Dr. DAYAN JAYATILLEKA
[This article is dedicated to the memory of the late B. Sirisena Cooray, former General Secretary of the UNP.]
The irony never fails to strike me when the Lankan liberals who fetishize the free-market above all in economics, are totally impervious to and imperiously ignore the signals of the political marketplace.
If Dr Ravi Ranan-Eliya’s SLOTS tracker is accurate and President Gotabaya Rajapaksa has lost a full third (33%) of his 2019 vote, then he is still slightly above the combined SJB+UNP vote of 2020, i.e., the ‘greater UNP’ space in the polity.
In an extended interview given to Dinesh Weerakkody which was the cover story of Business Today February 2000, the UNP’s former strongman-General Secretary Sirisena Cooray, who had been Ranasinghe Premadasa’s righthand man for decades, predicted (“take it from me”) that the UNP under Ranil Wickremesinghe would average 25% in the future. He was right. After a quarter century that ideological space in the political spectrum has become structural, though the UNP itself has almost vanished. No combination of forces that stays within that space can defeat the regime. Only a breakout/breakthrough strategy can.
Political commentators correctly observe that the decline of the regime’s popularity is not matched by the rise of the Opposition’s. They fail to grasp the reason for the mismatch and prefer instead to prattle on about the allegedly poor performance of the current Opposition, chiefly the SJB.
I’d say that mismatch is because the regime’s popularity has declined so speedily that the memories of the previous administration’s negative performance have not faded. The Gotabaya administration has proved the most traumatic to our material well-being in our post-1948 history. The predecessor Yahapalanaya administration, chiefly Ranil’s UNP with its foreign and constitutional policies and cultural nihilism, proved traumatic to our national identity and sense of sovereignty.
To re-state: the Gotabaya presidency and the Pohottuwa are in a downward spiral which they can’t pull out of and are wildly unpopular. This in no way means that the values, policies, practices and profile of the Yahapalanaya UNP by any other name are retrospectively popular. It too is unpopular, doubtless less so currently than the GR regime, but that’s a low bar.
didn’t fail because the Government “failed to resolutely prosecute the crooked Rajapaksas”. The prosecutions didn’t help the Government and in fact hurt it, because the larger percentage of the public perceived a UNP which had appeased if not collaborated with the LTTE, persecuting Mahinda, who had won the war, depriving him – and therefore the Sinhala majority–of the Opposition leadership and prosecuting those who were loyal to him.
Those who see the GR presidency as a self-evident argument for the abolition of the executive presidency ignore the market signals that the primary problem was/is not the presidency as an institution:
(a) Even the protesting peasants curse the parliamentarians and Cabinet more, and more often, than they do the ruler.
(b) The former president Maithripala Sirisena found an ally and survived electorally while the former Prime Minister did not, and the former Speaker and former Foreign Minister couldn’t muster any political traction by the tail-end of the previous regime and opted out.
(c) It is doubtful that a two-thirds majority in parliament and a simple majority in the country at a Referendum can be mustered for a Constitutional change that abolishes the directly elected executive presidency while enhancing or even retaining the 13th amendment or any form of provincial devolution. A majority of Sinhalese will not vote for it. Any government, Constitutional order or law that exists without the consent of the majority of the majority is doomed to generate eternal instability, even a coup.
The citizens detest the Gotabaya regime for the trauma they are being put through. They almost certainly regret their choice of 2019. But only someone who is deluded would think that means they wish to return to 2015-2019 (or 2001-2004) or approve of that government and its values.
SLPP & SJB
Sirisena Cooray often insisted that the UNP must win back “the majority of the majority” which Ranil Wickremesinghe had lost. That was the bedrock of any winning strategy, he emphasized, endorsing the report of NGP Panditharatne (2003) that most UNP activists felt the party could never win the Presidency under the leadership of Ranil Wickremesinghe because he had lost the support of the Sinhalese, especially the rural masses.
The accusation that the Rajapaksas’ SLPP and Sajith Premadasa’s SJB are ‘two sides of the same coin’, or more charitably, siblings, is vastly amusing. If the underlying critique is that there is a similarity or sharing of views or values in some sense, then my answer as a Realist is “I would certainly hope so!” because there is little prospect of winning back “the majority of the majority” i.e., the Sinhala voters who shifted to the Pohottuwa, if an Opposition party takes a stand and espouses values that are the total opposite—the antipode– of those of the majority.
