at-Bar is specifically vested in the Chief Justice. The Court, once appointed, has full authority regarding summoning, custody, and bail, subject to the restriction that bail may usually be granted only with the consent of the Attorney-General.
II. Appropriate Parameters
A useful point of departure, as a means of determining the proper limits of this judicial procedure, is to examine the character of offences which have led in our country throughout the post-Independence era to the constitution of Trials-at-Bar. A classification of the decided cases during this entire span of more than seven decades is attempted here for this purpose.
(1) Murder
Several Trials-at-Bar in Sri Lanka have been concerned with charges of murder, not per se, but invariably combined with circumstances which impart to the offence the added element of exceptional public importance, in terms of grave jeopardy to established institutions, public tranquillity, or seminal values underpinning governance.
The following are examples:
(a) the murder of a High Court judge engaged in the trial of five persons accused of capital offences pertaining to trafficking in drugs (Sarath Ambepitiya);
(b) the murder of a Member of Parliament in the midst of mob violence on a street, in the throes of widespread protests aimed at bringing down the incumbent government (Amarakeerthi Athukorala);
(c) the killing of two youth while in police custody (the Angulana case);
(d) the killing of villagers by Army personnel during a public demonstration (the Rathupaswala case);
(e) the disappearance of a social activist and human rights defender (Prageeth Ekneligoda).
(2) Offences involving State security and possible contravention of International law
* charges pertaining to firearms and ammunition and their use on the high seas (the Avant Garde case).
(3) Alleged gross dereliction of duty by senior government officials, including a former Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and a former Inspector-General of Police, leading to the death of a large number of persons by explosions in public places such as churches and hotels (Easter Sunday Bombing case).
(4) Grave corruption allegations in respect of procurement or other major misdemeanours
* two Trials-at-Bar were appointed to hear cases arising from the Central Bank bond scam in 2016, alleged to involve a former Minister of Finance, a former Governor of the Central Bank, his son-in-law and others (Central Bank bond case);
* charges against a previous Minister of Health, senior officials of the Ministry, and others in connection with the procurement of substandard immunoglobulin vials, leading to deaths and grievous bodily harm (Keheliya Rambukwella);
* charges filed by the Financial Crimes Investigation Division against the Chief of Staff of a former President and a former Chairman of the Sri Lanka Insurance Corporation for alleged large-scale misappropriation of public funds (Gamini Senerath, Priyadasa Kudabalage).
(5) Sedition involving communal overtones and potential disturbance of the public peace (S.J.V. Chelvanayakam and others).
(6) Allegations relating to extra-judicial executions
* the trial of a previous Army Commander for statements made by him regarding unlawful execution of surrendering LTTE cadres (Sarath Fonseka White Flag case).
(7) Criminal defamation in volatile contexts
In 1954, in the earliest of this series of cases, allegedly defamatory remarks were published by the defendant in a newspaper known as Trine. The gist of the allegations was that Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, who had just relinquished the position of Minister of Finance to accept appointment as Governor-General, had engaged in “swindles on an international scale” (R v. Thejawathie Gunawardena).
The heinous character of the offences alleged, and the scope of their potential ramifications in all these settings, are evident at a glance. The distinguishing feature is not merely the gravity of the offence, but imputation of a wider dimension to it, typically in the form of a serious affront to the public wellbeing.
In the Thejawathie Gunawardena case, for instance, where the propriety of recourse to a Trial-at-Bar was vigorously challenged, the Supreme Court held that there was no ground for complaint because of the predominant element of public mischief apparent from the circumstances. This was due to the inflammatory content of the statements published, which could foreseeably “disturb or endanger the government” by igniting public feeling. Gravity of the allegations, from this point of view, and their probable impact on public confidence in the integrity of basic institutions of governance, were the factors relied upon to take the case out of the regular category of defamation litigation and justify use of the Trial-at-Bar procedure.
This characteristic of a high threshold of public importance, accompanied by complexity and volatility of the surrounding circumstances, is the central thread which runs through the diverse situations in which Trials-at-Bar have been constituted in Sri Lanka.
III. The Roles of Pivotal Functionaries
The principal responsibility is that of the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General. The essential nexus between their statutory functions is a salient feature of the law.
