Features
A neutral foreign policy in current context

By Neville Ladduwahetty
During a recent TV interview, the Host asked the Guest whether Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy is in “shambles”. The reason for the question was perhaps because of the lack of consistency between the statement made by the President and the Secretary to the Foreign Ministry relating to Foreign Policy. For instance, the first clear and unambiguous statement made by the newly elected President during his acceptance speech delivered in Sinhala in the holy city of Anuradhapura in which the only comment in English was that his Foreign Policy would be Neutral. This was followed during his address to Parliament titled: The Policy statement made by Gotabaya Rajapaksa, President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka at the inauguration of the Fourth Session of the 8th Parliament of Sri Lanka on January 3, 2020, in which he stated: “We follow a neutral foreign policy”.
However, the Secretary to the Foreign Ministry has on different occasions stated that Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy is “Neutral and Non-Aligned”. Perhaps, his view may have been influenced by the President’s Manifesto, “Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour”, that stated that out of 10 key policies the second was “Friendly, Non-Aligned, Foreign Policy”
The question that needs to be addressed is whether both Neutrality and Non-Alignment could realistically coexist as policies to guide Sri Lanka in the conduct of its relations with other Nation-States. Since neutrality is a defined policy that has a legal basis and has a history that precedes Non-Alignment, there is a need for the Neutral State to conduct its relations with other States according to recognised codified norms with reciprocity. On the other hand, Non-Alignment was essentially a commitment to a set of principles by a group of countries that had emerged from colonial rule and wanted to protect their newly won independence and sovereignty in the context of a bi-polar world. The policy of Non-Alignment therefore, should apply ONLY to the members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Thus, Non-Alignment, being only a set of principles adopted by a group of like-minded sovereign States to protect and preserve their common self-interests, its conduct in respect of States outside the Non-Aligned Movement becomes unstated and therefore undefined. Neutrality instead is a clear policy that defines how a neutral country such as Sri Lanka conducts its relations with other countries, and how other countries relate with Sri Lanka primarily in respect of the inviolability of its territory.
NON-ALIGNED and the NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT
A statement dated August 22, 2012 by the External Affairs Ministry of the Government of India on the historical evolution of the Non-Alignment Movement states:
“The principles that would govern relations among large and small nations, known as the “Ten Principles of Bandung”, were proclaimed at that Conference (1955). Such principles were adopted later as the main goals and objectives of the policy of non-alignment. The fulfillment of those principles became the essential criterion for Non-Aligned Movement membership; it is what was known as “quintessence of the Movement until early 1990s” (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement, August 22, 2012).
“Thus, the primary objectives of the non-aligned countries focused on the support of self-determination, national independence and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States; opposition to apartheid; non-adherence to multilateral military pacts and the independence of non-aligned countries from great power or block influences and rivalries; the struggle against imperialism in all its forms and manifestations; the struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism, racism, foreign occupation and domination; disarmament; non-interference into the internal affairs of States and peaceful coexistence among all nations; rejection of the use or threat of use of force in international relations; the strengthening of the United Nations; the democratization of international relations; socioeconomic development and the restructuring of the international economic system; as well as international cooperation on an equal footing” (Ibid).
These commitments did not deter countries such as India from violating the very principles India committed to in Bandung. To start with, India undermined the security of Sri Lanka by nurturing and supporting the training of non-state actors in late 1970s. Having made Sri Lanka vulnerable, India proceeded to coerce Sri Lanka to accept the Indo-Lanka Accord under which India was committed to disarm the militants. Having failed much to its shame, India violated the principle of the right of self-determination when it compelled Sri Lanka to devolve power to a merged North-East Province. All these actions amounted to a complete disregard and the mockery of the lofty principles of NAM undertaken to protect India’s self-interest. What is clear from India’s actions with regard to Sri Lanka is that when push comes to shove, self-interest overrides multi-lateral commitments.