Only if the Opposition shows sensitivity to whatever is legitimate in the concerns of the Pohottuwa voter; only if those voters feel that their concerns and core values will be respected and safeguarded by the Opposition; only if what the Opposition says emotionally resonates with the Sinhala voter who shifted as a bloc to the Pohottuwa, can they be won over and the regime defeated. This is exactly how Joe Biden won back the social strata and the states that the neoliberal Hillary Clinton lost to Donald Trump and earlier, Bill Clinton won the South from the Republicans.
The Lankan Opposition must fuse whatever was legitimate and correct in the SLFP, UNP and Left traditions, values and discourses.
A human is not only an economic animal (‘homo economicus’) but fundamentally a political and social animal, as the ancient Greeks understood. Today the economic factor has punched through, but it won’t stay that way if too much violence is done to the political and social animal within.
If the main Opposition sports a cosmopolitan cultural profile and minoritarian-globalist discourse when a Referendum on a new Sinhala-Buddhist, minimal-devolution Constitution is looming, nationalism may partially neutralize the socioeconomic and governance factors, the Sinhala-Buddhist vote may split, and some may stay home.
By contrast, an ‘organic’ Premadasa-ist populist profile could (as in 1988) neutralize the nationalist factor acting as a Pohottuwa/GR asset, swing the Sinhala middle ground over to the mainline Opposition and ensure massive NO vote, a protest vote on socioeconomic grievances, which could break the back of the autocratic GR regime.
The Sinhala-Buddhist voters who, in a tectonic shift, swung to the Rajapaksas in 2018-2020, have swung away from them as a result of meltdown of their economic conditions. The material factor has eclipsed the ethno-nationalist for the moment, which doesn’t mean that the Sinhala-Buddhist voters have deleted their values and identity concerns. No economic crisis is going to make them swing all the way from the Gotabaya paradigm to the Ranil-Mangala-CBK cosmopolitan-elitist paradigm. Most are mainly Mahinda voters, and a smart Opposition would not flaunt Yahapalanaya UNP policies and icons, but instead pivot, move halfway and reposition itself in the progressive center so that those voters would have to come only halfway themselves.
What is it that gives the neoliberal Right in Sri Lanka such ideological durability even in the Opposition when its main agency and agents, the UNP and Ranil Wickremesinghe, have consistently been unsuccessful, and the ideology is itself widely discredited and obsolescent in the West?
The dirty secret lies in the decision made by Mr. Wickremesinghe to break sharply with UNP tradition maintained even during the Cold War (old and new), and formally, officially incorporate the party in a global ideological bloc, that of the world’s Conservative, Christian Democrat and Center-Right parties grouped in the International Democratic Union (IDU), co-founded by the US Republicans and the UK Conservatives.
The opportunities, funding flows and ideological indoctrination have created a certain stratum in Sri Lanka, an elitist policy Establishment in the party-political and civil society spaces, which regards adherents of rightwing, free-market fundamentalist, anti-state globalist economic thinking, to constitute its real family, far more than it regards Sri Lanka’s working people and least of all the Global South or progressive opinion (social democratic and liberal) in the West, as its family or “hive”.
There were very good contributions ranging across the political spectrum in the Budget debate on the Foreign Ministry vote by Imtiaz Bakeer Markar, Tharaka Balasuriya, Gajan Ponnambalam, Rauff Hakeem and Harini Amarasuriya. One could almost discern the outlines of a refreshing revisionist conversation and potential consensus.
However, in the main, the polarization continues between extremes continues on foreign policy.
Reflecting on his presidency, Barack Obama went on the record that his biggest single regret was Libya. Obama and his Secretary of Defence Bob Gates were against intervention, but that intervention went ahead, double-crossing Russia and the Security Council resolution, culminating in murderous regime change, opening the door for the wave of Islamist jihadism including ISIL, and triggering a toughening in Russia’s global stand under a returning Putin.
Three personalities were responsible for driving the US decision to intervene in Libya which policy decision Obama says is his greatest regret: Hillary Clinton, Susan Rice and Samantha Power.