(i) The Chief Justice
In Somaratna Rajapaksa v. Attorney-General, it was clearly recognised that the repository of power to constitute a Trial-at-Bar is the Chief Justice, but subject to the requirement that an indictment or information “furnished by the Attorney-General” operates as the material basis for exercise of the Chief Justice’s authority in this regard.
An explicit trajectory is established, linking the initiative by the Attorney-General with the Chief Justice’s decision.
(ii) The Attorney-General
Action by the Attorney-General is located within the overall ambit of prosecutorial discretion vested in him in respect of a wide range of matters, including assessment of the sufficiency and probative value of evidence to warrant institution of criminal proceedings, the decision to indict, and withdrawal of a prosecution by means of the entering of a nolle prosequi. The recommendation in respect of a Trial-at-Bar falls into place within the field of this broad authority.
The crucial attribute of the Attorney-General’s functions in this area is that he acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. A basic anomaly in the role of the Attorney-General in our constitutional system is that he combines, in his office, a variety of functions and responsibilities which entail some degree of conflict with one another. Despite this lack of institutional coherence and consistency, what is beyond doubt in the present condition of the law is that, throughout the whole gamut of prosecutorial decision making, the Attorney-General is required to eschew all political and other extraneous considerations and to arrive at his decisions in a spirit of total objectivity.
This is one of the cornerstones of our system of criminal justice. Although there is a statutory choice or discretion built into the Attorney-General’s responsibility, H.N.G. Fernando C.J. has aptly commented: “Our law has conferred on the Attorney-General powers which have been commonly described as quasi-judicial and traditionally formed an integral part of the system of criminal procedure” (Attorney-General v. Don Sirisena). In similar vein, the Supreme Court, in Victor Ivan v. Sarath N. Silva, Attorney-General, observed: “The Attorney-General’s power is a discretionary power similar to other powers vested in public functionaries, held in trust for the public, and not absolute or unfettered”.
While the purview of prosecutorial discretion residing in the Attorney-General, by virtue of enacted law as well as inveterate tradition, is strikingly extensive, it is not an untrammeled power: it is not beyond the reach of the courts. In a trilogy of progressive decisions by the Court of Appeal, Sobitha Rajakaruna J., (prior to his elevation to the Supreme Court), asserted the principle that the Attorney-General’s decisions, in appropriate circumstances, are amenable to judicial review: Sandresh Ravi Karunanayake v. Attorney -General (CA/Writ/ 441/2021), Duminda Lanka Liyanage v. Attorney-General (CA/Writ/323/2022), Nadun Chinthaka Wickremaratne v. Attorney-General (CA/Writ/523/2024).
In Attorney-General v. Karunanayake, Samayawardhana J ( with the concurrence of Thurairaja and Janak de Silva JJ.) declared: “Politically motivated indictments following regime change pose a serious threat to the rule of law and public confidence in the office of the Attorney-General and the entire justice system. Judicial oversight plays a vital role in ensuring that prosecutorial discretion is exercised independently, fairly, and in compliance with the law”.
The Supreme Court of our country has shown no inhibition in directly addressing the question whether the Attorney-General has properly exercised his discretion in laying the information which served as the basis of a Trial-at-Bar.
In Thejawathie Gunawardena’s case, in proceedings before the Supreme Court, it was strenuously contended on the defendant’s behalf that the Attorney-General had acted ultra vires for a collateral or improper purpose. The submission was that the person allegedly defamed was no longer holding public office, and invocation of the extraordinary procedure associated with a Trial-at-Bar was, therefore, unjustifiable. The Supreme Court, sitting in appeal, having considered the issue in depth, rejected the submission on the ground that his tenure had been very recent, and that the proximity of his connection with the incumbent government gave rise to the likelihood of intensifying public feeling because of the volatility and range of the allegations made against him.
These trends of judicial opinion have the effect that the principle of justiciability of the Attorney-General’s initiative in this regard is firmly embedded in our law.
IV. Conclusion
Trials-at-Bar serve a salutary purpose, but within stringently circumscribed limits. The decided cases in our country, spanning more than 75 years, indicate with exemplary clarity the confines within which this extraordinary procedure has legitimacy. The essential consideration is that there should not be room for the slightest doubt that immaterial factors may have come into play in the exercise of discretion.