In a similar vein Sri Lanka too, driven by self-interest, voted in support of UK’s intervention in the Falklands because of the debt owed by Sri Lanka to the UK for the outright grant given to construct the Victoria Hydro Power Scheme, although conscious of the fact that by doing so Sri Lanka was discrediting itself for not supporting the resolution initiated by NAM to oppose UK’s actions. These instances demonstrate that Non-Alignment as a Foreign Policy is subservient to self-interest thereby underscoring the fact that it cannot be a clear policy to guide how a State conducts itself in relation to other States.
Commenting on the issues of limitations imposed by being a Member of NAM Shelton E. Kodikara states: “For Sri Lanka as indeed for many of the smaller states among the non-aligned community, membership of the Non-Aligned Movement and commitment to its consensual decisions implied a widening of the institutional area of foreign policy decision-making, and collective decision-making also implied a limitation of the area of choice among foreign policy options…” (Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka, 1982, p. 151).
Therefore, arrangements with common interests such as those by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) or Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or any other group of countries with common interests, are mechanisms whose support and solidarity could be sought when needed to advance causes, as for instance when Sri Lanka advanced the concept of making the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace, and later in 2009 did so in Geneva. Notwithstanding such advantages, the hard reality is that Non-Alignment does not represent a clear statement as to how a State conducts its relations with Nation-States outside the Non-Aligned Movement. Therefore, it follows that Non-Alignment cannot be considered a statement of Foreign Policy by a State.
THE CURRENT CONTEXT
The statement by the Foreign Affairs Ministry of India cited above that the “quintessence” of the principles of the Non-Alignment lasted until early 1990s, was because the bi-polar world that was the cause for the formation of NAM had ceased to exist with the territorial break-up of one of the power blocks – the USSR. Consequently, the USSR lost its influence as a global power. In this vacuum what exists currently is one recognized global power with other powers aspiring to be part of a multi polar world. In the absence of recognized power blocks the need to align or not to align does not arise because Nation-States are free to evolve their own arrangements as to how they conduct their relations with each other. Consequently, the concept of Non-Alignment individually or collectively is a matter of choice depending on the particularity of circumstance, but not as a general Foreign Policy to address current challenges.
With China attempting to regain its lost territory and glory as a civilizational State following its century of shame, the geopolitical matrix has changed dramatically. The economic gains of China the likes of which are unprecedented alarmed the Western world to the point that the US deemed it necessary to adopt a policy of Pivot to Asia thereby making the Indian and Pacific Oceans the focus for great power engagement. This shift of focus has caused new strategic security alliances such as the Quad to emerge to contain the growing influence of China among the States in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. With the Maldives joining India as the latest members of Quad, Sri Lanka has become isolated; a development that has brought Sri Lanka’s location in the Indian Ocean into sharp focus as being of pivotal strategic interest to great and emerging powers.
It is in this newly formed geopolitical context that Sri Lanka has to formulate its Foreign Policy that necessarily must be fresh if Sri Lanka is to equip itself to meet the new challenges created by a coalition of States to contain the rise of China. One option is to join the Quad. This could mean Sri Lanka distancing itself from engaging with China. The other option is to engage with China to the exclusion of the Quad. Either of these options would cause Sri Lanka to lose its independence and the freedom to protect its core values and interests. Therefore, the choice is not to settle for either option.
These unprecedented circumstances and challenges cannot be countered by harking back to the glory days of Non-Alignment, because major influences of the movement (NAM) such as India, have recently abandoned the original principles it subscribed to when it became a part of Quad. Therefore, although NAM still represents a body of likeminded interests with the ability to influence causes limited only to resolutions that further the interests of its members, it is not in a position to ensure the inviolability of the territory and the freedom of a State to make its
A neutral
own hard choices. It is only if a Nation-State proclaims that its relations with other Nation-States is Neutral that provisions codified under the Hague Conventions of 1907 that would entitle Sri Lanka to use the inviolability of its territory to underpin its relations with other Nation-States. Therefore, the Foreign Policy statement as made by the President to Parliament should guide Sri Lanka in its relations with States because it is relevant and appropriate in the geopolitical context that currently exists.