These, and not Barack Obama, John Kerry or Joe Biden– still less Bernie Sanders or AOC– are foreign policy and ideological icons of Sri Lanka’s cosmopolitan neoliberals, ‘radical centrists’ and Yahapalanaya ex-UNPers who are Mangala proteges.
Troika of Heroes
It is in the final analysis an existential question. In economic development who should we be like? I would say Ranasinghe Premadasa. In foreign policy? Lakshman Kadirgamar. (Interestingly, he was commended in Sirisena Cooray’s Business Today Feb. 2000 interview). In Sri Lankan nationhood, embracing diversity and combating racism while being at one with the common people, I would say Vijaya Kumaratunga.
It is a triangulation of these three great heroes and martyrs that give us the values to be the best society that Sri Lankan can be within and the glowing example we can be in the world.
President’s Dinner for his Old Comrades
The President and Commander in Chief HE Gotabaya Rajapakse invited 186 of his old military comrades and their ladies for dinner at President’s House on Dec. 22, 2021. For a media that lives on gossip, this was manna.
A Sunday paper (not the Island) on 26 Dec reported the invitees numbered 1,050.The figure was specific. Many readers were, as expected, duped to believe it. Added on was that ‘drinks’ too were served as though that was news. No detailed description of the menu was given as has happened before for reasons that will be a revelation. Was it to show profligacy which was news? The Sunday Island of Dec. 2, 2021 had a news item by Dayan Jayatilleka that went one better. He increased the figure to a smarter 1,090. Those made a lie look like the truth. It was meant to be so. No questions were asked as to sources.
The Dec. 26 Sunday paper also had a dig at the organizers. Apparently a few had turned down the invitation. That was curious as the invitations were sent only to those who confirmed verbal enquiries as to their attendance. It may have been that after accepting the invitation a few old sweats, officers and gentlemen it is said they had been, were churlish enough to avoid attendance at the C in C’s dinner. Were they the same fellows, who being absent from the scene, did the counting of heads too?
Jayatilleka went further. He thought there was something odd if not sinister in the exercise. He believed 1,090 ‘senior military men, serving and retired’ attended. He asked readers not to continue reading if they did not believe that the invitations had been sent with some ulterior motive. The suggestion was that the dinner was not a ‘sociable, benign gesture of a year-end party’. It obviously worried him that good and normal men in SL would have thought differently and questioned the assumption.
To begin with his facts were absolutely cock eyed. The cooked figures he had been served (1,090) by someone who was possibly not at the dinner, clearly supported his fertile imagination. He probably thought a mere 186 officers at dinner would not be enough to invent a rollicking fairy tale.
The only serving officers present were the tri services commanders. With their spouses a round figure of 400 invitees could have been closer to the truth. All the others were veterans aged 70 years and above, some disabled. A few were 90 years old and were in wheel chairs.
Now what did Jayatilleka a former minister in the EPRLF that was a IPKF stooge that made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in the late1990s, think the doddering old and but still bold 186 could have been up to? It certainly helped to propel his latest onslaughts on the fanciful ‘militarization’ of the nation. Was it also to mark up points with the West, just in case?
So how did the ‘gala’ dinner go? First of all male guests in smart casual (tie), and their ladies in sarees, arrived well in time as is the norm among servicemen. They were given antigen tests by a team of medics before gathering in the manicured garden where the military bands played some lively music.
Old comrades reminisced with their friends, many after decades and two years of Covid. Everyone was refreshingly relaxed. Many recalled long forgotten incidents, hilarious mishaps mostly, and extraordinary characters they served with. Many heroes were present but stories of daring and battle were not recounted here. The missing was not forgotten.
As at any military social function, not a word of politics was heard. No one pulled rank. When the C in C came and graciously mixed with his guests, all older than him, no one in the best of service traditions and etiquette forgot who he, the C in C, was. He knew and called all of them by their first names. He seemed as happy as his guests were, to meet simply as old comrades, exchange greetings and enjoy themselves. There were no speeches.
A splendid buffet dinner followed.
Here was the first old soldier who had become the elected President and C in C of SL. He was now among old friends. They all thanked and wished him and his lady the very best in the challenging year to come.
People who will never know what military comradeship is should not waste their time trying to question the motives of a C in C in inviting his old comrades to dinner. It was the first ever in SL history. There was nothing ‘gala’ either, as anyone who was inveigled by his ‘informant’ may have believed. Such people should try not to judge others by their standards, be mean and gullible and should not to circulate worn out tales or have recurring nightmares about ‘militarization’.