This far transcends the entitlement of individuals to due process and impinges upon the health and vitality of procedures central to the administration of justice. My teacher, Professor Sir William Wade, pre-eminent among exponents of administrative law in our time, who had the distinction of holding Chairs of Law successively in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, told me that if he were asked to identify succinctly, in one sentence, the substance of the common law tradition, he would have no hesitation in replying that it consisted of robust hostility to unbridled discretion in public functionaries. Even the appearance of neglect of this rudimentary principle places in jeopardy the fulfilment of public aspirations about the quality of criminal justice.
By Professor G. L. Peiris ✍️
D. Phil. (Oxford), Ph. D. (Sri Lanka);
Former Minister of Justice, Constitutional Affairs and National Integration;
Quondam Visiting Fellow of the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge and London;
Former Vice-Chancellor and Emeritus Professor of Law of the University of Colombo
Features
Extended mind thesis:A Buddhist perspective
After listening to Prof. Charitha Herath deliver his lecture at the World Philosophy Day Conference at the University of Peradeniya and then reading his excellent article, “Buddhist insights into the extended mind thesis – some observations” published in The Island (14.01.2026) I was prompted to write this brief note to comment on the Buddhist concepts he says need to be delved into in this connection. The concepts he mentioned are prapañca, viññāṇasota and ālayaviññāṇa.
Let us look at the Extended Mind Thesis in brief. “The extended mind thesis claims that the cognitive processes that make up the human mind can reach beyond the boundaries of an individual to include as proper parts aspects of the individual’s physical and sociocultural environment” … “Such claims go far beyond the important, but less challenging, assertion that human cognition leans heavily on various forms of external scaffolding and support. Instead, they paint the mind itself (or better, the physical machinery that realises some of our cognitive processes and mental states) as, under humanly attainable conditions, extending beyond the bounds of skin and skull.
Extended cognition in its most general form occurs when internal and external resources become fluently tuned and deeply integrated in such a way as to enable a cognitive agent to solve problems and accomplish their projects, goals, and interests. Consider, for instance, how technological resources such as pens, paper, and personal computers are now so deeply integrated into our everyday lives that we couldn’t accomplish many of our cognitive goals and purposes without them (Kiverstein J, Farina M, Clark A, 2013).
It may be seen from the above that the Extended Mind Thesis is mainly concerned with human cognition. It seems that the tools that humans use to help them in the cognitive process are actually components of the extended mind. This is mentioned in Prof. Herath’s article as well. Though Buddhist theory of cognition does not imply such a relationship that involves the implements utilised in the process of acquiring knowledge, it proposes an inextricable relationship between the cogniser and the cognised. For instance, the eye-consciousness does not arise unless the object of cognition is present.
Reality of the world according to Buddhism is based on the relationship between the cogniser and the cognised. This theory is supported by the way in which Buddhism analyses the complex formed by the human personality and the world, which it does in three systems, expounding the bond between the two. First is the five aggregate analysis, second is the 12 bases (ayatana), and the third is the eighteen elements (dhatu). Whether this kind of entanglement is possible without some means of extending the mind is an interesting question.
According to Buddhism, the mind is not a substance but rather a function that depends on it. There are three terms that are used to refer to mind and possibly these may indicate different functions though they are very often used as near-synonyms. The terms are mano, citta and viññāṇa. The term mano is used to refer to the aspect of mind that functions as one of the six sense-faculties. Mano is responsible for feelings and it also coordinates the functions of the other sense-faculties. Citta generally means consciousness or combinations of consciousness and the other mental-factors, vedanā, saññā, sankāra as seen in the Abhidhamma analyses.
The term Viññāṇa means basic awareness of oneself and it is also used in relation to rebirth or rebecoming. It has a special responsibility in being the condition for the arising of nama-rupa, and reciprocally nama-rupa is the condition for consciousness in the paticcasamuppada formula. Further, the term “consciousness-element” is also used together with five other items; earth-element, water-element, fire-element, air-element and space-element which seem to refer to the most basic factors of the world of experience, indicating its ability to connect with the empirical world (Karunadasa, 2015). In these functions, consciousness may assume some relevance in the Extended Mind Thesis.