CONCLUSION
The Foreign Policy of a State is greatly influenced by its History and Geography. Historically Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy has been one of Non-Alignment. Furthermore, Sri Lanka participated in the Conference in Bandung in 1955; a date recognized as the beginning of the Non-Aligned Movement. Thus, although the geographic location of a State is well defined, the significance of its location could dramatically be transformed by geopolitical developments. The staggering economic revival of China from early seventies under the leadership of President Deng Xiaoping whose philosophy was to hide capacity, bide time and never claim leadership, was perhaps the reason for China’s tremendous transformations both economic and social, to proceed relatively unnoticed.
It was only with the announcement of President Xi Jinping’s policy of the Belt and Road Initiative announced in 2013, that the world came to realize that the power and influence of China was unstoppable. This policy resulted in China establishing its footprint in strategically located countries in the Indian and Pacific Oceans by funding and constructing infrastructure projects. Sri Lanka happened to be one such country. The need for the U.S along with India, Australia and Japan to form a security alliance to contain the growing power and influence of China in the Indian and Pacific Oceans was inevitable.
India’s alliance with the US has shifted the balance in Asia causing China to be the stand alone great power in Asia. As far as Sri Lanka is concerned this new dynamic compels Sri Lanka to make one of four choices. One is to align and develop relations with the US and its allies. Second is to align and develop relations with China. The third is be Non-Aligned with either. The fourth and preferred option is to be Neutral not only with the Quad and China, but also with all other States, and develop friendly relations individually with all States.
The policy of Non-Alignment by a State is an external declaration of intent that a nation would not align itself with either a collective or individual center of power such as the Quad or China, in the conduct of its relations. Neutrality by a State, instead, means not only a statement that it would be Neutral when conducting relations with collective or individual centers of power and other States, but also how such a State expects all States to respect its Neutrality; a policy that would be in keeping with Sri Lanka’s unique strategic location in South Asia. Thus, while the former works outwards the latter works both ways. More importantly, how Neutrality works is governed by internationally codified laws that are in place to guide reciprocal relations.
Features
Coping with Batalanda’s emergence to centre stage

by Jehan Perera
The Batalanda Commission report which goes into details of what happened during the JVP insurrection of 1987-89 has become the centre of public attention. The controversy has long been a point of contention and a reminder of the country’s troubled past and entrenched divisions that still exist. The events that occurred at Batalanda during the violent suppression of the JVP-led insurgency, remain a raw wound, as seen in the sudden resurfacing of the issue. The scars of violence and war still run deep. At a time when the country is grappling with pressing challenges ranging from economic recovery to social stability, there is a need to keep in focus the broader goal of unity for long-term peace and prosperity. But the ghosts of the past need also to be put to rest without continuing to haunt the present and future.
Grisly accounts of what transpired at Batalanda now fill the social media even in the Tamil media, though Tamils were not specifically targeted at that time. There was then a ceasefire between the government and LTTE. The Indo-Lanka Accord had just been signed and the LTTE were fighting the Indian peacekeeping army. The videos that are now circulating on social media would show the Tamil people that they were not the only ones at the receiving end of counter-terrorist measures. The Sinhalese were in danger then, as it was a rebellion of Sinhalese against the state. Sinhalese youth had to be especially careful.
It appears that former president Ranil Wickremesinghe was caught unprepared by the questions from a team from Al Jazeera television. The answers he gave, in which he downplayed the significance of the Batalanda Commission report have been viewed differently, depending on the perspective of the observer. He has also made a statement in which he has rejected the report. The report, which demands introspection, referred to events that had taken place 37 years earlier. But the ghosts of the past have returned. After the issue has come to the fore, there are many relatives and acquaintances of the victims from different backgrounds who are demanding justice and offering to come forward to give evidence of what they had witnessed. They need closure after so many years.
MORE POLARISATION
The public reaction to the airing of the Al Jazeera television programme is a reminder that atrocities that have taken place cannot be easily buried. The government has tabled the Batalanda Commission report in parliament and hold a two-day debate on it. The two days were to be consecutive but now the government has decided to space them out over two months. There is reason to be concerned about what transpires in the debate. The atrocities that took place during the JVP insurrection involved multiple parties. Batalanda was not the only interrogation site or the only torture chamber. There were many others. Former president Ranil Wickremesinghe was not the only prominent protagonist in the events that transpired at that time.