Old soldiers never die; they only fade away, even from the President’s House. God only knows what happens to mercenaries and tale carriers.
DE-CODING THE AKD-JVP-NPP RELATIONSHIP
DR. DAYAN JAYATILLEKA
The JVP-NPP is prominent in the struggle against the presidential system–while permitting speculation that Anura Kumara Dissanayake will be the presidential candidate—and in the vanguard in the struggle against corruption.
Whether it realizes it or not, it is being hypocritical—not because of that duality–and so too are those who support them on those grounds.
The reason is simple and self-evident. Whether one is against the presidential system as such, or whether one is against the 20th amendment while being for the Presidential system, the reason is the same: the critique of over-centralization. To spell it out, the objection is too much power and too many functions in the hands of a single person and the remedy is seen as the separation of powers, which makes for check and balances.
In its practice, the JVP-NPP runs completely against that principle.
The next ‘signature issue’ is corruption. There too, the principle is the same: if one person holds more than one post and there is a possible conflict of interest, that is the potential source of corruption. Here too, the crux of the matter is that one person should not head several institutional or organization spaces. Interlocking directorates are the conduit of corruption. I am not accusing the JVP-NPP of corruption, but of violating the principle of safeguards or guardrails against overlapping and over-concentration.
The NPP was not founded by non-party activists or those of many political parties. Still less was it formed by academics. It was founded by Anura Kumara Dissanayake in 2015.
The NPP is not led by a non-party personality. It is led by Anura Kumara Dissanayake who founded it.
Anura Kumara Dissanayake is the leader of the JVP. He was the leader of the JVP when he established the NPP, and remains the leader of the JVP.
It is reasonable to assume that as the JVP’s leader, rather than merely a JVP member or second-level leader, Mr. Dissanayake would have founded the NPP as part of the JVP’s strategic vision.
Insofar as the NPP is the creation of the JVP’s leader, the NPP is the child of the JVP.
Latin American Left
The JVP has almost always had phases in which it had personalities and mass organization to which it gave a long leash. Indika Gunawardena and Sunila Abeysekara are two examples but not the only ones. Perhaps a more important one is HN Fernando the politically highly literate leader of the Ceylon Teachers Union which he had built up into a 30,000 strong organization. All of them were purged from the party when views that dissented from the changing party line, were voiced. (HN Fernando, who was Wijeweera’s brother-in-law was physically assaulted).
These seem to me the earlier prototypes of what is now manifested as the NPP. The NPP seems to me to be a new model of the same old template: a front organization of fellow-travelers.
If the NPP were to be an autonomous civic or mass organization or more ambitiously the formation which should be recognized as a contender to lead the country, the Latin American Left provides the architecture.
Uruguay’s Tupamaros and its Communist Party founded the Frente Amplio, the Broad Front, which lasted from the early 1970s through the decades of military dictatorship, to this day. The first leader of the Frente Amplio who remained so for many years, was General Liber Seregni, not the MLN-Tupamaro leader Raul Sendic nor the Uruguayan CP’s leader Rodney Arismendi.
In El Salvador, the revolutionary vanguard unified as the FMLN, with its politico-diplomatic partner being the Frente Democratico Revolutionario, the FDR. None of the FMLN’s leaders headed the FDR.
That is the model by which the autonomy of the civic front is ensured. In the case of the NPP, it is headed, not even by a JVP personality like Nalinda Jayatissa or Bimal Ratnayake, still less a respected progressive activist, intellectual or cultural-artistic figure but precisely by the top leader of the JVP.
As a disciplined leader who is committed to the strategy and decisions of the JVP, there is hardly a structural possibility of genuine autonomy for and on the part of the NPP.
Political Culture: Falsification & Opacity
A great many of us watched as Anura Kumara Dissanayake repeatedly emphasized on national TV that Kumara Gunaratnam was never a member of the JVP. Quiet apart from the insult to the memory of Ranjithan Gunaratnam, a real hero and martyr of the JVP leadership, it was a plain lie because it was widely known that Kumara Gunaratnam played the major role in rebuilding the JVP clandestinely after the repression was over.