Further if we examine the role of consciousness in rebirth we find that a process called the patisandhi-viññāṇa has the ability to transmit an element, perhaps some karmic-force, from the previous birth to the subsequent birth. In these functions the enabling mechanism probably is the viññāṇasota, the stream of consciousness that Prof. Herath mentions, and which apparently has the ability to flow even out of the head and establish links with the external world.
It may be relevant at this juncture to look at the contribution made by Vasubandhu, the 4th Century Indian Buddhist philosopher. Vasubandhu’s interpretation of saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam (consciousness conditioned by volitional actions) treats the stream of consciousness as the mechanism of continuity between lives. He emphasises that this stream continues without a permanent entity migrating from one life to the next. The “stream” manifests as the subject (ego) and object (external world), which are both considered projections of this underlying consciousness, rather than independently existing entities. Vasubandhu also had proposed a kshnavada (theory of moments) to explain the stream of consciousness as consisting of arising and disappearing of consciousness maintaining continuity. These propositions may lend support to the Extended Mind Thesis.
Prof. Herath has mentioned the term prapañca (Pali – papañca) which generally means concepts. In the context of the extended mind thesis it needs to be examined in relation to the Buddhist theory of perception, because the former mainly pertains to cognition. As mentioned by Prof Herath, Ven. Nanananda in his book “Concept and Reality” has discussed this subject emphasising the fact that in Buddhist literature the term papañca is used mainly in the context of sense-perception. He says that “Madhupindika Sutta” (Majjima Nikaya) points to the fact that papañca is essentially connected with the process of sense perception. According to the Buddhist theory of perception the final outcome or the final stage of the process is the formation of papañca. Following the formation of concept there is proliferation of the concept depending on the past experience the individual may have in relation to what is perceived.
This process of perception, as given inthe Madhupindika Sutta, leading to conceptual proliferation is at the beginning impersonal and in the later stages it becomes personal with the involvement of the human personality with its self-ego and craving and finally leading to total bondage. And this bondage is between the human mind and the external world. Whether this entails an extended mind needs to be researched as suggested by Prof. Herath.
The third concept that Prof. Herath referred to in his lecture is the Yogacara idea of ālayaviññāṇa. Yogacara in its analysis of consciousness has added two more types of consciousnesses to the six based on the six senses, which is the classification mentioned in Early Buddhism and the two additional ones are kleshaviññāṇa and ālayaviññāṇa. The latter is called the storehouse-consciousness as it carries the seeds of karma. It is also called the approximating consciousness as it approximates at two levels; in this birth by collection of defilements and in the next birth by carrying them across in rebirth. The latter function may be relevant to the Extended Mind Thesis as it has the ability of projection beyond the body of the present birth and transmit to the body of the next birth.
If one is interested in researching into the concept of ālayaviññāṇa one must be aware that the three masters of Yogacara, i.e. Maithreyanata, Asanga and Vasubhandhu did not agree with each other on the nature of ālayaviññāṇa. While Maithreyanata was loyal to the early Yogacara idea that appeared in Sandhinirmocana Suthra, Asanga modified it to suit his thesis of idealism. Vasubandhu, however, adhered to the views of Early Buddhism and according to Kalupahana (1992) what he in his Trimsathika describes is the transformation of the consciousness and not the eight consciousnesses in the order in which they appear in Yogākāra texts. Here one is tempted to suggest that Asang’s idealism which propounds that the external world is a creation of the mind may lend support to the extended mind thesis. Idealism in Yogacara Buddhism may be another subject that needs to be researched in the context of the extended mind thesis.