The atrocities of the late 1980s were not confined to one location, nor were they the responsibility of a single individual or group. The JVP engaged in many atrocities and human rights violations. In addition to members of the former government and military who engaged in counter-terrorism operations there were also other groups that engaged both in self-defence and mayhem. These included members of left political parties who were targeted by the JVP and who formed their own para-military groups. Some of the leaders went on to become ministers in succeeding governments and even represented Sri Lanka at international human rights forums. Even members of the present government will not be able to escape the fallout of the debate over the Batalanda Commission report.
If the debate becomes a battleground for assigning blame rather than seeking solutions, it could have far-reaching consequences for Sri Lanka’s social and political stability. Economic recovery, governance reform, and development require stability and cooperation. The present storm caused by the Batalanda Commission report, and the prospects for increased polarisation and hatred do not bode well for the country. Rather than engaging in potentially divisive debates that could lead to further entrenchment of opposing narratives, Sri Lanka would be better served by a structured and impartial approach to truth-seeking and reconciliation.
NATIONAL HEALING
Earlier this month at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, the government rejected the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights assertion that the external evidence gathering unit would continue to collect evidence on human rights violations in Sri Lanka. This evidence gathering unit has a mandate to collect information on a wide range of human rights violations including intimidation and killings of journalists but with a focus on the human rights violations and war crimes during the course of the LTTE war and especially at its end. The government’s position has been that it is determined to deal with human rights challenges including reconciliation through domestic processes.
Addressing the High-Level Segment of the 58th Regular Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva in February this year, Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath said: “The contours of a truth and reconciliation framework, will be further discussed with the broadest possible cross section of stakeholders, before operationalisation to ensure a process that has the trust of all Sri Lankans. Our aim is to make the domestic mechanisms credible and sound within the constitutional framework. This will include strengthening the work towards a truth and reconciliation commission empowered to investigate acts of violence caused by racism and religious extremism that give rise to tensions within Sri Lankan society.”
The concept of a truth and reconciliation commission was first broached in 2015 by then prime minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s government. In 2019 after winning the presidential elections, former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa too saw merit in the idea, but neither of these two leaders had the commitment to ensure that the process was completed. Promoting reconciliation in Sri Lanka among divergent political actors with violent political pasts requires a multi-faceted approach that blends political, social, and psychological strategies.
Given the country’s complex history of armed conflict, ethnic tensions, and political polarisation, the process must be carefully designed to build trust, address grievances, and create a shared vision for the future. A truth and reconciliation process as outlined in Geneva by the government, which has teeth in it for both punishment and amnesty, can give the country the time and space in which to uncover the painful truths and the path to national healing.
Features
Challenging hierarchy? Student grievance mechanisms at state universities

Our universities are characterized by hierarchies. They manifest in formal and informal ways, reinforcing power asymmetries based on class, ethnicity and gender, and placing inordinate authority in those with higher status. In medicine, a ‘hidden curriculum’ orients undergraduates to hierarchies from their early days in training, placing professors over lecturers, ‘clinical’ over ‘non-clinical’ teachers, consultants over medical officers, and so on. While hierarchies are needed at universities (and hospitals) to streamline decision-making, dysfunctional hierarchies create unhealthy learning environments and a culture of fear that discourages students from asking questions and voicing concerns. They also legitimize mistreatment, humiliation, bullying, and other abuses of power. A few months ago, when I invited a medical student to participate in a session on ragging and harassment for incoming students, she asked me (quoted with permission), “What’s the point of doing a programme like that if ragging happens in official level by teachers with everyone knowing, Madam?” Her question led me to explore the avenues available at state universities for undergraduates to counter abuses of power by teachers and university administrations.
What can undergrads do?