The post 1994 JVP was built upon the foundation laid by Kumara Gunaratnam whom Anura Kumara Dissanayake told the nation was never a member of the party.
A few years ago, after Kumara Gunaratnam had been ‘disappeared’ and tortured in 2011, and was released only due to external lobbying and the intervention of Mahinda Rajapaksa, Gotabaya Rajapaksa made a throw-away public remark in response to Anura Kumara’s criticism of him on an entirely different matter, that the crackdown on Gunaratnam and his emerging new outfit (it wasn’t called Peratugamee at the time) was made on an alert from the same quarter that was now criticizing him. There was no answer from AKD.
If anything, a left alternative must occupy the moral high ground, and not only in its own eyes. The historical truth is the only path to the moral high ground.
None of this is meant as an indictment of or attack on Anura Kumara as a person. It speaks to the discourse, the political culture of the JVP and its opacity. The denial of Kumara Gunaratnam, his removal from the annals of the JVP, the sheer falsification of history, tells us what the JVP still is. This travesty is not something that has occurred, would occur or could occur in any other political party in Sri Lanka. The JVP was and is a party which is the most opaque in Sri Lanka.
It is the same Anura Kumara who leads the same JVP who also founded and leads the NPP.
Therefore, any influence that the NPP has on the JVP will be secondary, episodic and tactical, while the JVP’s influence over the NPP will be strategic and structural. The tail won’t be wagging the dog.
Foreign exchange, foreign policy, and economic roundtables
by Uditha Devapriya
Sri Lanka’s Central Bank will be settling a USD 500 million bond the day after tomorrow. Earlier this month, Ajith Nivard Cabraal tweeted that the Bank had set aside the required amount from its foreign reserves, reiterating the country’s commitment to honouring its debt obligations. Perhaps in response to this development, bondholders appear to have regained confidence about our prospects: latest figures show that bond market prices are converging with face value, though this may well be a temporary gain.
The January 18 settlement is the first of two that will have to be made to our International Sovereign Bond (ISB) holders this year. The second, amounting to USD one billion, is due on July 25. The Central Bank’s strategy is one of doubling down on these debt obligations while renegotiating loans from other governments. This strategy isn’t as muddled up as it is made to be by its critics: unlike governments, ISB holders don’t negotiate, and if they are asked to, it’s usually on the eve of a default or severe economic crisis.
In strategising a way out, then, the Central Bank has identified its priorities: it will pay up on its ISB commitments and devote foreign exchange to little else.
It’s difficult to predict how that will affect our foreign relations in the longer term. The country is presently governed by a party that promised never to sell or lease out its assets. Yet, today, officials are travelling everywhere, negotiating with this government and that, hoping for more lifelines. We have clearly exhausted other options: we can’t raise anything from bond auctions, and we are rejecting the IMF line. Since governments are easier to talk with, we are hence talking with as many of them as possible. It’s doubtful whether this is the only option available, but it’s probably the best shot we can give.
In giving that shot, however, are we exposing ourselves to the pressures of regional and extra-regional power pressures? Consider the countries we have gone to so far: Oman, China, and India. Negotiations with India have been successful, with Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar stating that Delhi is ready to stand with Sri Lanka. Though his government has remained quiet over requests for credit lines, these may well come our way.
On the other hand, Beijing has responded to Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s call to Foreign Minister Wang Yi to restructure its debts, with Cabraal declaring that a new loan is on the blocks. As for Oman, though negotiations have stalled over requests to explore the Mannar Oil Basin in return for interest-free credit, this too is a window that remains open.
These developments are, all things considered, intriguing. In the face of the worst global health crisis in over a century, our foreign policy has taken a massive beating. The fertiliser imbroglio with China and the withdrawal of Chinese projects from the North over alleged Indian pressure, as well as the visit of the Chinese Ambassador to the North, are cases in point here. All these point to an increasingly complicated foreign policy front. The question is, will the country’s foreign exchange problems complicate it even more?
Perhaps more so than the 1970s, when it faced a severe balance of payments crisis, Sri Lanka is gradually giving way to a foreign policy dictated by depleting foreign reserves. The administration’s dismissal of W. D. Lakshman and appointment of Cabraal, in that regard, accompanied a shift of focus, during the fourth quarter of last year, to the country’s foreign exchange situation. This has spilled over to our external relations.