Turning to recent research there is theoretical and speculative support from quantum theory for the idea of extended consciousness, but it remains a controversial area of research within physics, neuroscience, and philosophy. Several frameworks suggest that consciousness is not confined to the brain but is a fundamental, non-local phenomenon rooted in quantum processes that may connect minds to each other or the universe at large. (Wagh, M. (2024). “Your Consciousness Can Connect with the Whole Universe, Groundbreaking New Research Suggests”. Popular Mechanics. Retrieved from https://www.popularmechanics.com/scienc)
Finally, while it may not be clear whether the Extended Mind Thesis, as proposed by A. Clark and others (2013), has anything to do with consciousness it may be worthwhile to research into this matter from a Buddhist perspective, which will have to strongly bring into contention the factor of consciousness, which perhaps may have the potential to develop into an Extended Consciousness Thesis.
by Prof. N. A. de S. Amaratunga ✍️
PhD, DSc, DLitt
Features
Why siloed thinking is undermining national problem-solving
The world today is marked by paradox. Never before has humanity possessed such extraordinary scientific knowledge, technological capability, and research capacity. Yet never before have we faced such a dense convergence of crises—climate change, biodiversity loss, pandemics, food insecurity, widening inequality, disaster vulnerability, and social fragmentation. These challenges are not isolated events; they are deeply interconnected, mutually reinforcing, and embedded within complex social, ecological, economic, and technological systems. Addressing them effectively demands more than incremental improvements or isolated expertise. It requires a fundamental shift in how we think, research, and act.
At the heart of this shift lies transdisciplinarity: an approach that moves beyond siloed disciplines and engages society itself in the co-creation of knowledge and solutions. As Albert Einstein famously observed, “We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them.” The persistence of today’s global challenges suggests that our prevailing modes of problem-solving—largely mono-disciplinary and compartmentalised—are no longer adequate.
The limits of siloed knowledge
Over the past few decades, global investment in research and development has grown dramatically. Global R&D expenditure exceeded USD 3 trillion in 2022, and the worldwide scientific workforce has expanded to more than 8.8 million researchers, producing millions of academic papers annually across tens of thousands of journals. Indeed, the number of scientists has grown several times faster than the global population itself. This extraordinary expansion reflects humanity’s faith in science as a driver of progress—but it also sharpens an uncomfortable question about returns on this investment. Millions of scientists across the world produce an ever-expanding body of academic literature, filling tens of thousands of specialised journals. This disciplinary research has undoubtedly driven remarkable advances in medicine, engineering, agriculture, and information technology. The positive contributions of science to human civilisation are beyond dispute. Yet its effectiveness in addressing complex, real-world challenges has often fallen short of expectations, with impacts appearing disproportionate to the vast resources committed. Yet the translation of this vast knowledge base into tangible, scalable solutions to real-world problems remains limited.
The reason lies not in a lack of intelligence or effort, but in the way knowledge is organised. Disciplines are, after all, social constructs, each shaped by its own conceptual, theoretical, philosophical, and methodological traditions. While these traditions enable depth and rigour, they also encourage intellectual compartmentalisation when treated as ends in themselves. Modern academia is structured around disciplines—biology, economics, engineering, sociology, medicine—each with its own language, methods, reward systems, and institutional boundaries. These disciplines are powerful tools for deep analysis, but they also act as intellectual blinders. By focusing narrowly on parts of a problem, they often miss the broader system in which that problem is embedded.
Climate change, for example, is not merely an environmental issue. It is simultaneously an economic, social, political, technological, and ethical challenge. Public health crises are shaped as much by social behaviour, governance, and inequality as by pathogens and medical interventions. Poverty is not simply a matter of income, but of education, health, gender relations, environmental degradation, and political inclusion. Approaching such issues from a single disciplinary lens inevitably leads to partial diagnoses and fragmented solutions.
The systems thinker Donella Meadows captured this dilemma succinctly when she noted, “The problems are not in the world; they are in our models of the world.” When our models are fragmented, our solutions will be fragmented as well.
Wicked problems in a hyper-connected world
Many of today’s challenges fall into what scholars describe as “wicked problems”—issues that are complex, non-linear, and resistant to definitive solutions. They have multiple causes, involve many stakeholders with competing values, and evolve over time. Actions taken to address one aspect of the problem often generate unintended consequences elsewhere.
In a hyper-connected world, these dynamics are amplified. A disruption in one part of the global system—whether a pandemic, a financial shock, or a geopolitical conflict—can cascade rapidly across borders, affecting food systems, energy markets, public health, and social stability. Recent crises have starkly demonstrated how local vulnerabilities are intertwined with global forces.