The University Grants Commission (UGC) and all state universities have established mechanisms for reporting complaints of ragging and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). The UGC’s online portal entertains complaints on “all forms of ragging; sexual harassment; sexual or gender based violence; threats and intimidation; bullying; and harassment.” Complaint procedures for ragging and SGBV are described in detail on the websites of each university, as well as the websites of some faculties. Students may also take any complaints directly to the Dean, student counsellors, academic advisors/mentors, and teachers. In addition, many faculties have portals to submit online complaints on ragging and harassment, while others rely on informal mechanisms, like complaint boxes, to protect anonymity. While these systems are used by students to some extent, rarely do they function as checks and balances against abuses of power by teachers and others at the pinnacle of the university hierarchy.
Anyone who works at a state university would know that students (and the university community more broadly) have very little confidence in existing complaint and grievance procedures. While the minority of incidents that get reported may make it to the inquiry stage, the complaints are often withdrawn under threat and intimidation from the authorities or simply brushed under the carpet. More recently, certain universities and faculties have worked towards establishing formal student grievance procedures outside the SGBV/ragging reporting systems.
Newer grievance mechanisms
Sabaragamuwa University appears to be the only university with a university-wide policy for grievance redressal. The protocol described in the standard operating procedure (SOP) requires that students submit their complaint in writing to the Dean or Deputy Senior Student Counsellor of the relevant faculty. On receiving a complaint, a Committee will be set up by the Dean/Deputy Senior Student Counsellor to conduct an inquiry. The Committee will comprise five senior staff members, including “two independent members (one representing another department, and one may represent the Gender Equity and Equality Cell of the Faculty where relevant)…” The SOP further states that “any student can oppose to have his/her mentor and/or any faculty member to be in the five-person team handling his/her issue.” However, this information is available only to the discerning student who is able to navigate the university’s complex website, hit the Centre for Quality Assurance tab, view the list of documents and click ‘best practices’.
Several faculties of medicine appear to have introduced grievance mechanisms. The Grievance Committee of the Faculty of Medicine, Colombo, considers complaints regarding “a decision or action that is perceived to adversely affect the grievant in her or his professional academic capacity.” The procedure requires that students submit the grievance in writing to the Dean. The Committee comprises “persons who are not current employees of the Faculty of Medicine” and the complainant may request the presence of a member of the Medical Students’ Welfare Society. The Faculty of Medicine, Ruhuna, implements a grievance policy that is more expansive in scope, covering concerns related to “organizational changes in the teaching and learning environment, decisions by academic staff members affecting individuals or groups of students, changes in the content or structure of academic programmes, changes in the nature and quality of teaching and assessment, supervision of students undertaking research projects, authorship and intellectual property, [and the] quality of student services and access to university facilities and resources.” While the policy notes that incidents related to harassment, discrimination and bullying, come under the jurisdiction of the university’s SGBV policy, it does not entertain complaints about examinations. The medical faculty of the University of Sri Jayewardenepura (SJP), has an online grievance system that investigates complaints related to “any physical, psychological, academic or any other problem related to the University life”. The system commits to maintaining confidentiality, pledging that “information will not be divulged to members outside the Student Grievances Committee without the student’s permission.”
Gaps in existing systems
The university-wide SGBV/ragging reporting system could be used to address harassment and intimidation of all kinds. Sadly, however, undergraduates appear to be unaware of these possibilities or reluctant to use them. It is unclear as to whether the newer grievance mechanisms at universities and faculties have managed to achieve the desired outcome. Are they used by students and do they lead to constructive changes in the learning environment or do they simply exist to tick the check box of quality assurance? None of the websites report on the number of cases investigated or the kinds of redressal measures taken. If these mechanisms are to be used by students, they must fulfill certain basic requirements.
First and foremost, all students and staff must be made aware of existing grievance mechanisms. Policies and procedures cannot simply be included under a tab buried in the faculty/university website, but need to be placed front and centre. Students should know what steps the institution will take to ensure confidentiality and how those who come forward, including witnesses, will be protected. They should be confident that swift action will be taken when any breaches of confidentiality occur. Inquiries need to be conducted without delay and complainants kept informed of the actions taken. All in all, universities and/or faculties must commit to ensuring integrity and fairness in the grievance process.