Here the Central Bank has had to reckon with a contradiction: between its insistence on not going to the IMF and its assurances about meeting ISB obligations. Though it’s debatable whether the Bank has addressed, let alone resolved, that contradiction, it’s clearly making use of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy to pay bondholders their due.
For their part, economic experts have shifted in their response to what the government is doing. While earlier they warned about impending defaults, now many of them have turned to questioning the current policy of repaying bondholders no matter what.
Nishan de Mel of Verité Research, for instance, points out correctly that defaulting is not the same thing as declaring bankruptcy. Suggesting that the former is preferable, he contends that the government should do what it can to renegotiate its debts. On the other hand, as Dushni Weerakoon of the IPS rightly observes, restructuring debt may be easy for a country with a reputation for defaults, like Ecuador, but it is unviable, lengthy, and costly, at least in the short and medium term, for a country like Sri Lanka.
What of the IMF line? It’s obvious that Sri Lanka can no longer negotiate for more breathing space from the IMF without conditionalities being imposed on it. The only way it can obtain such space, in other words, is by succumbing to those conditionalities.
Now, defenders of the IMF line may argue, justifiably, that there’s no give without take, and that if we go to that body we will have to eat humble pie, gratefully. But the question to ask here is, who are we asking to take on these burdens? Who are we asking to endure more of the same? Have IMF advocates considered these problems?
The IMF is not a charity: it has provided financial assistance to almost 90 countries on condition that fiscal discipline be enforced in the long term. If we go down that road, we will need to give back something, like public sector retrenchment and fuel price formulas. These have generated enough backlashes elsewhere. Are we ready to risk them here?
So long as the government fears an uprising from the people, it will not choose the IMF line. To say this is not to defend the powers that be. They have contributed to the mess we are in. But to admit to that is not to deny that, whatever that mess may be, to opt for structural adjustment, when social pressures are peaking, would be politically inadvisable.
That is why Basil Rajapaksa’s billion rupee economic relief package, tabled earlier this month despite much criticism, is intriguing: among other things, it promises a LKR 5,000 allowance to 1.5 million government workers, pensioners, and disabled soldiers. Its underlying thrust is not less money, but more: not spending cuts, but spending hikes.
The urban and suburban middle-classes have responded to the package with characteristic ambivalence. While demanding for relief from the government, they are also questioning the efficacy of printing money. What they have failed to realise is that that printing money is the only resort the government has to grant the kind of relief being demanded. It’s a classic either/or scenario: you get the relief with printed money, or you don’t.
Though economists don’t spell it out exactly in these terms, they do observe that printing money can only lead to greater inflation, implying that the only alternative is to stop doing so. But what are the socio-political costs of such measures? What are the knock-on effects they will have on economic relief for the masses? To ask these questions is not to split hairs, but to raise valid concerns that have not been addressed by the other side.
That is not to say that the government’s measures have been farsighted. They have not. Though Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) policies, which the regime is advocating, may get us space in the short term, it is not the type of reform we should be enacting in the longer term. The policies we need require radical reform and radical action. However viable it may be, printing money should not be considered a substitute for such reform.
To suggest one option, one of Sri Lanka’s most brilliant economists, Howard Nicholas, has advised that we industrialise, noting that the historical record has been better for countries which opted to do so. The example of Vietnam shows how even a sector like textiles can be used to propel industrialisation. That is an example Sri Lanka under Ranasinghe Premadasa followed, at least according to Dr Nicholas, but it is one we have since abandoned, in favour of orthodox prescriptions of fiscal consolidation and untrammelled privatisation.
Sri Lanka needs to consider these options without caving into stopgap measures and orthodox alternatives. How do we do that? As Dayan Jayatilleka suggested some time ago, we should convene an economic roundtable. Such a roundtable will likely prevent economic discussions from becoming a monopoly of elites, thereby helping the government, and the opposition, to align the interests of the economy with the interests of the masses.
This has been a long time coming. Both the government and the opposition have tended to view economic priorities as distinct from other socio-political concerns. Yet the two remain very much interlinked. In that sense, caving into economic orthodoxy while ignoring social reality would be detrimental to the future of the country and the plight of its people. To this end, we need to think of alternatives, and fast. But have we, and are we?
The writer can be reached at email@example.com
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