Despite decades of research aimed at tackling such problems, progress remains uneven and, in many cases, distressingly slow. In some instances, well-intentioned scientific interventions have even generated new problems or unintended consequences. The Green Revolution of the 1960s, for example, dramatically increased cereal yields and reduced hunger in many developing countries, but its heavy dependence on agrochemicals has since contributed to soil degradation, water pollution, and public health concerns. Similarly, plastics—once hailed as miracle materials for their affordability and versatility—have become a pervasive environmental menace, illustrating how narrowly framed solutions can create long-term systemic risks. This gap between knowledge production and societal impact raises a critical question: are we organising our research and institutions in ways that are fit for purpose in an interconnected world?
What is transdisciplinarity?
Transdisciplinarity offers a compelling response to this question. Unlike multidisciplinary approaches, which place disciplines side by side, or interdisciplinary approaches, which integrate methods across disciplines, transdisciplinarity goes a step further. It transcends academic boundaries altogether by bringing together researchers, policymakers, practitioners, industry actors, and communities to jointly define problems and co-create solutions.
At its core, transdisciplinarity is problem-driven rather than discipline-driven. It starts with real-world challenges and asks: what knowledge, perspectives, and forms of expertise are needed to address this issue in a meaningful way? Scientific knowledge remains essential, but it is complemented by experiential, local, and indigenous knowledge—forms of understanding that are often overlooked in conventional research but are crucial for context-sensitive and socially robust solutions.
As C. P. Snow warned in his influential reflections on “The Two Cultures,” divisions within knowledge systems can themselves become barriers to progress. Transdisciplinarity seeks to bridge not only disciplines, but also the persistent gap between knowledge and action.
Learning from nature and society
Nature itself provides a powerful metaphor for transdisciplinary thinking. Ecosystems do not operate in compartments. Soil, water, plants, animals, and climate interact continuously in dynamic, adaptive systems. When one element is disturbed, the effects ripple through the whole. Human societies are no different. Economic systems shape social relations; social norms influence environmental outcomes; technological choices affect governance and equity.
Yet our institutions often behave as if these connections do not exist. Universities are organised into departments with separate budgets and promotion criteria. Research funding is allocated along disciplinary lines. Success is measured through narrow metrics such as journal impact factors and citation counts, rather than societal relevance or long-term impact.
This mismatch between the complexity of real-world problems and the fragmentation of our knowledge systems lies at the heart of many policy failures. While societal challenges have grown exponentially in scale and interdependence, organisational structures and problem-solving approaches have not evolved at the same pace. Attempting to address borderless global issues using rigid, compartmentalised, and outdated frameworks is therefore increasingly counterproductive. As former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon aptly stated, “We cannot address today’s problems with yesterday’s institutions and mindsets.”
Transdisciplinarity and sustainable development
The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) offer a vivid illustration of why transdisciplinary approaches are essential. The 17 goals—ranging from poverty eradication and health to climate action and biodiversity—are explicitly interconnected. Progress on one goal often depends on progress in others. Climate action affects food security, health, and livelihoods. Education influences gender equality, economic growth, and environmental stewardship.
Achieving the SDGs therefore requires more than sector-by-sector interventions. It demands integrated, cross-sectoral responses that align research, policy, and practice. Transdisciplinarity provides a framework for such integration by fostering collaboration across disciplines and sectors, and by grounding global goals in local realities.
For countries like Sri Lanka, with complex socio-ecological systems and rich cultural diversity, this approach is particularly relevant. In Sri Lanka, more than 6,000 individuals are engaged in research and development, with over 60 per cent based in universities and other higher education institutions. This places a particular responsibility on academic and institutional leaders to create environments that encourage collaboration across disciplines and with society. Policies, assessment schemes, funding mechanisms, and incentive structures within universities can either reinforce silos or actively nurture a transdisciplinary culture. Sustainable development challenges here are shaped by local contexts—coastal vulnerability, agricultural livelihoods, urbanisation patterns, and social inequalities—while also being influenced by global forces. Transdisciplinary engagement can help bridge this global–local divide, ensuring that policies and innovations are both scientifically sound and socially meaningful.
Why transdisciplinarity is hard?