Second, the independence of inquiries must be guaranteed. Some universities/faculties have SOPs that require the inclusion of ‘independent’ members in grievance committees—members who are currently non-faculty, academics from other faculties and/or student representatives. Whether the inclusion of non-faculty members would be sufficient to safeguard independence is questionable in fields like medicine where there is a tendency to cover up professional misconduct at all levels. Permitting complainants to have a say in the makeup of the inquiry committee may help to increase confidence in the system. It may be advisable for inquiries to be handled by ombudspersons or others who do not have a stake in the outcome, rather than by academic staff who are part of the university hierarchy.
Third, grievance mechanisms must address the very real possibility of retaliation from university administrations and teachers. The TOR of the Faculty of Medicine, University of Ruhuna, states that the Committee must ensure “students do not suffer any victimization or discrimination as a result of raising complaints or grievances,” but provides no guidance on how this might be accomplished. Any grievance mechanism must address what recourse to action complainants (and witnesses) have in the event of retaliation. At present, there are no regulations in place to ensure that persons alleged of misconduct are not involved in examination procedures. Neither do universities provide any guarantee that complainants’ academic/employment prospects will not be compromised by coming forward. This is especially concerning in medicine where practical assessments of clinical skills and interview-based examinations (viva) are common, and those at higher rank are usually trainers at the postgraduate level.
Going forward
Student grievance mechanisms provide a structured process for students to voice concerns and seek redress when they feel they have been treated unfairly or unjustly by university staff or policies. The mechanisms currently in place at state universities appear to be weak and insufficient. The UGC could call for universities to participate in a consultative process aimed at developing a policy on handling student grievances in ways that promote fairness in academic matters, faculty conduct, and administration at state universities. While such a policy could foster supportive learning environments, build trust between university administrations and students, and protect students from bullying, intimidation and harassment, it must be accompanied by efforts to address and undo dysfunctional hierarchies within our universities.
(Ramya Kumar is attached to the Department of Community and Family Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Jaffna.)
Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
By Ramya Kumar
Features
Big scene for Suzi… at oktoberfest

The months literally keep flying and, before long, we will be celebrating Oktoberfest.
In our scene, Oktoberfest is looked forward to by many and the five-star venues, especially, create the ideal kind of atmosphere for the celebration of this event, held in late September and early October.
Suzi Croner, who was in town last month (February), is already contracted to do the Oktoberfest scene at a popular five-star venue, in the city.
She says she will be performing six consecutive nights, from 23rd to 28th September, along with a band from Germany.

Suzi’s scene in Switzerland
According to Suzi, the organisers have indicated that they are looking forward to welcoming around 1,500 Oktoberfest enthusiasts on all six days the festivities are held.
“I’m really looking forward to doing the needful, especially with a German band, and I know, for sure, it’s going to be awesome.”
In fact, Suzi, of the band Friends’ fame, and now based in Switzerland, indicated that she never expected to come to her land of birth for the second time, this year.
“After my trip to Sri Lanka, in February, I thought I would check things out again next year, but I’m so happy that I don’t have to wait that long to see my fans, music lovers and friends for the second time, in 2025.”
Suzi spent 11 amazing days in Sri Lanka, in February, performing six nights at a five-star venue in Colombo, in addition to doing the ‘Country & Western Nite’ scene, at the Ramada, and an unscheduled performance, as well.

Suzi Croner: Colombo here I come…in September
Her next much-looked-forward to event is ‘Country Night,’ Down Under.
It will be her second appearance at this ‘Country Night’ dance and music lovers, in Melbourne, in particular, are waiting eagerly to give Suzi a rousing welcome.
Suzi’s bubbly personality has made her a hit wherever she performs.
In her hometown of Spreitenbach, in Switzerland, she is a big draw-card at many local events.
Suzi was the frontline vocalist for the group Friends, decades ago, and this outfit, too, had a huge following in the local scene, with a fan club that had over 1,500 members.
The band was based abroad and travelled to Sri Lanka, during the festive season, to keep their fans entertained, and it was, invariably, a full house for all their performances in the scene here.
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