Despite its promise, transdisciplinarity is not easy to practice or institutionalise. Deeply entrenched disciplinary identities often shape how researchers see themselves and their work. Many academics are trained to excel within narrow fields, and career advancement systems tend to reward disciplinary publications over collaborative, problem-oriented research.
Institutional structures can further reinforce these silos. Departments operate with separate budgets and governance arrangements, making cross-boundary collaboration administratively cumbersome. Funding mechanisms often lack categories for transdisciplinary projects, leaving such initiatives struggling to find support. Time pressures also matter: genuine engagement with communities and stakeholders requires sustained interaction, yet academic workloads rarely recognise this effort.
There are also cultural and ethical challenges. Different disciplines speak different “languages” and operate with distinct assumptions about what counts as valid knowledge. Power imbalances can emerge, with certain forms of expertise dominating others, including the voices of non-academic partners. Without careful attention to trust, equity, and mutual respect, collaboration can become superficial rather than transformative.
The way forward: from aspiration to practice
If transdisciplinarity is to move from rhetoric to reality, deliberate institutional change is required. Sri Lanka, in particular, would benefit from articulating a clear national vision that positions transdisciplinary research as a core mechanism for addressing challenges such as climate resilience, public health, disaster risk, and sustainable development. National research agencies and universities can play a catalytic role by creating dedicated funding streams, establishing transdisciplinary centres, and embedding systems thinking and stakeholder engagement within curricula and research agendas. First, awareness must be built. Universities, research institutes, and funding agencies need to invest in dialogue, training, and pilot projects that demonstrate the value of transdisciplinary approaches in addressing pressing societal challenges.
Second, leadership matters. Institutional leaders play a critical role in signalling that transdisciplinary engagement is not peripheral, but central to the mission of knowledge institutions. This can be done by embedding such approaches in strategic plans, allocating seed funding for collaborative initiatives, and recognising societal impact in promotion and evaluation systems.
Third, structures must evolve. Flexible research centres, shared infrastructure, and streamlined administrative processes can lower the barriers to collaboration. Education also has a role to play. Introducing systems thinking and problem-based learning early in undergraduate and postgraduate programmes can help cultivate a new generation of researchers comfortable working across boundaries.
Finally, ethics and inclusivity must be at the forefront. Transdisciplinarity is not merely a technical methodology; it is an ethical commitment to valuing diverse forms of knowledge and engaging communities as partners rather than passive beneficiaries. In doing so, it strengthens the legitimacy, relevance, and sustainability of solutions.
A collective learning challenge
Peter Senge once observed, “The only sustainable competitive advantage is an organization’s ability to learn faster than the competition.” This insight applies not only to organisations, but to societies as a whole. Our collective ability to learn, unlearn, and relearn—across disciplines and with society—will determine how effectively we navigate the challenges of our time.
The shift from siloed disciplines to transdisciplinary engagement is therefore not a luxury or an academic trend. It is a strategic necessity. In a world of complex, interconnected problems, fragmented knowledge will no longer suffice. What is needed is a new culture of collaboration—one that sees connections rather than compartments, embraces uncertainty, and places societal well-being at the centre of scientific endeavour.
Only by breaking down the walls between disciplines, institutions, and communities can we hope to transform knowledge into action, and action into lasting, equitable change.
A final word to Sri Lankan decision-makers
For Sri Lanka, the message is clear and urgent. Policymakers, university leaders, funding agencies, and development institutions must recognise that many of the country’s most pressing challenges—climate vulnerability, public health risks, food and water security, disaster resilience, and social inequality—cannot be solved within institutional silos. Creating space for transdisciplinary engagement is not a marginal reform; it is a strategic investment in national resilience. By aligning policies, incentives, and funding mechanisms to encourage collaboration across disciplines and with society, Sri Lanka can unlock the full value of its scientific and intellectual capital. The choice before us is stark: continue to manage complexity with fragmented tools, or deliberately build institutions capable of learning, integrating, and responding as a system. The future will favour the latter.
by Emeritus Professor Ranjith Senaratne ✍️
Former Vice-Chancellor, University of Ruhuna,
Former General President, Sri Lanka Association for the Advancement of Science
Former Chairman, National Science Foundation
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